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​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ :This week in our departmental seminar

Shiran Rachmilevitch (University of Haifa)

​​Title: Auctions with a multi-member bidder

​I consider an auction in which one bidder is a multi-member team, consisting of ex ante symmetric individuals for whom the auctioned good is a public good: if the team wins it, they all enjoy it. The team members need to agree on a bid, and on splitting the payment to the auctioneer if they win. They take these decisions through a mechanism, to which they send reports. If the auction format is second-price, then for a large class of mechanisms the game has a symmetric equilibrium. Under the first-price format, the game generally has no symmetric equilibrium.

​​​Our departmental seminars take place every Thursday at 11:15-12:30 in seminar room 465 (unless ​​otherwise specified)

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