10:00-11:00, חדר עסקאות, 003
המחלקה לניהול בפקולטה לניהול ע"ש גילפורד גלייזר
מזמינה אתכם ל- JOB TALK עם המרצה:
Dikla Perez
TAU
Consistency in Identity Related Sequential Decisio
Consumers often make sequential consumption decisions such as when shopping in a mall or choosing dishes in a restaurant. In addition, many of these decisions are based on the identity consumers wish to express and communicate to others – often either personal or social identity. The current research introduces product visibility as a central factor that influences whether consumers express a consistent identity along this sequence of decisions or choose to express different types of identities (i.e., being less consistent). A set of experiments in the field and in the lab, coupled with an internal meta-analysis show that when the product involved in the first decision in the sequence is of high (as opposed to low) visibility, the consumer is more likely to self-monitor her behavior and consequently to engage in consistent behavior—i.e., a first decision that expresses one’s social (personal) identity will be followed by a second decision that expresses one’s social (personal) identity.
12:45-13:45, חדר עסקאות, 003
המחלקה לניהול והמחלקה למנהל עסקים בפקולטה לניהול ע"ש גילפורד גלייזר מזמינות אתכם ל- JOB TALK עם המרצה:
חגית פרי
אוניברסיטת ברקלי
This paper develops an empirical model that examines the problem of finding the optimal long-term pricing strategies in competition, when consumers gain information through trying products, but gradually may eventually forget the information acquired. We observe cyclic sales in many markets, where brands in the market reduce their prices for a short period of time and then return the prices to the previous levels in a cyclic manner. This market behavior has been attributed in some cases to the dynamics of trying and forgetting by consumers, and these have been studied both theoretically and empirically. However, the complete system that connects demand to the equilibrium market behavior was only been examined theoretically for both monopoly and duopoly market structures thus far. This paper builds an empirical model that includes both the demand and supply sides. It estimates a discrete choice based demand system that include heterogeneous effects. Then, the demand estimates are taken to the supply side, where the outcome of a dynamic game is simulated. Using a unique data set and market setting allows the identification of the trying and forgetting effects and the results of the estimation are consistent with these effects being present in the market. The equilibrium pricing policies give the sales schedules and lengths, and also provide the optimal pricing in equilibrium for each brand, for each time period along the dynamic game. Having the complete pricing menus allows us to empirically estimate and show the large impact that including these dynamics can have on market shares and especially on entrants' market shares. In fact, in the example case presented in the paper, the market share of the entrant almost doubled if it had used the optimal pricing policy, which involves sales every few weeks.
