Adam Raz

 

The article deals with the days before Yom Kippur War and is divided into two parts. The first part addresses three questions: whether and when “special methods” were implemented – dubbed “the national insurance policy of Israel” – to produce intelligence? Is Eli Zeira, the head of Military Intelligence, deliberately misled his superiors, Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (among others) when he gave them to understand that the “methods” were working? What were the chances that the “methods” will give the warning that could have prevented the surprise? The author refers to all the evidence found in literature, open archive, and to the historiographical debate that has developed around the issue and determine that the “methods” were close and Zeira indeed misled his superiors when he gave them to think otherwise (that the “methods” not provide any indication that Egyptians face war). The author argues that the category “conception” used for 40 years to explain the reasons for the failure of intelligence is irrelevant and not convincing as explanation to Zeira action.

 

The second part of the article attempts to answer the question why the methods were not use and why Zeira misled his superiors when he gave them to understand that the measures are activated. The author doubts the claim that Dayan did not know that the methods were not active. The author argue that Zeira actually served Dayan political line – a Policy that was controversial among the political leadership. The author claims that Dayan knew – despite what it says in the literature – the “methods” weren’t activated, because he was interested the war will begin in a situation where Egypt and Syria attack Israel first and the last is required to stop and stabilize a new defensive line as a new political and military reality that severe the status quo. The realization of Dayan “defensive” policy didn’t require accurate information about the opening hour of fighting. Dayan argues that regular forces can stand alone for the first days of fighting.

 

The author shows the historical roots of Dayan policy and is opposition to use the territory occupied in 1967 as item for negotiation. Against Dayan were Golda and Dado. The Last opposed Dayan’s stagnation strategy and sought that the war will be used to achieve strategic target as a lever to achieve peace agreements. They opposed the Israeli withdrawal in the first days of the war, as Dayan recommended, and sought that the Egyptian army will be defeated in the war. This is why the information the “methods” could provide were denied from them.