Divided Fronts – The “Strange” Anatomy of Rabin’s Oslo Decision
Abstract
The article discusses the reason behind Yitzhak Rabin’s decision to pursue the Oslo talks that led to the signing of the Oslo Accords. The author takes issue with the common interpretation that after soberly
considering the situation Rabin abandoned his illusion over the Washington Talks (which continued in the wake of the Madrid Peace Conference). The author argues that Rabin opposed the Oslo talks for
strategic reasons: he objected to the negotiations being conducted by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres with the PLO leadership in Tunis (the “Overseas PLO”) that represented Arafat and the militant approach toward a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite Peres’ diplomatic efforts, Rabin regarded the local Palestinian leadership (the “Home PLO”), that represented the constructive approach to resolving the conflict, as the sole partner capable of and interested in achieving an abiding peace.
The article contends that the Peres faction, which held a dominant position in the Labor Party, obstructed Rabin’s policy and contended against it in the party, government and media. Peres, in conjunction with Arafat, stymied the Washington Talks in order to check the influence of the constructive elements in the PLO. Rabin was in danger of having the rug swept from under him as party leader and being robbed of any possibility of determining or even influencing policy. The article concludes that Rabin’s decision was a compromise between two conflicting policies within the government rather than a change in his strategic outlook.
