Gated/gating community: the settlement complex in the West Bank

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The claim that the settlements in the West Bank are gated communities might seem trivial. Those settlements are an explicit example of a community featuring, on the one hand, social cohesion based on shared values, while, on the other hand, self-isolation with the help of fences and a stress on the 'security of the community'. The argument of this paper, however, is different. The paper suggests that the settlement layout in the West Bank is not just an aggregate of 124 'legal' gated communities and a similar number of 'illegal outposts', but rather a single, contiguous gated community gating, in turn, Palestinian 'islands' within it. The reading I will offer seeks to look at the space in question through a careful reading of its use values. The emphasis is put on the question of mobilities in order to show how the fortressed points turn into an exclusionary web by means of separated roads and movement restrictions. By analysing the combined system of settlements, roads, military legislation, spatial design and applied violence, the paper shows how the few hundred points consolidate into one coherent spatial system. The paper wishes to contribute to the spatial analysis of the now 45-year-old Israeli occupation of the West Bank, to the growing study of politics of mobility and to the discourse of gated communities by adding colonialism and violence to the mostly neoliberal explanations of the phenomenon.

Key words gated communities; Occupied Palestinian Territories; settlements; roads; mobilities

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Introduction

The claim that the settlements in the West Bank are gated communities might seem trivial. Whether looking at the 'security' or at the 'socio-cultural' definitions of gated communities as they appear in the geographic and sociological literature, it is difficult to think of a more explicit example of a community featuring social cohesion based on shared values on the one hand, and self-isolation with the help of fences and a stress on the 'security of the community' on the other. From the very beginning of the settlement project, a clear separation has been maintained between the Jewish settlers and their Palestinian neighbours, a separation that has only deepened as years have gone by. Following various stabbings and shootings of settlers by Palestinians within the premises of the settlements themselves, the latter have increasingly shut themselves off from the Palestinians. From 1996 onward, Palestinians have been prohibited from entering settlement premises for any purpose other than work, and workers have been subjected to tight surveillance. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, security procedures have been further tightened and the fences significantly reinforced. At the same time,

the internal sense of community and the demarcation from the outside have intensified. The creation of a spatial and conceptual dichotomy between 'us' and 'them', between 'here' and 'there', has thus been completed.

The argument of this paper, however, will be different. What the paper shows is that the settlement layout in the West Bank is not just an aggregate of 124 'legal' gated communities and a similar number of 'illegal outposts',[1] but rather a single, contiguous gated community gating, in turn, Palestinian 'islands' within it. This assertion might sound puzzling: the sum total of built-up areas in the settlements amounts to less than 2 per cent of the West Bank's territory; the settlers' number (including East Jerusalem) amount to less than 15 per cent of the West Bank's population; and the total area occupied directly by the settlement complex (that is, the area falling within their municipal jurisdiction) amounts to circa 42 per cent of the West Bank's territory (B'tselem 2002a). These figures seem to make it difficult to claim that the settlements constitute a single, contiguous, gated and gating community.

The paper proposes to look at the space in question through a careful reading of its *use values*. That is to

say, in contrast to the dichotomous maps presenting the Israeli and Palestinian areas in different colours, I will ask what usages of the space are available to each of the two parties: Who is allowed to move, in what ways, where from and where to? To whom does the public space belong? For whom is the space contiguous and for whom is it segmented? Thus I will show how the settlements have been constantly expanding their (physical or virtual)[2] fences in the direction of the Palestinian space with the aim of creating a contiguous Jewish space, whereas the Palestinian communities have become isolated islands at the heart of the settlements' contiguous 'security envelope'. The outcome of this process, I will argue, is a contiguous, rapid, tightly knit Jewish space and a fragmented, slow, uncertain Palestinian space gated in by its Jewish counterpart.

The study draws upon a large corpus of data gathered in the Occupied Territories by academic scholars, NGO reports and newspaper articles. However, this is not an empirical paper, but a conceptual study that tries to analyse the spatial significance of the existing knowledge in order to describe the gated/gating community in the West Bank. It will concentrate on the deep logic of the spatial design and function during the occupation years in order to show how the situation of rapid and fluid Jewish movement versus slow and blocked Palestinian movement has developed. The phenomenon described reached its peak during the second Intifada (2000–2007), when hundreds of checkpoints blocked Palestinian movement and disrupted everyday life (Bishara 2006; B'tselem 2007; Handel 2009; Makdisi 2008;). Yet this qualification should be qualified too. Although many of the checkpoints are now open and movement is relatively free throughout most of the West Bank, the logic of spatial design remains, and the potential for closure is always there. The gates are in place and the whole array of blockages can be redeployed in hours. Hence the description offered here is not historical but is rather a study of an existing case, always on the verge of deterioration.

The paper comprises several sections. It begins with a theoretical introduction discussing various types of thoroughfares and their impact on the space they traverse. The second section will present the phenomenon of gated communities in several cities around the world against the theoretical backdrop provided in the preceding section. The third section will demonstrate how the space of the West Bank has become a space of clear differences between the two population groups, Israelis and Palestinians, due to the production of the gated/gating community.

The use of the concept of gated communities in the analysis of Israel's spatial expansion in the Occupied Territories is not intended to replace colonial or military perspectives. Rather, it is a complementary perspective aimed at helping to explain how – despite its clear spatial and demographic inferiority – Israel and the Jewish settlers dominate the West Bank. The discussion of gated communities in this paper also seeks to expand the gated communities discourse by adding colonialism and explicit violence to the equation.

Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is usually thought of in terms of colonialism (Gregory 2005; Hass 2004; Reuveny 2003), apartheid (Bakan and Abu-Laban 2010; Dayan 2009; Zreik 2004), 'creeping apartheid' (Yiftachel 2009) or ethnocracy (Yiftachel 2006; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004).[3] Ann Stoler (2006) reminds us that there are so many types of colonialism that it has become difficult to define what colonialism is. This paper will attempt to describe a specific type of colonialism, separation and population management. The macro-level of analysis is by no means abandoned, but rather refined and fine-tuned through careful examination and analysis of the micro-level. In other words, the colonial frame might not in itself be sufficient for a full analysis and understanding of the phenomenon. This is not to say that the Occupied Territories case is *sui generis* – not at all – but detailed cases should be compared in order to extract the relevant categories, rather than to ask whether a case falls into a ready-made category that always has its excesses.

Thus the prism of gated communities employed in this paper is not meant to serve as yet another 'ism' such as 'gatism' or the like as a new catch-all phrase that has some inherent and comprehensive explanatory power. Rather, the notion of 'gated community' is helpful in clarifying how the categories of colonialism or apartheid incarnate in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It helps to understand the ways in which the spatial control of the Territories through means of openness and closure, control over the entrances and exits, and management of the movement of people and goods (cf. Foucault 1977; Sack 1986) is achieved and maintained.

This paper focuses on the question of territorialisation by means of movement control, emphasising the role of the speed of movement and of infrastructures. The comparison to gated communities suggests an innovative mode of structural analysis and spatial understanding of the Jewish colonisation process in the West Bank. The paper wishes thereby to contribute to three fields of knowledge: the study of Israel's occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the growing discourse on the politics of mobility (cf. Cresswell 2010; Urry 2007) and the study of gated communities. With respect to the latter, my contribution consists primarily in supplementing the usual economic and cultural points of view with an emphasis on the role of violence, colonialism and human movement in space and time. The study concentrates

on a mostly non-urban occupied area and highlights questions related to roads and networks.

Roads: political economy in four dimensions

Roads are usually regarded as movement and acceleration tracks connecting places to one another and compressing distances (as measured in terms of use value) between various points. But there are different kinds of thoroughfares and different ways in which they influence the space in which they reside.

The political economy of roads should be studied in four dimensions: (1) longitudinal acceleration of privileged populations between privileged points; (2) widthwise deceleration as a result of the spatial block created by wide or fenced roads; (3) vertical separation between different movement plateaus prioritising one population's speed, usually at the expense of the other's; and (4) time–space communities, which are created by the roads' networks, and are the focus of the current paper.

In von Thünen's (1826) well-known *The isolated state* there is a hypothetical model of an isolated city situated at the heart of a uniform and fertile plain extending to infinity. Around such a city, concentric belts of various land uses would form, in a configuration reflecting the respective amount of labour required and transportation costs. When a canal is dug across the plain, von Thünen claims, the belts would extend themselves alongside the canal, due to the accelerated speed of movement, which leads in turn to diminishing transportation expenses (of workers from the city or of products to the market). The space thus becomes more 'condensed' and distances become shorter; in other words, an alteration occurs in the relation between the absolute value (distance in metres) and the use value of the space.

The example of the canal, however, is idiosyncratic and not similar to other rapid transportation routes. The canal's relative advantage is clear: it is accessible to all those who live alongside it, and no more than a simple boat is needed in order to reduce the distance from the city. Such is also the case with pathways or with regular roads. Highways and railroads, by contrast, are not so freely and immediately accessible, thereby leading to a significant spatial distortion. Slums tend to develop alongside highways exiting the big city, yet without improving the mobility of their residents. Nor do trains stop just anywhere; they only stop at predetermined stations, and whoever lives in-between stations remains transparent to the passing trains. Put simply, the laying of a railroad or the construction of an inaccessible highway creates privileged points at the expense of the overall space, thereby producing two distinct spaces: one for those who can afford a ticket (or who live next to a station) and one for those left behind.

So far we have been dealing with the longitudinal dimension, that is, with the road as an acceleration track (even if a selective one) between different points in space. But roads also have a breadth dimension: the possibility of crossing the transportation route must also be examined. Crossing a railroad is relatively easy. The case is different with a multilane highway, or when the rail/road is fenced or blocked. In such cases, the connecting thoroughfares become separating ones, parcelling out the space into subcells. The thoroughfares connecting those with economic means (who are thereby capable of purchasing a ticket or holding a car), or those belonging to the 'right' nationality or race, are the very same thoroughfares that block the rest and restrict their movement. The more rapid and technologically advanced the movement, the more it brings the privileged points closer to each other, the less it is accessible to a greater number of human beings.

To explain the way in which thoroughfares can parcel out a space, consider the following historical example. In his book on the history of barbed wire, Reviel Netz (2004) describes the way in which the latter has served the occupation of space. When the wire was invented in the 1870s, it was designed for cordoning cattle herds and restricting their movement. The first time barbed wire was used overtly for controlling human beings and for deciding a war over space was in the Boer War (1899–1902). In this war, Britain set out to defend its interests in South Africa, above all the gold mines that were just being discovered during those years. Although the first battles against the Dutch settlers were quickly decided in favour of Britain, the Boers subsequently started organising themselves in commando units comprising horse-mounted riflemen who attacked the British garrison force and blew up the railroads used as a major platform for transporting merchandise and military forces.

In their attempt to protect the railroads, the British turned to a method commonly used at the time to protect railways from wandering animals: barbed wire. Thick barbed-wire fences were put up alongside the railways that, as in any other place under British control, traversed many other places. The stretches of barbed-wire fences were punctuated by the British with small guard posts about a kilometre apart. This method proved successful beyond all expectations: the new technology created spatial enclaves that made it possible to control extensive territory with a relatively small military force. A handful of soldiers could from now on keep at bay and push back a fairly large commando unit.

Netz (2004) demonstrates how the railroad network became an instrument of spatial control using lines

connecting various points (i.e. train stations). Once the railway network had been fortified with barbed-wire fences, a 'topological inversion' took place: the lines *connecting* the stations became separation lines *disconnecting* one plain from another. The South-African savannah was split up into relatively small parcels of land surrounded on all sides by barbed wire. Thus, once the isolated points had been connected with defensible lines, control over these points amounted to control over the entire space.

In other words, routes traversing a plain are not neutral lines, as they might appear in the conventional way of mapping according to absolute values. Rather, thoroughfares transform and distort the space. They bring certain points closer to each other while setting others further apart. In the case just described, two distinct spaces were created: a cohesive, connected British supra-space, its points close to each other, and a disjointed, parcelled-out South-African infra-space, its points distant from each other. To be sure, these spaces do sit one on top of the other – and in the conventional mapping based on absolute values it is indeed difficult to tease them apart – but when use values are brought into play, two strictly separate spaces are revealed.

To this, we should add the vertical separation. According to Michael Sorkin, there is a constant desire to

increase speed (and save time) by prioritizing the faster means of movement … Typically, this means slower vehicles yield to faster ones and pedestrians to all, walkers deferring to cars, cars to trains, trains to planes and so on. Modern city planning is structured around an armature of such conflict avoidance. (Quoted in Diken and Lausten 2005, 66–7)

This 'conflict avoidance', which means making the fast ones faster while still allowing the slower to move (in cases that are not as extreme as that described above by Netz), leads to a growing tendency towards separation of the movement into different layers, where interchanges substitute junctions. This is actually the passage from the two-dimensional description of the longitudinal acceleration and the widthwise deceleration towards the three-dimensional roads' system.[4]

It is the vertical separation that makes smooth travel across space possible, and the 'conflict avoidance' is what creates separate time–space communities, to which the rest of the paper is devoted. It may be argued that in the supra-space system, the separation between the points and the lines is artificial and superfluous. Fiona Wilson suggests that 'instead of envisioning roads as neutral lines going from point A to point B, they should be visualized as stretched-out places' (2004, 529). This claim is very plausible. It is impossible to make sense of the suburb without the road through which it is accessed, and which constitutes a condition for its very possibility; it is impossible to

make sense of the factory or the mine without the railroad that reaches all the way to the port; and so on. This state of affairs is even more evident when use of the rail/road is available exclusively to one population group. In early 20th-century South Africa, the railroads did not merely connect British places, but were part of the very spatial apparatus and rationality that made those places possible. The railroads themselves were, in fact, British *places*. A similar dynamic takes place, as I will show below, in several gated communities around the world, and may also be discerned very clearly in the spatial layout of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

Gated communities: points, lines and networks

The phenomenon of gated communities is on the rise all over the globe and can be found in the USA, Canada, the UK, East Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and more (see overview and references in Grant and Mittelsteadt 2004; Rosen and Razin 2008). In Israel the topic is studied mainly in Gillad Rosen's works (Grant and Rosen 2009; Rosen and Grant 2011; Rosen and Razin 2008 2009), in Haim Yacobi (2012), and in a quite recent edited volume of essays (Lehavi 2010). While some put the emphasis on the physical gates or on the limitation of access and closure of roads (cf. Blakely and Snyder 1997; Caldeira 2000; Grant and Mittelsteadt 2004; Landman 2006; Marcuse 1997a 1997b), others emphasise the homogeneity of residents and the shared values or goods of the community (Grant and Rosen 2009; Rosen and Grant 2011; Rosen and Razin 2008).

Gated communities differ on several factors of enclosure, security features, amenities, type of residents, tenure, location, size and policy context (Grant and Mittlesteadt 2004). They tend to turn their backs on the city and aspire to create an autarkic community that has no need for the outside world.[5] In Jakarta, for example, there are gated communities boasting hospitals, shopping centres, sports centres and a university; and in Beijing there are communities operating their own electricity and water networks, independently of the municipal infrastructure. Yet not all communities are capable of achieving this goal of self-segregation to such an extent. The hindering constraint is usually economic, having to do mainly with the population size and the 'entry threshold' beyond which it would be economically profitable to introduce a given product into a certain area: 'the more self-contained a community is, the less frequently inhabitants need to venture outside' (Grant and Mittelsteadt 2004, 923).

In large and economically powerful gated communities, many products cross the entry threshold, going

as far as the establishment of hospitals and universities. And what happens when the communities are small and scattered? In such cases only the residential area is closed and secured, whereas every outing for shopping or for work involves exiting the compound to the 'hostile areas' of the city. There are various ways of addressing the problem of transition between secure compounds. One example comes from the city of Sao Paulo, Brazil, where 'helicopter taxis are fast becoming one of the most popular means of getting around Brazil's most populous city' (Diken and Lausten 2005, 94). The well-off residents of Sao Paulo move among the various gated communities, or between them and secure work and shopping centres, in complete detachment from the city, high above it. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a mode of transit that is more detached from the city below. Yet this mode of transit, precisely due to the extremity of its detachment, has no impact on the traffic in the city itself. In the terminology articulated earlier about thoroughfares and their impact, this mode of transit greatly diminishes the distance between points in the longitudinal dimension, but has no simultaneous impact on other dimensions.

A different example is that of Managua, Nicaragua. In Managua, as described by Dennis Rodgers, there is a growth – for various geographical reasons that are not pertinent to our discussion – of relatively small gated communities dispersed over numerous places across the city. These communities are not large enough to be autarkic, and their economic status is not sufficiently established to enable the renting of helicopters. The solution found with the massive support of the municipality and the government was the construction of a highway network linking the various communities, such that in effect a single, city-wide system was created. According to Rodgers,

> it is the interconnection of these privately protected spaces that constitutes them as a viable 'system', and it can be contended that the most critical element that has permitted the emergence of this 'fortified network' has been the development of a strategic set of well-maintained, well-lit, and fast-moving roads. (2004, 120–1)

In other words – and especially if we keep in mind Wilson's suggestion to see roads as 'stretched-out *places*' (Wilson 2004, 529) – the spatial dispersal of Managua's gated communities may be viewed, not just as a 'system of connected communities', but really as one single space–time community. The thoroughfares, just like the gated communities themselves, belong to one population stratum only. These are multilane, gated highways, in which intersections are replaced by interchanges (making an effective vertical separation). However, the highways are not linked to the slower roads (leading to and from the poorer or pre-Sandinista areas).

In this way, gated communities completely alter the physical space. They split the city into two layers, one connected and the other fragmented; one in movement and the other frozen. The highways that traverse the city to connect the gated communities to each other are extremely hazardous and exact a heavy toll of victims (Davis 2006, 132). Thus, even though an official prohibition against crossing them does not necessarily exist, these roads have created highly efficient demarcation lines (resembling Netz's 'topological inversion'). The gated communities are close to each other, constituting in effect a single, contiguous complex, whereas the rest of the city undergoes fragmentation. With the help of rapid roads that are dangerous to cross, a relatively uniform, contiguous and organic space has become fragmented just by dint of the possibilities of movement within it. Put differently, there is no single, clear, contiguous borderline separating 'here' from 'there', but a series of various kinds of demarcation lines that fundamentally alter the space.

This state of affairs is often found in the inner cities as well, in cases where residents obtain municipal approval to demarcate, gate and restrict entry to previously open areas (cf. Berner 1997; Jurgens and Gnad 2002; Landman 2003 2006). I underscore this aspect of gated communities in inner cities in order to point to the way in which an existing space is altered. That is, unlike communities located at the outskirts of town – and therefore pre-planned as separate – the communities within the cities close off a part of the city that used to be contiguous, and impose a different regime of movement in a space that previously had no restrictions.

This model makes it possible to identify the transformation of space from egalitarian and public to inegalitarian, private and exclusive through diverse methods of acceleration and deceleration. The model shows how the modes of transit and the fences enhance the contiguity and stability of the space of one (minority) group at the expense of the other (majority) group; or in other words, how self-segregation, which produces a single, autarkic and stable place for the minority, at the same time fragments the space of the majority to numerous small places that are not self-sustainable.

The settlement complex in the West Bank as a gated/gating community

In their account of the evolution and development of enclosed residential neighbourhoods in Israel, Gillad Rosen and Eran Razin distinguish between three types of enclaves: landscapes of heritage (ultra-orthodox Jewish cities, inner division of a Bedouin city), fortress landscapes (frontier settlements in Israel and in the Occupied Territories) and fortified and privatised

neighbourhoods (new urban gated communities). Rosen and Razin explain that the fortification of rural settlements in frontier areas was a common feature and symbol throughout most of the 20th century (see also Carmon 1994; Falah 1996; Tzfadia and Yacobi 2011). The West Bank settlements are therefore direct descendants of this type of gating (see Rotbard 2002), while displaying even more intensely the features of fortification and fencing, as will be discussed below.

Fortified settlements, gates and enclaves are hardly a new phenomenon, of course (Marcuse 1997a; Wu 2005). They differ widely in the reasons for enclosure (fear, ethnicity, race, class, shared values, etc.); the specific features of the closure (What type of gates? Are they open or closed? During daytime or night-time? Are there walls? Are there armed guards? What happens to an intruder? etc.); the relations between the gated entity and its neighbouring area (Work relations, shopping and shared facilities? Relations marked by fear and mutual suspicion?); and the policy context (Do the state or municipal authorities encourage or discourage the gating? Do they supply resources and state power in favour of the gated?).

My examination of the gating phenomenon in the West Bank deals with those categories: the reasons for enclosure, the closure's characteristics, the relations with the neighbouring area and the policy context. Regarding the reasons for enclosure, the settlements in the West Bank were part of a network since their very inception, both in their positive features of shared ethnicity and values and in their exclusionary character with respect to the Palestinian population. Also, Israel's purpose was to seize as much land as possible, therefore planning the settlements' form and dispersion as part of a wide network (Eldar and Zertal 2007; Weizman 2007). As for the closure's characteristics, the settlements' closure was achieved for many years without walls and gates. Until the first Intifada (1987) those were hardly needed, and they definitely did not justify their high costs. But even later, as the settlements were becoming increasingly dangerous places, most of the settlements refused gating as the settlers knew that fences and gates would limit their expansion and make them feel closed and ghettoised (Eldar and Zertal 2007; Handel 2009). In fact, the Jewish settlements started gating themselves only after they had turned into a single, fortified net cast wide enough as to constitute not a gated but a gating community. Finally, the settlements' relations with the surrounding area had always been exclusionary, but they gradually came to encompass more and more domains: from separate settlements to separate road network. The ethnic feature effected a clear-cut separation between the populations, their villages and later their cars.[6]

Since its occupation in 1967, Israel constructed over 250 'legal' and 'half-legal' settlements (built as 'neigh-

bourhoods' of existing settlements, although located several kilometres away) as well as 'illegal' outposts in the West Bank.[7] Israeli geographer Elisha Efrat (2006) claims that the settlements have failed because they have been unsuccessful in creating a critical demographic mass, and that their geographical dispersion has weakened them and proved counter-productive. His approach, deriving from the classical planning-geographical position, misses the complexity of the spatial expansion process described here. To be sure, the number of settlers today amounts only to 15 per cent of the entire population of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and the built-up area of the settlements encompasses less than 2 per cent of the West Bank's territory (B'tselem 2002a). Judging by traditional indices, the settlers are indeed at a clear nominal inferiority. But these indices overlook the most important factors in the organisation of space and its usage: the settlements' location, their form and trajectory of development, the roads connecting them to each other, and the military practices employed to protect the settlements and the roads. It is precisely these variables that adumbrate the true scale of Israel's seizure of control over the West Bank. These are the most significant factors for making sense of the points' dispersion and of their connection by secured lines – roads functioning simultaneously as acceleration tracks and as separation lines.

The settlements have been dispersed over the area by calculated design. The settlers have well understood that 'our hold over a stretch of land does not depend on the size of the population inhabiting it, but also on the size of the area on which this population leaves its imprint' (Gush Emunim 1980, 15). The map of the settlements, based on the settlers' plans and backed by the state's apparatuses and its military power, shows how the latter have fanned out over the entire space – often deliberately at the heart of Palestinian population concentrations (Figure 1). Many of the settlements have been established very close to Palestinian habitations, in a way that prevents the latter's development. In some of the cases, a settlement would be established precisely in an area that constitutes the natural destination (for topographical reasons) for the future expansion of the Palestinian habitation (B'tselem 2002a).

Most of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank are very small. Forty per cent of them are inhabited by fewer than 500 people; 20 per cent are inhabited by 500–1000 residents; another 18 per cent are the home of 1000–2000 people; 14 per cent have a population of 2000–5000; and only 8 per cent have a population higher than 5000 people. As for the outposts, only 7 per cent of them have more than 100 inhabitants, and the biggest outpost inhabits 750 residents.[8] This population distribution means that most of the settlements are not

Figure 1   Map of the settlements in the West Bank, November 2013
Source: Peace Now

self-sufficient, autarkic entities and that safe movement between them is crucial.

Establishing a chain of small settlements situated at strategic distances from each other – sufficiently close to enable connection on the one hand, but sufficiently far apart to enable efficient dispersion on the other – is an efficient way of seizing large areas in a short time and with relatively few resources. This advantage comes at the price of lack of available services (schools, clinics, shopping centres and so on) and a diminished sense of security. Yet it is precisely for this reason that roads, throughways and lines of communication become doubly important, and their expansion and fortification are meant ultimately to turn all these settlement points

into cohesive blocks that add up to real territorial contiguity. In any case, the emphasis in the planning is not necessarily on the physical distance between the points, but mainly on the symbolic distance and on the sense of security of those using the space.

Every settlement established in the Occupied Territories has carried a road in its train, even when it meant breaking new paths through difficult, rocky and extremely steep terrain. Ten kilometres of roads were required in order to connect the settlements of Kadim and Ganim (300 inhabitants) to the Jenin bypass road; a 14-kilometre road has been paved for 300 people living in the settlement of Shim'a; and over 30 kilometres of road have been paved between Tkoa and the Dead Sea in order to connect roughly 550 settlers living in Ma'ale Amos and Mitzpe Shalem (Efrat 2006, 84). In the same way, every outpost also gets a paved road connecting it to the main road.

Over the years, hundreds of kilometres of bypass roads have been constructed, especially since the Israeli military's withdrawal from the Palestinian cities in the mid-1990s and the partition of the West Bank into Areas A, B and C. These roads bypassed the Palestinian cities and villages and connected the settlements to each other and to Israel west of the Green Line (the armistice line that marked the border between Israel and its neighbouring countries in 1949); but until the mid 1990s they also served Palestinians driving within the West Bank and commuters working in Israel. While the roads did serve as an effective barrier against the development of Palestinian villages, and significant restrictions have been imposed on construction in their proximity, the use of the roads themselves was still shared. Starting in the second half of the 1990s, and even more so following the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, the policy was changed: Palestinian movement became forbidden on many roads, and sometimes even crossing or approaching the roads was prohibited.

It is important in this connection to grasp the deep significance of the threat, real and perceived, to Jewish movement between the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially during the Intifadas. This threat, more than any direct attack on one specific settlement or another, touched the Achilles' heel of the logic of the settlement complex. The struggle over movement, therefore, was of strategic significance, as both sides very well understood. The following words – written by Pinhas Wallerstein, Head of the Binyamin Regional Council (near Ramallah) – underscore the importance of movement between the points that make up the settlement complex:

We will lose control of any area we won't be driving in. In Arab population centers where we won't be driving continuously, our ability to move freely will diminish … Our very presence or mobility makes contiguous Arab control more difficult …

Jewish presence in the settlements, and the connections between them, will in effect confine the area of influence of the Arab block … This block, if only for the sake of future generations, must be cut into slices … *Especially with roads that will actually be traveled on!* … It is extremely important to emphasize the importance of every single settlement … Its access roads and other infrastructure … Clearly, under uncertain security conditions the natural tendency is to move out of the center [of the Arab block] and transfer all movement to areas lying outside the *Gav Hahar* area [Hebrew name for a major West Bank region densely populated by Palestinians – AH] … [but this] will weaken the connections and will enable a strengthening of the Arab block. (Wallerstein 1994, 28–9; emphases added)

The solution to the threat was the separation of movement, and the priority was given to the Jewish settlers. A report by the NGO B'tselem (2004) lists three types of West Bank roads on which Palestinian movement is restricted: completely prohibited roads (17 roads totalling 120 kilometres), partially prohibited roads (10 roads totalling 245 kilometres) and restricted use roads (14 roads totalling 365 kilometres). The total length of roads in the West Bank is roughly 2000 kilometres, so that the various restrictions pertain to over a third of them. This list compiled by B'tselem refers only to relatively main roads, without referring to internal roads leading to settlements only. These little roads and their impact should not be underestimated. The roads function as a barrier because its crossing is forbidden for Palestinians, and even approaching it is dangerous – be it for fear of harassment by soldiers or Border Patrol policemen, or for fear of the settlers who might be violent and unpredictable.

Hundreds of manned checkpoints and physical barriers (iron gates, ditches, earth mounds and cement blocks) blocked and tunnelled Palestinian movement during those years. The checkpoints along the Green Line were meant to prevent suicide bomb attacks in Israeli cities, but they made up no more than 10 per cent of the checkpoints.[9] The other 90 per cent were dispersed along the West Bank's main arteries, blocking Palestinian access to roads used by Jewish settlers. The idea was to prevent shootings and stone throwing on settlers' cars, but the strict priority to the settlers' movement came deliberately at the expense of that of the Palestinians. The blockages regime froze nearly all Palestinian everyday life. It generated a high level of uncertainty, resulting in an inability to plan ahead and to fulfil simple daily activities such as work, study, maintenance of familial and social relations, and so on. In 2004, for example, only 0.14 per cent of the Palestinians held a valid permit to cross internal checkpoints in the West Bank (B'tselem 2004). Eighty-five per cent of the West Bank Palestinians did not leave their village in the first three years of the second Intifada (Gordon 2008, 209). Several studies

and reports show how a route that once took an hour's drive turned to be a whole day's journey, and even more (B'tselem 2001; 2007; Kelly 2006; Makdisi 2008). More than that, it was a dangerous journey due to an easy finger on the trigger on the part of both soldiers and settlers (cf. B'tselem 2002b). That is why Palestinians reduced their daily movement to the necessary minimum. One example among very many is that of Samar Sada from the village of Jit (a few kilometres outside Nablus), who recounted:

> We're imprisoned here. My children haven't left the village for four years. I haven't gone to Nablus for four months. Why should I go there? A soldier will tell me 'Bring a permit.' I have a smart card for Barkan [Israeli industrial zone; AH], but if there's a soldier who has it in for Arabs, I don't know for what reason, he'll tell me 'Stop at the side.' So why should I go? I prefer to be at home, not to go out and not to encounter such things. (Levy 2007)

With this mechanism, the topological inversion is completed. The lines connecting the Jewish points become dangerous for Palestinian passage – either by car or by foot – and in this way isolated islands are cordoned off (see Figure 2). This state of affairs was perpetuated politically and graphically with the partition of the West Bank into areas A, B and C. Area C, under full Israeli control, encompasses 60 per cent of the West Bank's territory. Scattered within it are no less than 190 separate islands of Areas A (full Palestinian control) and B (Israeli security control and Palestinian civilian control). The Jewish settlements and roads are those that dictated this map, based on a clear assumption that 'whatever is not already Palestinian will be Israeli'. The boundaries of the areas given to Palestinian control often directly border on the built-up area, and always at a large distance (security and future development spaces) from the Jewish settlements and roads.

It should be made clear that the settlements had not been built with a premeditated intention of restricting Palestinian movement, but mainly in order to restrict Palestinian construction and to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity (just as the railroads in South Africa had not been laid down with the intention of parcelling out the space and using them as an instrument for winning the Boer War). In both cases, however, the original intention makes no difference. Once the need for splitting up the space had arisen, the settlements and the roads served as an excellent basis for barriers and splittings. The relatively new roadblocks and gatings are the realisation of the potential of closure and bounding that had been embodied in the spatial organisation from its very inception. All that was needed in order to realise this potential was to redefine the rules of movement and to reinforce them using dirt embankments and ditches.

Figure 2   Left: Map of Israeli-only roads, 2007. Right: Map of Palestinian 'land cells' as created by the closures regime
*Sources*: Left: OCHA and right: Handel (2009)

This kind of technology for controlling space is quite cheap. It is much cheaper and simpler to erect dirt embankments at points of intersection between roads than to construct hundreds and thousands of kilometres of walls and fences. When we add the defence–offence practices, which have the effect of thickening the points and the lines by pushing Palestinian movement further back, the emerging picture is that of an increasing isolation and constriction of Palestinian life to the premises of the now isolated villages (see Handel 2009).

The settlements are not just discrete gated communities connected by roads, but form a single, cohesive, stable system. The transition from Israel within the Green Line to the gated road leading directly to the gated settlement is smooth and rapid. Many of the roads travelled by the Jewish settlers are reserved exclusively for them, and are thereby expropriated from the space surrounding them. The road is an integral part of the settlement complex, hence the two are analytically inseparable. This complex not only leads to the strengthening and tightening of the network of Jewish communities, but at the same time also weakens and fragments the Palestinian communities. As long as there is nothing more than a cluster of points sharing the same infrastructure, the space is available more or

less equally to everyone. Once the security and stability of one side is given preference at the expense of the other, an acceleration process begins for one alongside a deceleration process for the other; expansion versus blockage. Israeli stability is the cause of Palestinian instability; Israeli acceleration generates Palestinian deceleration; the coming closer of Israeli points to each other has the effect of pulling apart the Palestinian points from one another; certainty for Israelis spells uncertainty for Palestinians.

As in the case of Managua, the settlements – thanks to the rapid, gated and secured roads where the travel of Palestinians is prohibited – form a single gated community connected safely to the Israeli mainland. This gated community gates within it all the other communities left 'inside' (trapped between the roads) but also 'outside' (excluded from rights, from attention and concern). This is a kind of 'gating from within', which isolates the privileged minority while cordoning off and pushing away all the rest (see Figure 3).

The role of movement has already been elaborated in Atkinson and Flint's (2004) analysis of gated communities in the UK. They claim that there are actually three spatialities of segregated social actions: territories (i.e. the fortified residential zones); objectives (i.e. nonresidential locations to which people travel on a daily basis

Figure 3   The gated/gating web. Left: Situation before the fortressing of the web – Palestinian villages and Jewish settlements share the same road network. Right: Paving bypass roads and fortressing of the Jewish nodes and corridors creates a gated/gating web cutting off Palestinian villages

– work, leisure, etc. – which usually are also closed and have limited access); and corridors (which they define as 'modes of travel which suggest an attempt to shield or to immunise against casual or dangerous encounters' (888), such as cars, first-class train or air travel and taxis). A similar argument is made by Rosen and Razin (2008), who talk about the significance of segregated means of movement as part of the gated communities in Israel – from the uni-gendered buses of the ultra-orthodox communities to the segregated roads in the West Bank and toll roads that enable fast movement of people of means.

Still, the research presented here differs from Atkinson and Flint's as well as from Rosen and Razin's arguments on two major points. First, in the case of the West Bank, the roads are not only separated 'corridors' but are a necessary and critical part of the settlement complex, without which it will collapse. They have been integral to the planning of the Jewish West Bank at least from the 1980s (Handel 2009); and the regular, uninterrupted use of the roads has ever since then been perceived as critical (Wallerstein 1994). The West Bank roads themselves have been unsafe since the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, so car-based separation has never been enough, leading to the conclusion that the roads themselves should be separated too (and even access to the road and its crossing should be limited). Secondly, in the West Bank, the self-gating of one population does not mean only 'lack of diversity' in the public space (Atkinson and Flint 2004), but actually blockage of movement and destruction of the public space for the other population. The separation is not on a voluntary and individual basis, but rather a state-organised, military- and violence-based separation. The uni-national corridors are at the same time uni-national

walls. And as these corridors are the necessary condition of possibility of the whole complex, huge efforts are invested towards their maintenance.

Ronen Shamir (2005) makes an important theoretical distinction based on the difference between the prohibition of exit and the prohibition of entry: the former is that which pushes away or apart, locking people behind bars or confining them to ghettos, to camps and so on; the latter is that which underlies 'admission committees' to community settlements or the selection of those seeking to enter a monitored and secure shopping mall. It might be worthwhile to try to classify the modes of policing of movement according to the space left between the borders of closure and the borders of entry: between the walls of a prison and the gates of a shopping mall; between the fences surrounding the refugee camps and the borders of Western countries. From this analytical perspective, the West Bank settlement complex emerges as a gated/gating community: as opposed to other places around the world, in the Territories it is impossible to separate the prohibition of entry from the prohibition of exit. In the West Bank, self-gating and other-gating are one and the same.

We may distinguish here between two different stages in the evolution of the complex, which, despite being staggered chronologically, are by no means separable by a clear-cut demarcation line. The two stages are *ideological* gating and *security* gating, the latter having been added historically as a second layer on top of the former. To be sure, the security aspect of the spatial separation had existed in the settlements from their inception, but it had been less conspicuous during the first years of the settlement project. The significant shift occurred with the outbreak of the first

Intifada, and intensified with the Oslo Accords and especially since the beginning of the second Intifada.

The first type of gating – which in most cases has not been accompanied by physical gating – manifested itself in the construction of settlements in detachment from their Palestinian environment. This desire for self-segregation is actually the same motive for enclosing that guided the fortress landscapes described by Rosen and Razin (2008), namely settlements that were built from the beginning as separate entities. Segal and Weizman (2002) indicate this self-segregation as it reveals itself in the architectural style of the settlements' red-roofed houses; in the differences of latitude between the settlements and the Palestinian villages, the former resting on hilltops and mountaintops and the latter residing on hillsides, beneath the settlements; and so on. But beyond the architectural separatism there is also a complete self-segregation with respect to the social and economic systems, the sharing of which – in contrast to the electricity and road infrastructures – has never been intended. It has always been completely clear that with respect to education, culture, shopping and leisure centres, and so on, there would be no mixing between the existing (Palestinian) system and the incursive (Jewish) system. In general, Israel's incursion into the Territories may be characterised – in correlation with old colonial practices – as expansion-cum-separation. Ethnically based separation had always been crystal-clear and beyond any doubt, even before actual fences were erected between the habitations, and even when the use of roads had still been open to everyone.

In this relatively initial phase of the settlements (which started to decay in the first Intifada, and ended for good with the second Intifada), there was not yet a settlement *system* of the kind I have characterised earlier. The ideological communities were relatively autonomous, or were at least clustered into small- or medium-scale settlement blocks. The space was not divided into two detached and sharply differentiated spaces, Israeli and Palestinian. The settlement complex, the Jewish supra-space in the Territories, had not yet attained its full realisation, and the Palestinian space was still usable and relatively open to movement.

Stabbings of settlers by Palestinians working in the settlements and terror attacks in settlements and houses instigated the addition of the 'security communities' aspect. The security gating was subsequently expanded to the road network as well, following a dramatic rise in shooting incidents on the roads from the mid-1990s onward. It is only in the mid-1990s that we see the beginning of a significant gating process of the settlements, and later of the roads as well. The gating, the segregation of roads and the movement restrictions imposed on the Palestinians are the factors that converged to create the settlement complex

described earlier. The security layer was added onto the ideological bedrock and intensified the physical separation.

Talking about a system and about one gated/gating community is not meant to conceal the differences and the heterogeneity of the settlements. Some are religious, others are secular; some are rural, others urban; some are considered 'ideological' (the hard core of the Jewish settlements, usually located in the heart of Palestinian areas) while others are for 'housing improvers', who take advantage of the relatively low prices of houses and the generous governmental support given to people who move to the West Bank. These myriad kinds of settlements do not create one *community* except in the sense of a relatively weak set of shared values and amenities. But they do create one *gated community* in its functional aspect. According to Grant and Mittelsteadt, 'the key element of gating is the effort to control access to the settlement. Gated developments have an inside and an outside' (2004, 914). While the question 'whether gated enclaves are true "communities" is open to debate' (2004, 914), the gatedness and the limits on access and free movement is what defines the gated community and what separates the inside from the outside. Therefore, even though a settler from Ma'ale Adumim (a large urban settlement near Jerusalem) may perhaps never visit the settlement of Tapu'ach (small extremist settlement at the outskirts of Nablus), the two are nevertheless connected by fast roads and a security envelope that keep them cut off from their immediate environment, in a way that creates an ethnically based inside and outside.

Conclusion

Zygmunt Bauman claims that

> mobility climbs to the rank of the uppermost among the coveted values – and the freedom to move, perpetually a scarce and unequally distributed commodity, fast becomes the main stratifying factor of our times. (1998, 2)

This paper seeks to describe the differential movement of populations – not on a global scale, as Bauman does, but rather in its micro-geographical incarnations in gated communities and local roads.

Most of the literature on gated communities deals with closed compounds and their relations with their immediate surroundings or with the municipal level. Several works refer also to roads and other differentiated means of movement (Atkinson and Flint 2004; Landman 2006; Rodgers 2004; Rosen and Razin 2008). This paper adds to those studies by emphasising the zero-sum game in which the problem of the separation of movement goes beyond the mere absence of the strong population from the public space, or the mere

need to lengthen one's way in order to bypass a gated aggregate of streets. Rather, the paper shows how the gated communities together with the separated roads create one system, in which nodes and corridors are transformed into an exclusionary web by a mix of enclosure and security mechanisms.

On the basis of these observations, two new factors need to be added to the existing typology of gated communities suggested by Blakely and Snyder (1997) and Grant and Mittelsteadt (2004). Namely, beyond the (1) functions of enclosure; (2) security features; (3) amenities and facilities included; (4) type of residents; (5) tenure; (6) location; (7) size; and (8) policy context – all of those referring first and foremost to the gated community as a point and not as a node – I suggest adding the factors of (9) connectivity and (10) exclusionarity. These two factors broaden the view from the single gated community to the system in which it functions as a node. In many cases the gated communities do not create a web. The residents of one golf club or high-class compound do not necessarily have more connections with other gated communities in their area than they have with the rest of the city. On the other hand, gated communities might be characterised by a high level of connectivity, but still use the connecting corridors in a non-exclusionary manner. In order to have high levels of both connectivity and exclusionarity, a stronger power than that held by the gated communities' residents themselves is needed – usually the power of a state. In the case described here – the West Bank under Israeli occupation – the state and the military rule exercised by it are indeed very powerful. That is why this case is different from that described by Flint and Atkinson: it is not only the 'movement cells' that are separated (cars, first-class trains, etc.) but the very roads and infrastructures. In the West Bank, the degrees of connectivity between the Jewish settlements and of exclusionarity along those corridors add up to form a community whose very gatedness also has a gating effect at the same time.

The settlement complex in the West Bank is not to be construed as an aggregate of discrete gated communities linked to each other with wide roads, but as a single gated community. The method of spatial analysis based on use values makes it possible to look differently at the entire population of the West Bank, and to ask how this population may use the space: What does a distance of X mean for an Israeli and for a Palestinian? Who is allowed to use the rapid road, and who endangers themself even by merely approaching it? Have the settlements really failed, as Efrat (2006) claims, or have they been successful beyond all expectations thanks to a calculated dispersal over the area? This mode of observation makes it possible to overcome the traditional cartography and to discern multiple layers in a map that at first glance looks like an inseparable mixture of Jewish and Palestinian points. The Israeli complex in the West Bank, with its settlements and its roads, constitutes a *single array*, and that is why – to the rejoicing of some and the dismay of others – it is both more resilient and more sustainable than is usually assumed.

The paper contributes to the study of gated communities by analysing a non-urban case in an occupied area, and above all by emphasising the role of roads and organised state violence in maintaining a separation of movement that results in a gated/gating community. The stress placed by the state and the settlers on the security and gating aspects of the lines connecting the nodes to the web led to the formation of the gated/gating community. The complex of gated communities, based as it is on the network of roads that connect small settlements, has the effect of blocking Palestinian movement and creating a 'gating from within' in which the minority gates the majority by help of state regulations and power. Finally, the paper shows how, in a situation of perceived danger, movement itself becomes a problem, and how the politics of mobility turns into a zero-sum game. Thus, it might be that in other places around the globe, under a real or perceived threat of crime, terror or other elements of 'social danger', states and municipalities will muster the legislative and the explicit power needed to enhance the connectivity of the people of means, while at the same time bolstering their corridors' exclusionarity. In that, a preference would be given to those people's safety not only within the gated houses and communities but also on the roads, thereby reducing the rest of the population's public space and freedom of movement.

Notes

1 'Illegal outposts' are small Jewish settlements that were erected without government permission. Despite their 'illegality' most of them receive military protection and state budgets. The 'legal' definitions are of course part of the Israeli state discourse. According to international law, none of the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories is legal.

2 By virtual I refer to what is frequently termed the settlement's 'security envelope'. This can be composed of real fences, but also of electronic devices, legislative zonings and more. The virtual fences are unmapped and their boundaries are not signed on the ground, making them highly ambiguous and uncertain (see Handel 2010).

3   For a review and analysis of the various 'geographies of
    occupation', see Harker (2010).

4   For a thorough analysis of vertical geopolitics, see Elden
    (2013). For the Palestinian–Israeli case – from the three-
    dimensional roads' network to the tunnels in Gaza Strip –
    see Weizman (2007).

5   There are other cases as well. In Santiago de Chile the gated
    communities are relatively tied to the urban fabric. Accord-
    ing to Salcedo and Torres (2004), the gated communities –
    due to the fact that they are placed in the city centre rather
    than pushing strong populations to the suburbs – increase
    the integration and strengthen their neighbouring areas.
    Anyway, this is not the case in the West Bank, which is why I
    concentrate on the closed and self-isolating communities.

6   Palestinian cars have had different licence plates from
    Jewish cars since the first days of the Israeli occupation.

7   See note 1.

8   The details are calculated from Peace Now data (based on
    the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics); see http://
    www.peacenow.org Accessed 1 September 2013.

9   See closure reports and maps of the UN Office for the
    Coordination of Human Affairs (http://www.ochaopt.org)
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