

The Ben-Gurion University Philosophy
Department is pleased to invite you to

Factivity, Hallucination, Justification



A talk by

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Monday, 24 October 2022
From 12:00 till 14:00
Room 343, Diller Bldg (74)

Veridically perceiving puts us in a better epistemic position than, say, hallucinating does, at least in that veridical perception offers knowledge of our environment in a way that hallucination does not. But is there any further epistemic advantage? Some authors have recently argued that veridical perception provides a superior epistemic benefit over hallucination not just vis-a-vis knowledge, but vis-a-vis justification as well. This contrasts with a traditional view according to which experience provides justification irrespective of whether it's veridical or hallucinatory. Although I think there are reasons to reject this traditional view in favor of one on which some hallucinations are epistemically worse than veridical perceptions (and some are not), I don't think there is good reason to think that the mere fact of hallucination has any consequences for justification. More generally, I don't think that mere factivity has any interesting connection with justification.

