

## Competition and Pro-social Behavior in the Lab and in the Field

### Program Overview

- 9:00-9:30 Registration and Refreshments
- 9:30-9:45 Welcome - **Amos Schurr** (Ben-Gurion University) & **Ilana Ritov** (Hebrew University)
- 9:45-10:45 Session 1- Chair: **Simone Moran** (Ben-Gurion University)  
**Maurice Schweitzer** (University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School)  
Title: Deception, Morality, and Trust
- 10:45-11:35 Session 2–Chair: **Tehila Kogut** (Ben-Gurion University)
- 10:45-11:10 **Peter Bamberger** (Tel Aviv University)  
Title: Caring under pressure: The impact of helping others on provider stressor-strain relation
- 11:10-11:35 **Ela Segev** (Ben-Gurion University)  
Title: Multi-stage sequential all-pay contests
- 11:35-12:00 Coffee
- 12:00-13:15 Session 3–Chair: **Marieke Roskes** (Ben-Gurion University)
- 12:00-12:25 **Burt Kotler** (Ben-Gurion University)  
Title: Competition and cooperation in the field: Density-dependent habitat selection and safety in numbers in gerbils
- 12:25-12:50 **Judith Avrahami** (Hebrew University)  
Title: The chicken is cheaper here but not the cornflakes: contests with multiple objects
- 12:50-13:15 **Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan** (Hebrew University)  
Title: Facts, Preferences, and Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of Proportionality Judgment
- 13:15-14:15: Lunch
- 14:15-15:35 Session 4 – Blitz talks-Chair: **Yaakov Kareev** (Hebrew University)
- 14:15-14:25 **Elia Morgulev** (Ben-Gurion University)  
Title: Deception and decision making in professional basketball
- 14:25-14:35 **Einav Hart** (Hebrew University)

- Title: Enlarging the market, decreasing the profit: Competitive behavior when investment affects the prize
- 14:35-14:45 **Uriel Haran** (Ben-Gurion University)
- Title: Differential influences of moral emotions on individual and competitive goal-achievement
- 14:45-14:55 **Marina Motsenok** (Hebrew University)
- Title: Shallow pockets, kind heart: The effect of perceived personal financial state on prosocial activity.
- 14:55-15:05 **Margarita Leib** (Ben-Gurion University)
- Title: Corrupt reciprocity
- 15:05-15:15 **Roi Zultan** (Ben-Gurion University)
- Title: Outside threat makes humans more cooperative—but also more selfish
- 15:15-15:25 **Ronit Montal Rosenberg** (Ben-Gurion University)
- Title: Envy and helping behaviors in teams
- 15:25-15:35 **Ori Weisel** (University of Nottingham)
- Title: Corrupt collaboration
- 15:35-16:10 Coffee
- 16:10-17:10 Session 5–Finale - Chair: **Rachel Barkan** (Ben-Gurion University)
- Uri Gneezy** (UC San Diego)
- Title: Incentives and behavior change
- 17:10-17:20** Closing remarks – **Shaul Shalvi** (Ben-Gurion University, DMEP)

**Session 1: 9:45 – 10:45**

**Chair: Simone Moran**

**Maurice Schweitzer**

Title: Deception, Morality, and Trust

Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long asserted that deception is immoral and that deception harms trust. We challenge both of these claims. We demonstrate that individuals who tell prosocial lies, lies told with the intention of benefitting others, are perceived to be more moral than individuals who tell the truth. We find that moral judgments of lies are sensitive to the consequences of lying for the deceived party, but insensitive to the consequences of lying for the liar. We also demonstrate that prosocial lying can increase behavioral and attitudinal measures of trust. Specifically, prosocial lies increase the willingness to pass money in the trust game, both when deception is directly experienced and when it is merely observed. Both honesty and benevolence are essential for trust and moral character. When these values conflict, benevolence may be more important than honesty.

Bio: Maurice Schweitzer is the Cecilia Yen Koo Professor of Operations and Information Management at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. His research focuses on emotions, ethical decision making, and the negotiation process. He has published in Management, Psychology, and Economics journals such as the Academy of Management Journal, the Journal of Applied Psychology, Management Science, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Psychological Science, and the American Economic Review.

Maurice teaches Negotiations and Advanced Negotiations in Wharton's executive education, MBA, and undergraduate programs. He has won several teaching awards including Wharton's Whitney Award for distinguished teaching and Wharton's Hauck award for excellence in teaching. Maurice Schweitzer has won best paper awards in the Conflict Management Division of the Academy of Management, and he has served as the program chair for both the International Association for Conflict Management and the Society for Judgment and Decision Making conferences. He served as an associate editor for Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes and Negotiation and Conflict Management Research. He is currently an associate editor at Management Science.

**Session 2: 11:00 – 11:45**

**Chair: Tehila Kogut**

**Peter Bamberger**

Title: Caring under pressure: The impact of helping others on provider stressor strain relation

Research suggest that while social support and helping generally have a beneficial impact on *recipient* wellbeing, from a resource allocation perspective, such pro-social behavior may often be costly for the help *provider*. Drawing from resource ecology theory and recent findings from neuroscience, we propose that the gains gleaned from providing certain types of help to work-based peers may offset the resources lost, and in fact buffer the impact of stressors on provider strain. Using longitudinal data from a sample of newly hired call center employees, we distinguish between instrumental and emotional forms and demonstrate that while the provision of more emotional help has no net buffering effect for the provider, the provision of instrumental (i.e., task-related) help does.

Bio: Peter A. Bamberger ([peterb@post.tau.ac.il](mailto:peterb@post.tau.ac.il)) is Associate Dean for Research and Professor of Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management at the Recanati School of Business Administration, Tel Aviv University, and Research Director of the Smithers Institute, ILR School, Cornell University. Current research interests include peer relations and employee helping processes, occupational health psychology, and compensation strategy. Recent publications include *Human Resource Strategy* (Routledge, 2014), and *Retirement & the Hidden Epidemic: The Complex Link Between Aging, Work Disengagement and Substance Misuse* (Oxford, 2014). He received his Ph.D. in organizational behavior from Cornell University in 1990.

**Ella Segev**

Title: Multi-stage Sequential all-pay contests

We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants' expected highest effort. We also analyze if giving a head start, i.e., an exogenously determined mechanism that increases the winning probability of the first mover for any level of effort she exerts, improves the contestant's performance. Finally, we analyze the case where contestant 1 (the first mover) exerts an effort in the first period which translates into an observable output, but with some noise, and contestant 2 (the second mover) observes this noisy output when exerting her own effort.

Bio: Dr. Ella Segev is a faculty member at the Industrial Engineering and Management department at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Her research interest is in game theory and specifically auctions and contests. Ella received her Ph.D. from the Management school at Tel Aviv University. She then spent a year at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, NJ.

### **Session 3: 12:00 -13:15**

**Chair: Marieke Roskes**

#### **Burt P. Kotler**

Title: Competition and cooperation in the field: Density-dependent habitat selection and safety in numbers in gerbils

Habitat selection by individuals is often a density dependent process: as density increases, the quality of the habitat decreases due to resource competition, interference, and so forth. This can result in an Ideal Free Distribution. But gerbils also experience safety in numbers from their predators by sharing the burden of predation, leading gerbils to aggregate at low densities. These same changes in habitat quality should likewise affect the foraging efforts of individuals at the patch scale. We used density manipulations in fenced enclosures in the field to examine patch use in two species of gerbils, (*Gerbillus andersoni allenbyi* and *G. pyramidum*). At the same time, we used sand tracking to measure activity densities and confirm that gerbils show density dependent habitat selection across the stabilized and semistabilized sand habitats. We then quantified individual patch use using giving up densities (GUD; the amount of food left behind in a resource patch following exploitation) in artificial food patches. Gerbils used resource patches in a density dependent manner, showing lower GUDs at higher activity densities. Interestingly, this was not the case in both habitats. In the stabilized sand habitat, GUDs for both gerbils were high, and decreased with increasing activity density, but in the semistabilized dune habitat, GUDs remained constantly low. This caused led GUDs in the two habitats to converge at high activity densities. For these surprising findings we suggest two mechanistically different explanations, one that relies on ideal despotic distribution and the other on safety in numbers. Evidence supports the second hypothesis in which safety is pumped from the semistabilized to the stabilized habitat with increasing activity density.

Bio: Burt P. Kotler is a professor of desert ecology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. He received his B.S. and M.S. at the University of Michigan and Ph.D. at the University of Arizona under the supervision of Michael L. Rosenzweig. His research interests include: the foraging games played out between desert gerbils and their predators; the mechanisms by which ecologically similar species can coexist on limited resources and in the face of predation; the application of behavioral indicators to conservation biology. Kotler has over 130 scholarly publications and is an ISI Highly Cited Author. He is on the Board of Editors for the journals *Ecology* and *Ecological Monographs*, and is the coeditor-in-chief for the *Israel Journal of Ecology and Evolution*.

#### **Judith Avrahami**

Title: The chicken is cheaper here but not the cornflakes: contests with multiple objects

Contestants often have to decide how much to invest in a contest in which investments are lost irrespective of winning or losing. Contests may vary, however, in an important way: in some cases contests involve a single object and in other cases they involve a series of objects such that contestants attempt to maximize the number of objects won. The difference between these cases will be discussed

from a psychological and from a theoretical perspective. Results of an experiment that tested behavior of players with unequal resources at their disposal in multi-object contests will be reported.

Bio: Doing research in decision behavior with a focus on interactive decision-making. BA in philosophy and English literature from Tel Aviv University, graduate studies in cognitive psychology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

### **Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan**

Title: Facts, Preferences, and Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of Proportionality Judgment

Legal proportionality is one of the most important principles for adjudicating among conflicting values. However, rather little is known about the factors that play a role in the formation of proportionality judgments. This research presents the first empirical analysis in this regard, relying on a sample of 331 legal experts (lawyers and legal academics). The policy domain addressed by the experiment is the anti-terrorist military practice of targeted killings, which has been an issue of a legal debate. Our experimental findings suggest that proportionality judgments are receptive to normatively relevant facts. We also find strong correlational evidence for the effect of ideological preferences on such judgments, but no indication that information processing was systematically biased. These results are consistent for two proportionality doctrines. We suggest that proportionality judgment is anchored jointly in the experts' policy preferences and the facts of the case. We outline the implications of the findings for the psychological and legal literature.

Bio: Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan is a senior lecturer of Political Science and Public Policy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He received his PhD at Oxford University in 2006. Raanan's research focuses on cognitive aspects of political and public decisions and behavior of both lay-individuals and experts. His current research projects address the role of ideology in shaping political judgments, legal proportionality in public policy, and the effects of reputation on organizational activity. His works were published in the British Journal of Political Science, Political Behavior, Governance, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Public Administration, and Administration & Society.

## **Session 4: 14:15-15:35**

### **Blitz Session**

**Chair: Yaakov Kareev**

#### **Elia Morgulev**

Title: Deception and decision making in professional basketball

We examine the behavior of professional referees and players in the context of offensive fouls in basketball. Over 500 incidents that had the potential to meet the criteria of an offensive foul were recorded from the 2009/10 season of the Israeli Basketball Super League and were analyzed by basketball experts. Falling intentionally in order to improve the chances to get an offensive foul is a very common behavior of defenders (almost two thirds of the recorded falls). It seems to be helpful at first, increasing indeed the chances to get an offensive foul, but a more careful analysis shows that the entire impact of an intentional fall on the team seems to be negative. We suggest that both rational reasons and biased decision making lead players to frequently act against their team's interest by falling. Referees almost never call an offensive foul if the player remained on his feet, and are generally calling fewer fouls than the number judged by experts as appropriate. We explain the referees' behavior both by using the representativeness heuristic and by examining closely the referees' interests and observing that to some extent even their officiating mistakes may be rational.

Bio: Elia is a PhD student in the Faculty of Management at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. His research interests are JDM and Sport Psychology. In his PhD research Elia examines the effects of success on following performance.

#### **Einav Hart**

Title: Enlarging the market, decreasing the profit: Competitive behavior when investment affects the prize

Competitions are ubiquitous, be it in schools, workplace promotions, legal battles or R&D races. These competitions often require investing many resources – which at times are to the benefit of all, but can also be a sheer waste. We examine competitions in which the winner's prize changes with the contestants' investments. We observe higher investments when the opponent's investment increases the winner's prize, and lower investments when the opponent's investment decreases the prize. We also observe higher investments when one's investment increases one's own prize. Importantly, contestants earn less in competitions in which the prize depends on investments than in competitions in which the prizes are independent of investments.

Bio: Einav Hart is a PhD candidate in the cognitive science department and in the Federmann center for the study of rationality, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her thesis focuses on investment behavior in competitions. Her research examines both normative and descriptive aspects of choice behavior in various individual and interactive situations.

Research interests: decision-making, game theory, social psychology, experimental and behavioral economics.

## **Uriel Haran**

Title: Differential influences of moral emotions on individual and competitive goal-achievement

Moral emotions are regarded as powerful motivators of goal-directed behavior, yet their influence is not entirely clear. Prior research finds a positive effect of moral emotions on pro-social behavior and inter-individual cooperation. However, other settings, namely competitive settings, create a contrast between one's goals and those of others. Positive outcomes in these contexts typically entail denying others of these outcomes. This raises a question regarding the influence of moral emotions on competitive behavior. The present study tested the effect of guilt on competitive and non-competitive goal-directed behavior. Half of participants were primed with guilt whereas the other half did not. Then, participants completed a task with either a competitive or an individual performance goal. While guilty participants exerted more effort to meet individual objectives than did participants in the control condition, in the competitive setting guilt reduced participants' effort to beat their counterparts. These results shed light on the complex relationship between moral emotions, motivation, and competitive goals.

Bio: Uriel Haran is a lecturer at the Department of Management at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Uriel's research applies Judgment and Decision Making research methods to investigate organizational and management-related questions. His main areas of interest are social comparison and competitive behavior, moral judgment and ethical norms in organizations and overconfidence in estimates and predictions.

## **Marina Motsenok**

Title: Shallow Pockets, Kind Heart: The Effect of Perceived Personal Financial State on Prosocial Activity

Our research examines the effect of perceived personal financial state (FS) on participation in volunteering activities. First, a secondary analysis of data from the European Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement (SHARE) revealed that lower assessment of personal FS is associated with prosocial motivation for volunteering activities. Next, in a lab study we manipulated participants' perception of their personal FS. Participants randomly assigned to the low FS condition were more willing to volunteer in a social organization than participants assigned to the high FS condition. The results of the experimental manipulation support the causal role of subjective FS and volunteering.

Bio: Marina Motsenok is a PhD Candidate at the School of Education, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Marina received her BA in Sociology and Education and her MA in Organizational Sociology from the Hebrew University. Marina's doctoral thesis focuses on the effect of vulnerability on prosocial behavior. In her research, she explores how perceptions of personal financial, social and physical states promote volunteering and helping others. Marina's research interests include prosocial behavior, social comparison, social trust and moral judgment.



## **Margarita Leib**

Title: Corrupt reciprocity

Will people reciprocate others' generosity by bending ethical rules? Two Dictator-Game experiments demonstrate that people experiencing generosity from another person reciprocate by lying in order to boost the benefactor's outcomes (i.e., direct reciprocity), as well as to boost an unrelated person's outcome (i.e., upstream reciprocity). Evidence further suggests that such corrupt reciprocity is driven by pro-social (not selfish) people. Our results raise the question – should reciprocity always be encouraged?

Bio: Margarita Leib is a graduate student in social psychology at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, under the supervision of Dr. Shaul Shalvi and Simone Moran. Her main area of research is behavioral ethics and decision making.

## **Ronit Montal Rosenberg**

Title: Envy and helping behaviors in teams

Upward social comparisons (SCs) often trigger feelings of envy and consequently lead to destructive interpersonal behaviors, and impaired task performance. In this research, I examine these destructive effects in teams. I focus on the effects of envy on help giving and help seeking, and examine key team characteristics - i.e., task and reward interdependence that may moderate these effects. In my talk, I will present initial results supporting the notion that envy toward upward SC peers decreases helping behaviors, and that this effect is moderated by team interdependencies.

Bio: Ronit Montal Rosenberg is a PhD student in the Faculty of Management at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Her research interests are decision making, emotions in teams and team processes. More specifically, in her PhD research she examines the effects of envy on helping behaviors in teams, and the moderating role of team interdependence.

## **Ro'i Zultan**

Title: Outside threat makes humans more cooperative—but also more selfish

Inter-group conflict increases cooperation and reduces free riding within threatened groups. This common enemy effect is well documented in field and laboratory studies, and was shown to be evolutionary stable. However, the response to inter-group conflict heavily depends on the cues that individual receive about the nature of the conflict. We show that the same conflict situation can be perceived in different ways---which trigger opposing behavioral patterns. An individual who perceives a threat to the group supports the group by contributing to the group effort. conversely, an individual who perceives a personal threat behaves in a self-supporting manner and free rides.

Bio: Ro'i Zultan is a lecturer at the Economics Department at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. R'oi is an experimental economist with background in cognitive and experimental psychology. He is mainly interested in understanding how groups shape cognitions and behavior as well as in more broad issues of cooperation and behavior in teams. He is also interested in some basic game theoretical issues, experimental auctions, and experimental methodology. Ro'i is a senior lecturer at the department of economics at Ben-Gurion University of Negev and the director of the Negev Experimental Economics Laboratory.

## **Ori Weisel**

Title: Corrupt collaboration

Cooperation has many benefits; does it also have a “dark side”? We explore this question by introducing a novel sequential dyadic die-rolling paradigm. Players earned money (only) when both reported to have rolled the same number (a ‘double’), and could inflate their profits by misreporting the actual results. The tendency to lie in this collaborative dyadic setting was amplified relative to a comparable individual setting, and reduced when payoffs were not fully aligned.

Bio: Ori Weisel received his PhD in social psychology and rationality from the Hebrew University. Currently he is a research fellow at the Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham, and has previously held a research fellow position at the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany. His main research interests are determinants of intra- and inter-group conflict and cooperation; unethical behavioral, in particular in collaborative settings; and cooperation and competition in social dilemmas, in particular under uncertainty.

## **Session 5: 16:10 – 17:10**

### **Chair: Rachel Barkan**

## **Uri Gneezy**

Title: Incentives and behavior change.

Professor Uri Gneezy will talk about the research projects appearing in the book he coauthored with John List: *The Why Axis* and will also present data from a new and exciting research project.

Following the talk, Professor Gneezy and Dr. Racheli Barkan will discuss selected issues concerning research of cooperation and competition in the real world.

Bio: Uri Gneezy Epstein/Atkinson Endowed Chair in Behavioral Economics, Professor of Economics & Strategy, Rady School of Management, UC San Diego

As a researcher, Gneezy's focus is on putting behavioral economics to work in the real world, where theory can meet application. Gneezy is looking for basic research as well as more applied approaches to such topics as incentives-based interventions to increase good habits and decrease bad ones, Pay-

What-You-Want pricing, and the detrimental effects of small and large incentives. In addition to the traditional laboratory and field studies, he currently works with several firms, conducting experiments in which he is using basic findings from behavioral economics to help companies achieve their traditional goals in non-traditional ways.

Gneezy recently coauthored a book with John List (<http://thewhyaxis.com/>) in which they discuss field experiments that study how to implement behavioral economics insights in the “real world.” To get the answers, Gneezy and List boarded planes, helicopters, trains, and automobiles to embark on journeys from the foothills of Kilimanjaro to California wineries; from sultry northern India to the chilly streets of Chicago; from the playgrounds of schools in Israel to the boardrooms of some of the world’s largest corporations. In *The Why Axis*, they take us along for the ride, and through engaging and colorful stories, present lessons with big payoffs.