(1959) portrays three young men of this generation. They are not, however, portrayed as heroes, but rather as troubled young men driven to Petra by personal problems. The protagonist of *Perfect Peace* (1982) by Amos Oz crosses the border in order to go to Petra to escape the confines of kibbutz life. The three characters in the play 'Petra' (1998) by Yehonathan Geffen are portrayed as senseless cowboys who end up killing each other. These three writers belong to three different generations, and the way each one of them treats the Petra episode demonstrates how, in the last fifty years, Israelis have viewed the formative years of the State of Israel.

Beyond these superficial resemblances the article focuses mainly on the similar ideological inner ties between the later work and the earlier one. These ideological ties are described as concentric circles leading in both works from the absolute denial of any possible change concerning the Jewish immigrants in Eretz-Israel, to the obvious affection and acceptance of the younger native generation. These ties between the two works are to be perceived as a kind of dialogue, in which Oz's novella follows and points out the mutations that took place during the development of the younger generation first mentioned in Brenner's novel.

This is Oz's indirect way of criticizing some aspects of the Zionist enterprise in Eretz-Israel as seen from the standpoint of the 1970s following the crisis of the Yom Kippur War.

# The Reflection of the Petra Episode in Hebrew Literature

## Nessia Shafran

Seeing Petra, the ancient capital of the Nabateans which is situated in present day Jordan, was the ultimate dream of young Israelis in the 1950s. But few realized their dream and of those who went only three known people returned. Ten men and two women were killed by the Jordanians after crossing the border on their way to Petra in four separate journeys between 1953 and 1957.

The attitude of the Israeli public towards these illegal trips to Petra was complex. On the one hand they were condemned as senseless adventures which resulted in needless deaths, but on the other hand young people who went to Petra were regarded as heroes, and with each killing the myth of Petra grew stronger. In essence, going to Petra was the extreme culmination of the ideal of the 50s - physical love for the Land of Israel which was manifested in long, arduous hikes, especially in the desert.

The Petra episode was reflected in Hebrew literature from the very beginning. The first poems were written after five people, all of them veterans of the War of Independence, were killed in 1953. The dead were glorified and hailed as heroes. in the mid-1950s, a younger generation of Israelis became fascinated with Petra. This generation came of age around the time of the Sinai Campaign of 1956. The novella by Yehoshua Bar-Yosef *On the Way to Edom Rock*

(*Compassroad*, 1960:24). This declaration is in contradiction to numerous expressions in which the word 'silence' and its synonyms - quietness, stillness, calm, hush, etc. - are evidence that Guri's narrator has indeed heard of the silence and that despite this declaration, he - the lyrical 'I' - is attentive to his own internal world and not only to the noises of his surroundings. In fact, the author of this article claims that the spiritual and psychological climate which levitates from the silence, or from the silences which Guri's poetry sustains, dictates the greater part of the situations which are formed in Guri's poetry and comprise a central characteristic in the personality of the speaker. Furthermore, the author of the paper examines the validity of the claim put forth by Guri's critics, N. Zach and D. Miron, that his poetry is one of noise expressing the collective, clamorous existence. The critics paid attention to the tumultuous voices of wartime Israel (*Flowers of Fire*, 1949) while disregarding the silence. The author points out that not only does Guri's poetry know the quietness and the silence, it is founded in the very silence which is the key to the understanding of the poet's loud poetry. This is no oxymoron of 'silence - cry' which expresses a moral cry, or a psychological-existential cry which in itself is a threat to the personal and collective 'I' as pronounced by S. Yizhar or A. Kovner, but Guri's is the 'still small voice' which is a continuance of the voice from the time of the Prophet Elijah (*Kings* I, 19:12).

# Have I Prayed for this Child?
## 'Longing' by Amos Oz and 'From Here and From There' by Y. H. Brenner - A Comparative Study

Chaya Shacham

This article examines the ties between the novella 'Longing' by Amos Oz (1976) and 'From Here and From There' by Y. H. Brenner (1911). Although seemingly there is quite a difference between the Oz novella and Brenner's novel, a close examination shows many aspects in which they resemble each other. For instance: the epic situation; the use of writing letters as part of creating a narrative sequence; the illness of both inner narrators, their hesitant character, their sexual inferiority as well as their taking young boys under their wings. Also, both authors use Jerusalem as the background to their works.

# The Palestinian Minority in Israel:
# The Challenge for the Jewish State and its Implications

## As'ad Ghanem

The Palestinian minority in Israel, like minorities elsewhere in the modern world demands personal and group equality within the State of Israel. Developments in this sphere support the descriptions of the development of other minorities in various empirical and theoretical studies of societies that are deeply split on an ethnic or national basis. Various positions characterizes the struggle of minorities against discrimination in order to achieve equality with the majority. The Palestinian minority in Israel wants a change in the ethnic, Jewish-Zionist character of the state. It wants the state to be the state of all its citizens and also wants a collective status similar to that enjoyed by the Jews. This minority wants to directly influence matters affecting it and its future developments as well as its future status.

The minority's demands are extremely revolutionary in light of the ethnic character of the state and the fact that the Jewish majority supports a continuation of this character and generally gives priority to continued discrimination against the minority. The result of the combination between the state's backing and the majority's support of the discrimination policy against the minority suggests that the latter will encounter an iron wall of institutional and public opposition to its demands. This situation pushes the minority to an inevitable deeper existential crisis. The clear deterioration in the minority's status will produce a multi-dimensional crisis. The situation described in the article confronts the state, the majority and the minority with hard decisions concerning the nature of the partnership that can satisfy both the demands of the majority and the aspirations of the minority.

# The Silence and the Noise in Haim Guri's Poetry

## Reuven Shoham

In the poem 'The Silence and I' the speaker declares: 'I have heard of the silence / I have not met it yet // It belongs to the Land / Whose name I do not know'.

An early amendment to the law in 1957 made it possible for the Institute to provide pensions to the partially retired elderly. Partial retirement was defined as when a person works from time to time, has substantially reduced work in his or hers occupation, and income from work does not exceed a certain prescribed low amount. However, the extent of 'substantially reduced work' remained a vague term and granted the Institute enormous powers and discretion as to how to interpret these provisions. The implementation process involved undertaking continuous checks as to the number of hours of work an individual actually engaged in and the extent of the pensioner's incomes from employment. It not only led to a great deal of litigation on the part of claimants but also to considerable hardship among many of the elderly who encountered serious access barriers that prevented their ongoing receipt of an old age pension.

From its inception, protests were made against the inequity of this retirement policy and the manner in which it was implemented by the NII. Social policy advisers from abroad, Members of Parliament, the State Comptroller's Office and many NII officials strongly disapproved of the manner in which the retirement policy was pursued over the years. Nevertheless, the senior management of the NII remained adamant in its support of the flawed policy and continued to cling to it until the beginning of the 1970s. The lack of political power by the specific groups of the elderly population that were subjected to this policy made it difficult for them to bring about the necessary policy change.

Eventually, the NII recognized that the strict retirement policy provisions were unjust in principle and unworkable in practice. A more liberal policy adopted in 1970 abandoned the notion of 'substantially reduced work' and the attempts to limit the actual number of hours of work undertaken by a pensioner. Ever since, in practice the policy allows receipt of a pension in the designated years if a pensioner's income does not exceed a certain limit that is adjusted according to fluctuation in the average wage.

adults above the age of 35 was restricted and immigration candidates had to undergo severe medical examinations. Immigrants without a profession or money were committed to spend two years in an agricultural settlement. The preferred groups were youths and young people without families.

These regulations which became the foundation of the selection policy were not designed exclusively for North African Jews, but for all Jews not living in countries of distress. However, it was the North African Jews who became its primary victims. Yitzhak Raphael, Head of the *Aliyah* Department, was among the champions of this policy. He was supported by most of his colleagues at the Executive of the Jewish Agency, as well as by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.

It is possible to point out a number of motives for the selection policy beyond the need to lighten the burden of the young nation's absorption infrastructure. These include providing manual labor for agriculture and bringing the young people without their parents and traditions thereby absorbing them into the 'new society' being created in Israel.

# Barriers of Access to the Old Age National Insurance Pensions in the 1950s and 1960s: The Retirement Conditions

## Abraham Doron

During the 1950s and 1960s, payment of pensions under the national insurance scheme to men between the ages of 65 and 70, and women between the ages of 60 and 65, was initially conditional upon full retirement from any employment. This was later changed to partial retirement only. The main issue faced by the National Insurance Institute (NII - the Israeli government agency responsible for the administration of the country's social security system) was how to interpret the retirement requirements during a period in which the low pension rates made it extremely difficult for a retired person to reach an acceptable living standard on the pension alone. This study deals with the ways in which the NII dealt with the access barriers that the retirement conditions created for many of the elderly who sought to receive an old age pension and the struggles that took place over the years to change this policy.

as an attempt to solve the country's problems, but rather as a part of the political struggle which he was waging against the party which then united the two kibbutz movements into *Mapam*. The kibbutz movements did not absorb the immigrants of that period and relations between the immigrants and the kibbutzim only left scarring memories between the two to this day.

# The Beginning of the Selective Immigration in the 1950s

Avi Picard

The Zionist Movement assigned itself different, and at times, contradictory goals e.g. building Eretz-Israel vis-a-vis rescuing oppressed Jews. The growing plight of European Jewry in the 1930s together with the restricted immigration possibilities worldwide convinced many Jewish leaders to support *Aliya* . This is part of the background in which the struggle for the creation of the State of Israel took place. Once independence was declared, the State immediately opened its gates to all Jewish immigrants. Within three and a half years 700,000 immigrants arrived all to be absorbed by a population of 650,000. This put enormous strain on the country's absorption facilities. But the distress of the Jewish population in Arab countries, as well as the fear that the Communist East-European countries would deny Jewish emigration, prevented any restricting of immigration.

Many Jews in North Africa which formed the largest Jewish Diaspora in Moslem countries regarded themselves as candidates for immigration. However, the North African immigrants suffered from an inferior image, rather more than other Oriental Jews. The North African Jew was considered to be aggressive, violent, lazy, undisciplined and non-European in his behavior. Furthermore, this negative image was not mitigated by the exotic romantic aura that surrounded and  upheld, for example, the image of the Yemenite Jew. This very low image, as well as the fact that North African Jews were living under complaisant French rule, and the tremendous strain on Israel's existing resources, contributed to the delay in their immigration during the first three years of the State's existence. The emigration from North Africa only began towards the end of 1951. By this time various regulations had been adopted in order to control the flow of newcomers. In accordance with these regulations, the immigration of

# The Exodus Began and What Did the Pioneers Contribute to It?

## Eli Tzur

This article deals with one of the most crucial periods in Israel's history. In the time between the establishment of the State of Israel and the end of the immigration wave in the summer of 1951, the Jewish population of the state tripled itself and its ethnic composition changed. Instead of continuing as a homogenous population comprised of Jews from Central and Eastern European communities, Jewish immigrants from all the diasporas reached the country. This wave of immigration stemmed from the Zionist obligations to open the gates of the country to every Jew as well as the political leadership's fear that without a rapid population growth the country would collapse. It was almost beyond the country's capabilities to absorb the new immigrants and the pressure threatened to destroy the country. Prime Minister D. Ben-Gurion, who was the main supporter of unlimited immigration, looked for specific groups amongst the country's old-timers who would be willing to support this mass immigration and absorb it so that the general population would also be willing to make sacrifices for the same purpose. It was only natural that Ben-Gurion would turn to the kibbutzim which in the past had been the main group within the Zionist movement who had dealt with immigrant absorption, settlement and security. However, at this point, he discovered that the kibbutzim were not willing to act upon the intentions as he had determined them i.e. volunteer for the purpose which an external body - the government under his leadership - had set. Following the kibbutzim's refusal to act as an absorption contractor, and later to employ immigrants, Ben-Gurion attacked them in the Knesset, in what is known as the 'I am ashamed and shocked' speech. The two major kibbutz movements, *Hakibbutz Haartzi* of *Hashomer-Hatzair* and *Hakibbutz Hameuchad*, though willing to absorb immigrants on their kibbutzim, refused to serve as the absorption contractors of the state. Kibbutz members, tired after a decade of unceasing activism within their respective movements, found it increasingly difficult to lower their already meager lifestyle in order to absorb the newcomers on their kibbutzim. The leadership's argument, that without rapid population growth similar to that of the general population the kibbutzim would lose their relevance - was of no avail. The kibbutzim did not regard Ben-Gurion's demand

Mandatory period, in Palestine. The primary purpose behind the establishment of the Names Committee was national-ideological and political. The Committee functioned as an additional tool for reinforcing Zionist claims to Palestine and for buttressing Jewish positions by amplifying Jewish content and identity in the locale and helping the Jewish population take root in its historic birthplace. This explained the pivotal principle which guided the Committee in designating names - reviving the names of historic Jewish locations in Palestine. It provided a way of symbolizing the continuity between the current Jewish settlers and their historical forefathers and attested to the deep connection between the Jewish people and its land. The sensitivity to the political aspect which was connected with the names blocked the choice of names, even those fitting into a Jewish historical context, if the resultant interpretation could constrict the boundaries of the country. Also, the effort to limit the use of non-Hebrew names for places (that were not connected with the revival of historical names) was a further expression of the effort to award a Hebrew-Jewish identity to the reviving Land of Israel.

The Names Committee did not enjoy full independence in making decisions about names, nor did it have any real means for enforcing its decisions. On the one hand, it had to respond to institutional requests, especially from the JNF, that had been channeled to it. On the other hand, the Names Committee confronted on various occasions the aspirations of settlements whose set of priorities (and sometimes principles) differed from those of the Names Committee. They wanted to mold an alternative content into the name, or use the name to transmit a different message. Thus the settlements refused to accept the names which the Names Committee recommended or even designated in its conclusive decisions and insisted on the names which they wanted. In the long term, the names which the settlements designated for themselves were subsequently recognized by the Israeli Government Names Committee. There is no doubt that the impact of the name in practical usage was more powerful than the formal name.

absolutely renounce all its forms, including individual, group and state terrorism.

The very same day the US Administration concluded that by these words Arafat had fulfilled their pre-conditions for opening an official dialogue with the PLO.

# Who is Responsible for the Outbreak of the 1967 War? The Case of Jordan

### David Bukay

The article tries to investigate the political and military causes, and to find the real reasons that brought about the crisis which started on 14 May and the war which erupted on 5 June 1967. These events, culminated by an inadvertent war, came by surprise, and against all the predictions of the countries involved, on the regional and international levels.

The article analyzes the situations, as well as the motives and opportunities of the players, and maps the reasons for their involvement and intervention accordingly. It concludes by stating that although Syria was responsible for initiating the crisis, Jordan was the main cause for the outbreak of the 1967 War. The inclusion of Jordan in the crisis circle, openly on 30 May, but tacitly from 26 May, drastically changed the whole strategic and military balance of power and brought the war to the point of no return.

Under these conditions, Israel had no choice but to initiate a preemptive war, since all its strategic *casi-belli* were violated and its national security was at stake.

# The Naming of Jewish Settlements in Palestine during the British Mandate

### Yossi Katz

The Names Committee of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) was the first institutional Jewish body in the modern era whose task was to confer names upon Jewish settlements established on nationally owned soil, during the

ties were the last vestige of Jordan's connection with the West Bank. On 7 August 1988 the king stated that 'Jordan has no sovereignty over the West Bank which belongs to the Palestinians in the occupied territories.' It seems that Husayn came to the realization that what remained of his connection to the territories had become more of a burden than an advantage.

3. The Change in the PLO's Strategy - The 19th PNC Resolutions (November 1988): The PNC's aim was 'To move the *Intifada* from the stone-throwing phase to the stage of political initiative whereby the Palestinian leadership should adopt creative and innovative tactics by injecting the political process with a new impetus in order to reach the international conference'. The debate in the PNC revolved around the notion of accepting 'realistic resolutions' which according to *Fatah's* leaders could pave the way for a political solution to the Palestinian issue. On 15 November 1988, the PNC ratified two documents: 'The Declaration of Independence' (of the Filastin state) and 'The Political Statement'. The PNC declared 'The Independence of Filastin' and the establishment of 'The Filastin State on our land, with Jerusalem as its capital' resting its legal basis on the 1947 UN Partition Resolution. For the first time the PLO officially recognized the existence of two states on Palestine Mandate territory - Israel and Filastin - although without specifying their borders.

4. The US Decision to Open an Official Dialogue with the PLO (14 December 1988): This change of policy came about as a result of intensive mediation and unrelenting pressure on Arafat by Sweden and Egypt. Also, in close coordination with the Americans, to consent to the US Administration's conditions for opening an official dialogue, that is, to accept clearly and unequivocally Resolutions 242 and 338, recognizing Israel's right to exist and condemning terrorism. Indeed, at a press conference held in Geneva on 14 December 1988, Arafat declared:

> [...] Yesterday, in my speech (at the UN General Assembly) I made reference to Resolution 181 as the basis for Palestinian independence. I also referred to our acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations with Israel within the framework of an international conference. In my speech yesterday it was also clear that we mean the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security [...] this includes the State of Palestine, Israel and other neighbors, according to Resolutions 242 and 338. As for terrorism [...] I repeat for the record that we totally and

approach produced a compromise whose positive results were seen in the Six Day War. The outcome of this war and the deployment following the French embargo demonstrate that the IDF was well equipped for the war while at the same time an infrastructure for the defense industries was established in Israel.

# The PLO: The Path to Oslo - 1988 A Turning Point
# in the Annals of the New Palestinian National Movement

## Moshe Shemesh

In a historical perspective, the Oslo Agreement between Israel and the PLO is the greatest achievement of the new Palestinian national movement since 1965 when *Fatah* embarked upon its 'armed struggle' against Israel. The Oslo Agreement came about as a result of political and social processes that the Palestinian society underwent and the changes which occurred in the PLO's strategy towards the conflict. Most important, it is also a result of the crises which the Palestinians and their leadership experienced: The 'Black September' of 1970-71, the Lebanese Civil War and the Lebanon War in 1982. The last phase of the PLO's path to the Oslo Agreement was paved by four major events which occurred during 1988. The aim of this article is to survey these events and the processes which led to them:

1. The *Intifada*: Although the *Intifada* broke out on 9 December 1987, its methods and goals only crystallized during the following year. It was an expected and inevitable consequence of the deep political and social processes at work in the territories since their occupation by Israel in June 1967. The *Intifada* was the culmination of these processes and not the start of something new. The *Intifada* years left their impact on both the Palestinians and the Israelis. The *Intifada* signaled and embodied the Palestinian 'social revolution'.

2. Jordan's Disengagement from the West Bank: The *Intifada* proved to King Husayn what had been in fact the reality for many years; that his grip on the West Bank was practically non-existent. Husayn justifiably believed that the *Intifada* could spread to the Palestinian sector of his country, which constituted no less than half of the population, and could thus jeopardize his stable regime. In his 31 July 1988 speech, Husayn announced the official disengagement of Jordan's administrative and legal ties to the West Bank. These

# Oil from Iran: Zvi Doriel's Mission in Tehran 1956-1963
## Part 2: The Operation

### Uri Bialer

The second part of the article describes Z. Doriel's role in initiating and implementing Israel's strategic decision made in the wake of the Sinai Campaign of 1956 to make Iran the cornerstone of its oil supply. The article highlights the difficulties and opportunities Doriel faced in Tehran. In so doing it illuminates the various endeavors which culminated in a strategic oil supply agreement signed in 1963 which in fact signaled his success.

# The Foundations for Defense R&D and Industries:
## Policies and Budget Aspects

### Yitzhak Greenberg

The Defense Industries in Israel have attained remarkable achievements. Their technical innovations and products are world-famous. These industries have supplied the IDF with many weapon systems and have become important exporters of arms. The foundations for defense Research and Development, as well as the infrastructure for the Israel Defense Industries, were all laid before the advent of the Six Day War. This development was made possible due to the far-sighted concept which directed the heads of the Defense Ministry, particularly the Defense Minister himself, David Ben-Gurion, and his deputy Shimon Peres. Ben-Gurion's attitude was to promote and enhance scientific research and its application to military functions. He believed that local development of unique and advanced means was an essential component of Israel's security. But he took no cognizance of economic aspects or budget considerations. The Army General Staff had other considerations than those of the Defense Ministry. By and large, the General Staff had serious reservations about heavy investment in R&D and local defense production. The General Staff preferred to build up the IDF combat units and supply appropriate answers to immediate threats by purchasing warfare systems abroad instead of allocating resources for R&D. These differences of

Establishing *Chedek* in Haifa and *Machleket Hamechkar* in Jerusalem indicates the accelerated pace of the offensive strategy of the *Hasbara* within the *Haganah*, despite the paradox that this strategy was based on improvisation and a lack of centralization of the *Hasbara* during this period.

# Operation 'Olive Branch'

## Mordechai Bar-On

During the night of 11-12 December 1955 an Israeli commando force attacked the Syrian positions along the north-eastern shores of Lake Kinneret. From the purely military point of view the operation was a great success for the Israeli units, for in a simultaneous surprise night attack all the Syrian positions, from the entrance of the River Jordan into the lake in the north up to the armistice demarcation line near Kibbutz Ein-Gev were conquered and demolished. Fifty-four Syrians were killed, thirty were taken prisoners and a large amount of weapons fell into the hands of the Israelis. Six Israeli soldiers fell in the battle, including one of the company commanders.

Despite the tactical success, the operation was looked upon with great disdain by many circles in Israel. There had apparently been no provocation from the Syrians which could warrant an operation of such scope and the Cabinet members had not been consulted and were angry at the procedural mishap. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Sharett, who was in Washington at the time making efforts to receive a positive American reply to Israel's request for heavy armament, considered it 'A stab in the back'. Indeed, the motive behind the decision to attack the Syrians was an attempt to provoke Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had signed a mutual defense treaty with Syria only a few weeks earlier, and drag him into an all out war. This article analyzes the rationale of the operation and the political context within which it was carried out. The author reports in great detail the development of the battle and examines its effect on Israel's foreign relations as well as internal political debates. The description of the battle relies heavily on the investigation conducted by the author immediately after the troops returned to their base, when he was Head of the Historical Branch of the IDF.

movement, which bore the burden of the struggle against Britain, would achieve Rome's intentions in the area.

The author also draws attention to Italy's propaganda efforts - especially from the Bari Wireless Station - as well as the intelligence and socio-economic involvement, which led to an escalation among the militant members of the Palestinian national movement. These activities made it far more difficult for the British military forces and the British civil administration to suppress the Arab revolt, as was reflected during the brutal events of this militant conflict.


# Research of Morale in the *Haganah*

## Zafrira Dean

Those in charge of *Hasbara* were fully sensitive to the subject of morale in the *Shura* ('rank and file'); they were also fully aware that operative conclusions for future use could be derived from their activities. Therefore, they instituted research of their methods on factors that influence morale. Two separate organizations were successfully initiated in different regions of the country, despite the harsh conditions which prevailed at the beginning of the War of Independence.

In February 1948, *Chedek* (*Cheker da'at kahal* - public opinion research) was founded in the Haifa District while at about the same time *Machleket Hamechkar* (Research Department) was established in the Jerusalem District. The almost simultaneous founding of both bodies, which sprang from similar local needs, was a sign of a stage in the development of the *Haganah* which showed it was maturing as a fighting force. Both research bodies were deliberately created within the *Hasbara* departments, since their purpose was to see that their research and findings were implemented by the *Hasbara* whose main task was to influence morale.

In contrast to *Machleket Hamechkar* which was headed by Prof. Louis Guttman, a noted leader in social studies research, *Chedek* researchers were not trained to use a representative sample of those interviewed, nor of formulating neutral questions, although these techniques had already been known for years in the scientific community. But both units, despite their close ties with *Hasbara* personnel, maintained the principles of autonomy and thus avoided receiving orders from the implementing authorities.

# Seven Steps: David Ben-Gurion's Way to Statehood, 1936-1948

Meir Avizohar

The article opens with a quotation from a letter by Chaim Arlozorov to Chaim Weizmann in the Spring of 1932 illustrating how painful was the writer's frustration with the impasse in which Zionism had been caught, specifically the dwindling immigration paired with the growing needs of the masses of European Jews to emigrate. Arlozorov suggested that Jewish leadership take control of the government of Palestine by a military coup, in order to facilitate Jewish majority in the country. He himself admitted that such a scheme was virtually impossible.

Comparing such a *cri de coup* to Ben-Gurion's persistent level headed approach to statehood, which he launched four years later, helps the reader to get the right perspective in order to evaluate Ben-Gurion's achievement. His starting point was a speech delivered on 9 March 1936 at his party's council in which he called for the adoption of 'A policy for a Jewish State'.

This article outlines seven stages that followed the speech and ended twelve years later on 14 May 1948 when Israel's Independence Declaration was proclaimed by Ben-Gurion himself. This came about as a result of a unique interaction between strong convictions and a realistic appreciation of relevant trends and forces in the turbulent years of appeasement towards the Arab rebellion of 1936-1939, World War II and the struggle against the British anti-Zionist policy of the post-war Labour government.

# Italy's Involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939

Jacob Markovizky

This article focuses on Italian activities in Palestine during 1936-1939. At the time, the authorities in Rome were resolved to weaken Britain's strategic position in the Middle East. This goal was influenced by a Realpolitik conception which emphasized the process whereby aiding the Arab national

# ABSTRACTS

## To Ascend a Mountain Pushing a Rock and To Let It Tumble Down: Initial Facets of Israeli Education Historiography

Rachel Elboim-Dror

The article is divided into three parts: First, the conceptual framework is presented and discussed, focusing on the different meanings of objectivity in history.

Second, different phases in the development of education historiography in Palestine and the State of Israel, from the middle of the 19th century till the 80s are analyzed. These include proto-history in the pre-Zionist period; participants-historians of Hebrew education during the pre-State period; historical research beginning to establish procedural standards at the end of the *Yishuv* period and the initial State period and the first scientific historical studies during the 70s and the 80s.

Despite this evolution, education history has always been discussed within the framework of the Zionist heroic drama of return and revival.

The third and last part discusses some features of historiography during the 90s and presents seven suggestions for future research, including: Attention to non-linear processes; overall systems view; economic factors as important but not determinative ones; declared priorities versus actual priorities; hidden actors; experiments with virtual history; and furthermore self-subversion by the historians themselves - as expressed in the metaphoric title of the article.