ABSTRACTS

'He Demanded of the Writers to Convey a Historical Outlook to the People...'

S. Yizhar

In 1991, S. Yizhar, the author, participated in a workshop that took place in Sede-Boqer, that was entitled: 'D. Ben-Gurion and Hebrew Literature'. This essay is based on his reminiscencing there.

Following a great deal of persuasion, the author was convinced to become a Knesset member on *Mapai's* ticket, headed by D. Ben-Gurion. It turned out that the author was too much of an individualist for political life and there was too big a void between the young writer and Ben-Gurion and his associates, for there also existed a two-generations gap between them.

Only later did Yizhar grow closer to Ben-Gurion, in the days when public opinion tended to blame the leader for being unjust in the Lavon affair, and he lost a great deal of his power and influence. The general attitude was that 'a king cannot be right'. But Yizhar himself was convinced – in contrast to the general feeling at the time – that Ben-Gurion then was like King Lear, on the run but in the right.

Coming closer to Ben-Gurion, Yizhar became acquainted with some of his characteristics and attitudes. Ben-Gurion was certain that nothing of importance had occurred in Jewish history since the days of the First Temple until the establishment of the State of Israel. He admired the Youth and was unwilling to see any flaws in them. In literature he saw only the ideology and its power to mobilize.

Ben-Gurion's strength lay in his all encompassing historical perspective which enabled him to disregard day to day pressures. He demanded of writers to convey this historical outlook to the people. But the author believes that a writer's interests lie in life's daily trials and tribulations.

The essay ends with a recounting of how Ben-Gurion convinced a group of tired fighters – who came to him from the besieged Negev to complain of harsh and impossible conditions – to forget their grievances while he challenged them with the great vision of a deep-sea port that would be developed in Eilat, following the end of the War of Independence.

The Lady and the Maidservant

Amos Oz

The great dramas that preceeded the establishment of the State of Israel, and those that came in its wake, gave rise to a normative-ecstatic trend in Hebrew literature side by side with the descriptive-observer trend.

The former trend demanded that literature become one of the means for shaping the citizen and forming the collective consciousness. This trend exists in every society that has ambitions to change the world. The latter trend was more hesitant and kept a certain distance away. The struggle between the two trends expressed itself first and foremost in the contention for linguistic ideology. The first believed that the language of literature should be normative and its function is to enrich the people's language. Whereas the others leaned towards the mimetic. Their goal was to listen intently to what went on in the spoken language.

In the essay before us, the author illustrates this point with several examples by some of the most prominent modern Hebrew poets and writers: S.Y. Agnon, Nathan Altermann, Haim Guri and Yehuda Amichai.

None of the trends express an attitude of hostility towards the state. There is doubt, irony and distance. The final debate lies with the question who is the Lady and who is the Maidservant – the State or Literature? Who exists for whom? The conclusion is that the breach does not necessarily run between different literary groups but at times the split is found within one poet.

This essay is based on a paper presented by the author at the conference: 'Shaping the Israeli Citizen', organized by the Ben-Gurion Research Center in April, 1988.

The Arab Invasion of 15 May, 1948

Yoav Gelber

The Arab states abstained for several months from overt military involvement in the Palestine campaign and decided, instead, to establish a volunteers' army organized by the Arab League. However, the defeats sustained by the Palestinians and the Arab Liberation Army in April 1948, gradually forced them to consider direct action of their regular armies to check the Jewish offensive and to prevent a total collapse and further exodus of Palestinians to their countries.

The Arab leaders ultimately decided to dispatch their armies to Palestine after a series of deliberations in Amman and Cairo in late April. Early in May, the Arab Chiefs of Staff discussed in Damascus the plans for the invasion and modified them several times. The principal reason for these changes was the conflicting interests and mutual distrust of the various rulers, that overruled the creation of a stable coalition, an agreed plan and a unified supreme command.

The *Yishuv's* intelligence services, the *Shai*, the intelligence at the *Hagannah's* general staff and the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, were late to realize the process that led to the invasion and to comprehend its significance. They knew about the Arab leaders' conferences but not about their contents. The gaps of information were bridged by rumours and estimations that were seldom more than wild guesses. Suspicions of Britain's intentions, and deep-rooted self-conviction of a British conspiracy to frustrate the Partition and the establishment of a Jewish state, helped to bias their evaluations.

Pre-dispositions, prejudices, lack of vital knowledge and poor quality of the existing information hampered the forecasts as to the Arab armies' intentions, objectives, movements and orders of battle. The mistaken estimations and predictions prior to the invasion considerably delayed and distorted the true understanding of the situation in the field after the attack. The intelligence failures of May 1948 precipitated Ben-Gurion's decision to reform the intelligence community, to cancel the *Shai* and to establish separate military, political and internal security intelligence services.

Israel's Struggle to Thwart UN Resolutions on the Internationalization of Jerusalem in the 1950s

Zaki Shalom

On 29 November, 1947, the General Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine. Under part III of the Partition Resolution it was stated that: 'The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime, and shall be administered by the United Nations...' The Jewish leadership, following bitter debates and hesitations, expressed its willingness to accept the Partition Resolution, including the internationalization of Jerusalem, as a price for obtaining an independent Jewish state.

The Arab-Israeli war which erupted shortly after the Partition Resolution was adopted by the General Assembly, led to a *de facto* partition of the City of Jerusalem, between Israel and Trans-Jordan.

On 9 December, 1949, the General Assembly again affirmed its call for the

internationalization of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum*. Shocked and agitated by this resolution which was supported by an extremely rare combination of Moslem, Christian and Communist states, the Government of Israel, led by Prime Minister D. Ben-Gurion, adopted a resolution of its own, to transfer the Knesset and Government ministries, (except the Foreign Office), to Jerusalem.

This decision was strongly criticised by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett and other ministers. The decision, they argued, would unnecessarily bring Israel into an encounter with the 'whole world'.

In this article, the author analyzes the main considerations which led Ben-Gurion to adopt such a resolution. It is an attempt to prove that contrary to the arguments of his opponents, Ben-Gurion's decision to move the Knesset and Government offices to Jerusalem, was the result of thorough and careful deliberations on his part.

Eventually, the article concludes, it could hardly be doubted that that daring decision efficiently served Israeli interests to thwart the long-enduring intentions within the international community, to weaken Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem.

Was the Year 1933 a Turning Point in the Zionist Immigration Policy?

Aviva Halamish

The article poses the question, whether the multiple dramatic events which took place during 1933 in Germany, (Hitler's rise to power), in Palestine, (massive Jewish immigration) and in the World Zionist Organization, (the Labour Movement's victory in the elections to the Zionist Congress), caused changes in the Zionist immigration policy.

This question is tackled on both the ideological and the political levels. From the very beginning of its activity in Palestine, the WZO adhered to the principle that the rate and composition of Jewish immigration to Palestine should be determined by the needs of the colonization enterprise carried out in that country, and was dependent on the amount of money invested there. In 1922 the WZO had accepted the principle laid down by the British Government, that the criterion for the regulation of immigration into Palestine was the economic absorptive capacity of the country.

The initial reaction of Zionist leaders to the events in 1933 included non-Zionist solutions to the problem of German Jewry. However, those ideas were quickly abandoned, to give way to political actions directed by the notion that

the disaster of the Jews in the Diaspora should serve as means for promoting the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. Thus, rather than causing a change in the Zionist immigration policy, the 1933 events enabled the execution of the basic Zionist principles.

The main conclusions presented in the article are: 1) 1933 was not a turning point in the Zionist immigration policy. The needs of Eretz-Israel continued to be the primary and guiding principle, with Diaspora Jewry being viewed as a reservoir for the Zionist enterprise. Moreover, the WZO insisted on regulating the immigration to Eretz-Israel by the economic absorptive capacity, after the British had substituted it by a political criterion. 2) The changes which did take place in the rate, geographical origin and class composition of Jewish immigration to Eretz-Israel, were the result of political and economic developments in Europe and Eretz-Israel , and were initiated by the British, who imposed their immigration policy on the WZO or carried it out in spite of the WZO's objection.

D. Ben-Gurion's Geographic-Settlement Concept and the Development of the Negev, 1948–1952

Chanina Porat

During the course of the War of Independence, David Ben-Gurion encouraged the establishment of settlements in the Negev. The settling of the Negev coincided with his ideas of 'Population Dispersal' for the absorption of the thousands of new immigrants and fulfilled a security role. Ben-Gurion's conflicts with [UN] mediator Bernadotte, made clear to the world the importance of the Negev for the Jews. In discussions on the subject of the abandoned lands of the Negev, the conflict of Ben-Gurion with *Mapam*, his chief rival, was disclosed. The institutions which he established, as well as the government policy, were meant to undermine the preeminent position of *Mapam* in the Ministry of Agriculture which was responsible for the abandoned lands and the settlement of the Bedouins.

Ben-Gurion challenged scientists to reveal the industrial and mining potentials of the Negev. The establishment of the 'Negev Council', the *Gadna*, the *Nahal* and the *Shahal*, all enabled him to advance the settlement of the Negev. The showpiece of his Geographic-Settlement concept was the city and port of Eilat. This was a preferred area for development and settlement as it was the gateway of the young state to Asia and Africa.

The Jewish Settlement in the Etzion Bloc 1967–1970:
The Final Product and the Original Plan

Yossi Katz and Shalom Reichman

The Eztion Bloc was the first region in Judea and Samaria where Jewish Settlement commenced following the Six Days War in 1967. The initiative was led by the sons and daughters of the 1948 Etzion Bloc settlers, most of whom were killed in the War of Independence. They yearned to return home and to renew the Etzion Bloc settlement exactly as it had originally been until the War of Independence – a concentration of several closely situated small rural settlements.

Soon after the 1967 War, the Israeli Government approved the settlers' plans, thus allowing the rebuilding of the first renewed settlement in the bloc – 'Kfar Etzion'. However, already in 1967, at the request of the Government, the Jewish Agency drew up plans for the establishment of additional settlements, joining up one after another in a line with the *moshavim* in the Adulam region in the west, (i.e. not in a separate compact bloc as the settlers had planned). Thus filling in with the essential development plan of the hilly region west of the Etzion Bloc.

In the course of time, the Etzion Bloc developed not as a line of settlements joined to the *moshavim* in the west, but separately as a compact bloc comprising up to 1970 of two *kibbutizim* and a regional-centre settlement, where the *Hesder Yeshiva* is also situated, (*Yeshiva* combining military service).

The explanation for the difference between the eventual development and the Government plan, may be found in a major government policy change, automatically affecting the Jewish Agency as well, regarding the purpose of resettling the Etzion Bloc. The original policy had viewed it as a symbolic act for which Kfar Etzion by itself would suffice. However, the newly amended purpose was demographic-security related requiring the full re-population of the hills of the original Etzion Bloc, and the re-establishment of the bloc not in a line reaching the upper-plane *moshavim* but a compact bloc.

Thus, although differently motivated, the plans of the initial re-settlers matched the eventual outcome carried out by the Government and the Jewish Agency.

David Ben-Gurion and Pinhas Lavon – Two Approaches in Labour Economy Thought

Yitzhak Greenberg

In this article, the author analyzes the differences in the approaches of David Ben-Gurion and Pinhas Lavon with regard to the Labour Economy (*Hevrat Ha'ovdim*). Both served as Secretary-General of the *Histadrut* and their views and activities greatly influenced the enterprises of the Labour Economy.

The differences in their approaches were reflected in the goals, the economic policy and the organizational systems of the Labour Economy. Ben-Gurion stressed the acceleration of the development of Labour Economy and the absorption of new immigrants. However, industrial democracy did not merit much of his attention. Lavon, in contrast, attached great importance to the subject of industrial democracy and to the involvment of the labourers within their working places. Though Lavon did appreciate the role which Labour Economy had in establishing the territorial and demographic infrastructure of the Jews in Eretz-Israel, he emphasized this less than Ben-Gurion.

Ben-Gurion's thinking about the Labour Economy grew out of the economic, social and political conditions of Eretz-Israel. Basically, his approach was pragmatic. Lavon's approach, taking into consideration the constructive goals of the Labour movement, rested upon universal principles.

Employment in Ashkelon in 1980

Gideon M. Kressel

Anthropoligical investigation into the reasons for the high rate of unemployment among the population of south Ashkelon shows the interplay of several factors:

a) From 1950–1977, in accord with the indulgent socialist governmental policy if a town had not reached the economic take-off point, an artificial structure of employment was created, essentially based on the infusion of 'money for all' provided by government ministries. After the *Likud* party victory in 1977, this infusion was severely reduced.

b) Arab workers from the nearby Gaza Strip were willing to accept conditions of overwork and underpayment, which were unacceptable to the Jewish workers. This lowered the wages of unskilled labourers and hurt the status of manual labour in the eyes of the Jewish population.

c) Most job offers were usually filled along ethnic lines. Since those in unskilled and semi-skilled positions were first and second-generation children of immigrants from Middle Eastern lands it is clear that they were the most vulnerable group having to compete with Arab labour.

d) Performance of manual labour along-side a growing number of Arabs, embarrassed the Jewish immigrants from Arab lands. Their collective rights and status among the Arabs had been upheld due to the Arabs' confinement to more undignified occupations. These Jews now felt let down by the Jewish state.

e) Poor motivation to achieve via manual labour, influenced by the diasporic traditions of employment that most residents of south Ashkelon neighbourhoods brought with them as immigrants, had been changing during decades of working with fellow Jews only. However, manual labour took on an undesirable connotation since the *Ashkenazi* establishment directed newcomers to enter such infrastructure ('primary') work, while they, themselves, were first to quit those professions.

f) In the latter 1970s, the diminuation of support to failing manufacturing concerns was not applied in the social sphere. This allowed people to live off their meagre government stipends than accept manual work and its poor conditions.

g) To quit the circle of manual labourers required the financial resources to open an independent shop or to acquire new professional skills. The majority of workers of south Ashkelon could not afford those resources. They switched to operating a small stall in the marketplace, having National Insurance and unemployment allowances to fall back on.

h) Local consumer culture in Ashkelon's southern neighbourhoods lagged behind that of the central Dan region. Moreover, goods could easily be obtained in Ashkelon without too much effort via the leniently-handled criminal sub-culture – so there was no point in working too hard.

Between Micah Joseph Berdichevsky and David Ben-Gurion

Avner Holtzman

David Ben-Gurion belonged to a group of Second *Aliya* leaders who, according to their own testimony, were fascinated by the writings of Micah Joseph

Berdichevsky, a key figure in the development of modern Hebrew literature and secular Jewish thought. This article tries to mark the areas in which Berdichevsky's influence is visible in the thought of the young Ben-Gurion. It also tries to distinguish the parts of Berdichevsky's vision with which Ben-Gurion could identify, from the parts he rejected. The textual analysis concentrates on the early writings of David Ben-Gurion: His early letters, (from 1904 onwards), and the first group of articles he published in Eretz-Israel since 1910.

In this corpus one can point out 'Berdichevskian' features in three of David Ben-Gurion's basic beliefs:

a) The concept of the need to revolutionize the Jewish way of existence by replacing its spiritual characteristics with healthy, natural earthly life on its own soil, according to the ancient model of Jewish national independence in the Second Temple period.

b) The assumption that the fate of the Zionist enterprise will be determined only by those individuals who will immigrate to Eretz-Israel and not by declarations of leaders and organizations in the diaspora.

c) The belief that the revival of the Jewish people in their land must be built on a secular national basis, preventing any kind of intervention by the Jewish orthodoxy.

On the other hand, Ben-Gurion could not accept at least three other main characteristics of Berdichevsky's thought:

a) Ben-Gurion's Socialist belief was opposed to Berdichevsky's deep suspicion towards Socialism, its leaders and its parties.

b) Ben-Gurion's consistent efforts to unite the Jewish public in Eretz-Israel, under professional, social and national frameworks contradicted Berdichevsky's reservation towards any kind of organization which limits individual autonomy.

c) Ben-Gurion's determined secularity was far from Berdichevsky's complex and ambivalent attitude towards Jewish religion and tradition.

A detailed comparative examination of the concepts of these two figures and their beliefs as reflected in their writings, shows the difference between their ways of thinking. Berdichevsky, as a thinker, could hold on to his pure idealistic values, while Ben-Gurion, as a political leader, acknowledged the need to compromise from time to time, with the heights of his vision, for the sake of achieving practical political goals.

Altruism Versus Egoism in Bialik's Poetry and its Russian Context

Hamutal Bar-Yosef

Bialik's poetry has traditionally been interpreted in terms of the conflict between 'national' and 'individual' experiences. This tension can be viewed as part of a broader, philosophical system of values common to Russian and Jewish thought at the turn of the 20th century. In its center there stood a moral tension between the belief in altruism and togetherness, axiomatic for Russian literature and thought in the 1880s on the one hand, and the consciousness of egoism, or even its moral legitimation, penetrating Russia in the last decade of the 19th century, on the other hand.

Egoism as a moral problem has a long history in West-European thought, and its legitimation may be scaled as 'weaker' or 'stronger'. Stronger legitimation of egoism developed in West-European literature influenced by Decadence and by Nietzschean ideas at the end of the 19th century. It is important to distinguish between Romantic individualism and Decadent moral egotism based on psychological subjectivism, leading to the negation of nationalism and collective experiences.

In Russia, Decadence and Symbolism created a deeper crisis of values than in the West, because of a special national slavophile tradition, elevating the value of altruism and togetherness (sobornost'), and because of the belief in the moral superiority of the Russian people over the West.

Bialik began his literary career in the early 1890s, when Russia was just beginning to absorb Decadent literary influences together with its psychological and moral assumptions.

In Bialik's poetry one can see a development leading from expressions of belief in the power of mercy, altruism and togetherness towards expressions of fear from the choking, self destructive character of altruism, a refusal to take part in altruism and togetherness and even legitimation of the egotistic self image. This development and the tension between the two inclinations is reflected, among others, in his use of apostrophe addressing 'my brother(s)' and in the image of 'tear'.

Bialik's moral philosophy was influenced by the cultural atmosphere in Russia at the turn of the century, an atmosphere of growing consciousness to egoism as an elementary drive. Together with hisorical facts (the pogroms), this is the spiritual background to the change in his and his contemporaries' view concerning national aggression.

The Appearance and Disappearance
of the Monthly *Ha'adama*

Pinhas Ginossar

In the years 1919–1921 three literary monthly magazines were published in Eretz-Israel : *Haezrach* which was the voice of a right-wing political body; *Ma'abarot* which expressed the views of *Hapoel Hatzair* party and *Ha'adama* which voiced the views of *Achdut Ha'avoda* organization. All three papers were sponsored and published by their respective parties. At the same time, other literary periodicals, which were politically unaffiliated stopped appearing. The monthly *Ha'adama* was the spearhead of the Labour movement's struggle for the precedence over the Hebrew cultural arena. This monthly first made its appearance in the last quarter of 1919. Its publication terminated at the end of January 1921.

The match between the editor, Yosef Chaim Brenner, and *Achdut Ha'avoda* was the best match possible. On the one hand was the unrivaled leader of the creative writers in the land, and on the other the broadest framework of the Labour movement.

The editor and the publisher supported each other but the tension between them was intrinsic. The publishers, tolerant and admiring as they were of the editor, had their own sensitiveness which they could not deny, particularly in a publication for which they were responsible. The editor, on his part, insisted that a work of art was entitled to and deserved full freedom of expression.

The monthly brought writers and poets into closer contact with the Labour movement, but mostly cultivated authors from amongst the labourers themselves, and fulfilled a vital role in the creation of an alternative culture of the Eretz-Israeli worker.

Though the journals were published in Eretz-Israel, most of the potential readers of the Hebrew literary magazines dwelled in Central and Eastern Europe. It was economics that played a significant role in the demise of *Ha'adama* and the other Hebrew publications. For, in 1921–1922 the readers in those countries in Europe, where the local currencies were at a very low rate, could not afford to pay for the imported printed papers from countries of hard currencies (i.e. the dollar and the sterling).

The Historical Continuity Motif in Conservative Judaism's Concept of Israel

Allon Gal

Philosophically believing in the historic development of Jewish religion and civilization – Conservative Zionists in the United States were immersed in the cultural treasures of this very history as it evolved across the generations. Moreover, as a minority in their own country, the tortured history of the Jews among oppressive majorities was constantly against their eyes. Consequently, Conservative Zionist thought demonstrated two distinctive features: 1) A deep concern that Israeli culture be linked to the entire, generationally-enriched, cultural heritage of the Jewish people – lest it would not be validly Jewish. 2) A compassionate urge to heed the lessons of the long and agonizing exilic past – lest Israeli society not be properly ethical.

Israel's difficulties since the Yom Kippur War made Conservative Zionists conceive Israel as a 'Minority State' intimately related to exilic history. On the other hand, the long Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Lebanon War and the shift to the right in the Israeli political and cultural makeup, have all influenced the Conservative Zionists to view the state as distancing itself from both the exilic legacy and present diaspora sensibilities.

From a Socialist Party to a Political Party

Israel Kollat

The starting point of this essay is a review of several new publications on the history of the Labour Movement in Eretz-Israel. It examines the personal motivations to write this history and the public need to encounter the political tradition with the historical realities.

The history of the Labour Movement is discussed against the different attitudes towards the state and the political party in the various socialist traditions and their confrontation with the actual developments of the parties in Europe.

The Israeli Labour Movement inherited a negative attitude to the party as such and an inclination towards decentralization and direct democracy as well as to cooperation, mutual aid and labour economy. On the other hand it played a

major role in the creation of the Jewish polity and in economic growth. Out of these different trends the political party emerged as a major factor which proved more viable than the *Histadruth*, which embodied the idea of a labour community, and perhaps even more than the Socialist idea.

The review of the publications discusses the intricate relations between the political party, the *Histadruth* and the *Kibbutz* movement. It follows the various explanation of the split in *Mapai* in 1942/4 and turns the attention not only to the inner dissensions but also to the predominent role which *Mapai* played in forging the Jewish political community in Eretz-Israel and its influence on the political life in the State of Israel.

The Revisionist Movement and the Labour Movement –
The Problem of the Delineation of Parameters

Yechiam Weitz

In this article two issues are addressed: One is a profile of the Revisionist movement as it appears in a plethora of studies which have been published over the past few years. What arises is a complex, multifaceted, tension filled movement in conflict. This is a very different profile from the united and monistic one that party members had attempted to describe. Furthermore, there is an attempt to map out and explain the internal conflicts.

The second issue is an analysis of the relationship between the Revisionist and the Labour movements. For the past few years this relationship has been described less as a 'break' or a 'large gap' and more by the use of complex terms. This change is due to: 1) When the Revisionist movement is described by more complex, ambivalent terms it is more difficult to portray its relationship with the Labour movement in simple and direct terms. 2) The many studies conducted during the past few years about David Ben-Gurion point to the fact that despite his expressions of hatred towards Revisionism and the 'Herut Movement', his political and even personal attitude towards this movement was more complex. In this connection it is important to examine his attitude towards the issue of 'the speed of fulfilling socialism' and to his order of priorities in fulfilling the Zionist and the Socialist ideologies. 3) From the latest studies of *Mapai* and the internal conflicts within the Labour movement – particularly during the 1940s and 50s – it appears that the largest part of the political and ideological tension during those years was between the different parts of the Labour movement itself and

not between the Labour movement and its rivals from the Right. Also, that there were issues in which *Mapai's* position was closer to that of the Revisionists and the 'Herut Movement' than to the Zionist Left.

The article concludes with the argument that the many new facets appearing in research about the two movements are a basis for delineating the new complex and synthetic parameters within which one may understand and clarify the relationship between the two movements.

The Conflict Between Zionism and Traditionalism Before World War I

Jehuda Reinharz

The seeds of conflict between traditional Judaism and secular-political Zionism were inherent in the Zionist idea itself. The conflict between adherents of traditional Judaism – who variously opposed the movement or affiliated themselves with it – and secular nationalists – who variously perceived religion as synonymous with the spirit of the ghetto and therefore an anathema, or sought to incorporate, in varying degrees, aspects of the Jewish traditional past into the new culture of the renascent homeland – shaped the development of the movement.

The newly shaped Hebrew culture and society in Palestine drew its spiritual sustenance from ancient sources and, while negating traditional Judaism, clung to its foundations. This dynamic inevitably caused much soul-searching on the part of individuals as well as society as a whole.

But wide-ranging and conflicting responses and soul-searching were not unique to the secular Zionist camp. Zionism was taken seriously by the Orthodox from the outset. Some regarded it as their mortal enemy. Some spiritual leaders had stated well before the advent of political Zionism that Jews had to hope and pray for their return to Zion, but actively to accelerate the redemption was a sin and strictly prohibited. Accordingly, Zionism was interpreted as the most recent and the least reputable of a long series of catastrophic pseudo-messianic attempts to forestall the redemption through human action, and the religious sages of Eastern Europe joined in a chorus of condemnation. Yet, when all was said and done, there was still the religious obligation in the Bible to settle in the Land of Israel, and the issue continued to trouble the Orthodox camp.

This essay examines the conflict between Zionism and traditionalism before World War I, against the backdrop of developments in the World Zionist Organization and particularly those in Palestine. What emerged from the clash of diversely singleminded, ardent positions was a highly pluralistic society. Adherents of the various positions shared a common ultimate perspective only because and insofar as it was not clearly focused. Only by concentrating their rival, absolute idealogical claims on limited, immediate tasks, that could be pursued side by side, were the jostling parties saved from frontal clashes.

The Entry of *Haredim* into the Government Coalition in Light of Their Response to the Yom Kippur War

Charles S. Liebman

In 1977, *Agudat Israel*, at that time the only political party representing the *haredi* sector of Israel's Jewish population, reversed a policy to which it had adhered since 1953 not to participate in Israeli governments, and agreed to join the new *Likud* led government. This reversal of policy has been explained by one author as a reflection of the growing economic needs of the *haredim* for greater public subsidies and by another author as a reflection of the *haredi* preference for right wing parties. The present article argues that an additional factor was the *haredi* response to the Yom Kippur War which created a far greater sense of identity between the *haredi* public and the remainder of Israeli society.

The war, in *haredi* eyes, signalled the bankruptcy of Zionism with its promise of physical security, self-reliance, and the possibility of Jews living a normal existence. *Haredim* were convinced that the war demonstrated to the secular as well as the religious, that Israel was incapable of defending itself, that it could not rely on the power of its armed forces, and only God's miraculous intervention saved the Jews from destruction. The suffering that the war imposed upon the Jews served to integrate the state into the rhythms of Jewish history whereas God's active intervention suggested the possibility that the state's existence did have some transcendent meaning – that its instrumentalities might be used to further *Torah* and tradition.

Dr. Moshe Sneh's Pro-Soviet Actions in 1949 – The Way to the Left, Background and Ideological Motives

Meir Avizohar

In the Archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, four letters have recently been found. These were sent from Tel-Aviv to Moscow, in 1949, reporting interviews with Dr. Moshe Sneh, who was then one of the leaders of *Mapam*. In two of the letters, it is reported that Dr. Sneh informed a Soviet diplomat that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) intended to attack, shortly, positions of the Syrian Army. The article discusses the background to the interviews and rejects the explanation that these meetings were a case of espionage and betrayal.

It is the author's view that Dr. Sneh was convinced that he was acting in the vital service of the Jewish people and the State of Israel by starting a process of confidence building between the Kremlin and himself and his party. The local development can be interpreted as following the universal phenomenon in the Communist Left – transferring the focus from the socio-economic issues to the international struggle between the East and the West culminating in the Cold War.

The author of this essay has found that Dr. Sneh acted according to a prognosis of a Third World War soon to break out and which was to result in a Soviet victory.

The Splitting of *Kibbutz* Ein-Harod

Eyal Kafkafi

The *Kibbutz Me'uchad* (K.M.) formed the largest framework within the *Kibbutz* Movement. In 1951, it split between 60 percent of the members who remained faithful to the United Workers Party, *Mapam*, which was pro-Soviet and the other 40 percent who were loyal to the Eretz-Israel Workers' Party, *Mapai*, which was pro-West. *Mapai*, at the time, was the ruling party in the State of Israel. The Cold War between the Eastern and Western blocs was the main background to the fall-out between the factions.

The *Kibbutz Me'uchad* evolved in Ein-Harod which also became its 'capital'. There was also a local and historical setting for the eventual split. Also, a unique situation developed in Ein-Harod.

From the time of its establishment in 1924–25, *Kibbutz* Ein-Harod was hard-hit by the serious conflict which erupted between the minority which was driven

by political aspirations, and which became the leadership of the *Kibbutz Me'uchad*, and the majority of the members who wished to concentrate all efforts in working on the productive units of the *kibbutz* itself and were opposed to the ambitions of the leaders of the *Kibbutz Me'uchad*.

In 1944, a new phase in the feud emerged which was to lead directly to the final split in 1951–53.

The split in Ein-Harod was unique due to the fact that in all other cases of fall-outs amongst members of a *kibbutz*, the majority would remain in their original place and the minority would move elsewhere. In Ein-Harod the majority supported *Mapai*. But *Mapam* members of the *Kibbutz Me'uchad* demanded that the local majority leave for they claimed that Ein-Harod was the 'Mecca' of the *Kibbutz Me'uchad*.

The conflict turned bitter. Parents confronting their children and teachers opposing their pupils. It even went so far as to become violent. *Mapam* supporters hoped to become the majority, believing that some of the older *Mapai* people would tire of the struggle. They were also encouraged by the fact that forty sons of *Mapai* members actually joined *Mapam*.

The Establishment of the PLO

Arie Boaz

The developments in the Arab world at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s brought about new ideas as to the revival of the 'Palestinian Entity'. In September 1963, the Egyptians initiated the appointment of Ahmed Shoukeiri as the 'Palestinian Representative' to the Arab League.

In May 1964, Shoukeiri convened in Jerusalem, the First Palestinian Conference and declared the establishment of the 'Palestinian Liberation Organization' (PLO).

Egypt regarded this step as a reasonable substitute for going to war with Israel. Jordan which had consistently objected to any expression of self-determination on the part of the Palestinians – gave its consent to the founding of the PLO under the assumption that this set-up was fictitious and would in no way threaten Jordan itself.

With the founding of the PLO, an important principle was established for the first time, according to which a Palestinian political body was to exist and which would serve as one representative framework for all Palestinians, with an accepted leadership and which would strive for an autonomous position in the Arab world.

Interestingly enough, it was the establishment of the PLO which placed the Palestinian issue on the Arab and international agenda as a political problem and not solely as a refugee problem — which later gave credibility and legitimation to the existence of the *Fedayiin* organizations. The institutional-organizational self-structure of the Palestinians in 1964, and the 'revolutionary' facet of the 'armed struggle' which the *Fedayiin* organization contributed to the PLO, when they overtook, in the summer of 1968, the organizational framework Shoukeiri had established. This combination is what turned the PLO into the complete organization as it is known to us today.

The National Dilemma of the Arab Christians in Jerusalem and the West Bank

Daphne Tsimhoni

This article examines the national dilemma of the Arab Christians, a small but influential minority within the Palestinian society in Jerusalem and the West Bank, against the background of their ambiguous and ambivalent relations with the Palestinian Arab national movement.

As in the past, Christians did not participate in the events that initiated the *Intifada* in late 1987 and have not become part of its leadership. However, they have shown a growing identification with its gaol of gaining independence of Israeli rule. They have been particularly involved in the presentation of the Palestinian cause to the West rather than in acts of violence during the *Intifada*.

A new phenomenon has been the public support of the *Intifada* by the church heads in Jerusalem. This is the outcome of the process of Arabization within the churches.

The growing influence of fundamentalist Islam on the *Intifada* resulted in the growing suspicions and violence of Muslims against Christians. This has accelerated Christian emigration from the area and has exacerbated the identity crisis of those who remain.

The necessity to define their relationship and common historical roots with the Muslim majority culminated in the establishment of *al-Liqà* Center, supported by the churches. The article examines discussions of *al-Liqà* Center and writings of Christian intellectuals showing their growing adaptation to the Muslim majority. Another phenomenon is the attempt to create a Palestinian theology of liberation. An important contribution to this is Rev. Naim Ateek's book, *Justice and Only Justice: A Palestinian Theology of Liberation*, (in

English), which preaches for a non-violent struggle and for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel.

Rather emotional and extreme attitudes are expressed by Geries Koury, the head of *al-Liqà* Center in his book *The Intifada of Heaven and Intifada of Earth*, (in Arabic).

The Palestinian Liberation theologians have gained wide circulation in the West adding the religious dimension to the Palestinian Arab claim for the Holy Land.