<u>CURRICULUM VITAE AND LIST OF PUBLICATIONS</u>

• Personal Details

Name: Shlomo Cohen

Date and place of birth: 27/10/1967, Israel

Regular military service: 13/11/1985 – 9/10/1988

Address and telephone number at work:

Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er-Sheva 84105, Israel.

Office phone: 972-8-6428811

Address and telephone number at home:

6 Bar Kochva, Jerusalem 97875.

Phone: 054 7541026

• Education

B.Sc. -	1989-92 – Hebrew Univ. – Hadassah Medical School	
	Magna cum Laude	
M.D. -	1989-96 – Hebrew Univ. – Hadassah Medical School	
M.A. -	1998-2001 – Hebrew Univ. – Philosophy	
	Name of advisor: Moshe Halbertal	
	Title of thesis: *Shame as an Ethical Motivation*	
Ph.D.	2002-2006 – Hebrew Univ. – Philosophy	
	Summa cum Laude	
	Name of advisor: David Heyd	
	Title of thesis: *Humanity Dwells in the Eyes: An Inquiry into Shame and Ethics*	

• Employment History

2016-present- Senior Lecturer in Philosophy – Ben-Gurion University

2012-2016 – Lecturer in philosophy – Ben Gurion University

2010-present – Medical Doctor (urgent care) – Terem urgent care clinics

2010 – External teacher – Tel-Aviv University

2009, 2011 – External teacher – Hebrew University

2008 – External teacher (as postdoctoral research fellow) – UCLA

2007 – External teacher – Hebrew University

2006 – External teacher (medical ethics)[unpaid] – Hadassah Medical School

1998-2010 – Medical Doctor (intensive care) – NTLY-intensive care

1997-98 – Medical Doctor (pediatric ER) – Hadassah hospital

1997-98 – Guide of historical tours in Jerusalem – Yad Ben-Zvi Institute

1992-2007 – Educator, program designer, and leader of educational seminars and tours for American students in Israel – Shorashim Organization

1991-92 – Teaching Assistant (Histology), Hadassah Medical School

• Professional Activities

Positions in academic administration:
2017-present: Chairman of the Human Subjects Research Committee (IRB) of Ben-Gurion University
2014-present: Chair of departmental M.A committee
2012-2014: Departmental M.A. advisor

Significant professional consulting:
2017: Referee for dissertation of Aliza Avraham, "Is It Justified to Clone Human Beings?" Haifa University, supervisor: Daniel Statman
2016: Referee for dissertation proposal of Zohar Kaufman, "Virtue Ethics in Psychoanalysis," Bar-Ilan University
2015: Referee for the (2015-16) Times Higher Education World University Rankings
2012: Referee for the Wellcome Trust Medical Humanities Postdoctoral Research Fellowship

Ad hoc reviewer for journals:
American Journal of Bioethics (multiple times)
AJOB Neuroscience
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Bioethics (multiple times)
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (multiple times)
Journal of Applied Philosophy
Journal of Medical Ethics (multiple times)
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy (multiple times)
Philosophia (multiple times)
Social Theory and Practice

Membership in professional/scientific societies:
2007-2008, 2012-2013, 2015-2017 – New Israeli Philosophy Association
2006-2007 – Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy;

• Educational Activities

Courses taught

"Introduction to Ethics" (BA) – Ben-Gurion University

"Introduction to Political Philosophy" (BA) – Ben-Gurion University

"Dilemmas in Bioethics" (BA) – Ben-Gurion University

"Topics in Normative Ethics" (BA) – Ben-Gurion University

"Truthfulness, Lying, and Deception" (BA) – BGU; Hebrew University

"Moral Psychology" (BA) – Ben-Gurion University

"The Philosophy of Sexuality" (BA) – Tel-Aviv University

"Medical Ethics" (BA) – UCLA

"Metaethics" (BA) – UCLA

"Autonomy, Paternalism, and Consent" (MA) – Ben-Gurion University

"The Limits of Rationality in Ethics" (MA) – Ben-Gurion University

"Human Dignity and the Duty to Respect" (MA) – Ben-Gurion University

"Ethics and Ontology" (MA) – Hebrew University

Research students

Gabriel Furth, MA, graduated 2017

Hila Bar, MA, expected 2018

Ron Aboodi, Kreitman post-doctoral fellow 2017-18

• Awards, Citations, Honors, Fellowships

(a) Honors, Citations, Awards

2006, Allan Bronfman Prize for the outstanding dissertation in the theoretical sciences, Hebrew University

2006, PhD in Philosophy – *Summa cum Laude*

2003, The Baumgart Award for Excellence in Ethical Research, Hebrew University, Department of Philosophy

1992, Bachelor in Medical Sciences- *Magna cum Laude*

(b) Fellowships

2011, Visiting Scholar – Center for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, *London School of Economics* – Visiting Scholar [unpaid]

2003-4, Fulbright Grant for Doctoral Students – Visiting Scholar, Columbia University School of Law, NYC [$12000]

1994, Hadassah Honors Exchange Program Scholarship**,** U. of Tennessee, Memphis [full expenses paid]

• Scientific Publications

H-index (Google Scholar) = **6**

Total citations (Google Scholar) = **157**

Total citations excluding own (Google Scholar) = **148**

(ISI – N/A)

Chapters in collective volumes:

1. **Cohen S.**, "The Proto-Ethical Dimension of Moods," in *Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking*, Contributions to Phenomenology Series, eds. H. Kenaan and I. Ferber, Springer Press (2011), pp. 173-184. {1 citation}

Refereed articles and refereed letters in scientific journals:

*Journal ranking: according to SJR SCImago 2014; citations according to Google Scholar

1. Reichman J., **Cohen S.**, Goldfarb M., *et al*. "Renal Effects of Nabumetone, a COX-2 Antagonist: Impairment of Function in Isolated Perfused Rat Kidneys Contrasts with Preserved Renal Function in Vivo," *Experimental Nephrology*, 2001; 9:387-396. {8 citations; IF=2.55; Q1}

2. Cohen S., "Fundamental Equality and the Phenomenology of Respect," *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 57 (2008): 25-53. {3 citations; Q – N/A [referenced in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* entry on "Respect" (not included in GS count)]}

3. Cohen S., "Conversations on Ethics," *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 59 (2010): 63-77. {0 citations; Q – N/A}

4. **Cohen S.**, "The Gettier Problem in Informed Consent" *Journal of Medical Ethics* 37 (2011): 642-45. {5 citations; IF=1.51; Q1}

5. **Cohen S.**, "Soft Categoricity in Ethics" *The Philosophical Forum* 42 (2011): 35-60. {1 citation; Q3}

6. **Cohen S.** and **H. Shapiro**, "'Comparable Placebo Treatment' and the Ethics of Deception" *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 38 (2013): 696-709. {16 citations; IF=0.85; Q1}

*****7**. **Cohen S.**, "Nudging and Informed Consent" *American Journal of Bioethics* 13(6) (2013): 3-11. {71 citations; IF=5.28; Q1} {21st most cited paper in the field of bioethics internationally for 2013, according to The Bioethics Research Library of Georgetown University}

*****8**. **Cohen S.**, "Nudging in Context" *American Journal of Bioethics* 13(11) (2013): W1-W6. {0 citations; IF=5.28; Q1}

*****9**. **Cohen S.**, "The Nocebo Effect of Informed Consent," *Bioethics* 28(3) (2014): 147-154. {34 citations; IF=1.48; Q1} {23rd most cited paper in the field of bioethics internationally for 2014, according to The Bioethics Research Library of Georgetown University}

Reprinted in: Helga Kuhse, Udo Schüklenk, and Peter Singer, *Bioethics: An Anthology*, 3rd edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2016), pp. 683-692.

*10. **Cohen S.**, "Human Being as Existential Paradox" *Appraisal: The Journal of the Society for Post-Critical and Personalist Studies* 10(1) (2014): 28-32. {0 citations; Q – N/A}

*11. **Cohen S.** "Abortion and Moral Perception" *Public Affairs Quarterly* 28 (1) (2014): 1-18

*12. **Cohen S.**, "The Ethics of De-extinction" *NanoEthics* 8 (2014): 165-178. {15 citations; IF=0.703; Q1}

13. **Cohen S.**, "Forced Supererogation" *European Journal of Philosophy* 23.4 (2015): 1006-1024. {4 citations; IF=1.19; Q1}

*14. **Cohen S.**, "A Philosophical Misunderstanding at the Basis of Opposition to Nudging," *American Journal of Bioethics* 15.10 (2015): 39-41. [Open Peer Commentary] {1 citation; IF=5.28; Q1}

*15. **Cohen S.**, "Genetic Integrity, Authenticity, and Aesthetic Worth" *Ethics, Policy, and Environment* 18.3 (2015): 271-274. [Open Peer Commentary] {Q1}

*16. **Cohen S.**, "The Irrelevance of Ontology for the Ethics of Autonomy" *American Journal of Bioethics* 16.2 (2016): 46-47. [Open Peer Commentary] {1 citation; IF=5.28; Q1}

*17. **Cohen S.**, "Are There Moral Limits to Military Deception?" *Philosophia* 44 (2017): 1305-1318. {Q1}

*18. **Cohen S.**, "Preventing Nocebo Effects of Informed Consent without Paternalism" *American Journal of Bioethics* 17 (6) (2017): 44-46. {1 citation; IF=5.28; Q1}

*19. **Cohen S.**, "Didactical Ordering and Emotional Moral Persuasion," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy* 16 (Spring 2017): 6-8.

*20. **Cohen S.**, "Manipulation and Deception," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (2017) [DOI:10.1080/00048402.2017.1386692]

*21. **Cohen S.**, "On Nudging Health" *Hastings Center Report* [accepted]

*22. **Cohen S.**, "The Moral Gradation of Media of Deception" *Theoria* [DOI:10.1111/theo.12139]

• Lectures and Presentations at Meetings and Invited Seminars

(a) Invited plenary lectures at conferences/meetings

*2013, *Nudging, Culture, and Informed Consent*, Galilee Colloquium on Social, Moral, and Legal Philosophy VII [international conference], Swiss-Israel Philosophical Foundation, Kfar-Blum, Israel

(b) Presentation of papers at conferences/meetings (oral or poster)

2006 *Shame, Laughter, and Play*, Annual Conference of the American Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy; Philadelphia

2007 *The Proto-Ethical Dimension of Moods*, "Philosophy's Moods" – International Conference; Tel Aviv University

2007, *An Overlooked Interpretation of Moral Facts*, Annual Conference of the Israeli Philosophical Association; Bar Ilan University

2012, *Forced Supererogation*, Annual Conference of the Israeli Philosophical Association; Haifa University

*2013, *Some Ethical Obstacles on the Path to Transhumanist Cognitive Enhancement*, Neuroethics: The Ethical and Social Challenges of New Discoveries in Neuroscience [international conference]; The Edmond Safra Center for Ethics, Tel-Aviv University

*2014, *The Non-identity Problem and the Discretization of Harm*, Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy V; University of Minho, Braga, Portugal

*2015, *Infectious Disease Ethics – Some Conceptual Challenges*, Infectious Diseases and Their Control – Past, Present, and Future, The Jacques Loeb Center for the History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences; Ben-Gurion University

*2015, *The Moral gradation of Media of Deception*, Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy VI; University of Minho, Braga, Portugal

*2015, *The Moral gradation of Media of Deception*, Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference; University of Colorado-Boulder

*2015, *Commentary on Stephen Kershnar's "How Consent Works,"* Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference; University of Colorado-Boulder

*2015, *The Precedence of Respect for Autonomy over Autonomy*, MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory; University of Manchester

*2016, *Deceiving versus Manipulating*, Annual Conference of the Israeli Philosophical Association; Hebrew University of Jerusalem

*2016, *Lies, False Implicatures, and Nonlinguistic Deception*, Morality, Ethicality, and Pro-Social Behavior – The joint conference of the Center for the Study of Rationality (HU), The Decision Making and Economic Psychology Center (BGU), and the Israeli Center of Research Excellence; Hebrew University of Jerusalem

*2016, *Ambiguities in the Ethics of Consent for Research*, Experimentation with Humans: Science, History, Politics, Ethics, and Ideologies, The Jacques Loeb Center for the History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences; Ben-Gurion University

*2016, *Deceiving versus Manipulating*, Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference; University of Colorado-Boulder

*2016, *Commentary on James Skidmore's 'Making Sense of Heroic Supererogation'*, Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference; University of Colorado-Boulder

*2016, *An Experimental Approach to Comparing the Moral Severity of Deception*, Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference; hosted by the Department of Philosophy, University at Buffalo.

*2017, *Manipulation: A Moral Defense*, Annual Conference of the Israeli Philosophical Association; Ben-Gurion University

*2017, *The Deceiving Game*, Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference; University of Colorado-Boulder

(c) <u>Presentations at informal international seminars and workshops</u>

2012, *Forced Supererogation*, Toleration, Supererogation, & Moral Duties: Conference in Honour of David Heyd, Hebrew University

(d) <u>Seminar presentations at universities and institutions</u>

2006, *Separation of Religion and State: Insights from the Israeli Case*, address to the American Constitution Society, Georgetown University School of Law, Washington DC

2008, Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University, *Existential Grounds of Moral Obligation*

2009, Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy, Hebrew University, *Soft Categoricity in Ethics*

2011, Philosophy of Medicine Forum, King's College London, *Placebo Treatment and the Ethics of Deception*

2011, The Jerusalem Forum of Bioethics, Hadassah Medical School of Hebrew University, *The Ethics of Placebo Treatment*

2011, Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University, *What Is Deception?*

*2013, Jerusalem Forum for Political Philosophy, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University, *Political Obligation, Fairness, and Reciprocity*

*2014, Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University, *The Ethics of De-extinction*

*2015, Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University, *The Moral Gradation of Deceptive Modes*

*2015, Workshop of the Edmund Safra Center for Ethics, Tel-Aviv University, *Comments on Yuval Eylon's 'Moral Custodians'*

*2016, Colloquium of the Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii – Manoa, *Manipulation, Deception, and the Limits of Truthfulness*

- **Research Grants**

*2017-2018, Grant for Interdisciplinary Research, Vice President for R&D, Ben-Gurion University and the Dean of Social Sciences and Humanities; Shlomo Cohen (philosophy) and Ro'i Zultan (economics), *The Moral Comparison of Modes of Deception: A New Experimental Approach for Solving an Old Normative Debate*, $15,000 (one year grant)

- **Present Academic Activities**

Books and articles in preparation

(Elaboration on all the following items is provided below in the section on synopsis of research in progress):
   - *"The Precedence of Respect for Autonomy over Autonomy"

- *"Culture, Truthfulness, and the Duty of Disclosure"
- *"The Logic of the Interaction between Beneficence and Respect for Autonomy"
- *"Evidence-Based Clinical Paternalism"
- *"Political Obligation and Reciprocity"
- *"A Reply to Archer on Forced Supererogation"
- *"What Kind of Duty is the Duty to Die?"
- *"The Nature of Sexuality"
- *Humanity Dwells in the Eyes: An Inquiry into Shame and Ethics* (Book manuscript)

Submitted for publication (indicate journal):
(Elaboration on all the following items is provided below in the section on synopsis of research in progress):
- *"The Moral Gradation of Media of Deception" (R&R from *Theoria*)
- *"The Deceiving Game" (submitted to *Journal of Moral Philosophy*)

• Synopsis of research, including reference to publications and grants in above

lists (Do not exceed three single-spaced pages.)

My dissertation was a comprehensive account of the place and nature of shame in ethics. In this it was a seminal work. It had a much larger aim than understanding shame ethics, however. It used the analysis of shame as a bridge between existential phenomenology and ethics, and attempted a novel theory on the (existential-ontological) foundations of ethics. Major questions in ethical theory that were addressed and reconceptualized in that work included the phenomenological, pre-theoretical sources of ethical obligation; the origins of human dignity; the relation between personhood and moral-personhood; the origins of our recognition of other persons as objects of moral concern; the place of intersubjectivity in ethics, and more. Although there is much from my dissertation I intend to rewrite for publication, I have hitherto only published one little offshoot: the paper "Human Being as Existential Paradox."

Since my doctorate, I have worked mainly on (1) general issues in moral theory, some with metaethical aspects, as well as (2) various aspects of the ethics of truthfulness, of informed consent, and of respect for autonomy more generally. Among the former, I include work on the background conditions of moral thinking ("The Proto-Ethical Dimension of Moods"; "Shame as a Preliminary to Ethics" [unpublished]), on the idea of categorical obligations ("Soft Categoricity in Ethics") and the limits of moral obligation ("Forced Supererogation"), on the limits of rationality in ethics ("Conversations on Ethics"), as well as a new argument for the basic equality of all humans ("Fundamental Equality and the Phenomenology of Respect").

Among the latter are the analysis of an overlooked difficulty in the concept of informed consent seen through the application of an open problem in epistemology ("The Gettier Problem in Informed Consent"), an analysis of the ethics of placebo treatments by way of new distinctions in the concept of truthfulness ("Comparable Placebo Treatment"); an analysis of the ethics of informed consent in light of the fact that the required disclosure of relevant information may itself be detrimental to health through the nocebo effect ("The Nocebo Effect of Informed Consent"); an exploration of the meaning of respect for autonomy in light of the idea of "libertarian paternalism," specifically, via an analysis of the ethically legitimate range of manipulative "nudging" practices in the informed consent interaction ("Nudging and Informed Consent"; "Nudging in Context"; "A Philosophical Misunderstanding at the Basis of Opposition to Nudging"). The issue of ethically adequate provision of conditions for decision making with regard to providing sensory data specifically is addressed in "Abortion and Moral Perception." Conditions for respect for autonomy are also addressed in "The Irrelevance of Ontology for the Ethics of Autonomy."

My paper "Are There Moral Limits to Military Deception?" advances a new theory about this barely explored question. It claims that there are no limits based on the ethics of truthfulness as such, and that all the moral boundaries that do exist in this respect are better captured by a different moral principle, namely of not harming "essential" non-combatants (I include in this category combatants who have resolved to stop aggression against you in the given circumstances).

A distinct line of research has begun with a couple of works in environmental ethics. "The Ethics of De-extinction" surveys the ethical considerations regarding the possibility of resurrecting extinct biological species, made possible by state-of-the-art genomics. This paper develops a theory of the concept of "respect for life," whose objects are species (not individuals), and probes the question of whether humanity has a moral obligation to revive species that it rendered extinct (say, through poaching) once the technology is available. "Genetic Integrity, Authenticity, and Aesthetic Worth" addresses the putative duty to protect genetic integrity.

The synopsis of my recent research continues in the next section on my present research.

Synopsis of research in progress

The general theme of my main current line of research is what I call "the ethics of manipulation" (broadly construed). One branch of this investigation is the analysis of deception; another is of manipulation narrowly construed (non-deceptive manipulation). These themes are intimately connected to the large question of the moral status of respect for autonomy, which is a focus of my writing. A major aspect of the latter is the morality of the practice of obtaining consent—another focus of my writing. Although manipulation is everywhere, its philosophical and ethical analysis is in its infancy. I have submitted to the Israel Science Foundation (November 2016) a long-term research proposal on this topic that will offer a new theory on the meaning and ethics of manipulation.

Elaboration:

I. Papers on the ethics of deception/manipulation/respect/consent:

[1] "The Moral Gradation of Media of Deception." [Submitted; under review]
This paper advances a new position on the moral ranking between lying, non-lying linguistic deception, and non-linguistic deception, based on a connection between the level of epistemic reliability of each medium of communication and level of breach of trust involved in deception.

[2] "Manipulation and Deception" [Submitted; under review]
This paper begins by establishing a hitherto unrecognized conceptual distinction between deception and "non-deceptive manipulation that causes false beliefs" – the latter does not provide false information, either directly or by implicature, but rather interferes with good judgment directly. I then attempt to demonstrate that a total moral ban on intentionally interfering with others' good judgment would impose such exceedingly unreasonable restrictions on normal practices of human communication that it would be unreasonable to *not* recognize the moral legitimacy of intentional manipulation that causes false beliefs in some informational contexts.

[3] "The Deceiving Game" [being written in collaboration with Dr. Roi Zultan (economics, BGU) and Prof. Shaul Shalvi (Economics, University of Amsterdam) (This research is supported by a special allocation from the Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences for interdisciplinary research within the faculty)]
This is an *experimental philosophy* rendition of the normative question posed in my "The Moral Gradation of Media of Deception." The paper uses a game of strategy devised by Dr. Zultan and myself to check empirically people's proclivity to lie as compared to falsely implicate or to deceive nonlinguistically, as well as people's relative willingness to trust

others who use each of these manipulations. We discuss *normative* implications that can validly be derived from our (surprising) empirical results.

[4] "The Precedence of Respect for Autonomy over Autonomy." [Penultimate draft available on demand]

I take my analysis of the moral permissibility of certain manipulations to offer a virtually unexplored window to the very meaning of respect for autonomy. (I deny the truism that manipulating others is antithetical to respecting their autonomy.) After making the case that the concepts of autonomy and the autonomous subject are hopelessly obscure and consequently prescriptively inert, this paper goes on to argue that we should reverse the explanatory direction: only if the *praxis* of respecting autonomy determines the meaning of "autonomy" can the constructed concept have any prescriptive capacity. I elucidate how there can be a practice of respecting autonomy without a prior concept of autonomy. I illustrate the priority of praxis over conceptual analysis and inference by reference to every component of autonomy mentioned in its common definitions (internalist as well as externalist).

[5] "Culture, Truthfulness, and the Duty of Disclosure."

Discussions of cultural relativity with respect to the ethics of informed consent are restricted almost exclusively to the specific issue of inclusion of the family in medical decisions in communitarian societies. This paper argues for morally legitimate cultural relativity with respect to the duty of disclosure, by using the sociological-anthropological distinction between high-context and low-context cultures. Speech in high-context cultures is often intentionally ambiguous. Speaking in precise, unequivocal terms can be considered offensive, can in fact confuse the listener who expects otherwise, and may damage trust. I contend that the wider the space for linguistic ambiguity in a culture, the more leeway there is for manipulative speech to not breach respect for autonomy. I draw conclusions regarding the normativity of cultural variations in practicing informed consent.

[6] "The Logic of the Interaction between Beneficence and Respect for Autonomy" [Penultimate draft available on demand]

This paper is part of the project of elucidating of the meaning and ethical status of respect for autonomy (which, again, in my research, is part of the general project of investigating the ethics of manipulation). This paper introduces a new typological scheme of the possible categories of interaction between the two basic moral duties: the "discrete," the "semi-discrete," and the "non-discrete" categories. This division relies on two parameters: the meaning of the duty and its forms of expression. Most often, only the "discrete" category, which involves simple competition based on relative weights, is explicitly recognized in ethical discussions. In contrast, in the semi-discrete category, the demands of one duty attenuate the forms of expression of the other duty; in the non-discrete category, one duty presupposes the other. The paper shows that all logical possibilities of reciprocal influence have real expressions, and discusses the importance of recognizing those options for accurate moral judgment in relevant cases.

[7] "Evidence-Based Clinical Paternalism"

[Written in collaboration with Dr. Ezra Gabbay (Weill Cornell Medical College, Cornell University)]

An infrequently-discussed condition of soft paternalism is its epistemic assumptions (regarding knowing the true preferences of the paternalized person). Recognizing the epistemic problems that inflict both interpersonal paternalism and paternalism in the context of social policy, this paper identifies scenario-types where there is both sufficient interpersonal evidence *and* good scientific evidence regarding the preferences of the relevant population; it argues that in some of those scenario-types there is a reversal of the presumption against paternalism (paternalism is pro-tanto morally permissible) and in others it is a moral *duty*. We illustrate by analyzing specific scientific evidence regarding consent for dialysis.

II. Papers on other topics:

[8] "Harming and Wronging in Creating" [Submitted; under review]
This paper offers a new solution to the notorious "non-identity problem." The first part expounds a new theory of harming constructed to answer the question of when it is sensible to speak of incurring harm in a context where one has been rendered overall better off. The second part of the paper uses the conclusions of the first part to argue for a new theory about when a creative act can wrong future people whose existence depends on that act. The main move applies "the logic of concept expansion" (developed in Meir Buzaglo, *The Logic of Concept Expansion* [Cambridge UP, 2002]) to the concept of wronging. It argues that an adequately expanded concept of wronging can be constructed from the conjunction of harming *de re* with wronging *de dicto*; such concept is indeed applicable to those creation cases in which (according to the analysis of the first part) there is harm.

[9] "Political Obligation and Reciprocity"
This work offers a new theory justifying political obligation (PO). John Simmons' general pre-theoretical requirements from a successful theory of PO: PO should be non-voluntary (independent of consent) and particular (concerns the laws of one's country specifically). This pares down the field to three grounds for PO: fairness, gratitude, or associative duties. I quickly dismiss the latter two and concentrate on the shortcomings of the more attractive fairness theory (as elaborated by George Klosko). The paper demonstrates how those are remedied by a more basic ethic of reciprocity (of which fairness theory is a particular instance). Klosko's (as well as Arneson's) justification presupposes a positive all-things-considered personal cost-benefit appraisal of state benefits; but then PO problematically fails to be truly non-voluntaristic. A review of the basic tenets of the (hugely understudied) ethics of reciprocity shows that a non-reciprocity norm would undermine society as such, not just society as a polity; hence, this rationale applies to reasonable anarchists too. Reciprocity-based obligation can therefore be a suitable ground for non-voluntary PO. The paper develops the conditions under which the duty of reciprocity holds and argues this applies to PO. An affinity exists between my theory and Christopher Wellman's rescue theory of PO, but there are crucial differences, notably: whereas Wellman's samaritanism is the *justification* for PO, for me it is a necessary *condition* for an obligation of reciprocity; and this successfully incorporates what was a natural duty account into a particularistic account of PO, satisfying Simmons' pre-theoretical requirements.

[11] "A Reply to Archer on Forced Supererogation" [Penultimate draft available on demand]
This short piece explains why Alfred Archer's criticism (*Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*) of my category of "forced supererogation" (*European Journal of Philosophy*) is a misunderstanding.

[12] "What Kind of Duty is the Duty to Die?"
In a famous paper ("Is There A Duty to Die?" *Hastings Center Report* [1997]), John Hardwig argued for the moral duty to die in certain situations where one's continued existence imposes overwhelming burdens on loved ones. Michael Cholbi has argued ("The Duty to Die and the Burdensomeness of Living," *Bioethics* 2010) that Hardwig's thesis cannot be right, as it has the absurd implication that the suffering loved ones have a moral right to kill those sick who involuntarily impose these costs. Based on the new deontic category of "forced supererogation" that I developed ("Forced Supererogation," *European Journal of Philosophy* [2015]), I claim that if the "duty to die" is reinterpreted as forced supererogation, then Hardwig's thesis can (whether or not it should) be defended against Cholbi's challenging criticism.

[13] "The Nature of Sexuality"
Against reductive views that interpret sexual pleasure and desire as essentially biological phenomena, I side with those who view interpersonal intentionality as their core. I identify four such views, but argue that each suffers from a fatal flaw: Thomas Nagel leaves sexuality without content; Sartre implausibly narrows the content to struggle only; Roger Scruton implausibly narrows it to love only; Robert Solomon makes it impossibly

cognitive. I argue that a more intuitive theory can follow McLuhan's dictum that "the medium is the message" (i.e. sexuality does have a message [contra Nagel], but it is not cognitive [contra Solomon]) coupled with the insight that *existentially*, the intentionality associated with "embodiment" need not be associated necessarily with either the *psychology* of love or of domination (as against both Sartre and Scruton).

[14] *Humanity Dwells in the Eyes: An Inquiry into Shame and Ethics* [Penultimate draft available on demand]
This is a book manuscript based on my dissertation. A couple of years ago I made a major revision of it, based on reviews of anonymous referees of the full manuscript for Cambridge University Press. My manuscript has not made it to the publication list, however. I now amend and update it periodically, in anticipation of a second attempt at publication.