



אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בנגב  
הפקולטה למדעי הרוח והחברה

המחלקה לכלכלה תשע"ז 2017

שם הקורס בעברית: דילמות חברתיות

שם הקורס באנגלית: Social Dilemmas

מס' קורס: 142-1-0122

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יעדי ההוראה

הקורס יעסוק במצבים בהם טובת החברים בקבוצה עומדת בניגוד לטובת הכלל, עם דגש על מחקרים ניסויים בטובין ציבוריים ודילמת האסיר. בדילמה חברתית, כל אחד מחברי הקבוצה תמיד יכול לקבל תשלום גבוה יותר אם אינו תורם לקבוצה, אבל מעדיף שכולם יתרמו על פני מצב שבו כולם פועלים על פי האינטרסים האישיים שלהם ואינם תורמים. במהלך הקורס נדון בגורמים המשפיעים על אנשים לתרום. הנושאים המרכזיים בהם נתמקד יהיו השפעות של תקשורת, תחרות בין קבוצות וענישה על נכונות לתרום.

פרשיות לימודים

מבוא: מוצרים ציבוריים ודילמות חברתיות.  
גורמים מבניים: השפעת המבנה האסטרטגי על שיתוף פעולה.  
הצגה: השפעת הדרך שבה מוצגת הסיטואציה על שיתוף פעולה.  
הדדיות: שיתוף פעולה מותנה.  
העדפות חברתיות: אלו מבני העדפות יכולים להסביר שיתוף פעולה?  
זהות קבוצתית: השפעת זהות קבוצתית על העדפות חברתיות ושיתוף פעולה.  
תקשורת ואינפורמציה: מעבר מידע לגבי הפעולות, ותקשורת מילולית.  
תחרות בין קבוצות: סכסוכים בין קבוצות ושיתוף פעולה בתוך הקבוצה.  
ענישה: מוסדות ענישה, ענישת נגד, ענישה ואי ודאות.  
מוצרים ציבוריים בשדה: ניסויי שדה במוצרים ציבוריים.

דרישות והרכב ציון הקורס

עבודה 50% ובחינה . 50% את העבודה יש להגיש עד מועד א' של הבחינה. עד 10% בונוס על פי ביצוע בניסויים.

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