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Cover Image: **Sandro B. (1475-1500), A Young Man Being Introduced to the Seven Liberal Arts, [Buon fresco], Paris: The Louvre Museum. Photo © Ariela Shimshon**

HÁGÁR | INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

in this issue

Preface

With the publication of this issue, Hagar Journal resumes its activity after a ten-year hiatus. The founding of the journal in 2000 was part of a social research boom, which dealt with the various new configurations of post-colonialism in a global era. Hagar Journal celebrated interdisciplinary thinking in the social fields. The journal was produced and published by the Humphrey Institute for Social and Cultural Research, founded by the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Ben Gurion University of the Negev. Today, still, the Humphrey Institute is the flagship initiative of the faculty, constituting a think-tank and research laboratory for its fellows from among the faculty members and research students of the faculty. The resuming of the journal is under the banner of interdisciplinary social research from all fields of knowledge. The journal aims to be a written expression of the research laboratory held at the Humphrey Institute, and to offer its readers articles from diverse fields of knowledge which together suggest innovative contemporary thinking about society as a concept, as a structure, as an object, as a means, as an institution, and as a critical framework.

Although this issue is the first after a long break, it continues the legacy and spirit of the previous issues. As part of the journal's vision, articles from different disciplines and diverse perspectives have been brought together under one heading. This diversity, we hope, will stimulate interest, thought, and discussion, which is the duty of the academy and is at the core of society. While our ambition is to serve as a platform for diverse voices, we recognize that this alone is insufficient. To resonate in both the academic and public spheres, voices require an attentive, critical, and engaged audience. We believe that such listeners will be found in this issue's readership. Recognizing the importance of a critical and in-depth discussion of topics related to the social sciences and the humanities, and based on the belief that knowledge should be accessible, the journal is open and available for anyone who has been sparked by interest and curiosity.

This issue is being published at a difficult time in Israel. Almost two months after the events of October 7, which shook Israeli society and challenged the stability of the intra-Israeli social fabric. These events found the country already in a divided state, due to severe political disputes. Faced with external danger, Israeli society found itself faced with the eternal local question regarding conflict resolution: Are we to solve conflicts by force of arms or through dialogue? The academic world has always been a conversational space. Power struggles may not have been lacking in it, but the ideology was and still is one: wisdom, knowledge, and contribution to humanity will come from continuous thinking and from

respectful discourse and discussion. This is also the motivation behind publishing the Hagar Journal. We wish to promote an advanced platform of open, critical and innovative discourse about society and culture and about social and cultural processes. We hope that the inheritance of discourse as a growth strategy will permeate the reality of life and create a social impact in everyday life.

We want to thank from the bottom of our hearts the Ph.D. candidates who were the fellows of the Humphrey Institute in 2022, and who devoted their time and energy to preparing the volume. We are also grateful to the reviewers and obviously to the contributors to this issue. Thanks are also due to the outgoing Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Prof. David Wettstein, and the incoming Dean, Prof. Nirit Ben-Aryeh Debby, for their unwaning support of the Humphrey Institute and in the resuming of publication of Hagar Journal. Special thanks go to Einat Perlman Rogel for the graphic design. After a strenuous period of much work, thought, and planning, we are delighted to present you with this issue.

Shamir Yona and Ayelet Klein Cohen, guest editors

Personal, National and International Vengeance Motif in Jeremiah

Shamir Yona[a], Rafael Furman[b]

Vengeance appears numerous times in the Book of Jeremiah, in various contexts. The aim of this article is to understand the reasons for the vengeance motif in the Book of Jeremiah, in relation to the historical and social circumstances in which it was created. A survey of the vengeance motif in the book shows a distinct literary structure of vengeance in the Book of Jeremiah, from personal vengeance, through national vengeance, to international vengeance. The Shaping of this structure is rooted in the psychological and sociological reality of the redactors of the Book of Jeremiah, as a response to the theological and social turmoil caused by the destruction and exile of Judah. The rage and spiritual crisis that followed the harsh events are manifested in the "vengeance scenes" throughout the book. These scenes serve as a way of coping with the disaster and its repercussions.

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In this article, our goal is to survey the theme of vengeance in Jeremiah, and through interpretative analysis to gain insight into the reason for the broad use of this motif specifically within this book. In order to deal with this topic thoroughly, we must first discuss the notion of vengeance in a broader scope.

The established meaning of the concept of vengeance is that of evil retribution, repayment, or punishment in response to an evil deed or some kind of harm (Brown, Driver and Briggs, 1951; Koehler and Baumgartner, 1994).[1]

Keywords: Jeremiah, Vengeance, Exile- Prophecy

The urge to avenge constitutes one of the most basic social and psychological characteristics, as testified by the place of the story of Cain and Abel in the Bible, one of the first events in the history of humanity. Vengeance also occupies a central place in additional constitutive events in the Bible, such as the stories of the deluge, the overturning of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the exodus. Vengeance as a literary motif is also prevalent in Greek drama and mythology, in the plays of Shakespeare, and in world literature of all ages and numerous cultures.[2]

Vengeance is a universal phenomenon, although the norms of vengeance vary between different societies. In some areas of the world, blood vengeance is customary, aiming to prevent behavior that is considered immoral and undesired in the society where it is conducted. In the Hebrew Bible, vengeance is clearly connected to the redeemer of blood, for example in Gen 4,15.24, Deut 32,43, and 2 Kgs 9,7. Additional roots used in reference to vengeance are: *šlm* של"ם (i.e. Jer 51,6); *pqd* פק"ד (i.e. Lev 18,25); *nḥm* נח"ם (i.e. Isa 1,24); *ḥmy* חמ"י (i.e. Isa 59,18); *ryb* רי"ב (i.e. 1 Sam 25,39); *g'l* גא"ל (i.e. Num 35,12); *bqš* בק"ש (i.e. Ez 3,18.20); *drš* דר"ש (i.e. Ez 33,6).[3]

The root *nqm* is also used within the same semantic field in other Western Semitic languages besides Hebrew, such as Amorite, Ugaritic, Phoenician, Aramaic, Ancient South Arabian (Sabaean), Pre-Islamic North Arabean (Safaitic), Classical Arabic, and Ethiopic (Ge'ez).

In his comprehensive study of the biblical root *nqm*, its uses, and meanings, Peels raises the problem of the attribution of this very human concept – to God (Peels, 1995). Vengeance is the result of hate feelings, wherefore it by definition is unique to human beings. However, the bible nevertheless attributes the act of vengeance to God numerous times. Relatively few scholars have occupied themselves with the subject of vengeance in the bible, although a number of important studies on this subject have nevertheless been written, amongst others by Merz (1916), McKeating (1963) , Mendenhall (1973), Dietrich (1976), Pitard (1982), Peels (1995), and Szabolcs-Ferencz (2015). A comprehensive survey of research on the subject can be found in the study of Peels. According to Mendenhall, blood vengeance has been considered illegitimate by any human society with official government institutions. The concept of vengeance is mentioned mainly in ancient mythological texts (i.e. the Ugaritic Epic of Aqhat) and international correspondences (especially the El-Amarna letters). In this kind of literary sources, vengeance is carried out by gods or kings and is therefore considered legitimate. Although this spirit is also apparent in biblical cases of vengeance, the root *nqm* underwent a semantic development over the long course of the bible's composition. According to Mendenhall, its ancient and original meaning is "redemption" or "rescue". He bases this claim on extra-biblical texts such as the El-Amarna letters, where Canaanite kings ask the king of Egypt to interfere

in their conflict with their enemies, using the verb *ekēmu*.[4] Mendenhall concludes that what these kings ask from the king of Egypt is redemption and rescue, but not vengeance in the late sense of the word: retribution. The meaning of the root *nqm* derives from the meaning of the Akkadian verb *ekēmu*, which means to take by force, rob, conquer, or grab (Oppenheim *et al.*, 1958). However, notes Mendenhall, the Canaanite scribes who chose the Akkadian term *ekēmu* in order to express the Western Semitic concept of "vengeance" were unjustified in their choice of this verb (or perhaps they did it for lack of a proper Akkadian alternative). Hence, *nqm* is an original Western Semitic root. According to Pitard, there is no connection between *nqm* and the term *ekēmu*, and there is no place in the bible where the root *nqm* means "redemption". Pitard claims that the meaning of *nqm* in the bible is the common meaning of evil retribution for harm caused, without the negative connotations usually attributed to this concept. On the contrary, in the bible the context is positive, and vengeance is connected to the enactment of justice. Peels, in his study, goes deeper in his treatment of the subject, and in his view, it is unjustified to adopt a generalizing exegetical and linguistic attitude when analyzing the concept of "vengeance" in the bible. Rather, each appearance of the root *nqm* should be judged by itself. Also Szabolcs-Ferencz, like Peels, claims that the root *nqm* carries different semantic nuances in its various appearances in the bible, however in general it is a legal term that describes the enactment of justice in accordance with the severity of the crime. The root *nqm* undoubtedly carries a negative meaning (as an evil deed, but not necessarily as retribution or response) in passages such as Lev 19,18, Ps 8,3; 44,17, Lam 3,60, and Jer 20,10. One should note the unique phrase *nqm* + את in Lev 19,18. The root *nqm* mostly occurs with the prepositions מן /מאת/ ב. It is unclear whether the law in Lev 19,18 refers to blood vengeance, evil retribution, or some kind of harm, or a private person taking the law into his own hands in any conceivable situation. According to Peels, this is not an instruction to the judges but an educational message aimed at the people, in accordance with the general orientation of the "Holiness Code" in Leviticus to avoid evil in all its manifestations and to strive for purity and moral perfection.

In his study, Peels divides the biblical appearances of the concept of vengeance into two main categories: a human being taking revenge on another human being (including personal revenge or national revenge on the enemies), and God taking revenge on human beings (whether on the people of Israel or on other nations). In this context, the concept of vengeance is connected to a reaction to a breach of the covenant, a just and rightful reaction, unavoidable, indispensable, and carrying legal validity (a kind of last resort). God, as the supreme judge, carries out his verdict in a completely legitimate manner. Vengeance is the punishment, the means. The goal is to carry out justice and to enforce it, to straighten out what has been distorted.[5] Contrary to Mendenhall, Peels does not try to reconstruct the diachronic development of the concept of vengeance in the Bible (because in his

opinion such an attempt lacks sufficient literary, linguistic, and historical basis), rather he works out a synchronic categorization of the five parallel semantic meanings of the root *nqm* in the bible:

1. Legal vengeance (punishing the wicked part of the trial), combined with parallel roots such as *šfṭ, dyn*, and *ryb*.

2. Retributive vengeance, punishing evil-doers and sinners, combined with roots such as *šlm, gml, pqd, ykḥ*.

3. Redeeming vengeance, combined with roots such as *gʾl, plṭ, yšʹ, ṣdq*.

4. Emotional vengeance that brings mental satisfaction, combined with the concepts "anger", "fury", "jealousy", and the roots *nḥm* and *nṭr*.

5. Vengeance out of enmity and hate, combined with the roots *snʾ, nṭr, ṣrr, ʾyb*.

In order to complete the background discussion on vengeance, it is important to dedicate an important place to the psychological aspects of vengefulness. This aspect, we believe, is based on all literature, including ancient theological literature. Berger, for example, deals with a vengeance from a psychological-therapeutic perspective (Ulrić, Berger and Berman, 2010). According to modern Western standards, vengeance is a negative, illegitimate, primitive, and anti-liberal phenomenon. It is forbidden by law and is considered the legacy of old-fashioned barbarian societies (especially blood vengeance). However, According to Berger, being involved in vengeance connects and confronts man with his own problematic past and apparently makes progress and healing difficult.

Psychology and psychoanalysis deal little with vengeance. Many have approached vengeance as an expression of mental disorder, and have connected it to "Drive theories". On the other hand, as already mentioned, literature and drama deal a lot with vengeance. The attitude towards the subject is somewhat ambivalent, comprising both repulsion and fascination at the same time. It is possible that the source of the repulsion is found in an attempt to repress and avoid carrying out vengeance and the price the arbitrator is apt to pay for his actions. According to Freudian psychoanalysis, vengefulness is a characteristic of people who have not processed their crude feelings properly and people with low developmental functioning.

Berger rejects this "traditional" approach and suggests approaching vengeance from a post-modern angle. She sees in the desire to avenge a potential therapeutic tool, which in the framework of a rational, cautious, and thorough treatment procedure can lead to the mental recovery of the revenge seeking victim. The

issue is complex, and differs from case to case and person to person. Traditional education, which causes conscious or unconscious repression of vengefulness, is unhealthy because it cuts off people from basic legitimate feelings and brings about a feeling of guilt, self-condemnation, lack of self-esteem, and shame. This might result in extreme outbursts in times of crisis and pressure. However, recent psychological writings contradict the traditional condemnation of vengefulness, hate, anger, and jealousy, especially when these feelings are found among victims of extreme violence (such as holocaust survivors). The new approach is not judgmental and not critical towards these feelings (in accordance with the "relational" tradition in psychoanalysis). The feeling of vengefulness is considered normal, normative, and even important. This feeling can serve as a psychological "warning light" that warns about the existence of an injury in need of processing and handling. This mechanism can be the key to recovery. It is precisely the abstention from taking revenge, it is overcoming, psychological recovery, the victim's success, achievements, and rehabilitation that appropriately ought to be considered his revenge on the one who caused him harm.

Generally speaking, the desire for vengeance stems from the other's lack of recognition, a recognition that is crucial for personal and interpersonal existence in society. The perpetrator's non-recognition of his victim, his existence, or his humanity constitutes a devastating blow to the personal world of the victim and his ambition to be "the sovereign of his own world". The victim is expected to understand the pressure put on him by society to forgive, to renounce his right for vengeance, "to move on in his life", as a society demand for him to forfeit recognition of the injustice done to him. In this way, the feeling of loneliness and experience of mental suffering intensifies, and this is the most dangerous and critical point with regard to the victim's attempt to take revenge on the one who caused him harm. Since the feeling of vengefulness is intensively repressed from a young age, in most cases it becomes indirectly manifested in arguments, insults, fury, or accusations, not necessarily directed towards the perpetrator, but rather towards the immediate surroundings that are not necessarily connected to the initial harm caused.

Vengeance in the Book of Jeremiah

The topic of vengeance is a prominent theme throughout the book of Jeremiah, appearing both linguistically, by use of the root *nqm* נק"ם, and also inexplicitly, through select episodes within the book. The number of occurrences of *nqm* is greater in Jeremiah than in the rest of the deuteronomistic literature, as well as in all other prophetic books. The root *nqm* appears seventeen times within the book of Jeremiah (in 52 chapters); eleven times in the book of Ezekiel (in 48 chapters), seven times in Isaiah (three in chs. 1-39, four in chs. 40-66); four

times in Deuteronomy (all within the Song of Moses in ch. 32); three times in the book of Nahum; once in Micah; and once within 47 chapters of 1-2 Kings (Even-Shoshan, 1993). In total, *nqm* appears in the Hebrew Bible 79 times in 19 books: 44 times as a noun (נְקָמָה or נָקָם), and 35 times in its verbal form. The root is found in historiography, law, prophecy, and wisdom literature.

In the following parts of this study, we will examine and analyze the explicit occurrences of the idea of vengeance in the book of Jeremiah. After this, other episodes in the book must be discussed which contain words or acts of vengeance, but do not use a distinct linguistic root to express it. Finally, after attaining a more complete picture, we will be able to discuss the questions arising from our survey, first and foremost of which are: who is the avenger, who is avenged, and what is the motive for vengeance in each instance? Additionally, why does the concept of vengeance hold such a central role in the book of Jeremiah?

In our discussion of vengeance in Jeremiah, we will divide the topic into three main categories: 1) collective vengeance on the people of Israel for breaking their covenant with Yahweh; 2) vengeance on other nations (on Egypt in chs. 44, 46; and on Babylon in chs. 50-51); 3) personal vengeance on Jeremiah's enemies. Regarding Yahweh's vengeance on Israel, Babylon, and Egypt, we will examine the passages that contain explicit use of the root *nqm*. Then, we will examine two passages that deal with vengeance but do not contain the root *nqm*: the account of Pashhur the son of Immer the priest (Jer 20,1-6), and the account of Hananiah the son of Azzur (Jeremiah 28).

The Vengeance of Yahweh on Israel

Jeremiah blames the people living in Judah for a decline both in morality and in faith, of social sins, and of ungratefulness toward Yahweh. The people are distorting justice (5,1-3, 28; 7,5-6; 22,13), committing adultery (5,7-8; 7,9), and exploiting the weakest members of society on the judicial, social, and economic planes (5,26-28; 6,6; 7,6). The general atmosphere described by the prophet is characterized by the adoption of immoral norms, which create a sense of social insecurity, a type of *homo homini lupus*. It is impossible to trust anyone because everyone is concerned with attempts to defraud, deceive, exploit, and abuse the trust of the other (6,13; 9,2-5). Societal confidence has been lost, and in its place are suspicion, lies, and deception. This social decline is the result of a decline in faith, in that the people do not fear Yahweh (5,22. 24). The ultimate judge has lost his authority, and thus his ability of deterrence in the eyes of the people. Therefore, all moral boundaries have been breached, resulting in chaos and cold-hearted recklessness. The heart of the people has become "revolting and rebellious" (5,23 - סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה), like the "stubborn and rebellious son" of Deut 21,18-21 who does not

heed moral exhortations and warnings, and whose punishment is death. Yahweh views this as a betrayal and a breach of covenant that cannot be forgiven (5,7). The people pay no heed to the goodness and abundance that Yahweh graciously provides (5,24; 25,5), and in their great pride, they despise the God who subdued the raging sea and defined its borders as "an everlasting ordinance" (– חָק עוֹלָם 5,22). For all these things, Yahweh decrees vengeance on the people of Judah and Jerusalem. This is declared as an undeniable fact and is presented as a rhetorical question repeated three times over, a type of chorus that emphasizes the finality of the divine decision to punish the people.

Yahweh's Vengeance on Babylon

The instrument of Yahweh's violent punishment of the people of Judah was the Neo-Babylonian Empire. During the entire period leading up to, during, and after the conquest, Jeremiah preaches in support of capitulation to Babylonian rule and presents Babylon as a tool in the hands of Yahweh for the discipline of Judah. Indeed, immediately after his designation as a prophet, Jeremiah refers to Babylon as "the families of the kingdoms of the north", (1,15 -מִשְׁפְּחוֹת מַמְלְכוֹת צָפוֹנָה) and then in a more explicit and detailed manner in chapters 20-29. According to Jeremiah, Yahweh will give to Babylon all the treasures of Jerusalem (20,5); the inhabitants of Jerusalem will be taken in exile to Babylon, Jerusalem will be completely destroyed (21,10) and its residents massacred. By divine decree, sovereignty over all the nations of the region has been given to Babylon, thus necessitating complete submission to Nebuchadnezzar, the servant of Yahweh (25,9; 27,6). The arrogant people of Judah, who have forgotten the mercies of Yahweh and despised his mighty power, will be humbled and brought to understand their true geopolitical status: they will be forced to bow before Yahweh's representative, Nebuchadnezzar the idol worshipper.

This radical viewpoint stood in direct opposition to the isolationist and pro-Egyptian stance held by Jehoiakim and Zedekiah and even opposes the popular belief in the eternal endurance of Jerusalem and the temple (Jeremiah 7,4; 26,7-24). As a result, Jeremiah attracted much harsh harassment, and at times found himself in actual mortal danger (20,1-2; 26,7-24; 37,12-16; 38,4-6). On the other hand, after the conquest, Jeremiah received preferential treatment from the Babylonian government, for his perceived faithfulness to their interests (39,11-14). However, even within his prophecies of Judah's destruction by Babylon, Jeremiah hints at the bitter end of Babylon to come at the close of her days of greatness (25,12; 27,7; 29,10). Jeremiah's anti-Babylonian prophecy comes to a climax in chapters 50-51, which are wholly dedicated to Yahweh's vengeance on Babylon.

Due to the dissonance that arises from these two seemingly conflicting aspects of the prophet's attitude toward Babylon (in other words, placing chs. 50-51 against the other parts of the book), some have claimed that chapters 50-51 were the fruit of later redaction, and are not part of the original or earliest edition of the book (Carroll 1986; Vanderhooft 1999). According to them, the mention of the destruction of the temple in 50,28; 51,11.24.35.51 proves that the time of writing or redaction was exilic, after 586 BC. Likewise, in certain passages, it seems that the writer was physically in Babylon at the time of writing or had been there in the past, and in person had seen its magnificent fortresses, including its "ʾošyôt" (50,15 – אֲשִׁיוֹת, see *asītu* in Akkadian: a fortified tower on the wall of the city), as well as its water fountains (50,38; 51,13.36). However, one of Jeremiah's unique attributes is his sober political viewpoint. He clearly recognizes that the defiance of Judah, such a small and marginal kingdom, against Babylon, at the peak of its power, will lead to disaster and total destruction. This sober and pragmatic perspective is not contradicted, but is rather further highlighted by Jeremiah's prediction of the fall of Babylon, being aware that "nothing lasts forever", and that the end of every empire is to fall and yield its place to a new rising power. In addition, his expression of feelings of vengeance against Babylon would likely have reflected the feelings of the whole nation after the conquest. Therefore, even if the writing of chapters 50-51 is later relative to other parts of the book of Jeremiah, it does not necessitate a contradiction in the prophet's approach (on this issue, see the analysis of Amesz, 2004). Jeremiah is a prophet of Yahweh, and as such, his primary role is not to protect the national interests of Babylon, but rather to be concerned with the fate of Yahweh's people and their moral and religious integrity. His preaching for surrender to Babylon does not stem from his love for Babylon, but from concern that his people would preserve their moral values and faith, even if they are unable to maintain their sovereignty.

All things considered, the first and foremost task of the prophet is the communication of the word of Yahweh to its intended recipient, and the recipient of chapters 50-51 is Babylon. Therefore, regardless of his own political views, Jeremiah delivers his message to Babylon in a direct and forthright manner. Because Yahweh's vengeance on Babylon is theologically motivated (rather than politically), the root *nqm* appears in close proximity to references to the destruction of the temple (Jer 50,28; 51,11). This would likely have been the central most painful part of the conquest of Jerusalem for Jeremiah and his countrymen. Besides losing national autonomy, the people lost their center of religious and community life.

Yahweh's Vengeance on Egypt

In the last decade of the seventh century BC, Egypt, led by the pharaohs of the twenty-sixth dynasty, took advantage of the imperial void left by the crumbling Assyrian empire in the areas west of the Euphrates, and tried to increase its political influence in the region. While Assyria, Babylon and Egypt competed for hegemony over the ancient Near East, kings of smaller kingdoms were often forced to make quick and fateful decisions about their politically and militarily alliances. These kings hoped, in light of the volatile political situation, that their chosen ally would rise as the victor. The book of Jeremiah describes a fascinating political battle within the kingdom of Judah that took place between the camp that favored loyalty to Babylon and the camp that favored loyalty to Egypt. In the "pro-Babylonian" camp were the scribes in the family of Shaphan, who were known as people of great influence in the courts of the kings in Jerusalem from the period of Josiah and onward (see 2 Kings 22). The Babylonian connection with this family is recognized clearly in Babylon's choice of Gedaliah son of Ahikam son of Shaphan as their representative that was placed in authority over the remnant community after the destruction of Jerusalem and after the deportation to Babylon. Jeremiah is also among the supporters of the pro-Babylonian position, shown by his blatant words in favor of submission to Babylonian rule throughout the book, and by the protection, he received from the officers of the house of Shaphan from those who sought his harm (See Jer 26,24). In addition, Nebuchadnezzar himself instructed that no harm be done to Jeremiah, and that he should be given permission to act freely (Jer 39,11-14). However, the "pro-Babylonian" camp was in opposition to the "pro-Egyptian" monarchy in Judah in its final years, especially during the days of Jehoiakim and Zedekiah. It seems that the most prominent figures in the pro-Egyptian camp were top commanders in the Judean army, who advised the king in strategic decisions. For example, Letter 3 from Lachish mentions "the commander of the army Konyahu son of Elnathan" who traveled to Egypt during the Second Revolt against Babylon. Likewise, in Jer 26,22 "Elnathan the son of Achbor" is mentioned, who went down to Egypt as the head of a delegation, most likely military in nature, to imprison the prophet Uriah.

In 605 BC, the imperial power struggle in the ancient Near East was decided in favor of Babylon. The armies of Assyria and Egypt suffered defeat at Carchemish, and Nebuchadnezzar began to consolidate and extend his power and influence throughout Syria and the land of Israel. Jehoiakim, king of Judah, who was appointed by Pharaoh Necho II instead of Jehoahaz his younger brother, held a clear pro-Egyptian stance throughout his reign. However, at approximately the end of 603 BC he was compelled to yield to Babylonian vassalage (see Dan 1,1-2; 2 Chr 36,6-7). For three years, Jehoiakim paid taxes to Babylon, however the failed Babylonian attempt to invade Egypt in 601 BC seems to have encouraged Judah,

along with some of its neighbors, to try to break free from the yoke of Babylon. The Babylonian response to the attempted uprising was firm and resolute, as demonstrated by 2 Kgs 24, and by the Babylonian chronicle from the seventh year of the reign of Nebuchadnezzar (Grayson, 1975).

Jehoiakim died in unclear circumstances during the Babylonian siege of Jerusalem. His son Jehoiachin surrendered and was exiled to Babylon, and his uncle Mattaniah (Zedekiah) was installed as ruler over Judah by Nebuchadnezzar.

The Egyptian defeat at Carchemish is discussed extensively in the words of the prophet Jeremiah in chapter 46, and is described as a humiliating defeat, followed by panic and bewilderment (46,5-6). The forces of Egypt in their military might are compared ironically to the overflowing Nile (46,7-8). Nevertheless, they are stopped when Yahweh decides to take revenge on Egypt (possibly there is a textual corruption between the words "Egypt" מצרים and "of His adversaries" מצריו in v. 10), and Pharaoh's army is wiped out as a "sacrifice to Yahweh the God of hosts" on the banks of the Euphrates (Irony is implied here as well, insinuating the loss of Pharaoh's army in the Red Sea). Just as Babylon served as Yahweh's vehicle for punishing Judah, so it serves him in punishing Egypt.

Yahweh's Vengeance on Jeremiah's Enemies[6]

Unlike the three examples of national, collective vengeance mentioned above, now we turn to Jeremiah's plea to Yahweh for personal vengeance on those who seek his harm. As noted above, Jeremiah's views concerning domestic and foreign affairs were defiant, aggressive, and infuriating to the government, the priesthood, and the people. In his preaching, he did not spare criticism of the local government, neither did he not shrink back from predictions of coming destruction and atrocities. For this he paid a heavy personal price, and suffered abuse at the hands of many classes of society: the king (36,26; 38,5), the princes (38,4), the priests and prophets (26,8), "all the people" (26,8.24b), and even "all my close friends, watching for my fall" כֹּל אֱנוֹשׁ שְׁלֹמִי שֹׁמְרֵי צַלְעִי (20,10 ESV). The identity of his harassers here is not fully clear in this rather unique phrase. Hoffman (2001) estimates that these are the people closest to Jeremiah, who were supposed to be concerned for his welfare and protection, but instead were trying to trap him. This interpretation fits well with what is written in 12,6. In Ps 41,10 this same meaning is found in a similar wording. Thus, in this case, it seems that the word שֹׁמְרֵי in 20,10 is best interpreted as עֹקְבֵי "watchers", "pursuers", or even "betrayers" rather than the typical meaning of "protectors" or "defenders". The Septuagint also supports this analysis, with the reading: πάντες ἄνδρες φίλοι αὐτοῦ· τηρήσατε τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτοῦ ("even all his friends: watch his intentions" Brenton), which can be reconstructed in Hebrew as כֹּל אֱנוֹשׁ שְׁלֹמוֹ שִׁמְרוּ צַלְעוֹ. Jeremiah's movements are

under surveillance, in order to frame him or even physically harm him (see also Ps 56,7; 71,10). If so, it seems that this is the most painful part for Jeremiah: betrayal at the hands of family and friends, and their enlistment to the camp of his enemies that are threatening his life. A great sense of isolation is apparent in Jeremiah's complaints to Yahweh, and he feels that he has no one left to rely on but Yahweh. His prayer for vengeance reveals Jeremiah's humanity, his human weakness. He not only desires salvation from his persecutors and the failure of their schemes, but he also longs for their suffering and death (12,3). He is not described as one of the merciful righteous but as hungry for revenge, a man whose hardships have drawn out of him cravings for violence, even against his own family and fellow residents of Anathoth (11,21-23).

At this point in our discussion, we would like to discuss in detail two episodes that contain the motif of Jeremiah's "personal" vengeance on his enemies (by the hand of Yahweh). These narratives are not poetic in style, as in the segments discussed above, but are rather prose descriptions of Jeremiah's experiences. First, we turn to Jeremiah's encounter with Pashhur the son of Immer the priest (Jer 20,1-6), and then to his dispute with Hananiah the son of Azzur (Jeremiah 28, particularly vv. 15-17). [7] Notably, the root *nkm* does not appear in these sections, but vengeance undoubtedly stands at the heart of the story.

Vengeance on Pashhur son of Immer (Jer 20,1-6)

In Jeremiah 19 Jeremiah proclaims a prophecy of wrath on Jerusalem. In chapter 20, as a direct response to this, Pashhur son of Immer the priest, the "chief officer in the house of the Lord", has Jeremiah beaten. It is likely that Jeremiah delivered his prophecy publicly, presumably in the temple during a major pilgrimage to Jerusalem, in order to obtain as large a number of listeners as possible. This is similar to other speeches given by Jeremiah in the temple, such as the "Temple Sermon" in 7,1-15 or the sermon of rebuke that leads to the trial of Jeremiah in chapter 26.

Concerning Pashhur's identity, we can safely assume that he held an administrative role in the temple, presumably responsible for maintaining order in the temple complex. His title "chief officer", and his actions against Jeremiah, are reflected in Jer 29,26 in which the "officers of the house of the Lord" are responsible for the imprisonment and removal of "every man that is mad, and maketh himself a prophet". Thus, Shemaiah the Nehelamite expects Zephaniah son of Maaseiah the priest to rebuke Jeremiah and imprison him for the letter he sent to the exiles of the second exile (29,23-24). In this letter, Jeremiah advises the exiles to establish themselves in Babylon, since their exile will be long, and to ignore false prophecies of a quick return to Judah.

After being beaten, Jeremiah is placed in "the stocks" (הַמַּהְפֶּכֶת - a place of confinement, mentioned alongside "the collar" הַצִּינֹק in Jer 29,26), probably for one night. After his release, his first action is to rename Pashhur to "*māgôr missābîb*", and he invokes the name of Yahweh as his authority. Following LXX (in which *māgôr* alone appears), it seems that *missābîb* מִסָּבִיב is an addition, perhaps influenced by v. 10, in which the same two words describe the plots of Jeremiah's enemies. The term *māgôr* מָגוֹר normally indicates fear and terror, but McKane (1986) notes a theory that māgôr may refer to destruction or even exile, and not necessarily dread or fear. This component in Pashhur's new name is a symbolic keyword in his punishment for persecuting Jeremiah and attempting to frighten him into silence. Yahweh will make Pashhur "a terror to thyself, and to all thy friends", who will fall by the sword of their enemies in front of his eyes (v. 4a).

However, this punishment is not only limited to Pashhur's personal and family sphere. Jeremiah takes this opportunity to sharpen his message further and presents a dual meaning by predicting the comprehensive punishment of the nation of Israel. Thus in verses 4b-5, Jeremiah describes the nation's exile to Babylon, the looting of the treasures of Jerusalem, and the collapse of the kingdom. In verse 6, the text returns to Pashhur and his family and refers to their journey into exile in Babylon. There Pashhur will die and be buried. At the end of verse 6, Pashhur is further accused of being a false prophet, although the book of Jeremiah records no false prophecies given by him. Essentially, by his assault and imprisonment of Yahweh's spokesman, Pashhur has contradicted Jeremiah's message and is therefore regarded as a false prophet (See Deut 18,22b on the link between the root *gwr* to false prophets). Hoffman (1983) develops this point further, arguing that Pashhur's role was not administrative only, but that there are grounds to assume he was an active member of the anti-Babylonian political camp in Judah. While we do not have information that can verify this claim, his punishment and retribution are indeed deeply associated with Babylon. Interestingly, these verses (20,1-6) are the first that mention Babylon specifically as the empire that will destroy and deport Judah. Conversely, there are those who argue that Babylon is not yet presented in these verses as the cause of a national disaster, but only as the tool of Yahweh for the personal punishment of Pashhur and his family (Reimer, 1998). This argument ignores the unambiguous text of verse 5, in which Jeremiah prophesies the capture of Jerusalem and its treasures by the Babylonians. Possibly, though, the start of the prophecy (v. 4a) and its end (v. 6) comprise a frame and could be seen as the essence of the original prophecy, which focuses on the punishment of Pashhur and his family.

Vengeance on Hananiah son of Azzur (Jer 28,15-17)

Chapter 28 relates the confrontation between Jeremiah, a true prophet who preaches capitulation to Babylonian rule, and Hananiah, a false prophet promising a rapid return to Jerusalem both of the exiles and of the temple vessels, within two years. This confrontation takes place in Zedekiah's fourth year as king. The survival of Jehoiachin in Babylon caused a schism in Judah between the supporters of Jehoiachin, who held out hope for his return, and the supporters of Zedekiah, Nebuchadnezzar's appointed representative. This became a major point of contention between the prophets, among them Hananiah, who prophesied Jehoiachin's quick return (28,3-4 here labelled "Jeconiah"). In addition, it is important to remember that in 594 BC, Zedekiah convened a regional anti-Babylonian conference in Jerusalem, which involved representatives of Edom, Moab, Ammon, Tyre, and Sidon (27,3).[8] The clash between Jeremiah and Hananiah apparently occurred as a result of this anti-Babylonian conference, or just prior to it. The conference was perhaps convened after a series of political and military problems in Babylon, both at home and abroad, such as the attack by Elam in 596/5 BC. Likewise, Jer 49,34-39 also describes a military confrontation between Elam and its enemies and the defeat of Elam. Moreover, in the winter of 595/4 BC, a revolt broke out in Babylon and was suppressed by Nebuchadnezzar.

Several years earlier, at the beginning of 598 BC, Pharaoh Khafra had come to power in Egypt. He was supportive of subversive activities against Babylon among the smaller kingdoms of the Southwestern Levant. It seems, therefore, that the combination of all these factors drove Zedekiah and his allies in their attempt to break free from the yoke of Babylon.

In chapter 27, at the command of Yahweh, Jeremiah made "bands and bars" (מוֹסֵרוֹת וּמֹטוֹת) for himself, and placed them around his neck as a symbol of the yoke of the king of Babylon on the peoples of the region. However, in chapter 28, Jeremiah plays a passive role, in comparison to the charismatic, dramatic figure of Hananiah. Hananiah begins his words in verse 2 in the name of "the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel", the full, unequivocal name of Yahweh, and dramatically declares that the yoke of Babylon will be broken from off the neck of all the nations. In Assyro-Babylonian imperial rhetoric, the term "yoke" (*nirū*) was used to illustrate the empire's undisputed power, as well as the utter enslavement of the smaller regional kingdoms. Thus Hananiah both opens (v. 2) and closes (v. 4) his statement by ironically referencing this yoke, creating a frame for emphasis. Moreover, Hananiah commits himself to a specific time frame in the near future: "Within two full years" Yahweh will bring back to Jerusalem the exiles and the temple vessels, including Jehoiachin, whom Hananiah views as the legitimate king of Judah.

This creates an interesting position for Jeremiah, who usually stands in opposition to the existing government authorities. Suddenly, the situation is turned on its head, and Jeremiah finds himself opposing, and in effect invalidating, the words of an opposition leader. However, he does not do so through direct confrontation. Jeremiah, who knows that the prophecy of Hananiah will not be fulfilled, initially expresses hope for its realization (v. 6), perhaps due to fear of further harassment. On the other hand, in verses 8-9, he does hint at one of the difficulties with Hananiah's optimistic prophecy. In the case of prophecies of peace, the final outcome is the only way to prove the reliability of the prophet. Jeremiah's words here are directly connected to the passage in Deut 18,20-22 that prescribes death as the punishment for a false prophet whose words are not fulfilled. Hananiah is aware of this hurdle, and in order to win over his temple audience, he recognizes that he must perform a physical and dramatic act to refute Jeremiah's contentions and to counter Jeremiah's symbolic act of carrying "bands and bars" on his neck (27,2). Therefore, Hananiah takes the bar off Jeremiah's neck and breaks it in front of all the people (28,10), symbolizing Yahweh breaking the yoke of Nebuchadnezzar from over the nations. The text does not provide a response from Jeremiah to this act, and the reader is left with the impression of Jeremiah's public humiliation and degradation, and Hananiah's overwhelming victory. Consequently, some argue that 28,12-17 is a later editorial addition, which aims to defend Jeremiah's honor and to clarify that Yahweh did not abandon his prophet. Jeremiah is sent to Hananiah with a new message for the nations, built on the principle of *lex talionis*, "an eye for an eye". Just as Hananiah broke Jeremiah's wooden bars, so Yahweh will place a yoke of iron upon all the nations, in the form of servitude to Babylon. Even the beasts of the field will serve Nebuchadnezzar (This detail is missing in LXX). Furthermore, in verses 15-16, Jeremiah gives Hananiah an entirely different kind of message, of a very personal nature. Hananiah has made false promises and has breathed false hopes into the hearts of the people, and this is considered *sārâ* סָרָה in the eyes of Yahweh – falsehood, and rebellion. According to Deut 13,6, the punishment for a false prophet who speaks sārâ is death, and indeed verse 17 discloses the death of Hananiah, two months later.

In Pashhur's case (20,1-6) vengeance was both personal and national alike, and the avenger was Yahweh. Here, in contrast, Jeremiah takes matters into his own hands and initiates revenge on Hananiah as punishment for his public humiliation. Paradoxically, Yahweh is then obligated to stand by his prophet and fulfill his words. This is reminiscent of the prophet Elijah in the affair of the drought (1 Kgs 17) and in the punishment given to Ahab for taking Naboth's vineyard (1 Kgs 21,17-24). In both cases, it seems that Elijah acts on his own initiative, without an explicit divine order. In the same way that Jeremiah is motivated by his personal rivalry with Hananiah, so Elijah is driven by his personal rivalry with Ahab. In both cases, Yahweh stands by his prophet, fulfilling his words, despite the personal

initiative of the prophet. In Elijah's case, however, it cost him his prophetical post, and led to his replacement by Elisha (1 Kings 19). [9]

Cycles of vengeance in the book of Jeremiah

In summary of our research thus far, it is clear that vengeance is a thematic motif in the book of Jeremiah. Yahweh himself is the avenger, and the objects of his vengeance are varied: at times the people of Israel, at other times a foreign nation, and at other times the personal enemies of his prophets. Yet still, the question remains, why does this motif exist in Jeremiah? Does it express any certain theological, philosophical, political, or social perspective meant to influence the contemporary readers of the book?

To better answer these questions, we must now turn our attention to an additional number of instances in the Bible in which divine vengeance is enacted on those who harm Yahweh's spokespeople. As seen above, Yahweh interprets the harassment of his representatives as a personal attack on himself (Avioz, 2005). For example, Num 16,28-35 describes the supernatural punishment of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, who publicly challenged Moses and Aaron by sharply criticizing their leadership (vv. 3, 13-14), claiming arrogance on their part, and attempting to incite others to rebellion. Moses appeals to Yahweh concerning this insurrection (v. 15), and he receives the full support and protection of Yahweh, who supernaturally wipes out the rebels and all their possessions from the face of the earth (vv. 31-33).

Another related case can be found in 2 Kgs 2, 23-25. The prophet Elisha encounters a group of "little children", who mock him: "Go up, thou baldhead; go up, thou baldhead". With no divine directive or even an appeal to Yahweh, Elisha curses these children in a most ruthless manner "in the name of the Lord", and forty-two of them are killed by "two she-bears out of the wood". Unlike Moses in the Korah incident, the vengeance here is Elisha's personal revenge, without any religious or political motives. In this sense, Elisha's private, egocentric revenge is more analogous to Jeremiah's vengeance on Hananiah.

An even more closely related example can be found in Amos 7,12-17. Like the confrontation between Pashhur the priest and Jeremiah, similarly Amaziah the priest of Beth-El clashes with Amos in a sharp war of words. Amaziah demands that Amos will go back to the land of Judah, and "there eat bread, and prophesy there" (v. 12). Note the nickname "seer", used by Amaziah to belittle Amos, implying that he sought financial gain from his prophecy. A pre-classical prophecy was characterized by "seers" (חֹזֶה or רֹאֶה) of various types, who made their living through prophecy (see 1 Sam 9,6-9). To this accusation Amos answers: "I am no prophet, neither am I a prophet's son" (v. 14). In other words, "prophecy is not my

livelihood, but agriculture. I was not born a prophet nor did I inherit this role from my ancestors." (This stands in contrast to the priest, who inherited his position by virtue of his family line, and not by virtue of his distinctive qualifications or direct election by Yahweh). Amos goes so far as to apply to himself a well-known Biblical metaphor related to God's chosen individual: "And the Lord took me from following the flock" (v. 15). This immediately brings to mind several "chosen" figures, including King David (2 Sam 7,8).

Amaziah's punishment, pronounced by Amos in verse 17, will be enacted by Yahweh in stages: Amaziah's wife will prostitute herself in the city; his sons and daughters will fall by the sword; his land "shall be divided by line" (i.e. taken by strangers); Amaziah himself will die on the unclean ground; and so also Israel "shall surely be led away captive out of their land." The incremental structure moves from the personal (Amaziah) to the collective (Israel). This is the reverse order of the structure of the punishment given to Pashhur in Jer 20, 4-6 in which Jeremiah begins with the nation, and then focuses on Pashhur. Still, there is a great similarity between these two episodes.

In light of the passages presented above, the existence of a literary convention has been suggested that includes stories and traditions about personal revenge on the enemies of the prophets of Yahweh (so, for example, Avioz, 2005). However, there are objections to this theory, and as we have demonstrated, the vengeance motif in Jeremiah is diverse and multi-faceted. Personal vengeance is only one component of the comprehensive vengeance motif in the book and therefore should be discussed as one part of a system of concentric circles: individual characters, the nation of Israel, and the regional empires. One of the prominent principles that surface in these circles of vengeance is the principle of *lex talionis*, "an eye for an eye". Just as Jeremiah's enemies desire to cause his death, he yearns for and prophecies their death (compare Jer 11,19 with 12,3, and 2,10 with 20,12). Many scholars, such as Kalmanofsky (2015) and Amesz (2004), have also pointed out the principle of *lex talionis* in Jeremiah's prophecies of vengeance on Babylon, Egypt, and other nations, such as Moab (ch. 48) and Edom (49,7-22).

According to Kalmanofsky, Jeremiah's prophecies of vengeance on the nations represent revenge fantasies on the psychological plane, a type of emotional and moral survival strategy that gave heart to the people of Israel during the conquest and exile. As already mentioned in our treatment of the psychological background of vengeance, the desire to avenge (including "vengeance fantasies") is considered dangerous, undesirable, and illegitimate. However, according to Berger, citing the words of Goldberg, vengeance fantasies can function as an important therapeutic tool, since they function as an imaginative satisfaction of the urge for vengeance and prevent the actual enactment of vengeance with its devastating consequences. This kind of restraint and the ability to rest content with fantasies of vengeance is

a sign of mental strength. One of the most common ways to describe vengeance fantasies is through art, like in the book of Jeremiah.

Prophecies of destruction against Babylon were intended to strengthen the sense of hope and divine justice in the hearts of listeners and readers. The Babylonians had violated the holy people of Israel and their God; they had plundered and destroyed the temple of Yahweh in Jerusalem; they turned Jerusalem into a heap of deserted ruins; and they had tortured, humiliated and massacred the inhabitants of the city. Therefore, Babylon will become "a dwelling-place for jackals, an astonishment, and a hissing, without inhabitant" (51,37); its temples will be desecrated (51,52); and its people will be tortured (51,54) and killed en masse (51,57). While restoration and redemption are anticipated for Judah, Babylon's fate will be final and absolute, with no hope of renewal. In our opinion, the prophecies of vengeance on Babylon in chapters 50-51 are rooted in the tangible experience of life in exile after the conquest. These deported people were desperate to know that Yahweh had not abandoned them and that justice would be done to Babylon and its allies for its violence. However, documents and inscriptions such as the Kurkh monolith (Grayson, 1996), which describes the early years of the reign of Shalmaneser III (858-824 BC), the annals of Sargon II (Fuchs, 1994) from Dur-Sharrukin (Khorsabad), and the Rassam Cylinder A of Ashurbanipal King of Assyria (in the description of his military campaign against the mainland portion of Tyre, Ušu) from 645-643 BC (Sterck, 1916), it appears that The fate of Jerusalem and the temple was not different from that of other insurgent kingdoms in the area of the Assyrian and Babylonian conquests. It was not unusual for an empire to punish a rebelling kingdom by damaging their temples, and even taking their gods and temple vessels captive (compare the fall of the Ark of the Covenant into the hands of the Philistines in 1 Sam 4-6). However, this fact does not lessen the grief and sorrow of the exiled people of Israel for their destroyed temple, and so it seems likely that Jeremiah 50-51 does indeed express a burning desire for revenge on Babylon.

Regarding Yahweh's vengeance on Egypt in Jeremiah, some claim, such as Peels, that Egyptian imperialism and the Egyptian sense of superiority are its cause. His assumption is based on several verses from chapter 46, such as verse 8b, that perhaps describe Egyptian "abuse" of various cities outside of Egypt in exchange for a ransom. In Jeremiah's view, Yahweh is the judge of the entire world (27,5) and he has a "quarrel" with humanity as a whole (25,35). In this interpretation, the words of wrath toward Egypt in chapter 46 also serve as words of comfort to Israel, who suffered greatly under Egypt's hand. Indeed, Israel's comfort is the subject of the final two verses of chapter 46 (vv. 27-28). This view is clearly consistent with the anti-imperialistic tone of Jeremiah's speeches against Babylon and Egypt. However, taking a broader perspective, an additional, distinctly anti-

Egyptian layer can be discerned in Jeremiah, and in fact in the entire corpus of deuteronomistic literature.

Jeremiah expresses strong opposition to any link between the kingdoms of Judah and Egypt, both before and after the Babylonian conquest (despite the fact that he went down to Egypt with the rest of the people after the assassination of Gedaliah). Jeremiah's anti-Egyptian stance is closely related to the figure of King Josiah and his religious reform, and also to the family of Shaphan the scribe, who played a major role in the reform's design and implementation, as seen in 2 Kings 22. In Jer 26, 24 it becomes apparent that this family had given Jeremiah protection from his adversaries (from the priests, the prophets, some members of the royal court, and even from the kings Jehoiakim and Zedekiah, apparently). According to the title verses of Jeremiah, the prophet began his activities in the days of Josiah, "in the thirteenth year of his reign" (1, 2). Based on 2 Kgs 22,1 Josiah introduced the religious reform in the eighteenth year of his reign (in 622 BC). However, in 609 BC, Josiah's life came to a premature end at Megiddo by the hand of Pharaoh Necho, when the Egyptian army made its way north to the Euphrates River to assist the Assyrian forces in combating Babylon. It seems that the death of the king brought an end to his religious and political reform, especially since Josiah's successor, Jehoahaz, was assessed harshly: "he did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord" (2 Kgs 23,32). In other words, Jehoahaz did not continue pursuing the centralization of the worship of Yahweh in Jerusalem, or the eradication of idolatry from the land. The author-redactor of the Book of Kings gives a similar assessment of all the kings of Judah after Josiah, all the way up to its final destruction. In light of this, a significant link can be established between Jeremiah's (and Shaphan's) pro-Babylonian stance and Egypt's responsibility for the death of Josiah and the disruption of his reform.[10] Egypt is presented in the book of Jeremiah as a place from which comes disaster, and as a result, all contact should be avoided with this kingdom.[11] When he arrived in Egypt together with "Johanan son of Kareah, and all the captains of the forces" (43,5) perhaps taken against his will, Jeremiah's first act on Egyptian soil was to pronounce a prophecy of the destruction of Egypt, a trend that continues from chapter 43 to chapters 44 and 46.

After the death of Josiah, it seems that Jeremiah considered Jehoiakim to be the representative of the Egyptian government in Judah. As seen above, his opposition aroused the wrath of the religious and political "establishment". Thus, the words of the prophet reflect an anti-Egyptian tradition, which fueled his desire for divine vengeance on Egypt. This link constitutes an important component of the interconnecting circles of vengeance in the book of Jeremiah, each interrelated to the other, which is used by the author as a rhetorical-psychological tool to convey

his messages, both moral and political, to readers who are expecting divine justice to appear and to save them from their spiritual suffering.

Summary

At the center of the book of Jeremiah stands the destruction. The destruction and exile of the kingdom of Judah left a deep wound in the soul and spirits of the survivors from the destruction in Judah and the exile. Feelings of fury, humiliation, abandonment, impotence, and frustration that awoke within the beaten community following the terrible trauma, found literary expression at the hand of the authors and redactors of the book of Jeremiah. The desire to avenge is part of the processing of the victim's harsh emotions. It is normal and to a certain extent even healthy, as long as the victim is strong enough emotionally in order to abstain from carrying out real vengeance and channel his desire for revenge into the ability to rehabilitate himself, recover, thrive, and see this as constituting the perfect vengeance.

From the emotional and crude desire to avenge, having been literarily processed at the hand of an artist, the motif of vengeance developed in the book of Jeremiah and infiltrated the areas of theology and politics. In this way, "cycles of vengeance" came into being in the book of Jeremiah, and they focus on different factors, from the personal domain (the prophet's personal enemies), through the relations between God and the people of Israel, to the relations between God and other kingdoms and different nations. Especially the third domain, the international domain, which seemingly has nothing to do with feelings and man's inner world, stands at the center of the personal pain of the book's author. The personal and the political are mixed up since the tragedy was a national tragedy with a tremendous impact on all areas of the lives of individuals.

The authors retrospectively "take revenge" on the objects of their fury: the kings of Judah, who in their political shortsightedness rebelled against Babylon; the false prophets, who led astray the hearts of the people and the rulers and thereby hastened the end; the stubborn, arrogant, corrupt, and cruel people, which hurried towards the disaster and did not heed the voice of God's prophets; and the demolishing and exiling empires, that brought an end to the kingdom of Judah. The will to avenge is the will for correction, justice, religious repentance, and for national resurrection. In his vengeance, God restores the divine justice, and in this way the readers of the book of Jeremiah, that is to say, the victims whose honor has been downtrodden, feel and know that justice shall be done and that God has not abandoned them despite the destruction of his sanctuary in Jerusalem.

Notes

1   On the sociological aspect of the phenomenon of vengeance, see Elster, 1990.

2   For a fascinating survey of this issue, see Rosen, 2007.

3   The order of the roots in this list does not indicate their distribution in the Hebrew Bible, and for each root, only one example of many has been presented.

4   A number of examples of this appear on pp. 78—82 in the work of Mendenhall.

5   In several later cultures, vengeance is even considered a legitimate tool for obtaining justice, restoring lost honor, and making peace, but also as a political tool in the service of the Church and the monarchy. For example, in the European middle ages, as shown by Smail and Gibson (2009).

6   The Issue of "Jeremiah's complaints" is extended, and exceeds this paper's scope. The following segment will deal with some of the lamentation/ complaint texts in Jeremiah. For a comprehensive analysis of this issue, see chapter five in Polk's exegesis on Jeremiah (Polk, 1984).

7   We could also include in the category of "personal vengeance" Jeremiah's prophecy to king Jehoiakim in 36,30 which he delivered after the tearing and burning of the scroll containing Jeremiah's prophecies in v. 23. Nevertheless, this case is different from those of Pashhur and Hananiah, in that the confrontation here between Jeremiah and his enemy is not physical and direct, but rather indirect and at the ideological level, without a face-to-face conflict.

8   This assumes that the title verse of Jeremiah 27 is corrupted, and originally referred to Zedekiah and not Jehoiakim, as in chapter 28.

9   The matter of Elijah's character and actions in this and other contexts is at the center of the study done by Garsiel (2014).

10   See Reimer's extensive discussion (Reimer, 1998).

11   See the narrative concerning Uriah the prophet in Jer 26,20-24.

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From Tokenism to Meaningful Representation: Insights into the Experiences of Palestinian Arab Women in Local Politics in Israel

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This study explores Palestinian Arab women's experiences in Israeli local politics, focusing on the challenges they face and the implications for their representation. Through interviews and analysis, the study uncovers a gap between the quantitative and qualitative representation of women in political positions. While there has been an increase in the number of women holding office, the qualitative evaluations reveal persistent barriers and inequalities. The women interviewed encountered obstacles such as gender biases, tokenism, and limited control over the electoral process, which hinder their full-fledged participation. The study results demonstrate the role of early community engagement in shaping women's political involvement, the challenges of balancing familial and political responsibilities, the importance of family support and the role of civil society organizations play in providing training and support for women candidates, filling a void left by political parties. The results also show that despite their passive role in the electoral process, the Palestinian Arab women local politicians exercise some degree of agency by seeking self-empowerment and support. Overall, the study results suggest the need for ongoing efforts to promote gender equality, empower women in decision-making processes, and bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative representation.

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Introduction

The significance of local politics lies in its impact on the representation of women in politics. This sphere of governance is particularly important because it operates in close proximity to the citizens and serves as the primary provider of daily necessities, in contrast to national politics which is less familiar to individuals in terms of personal experience and the workings of bureaucracy (Choudhry and Richard 2014; Sumbas 2020). The past decade has indeed witnessed a significant increase in women's presence in local politics (Barnett and Shalaby 2023). According to the newly published United Nations (UN) Women in Local Government data set (2022), women constitute 36% of local deliberative bodies worldwide compared to merely 25% in national parliaments. Much of this increase is the result of gender quotas (Sumbas 2020). The Gender Quotas Database (International IDEA 2022) shows that as of 2021, 75 countries had some form of gender quota on the local level. That said, reality in Israel-on which this paper focuses, is different. With no statuary laws or quotas to guarantee women representation in local politics in Israel, and with only monetary incentives rewarding lists including women, that are usually not utilized (Desivilya-Syna et al. 2020), women representation is significantly lower on the local level (around 16.2%) compared to the national level (around 24%) (Knesset Research and Information Center 2018). This under-representation of women is more apparent among the Palestinian Arab women in Israel whose representation on the local level is barely 2% (ibid). However, despite the low percentage of Palestinian Arab women representation in local politics in Israel, there has a been a slow but steady rise in their participation from the 70s (the decade in which Arab women started entering local politics in Israel) until recently. As for the present term 2018-2023, according to Awad, the director of *Women against Violence* organization in Nazareth, Israel, there are about 25 Palestinian Arab women serving in different local authorities in Israel, compared to only 3 in the 70s (Awad personal communication, June 1st, 2023).

Although research about Israeli women in local politics abound, there is little research about Palestinian Arab women local politicians in Israel. This fact may be accounted for the recentness of this sociological phenomenon, as Palestinian Arab women started entering the local political arena only in the 70s of the previous century. Another reason for the scarcity of research may be ascribed to the marginalization of the Israeli media of Arab women local politicians (Abu Oqsa- Daoud 2003; Harker and Russel 2019), which in turn may be translated into a lack of interest of researchers in this topic, and hardships reaching the women. Regardless of the reason, for Arab women in traditional patriarchal societies to occupy public and political positions, despite the tremendous difficulties, this is a development that must be acknowledged and researched (Al Maaitah et al. 2011), as participation of women at top tiers can benefit the society at large,

especially by sustaining the democratic processes (Moghadam 2010), and is significant for the formation of the world view of gender equality (McGee 2010; Sumbas 2020). Research by Norris and Inglehart (2019) highlights that increased female representation leads to improved policy outcomes and a more democratic governance process. Yet, women participation in local politics in Israel faces tremendous barriers (Desivilya-Syna et al. 2020).

In compliance with the studies on the critical role of women in local governance for the promotion of gender equality and the barriers in the way of these women the intention in this study is to take the existing discussions of women's role in local politics one step further. To this end the focus of this article is the experience of Palestinian Arab women in Israeli local politics in light of their numerical increase but in a holistic manner targeting their experience prior to during and after their election for one term (i.e. 2013-2018) or more (i.e. 2018-2023) and striving to extend our knowledge and critique of these women's process of political engagement, limitations, but also insights.

Literature Review

The World Economic Forum examines the global gender gap across four leading indices: educational attainment, health and survival, economic participation and opportunity, and political empowerment. According to its data, the most striking gender disparity based on the share of women is still in politics (WEF 2018). Women, in general, face a myriad of obstacles on their way to politics. The structuralist and binary way in which gender roles are viewed are detrimental to their integration in politics, as the public sphere has always been linked to males and the private one to females (Herzog 1994, 1999). Despite women's entrance into the political public sphere, it has been found that they are once again subjected to a binary hierarchy that categorizes them based on expectations and responsibilities (Desivilya Syna et al. 2020).

The concepts of demand and supply offer insights into the barriers that hinder women's progress towards political positions (Holman and Schneider 2018; Krook 2010). Demand-side explanations refer to external factors that are beyond the control of women themselves (Holman and Schneider 2018). These factors include structural elements such as gender discrimination (Sapiro 1981; Briggs 2000; McGlen et al. 2011), gender stereotypes held by voters (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2000; Fox and Smith 2001), lack of role models (Briggs 2000), male dominance and the prevalence of macho presenteeism (Farrel and Titcombe 2016), as well as institutional factors within the political system itself (Duerst-Lahti 1998; Desivilya-Syna et al. 2020) and dynamics within political parties (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Niven 2006). On the supply side, which pertains to women's

choices and aspirations influenced by gendered socialization patterns (Holman and Schneider 2018), there are various factors at play. These factors encompass the motherhood penalty (Carroll 1989; Stalsburg 2012; Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Holman and Schneider 2018), underrepresentation in crucial professions such as business and law, which often serve as steppingstones for political careers (Sweet-Cushman 2016; Holman and Schneider 2018), and gender disparities in terms of self-efficacy and self-reliance (Lawless and Fox 2005; 2010).

New research examining women's experiences in local governments per se indicates that cultural factors play a more prominent role in perpetuating the exclusion of women from local politics compared to institutional and structural factors (Sumbas 2020). These cultural factors include an androcentric political culture, religious beliefs, and the persistence of traditional attitudes towards women's involvement in politics (Norris and Inglehart 2001). This leads to significant barriers for women in participating and being represented in elections and political processes. Notably, political networks often function as exclusive "old-boys' clubs" at the local level, particularly in rural areas with smaller populations, where men predominantly occupy local offices (ibid).

Women from various cultures encounter barriers from both the demand and supply sides of the equation. However, ethnic minority women face additional challenges and cumulative disadvantages within politics (Murray 2016). Descriptive analyses reveal a significant underrepresentation of minority women in politics as a whole, although the extent of their exclusion varies across different geographical locations (Hughes 2013). Interestingly, the under-representation of women and ethnic minorities in elected office can paradoxically provide advantages for ethnic minority women (Mügge et al. 2019). In certain countries, such as the United States, a higher proportion of elected officials with Latino and African American backgrounds are women rather than men (Hardy-Fanta 2013; Orey and Brown 2014). Similarly, in New Zealand, ethnic minority women, particularly Māori, are better represented among MPs compared to ethnic majority MPs (Barker and Coffe 2018). In the national parliaments of Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, women with immigrant backgrounds have better representation than their male counterparts, although this is not the case in countries like France, Germany, Greece, and Italy (Mügge et al. 2019). For instance, in France, the descriptive representation of minority women has been slowly improving, but their inclusion is conditional on their willingness to serve as symbols of secularity and assimilation, which can limit the substantive representation of Muslim women (Murray, 2016). In the aforementioned countries, ethnic minority women seem to benefit from a "multiple identity advantage," experiencing less discrimination due to their dual assignment to underrepresented groups (Mügge and Erzeel 2016).

Palestinian Arab women in Israel represent a unique intersection of minority identities, including gender, ethnicity, nationality, and language, in comparison to the Jewish majority population in Israel (Abu Baker 2017). Similar to what has been observed, they also face significant under-representation in both local and national politics. However, unlike the "multiple identity advantage" discussed by Mügge and Erzeel (2016), Palestinian Arab women in Israel do not experience such benefits due to the conflicting nature of their two major identities: Palestinian and Israeli. These opposing identities do not contribute to a cohesive definition of identity but instead create a situation where exclusionary identities coexist (Samucha 1980, 2004; Haidar 1994). The passing of the nation-state law in 2018 in Israel has intensified the tension between the Palestinian and Israeli identities. This law redefines the Israeli state in terms that exclusively emphasize ethnicity, placing Palestinian citizens in a precarious position where they are neither fully stateless nor granted full citizenship rights (Jamal and Kensicki 2019).

As stated above, the current research aims to investigate the dynamics of gender equality in municipal government among Palestinian Arab women in Israel, especially considering the quantitative increase in their representation and based on their experiences and insights. It focuses on understanding the process through which these women make their way to an elected local office from a holistic approach. However, it is crucial that the specific context of the Palestinian Arab women in Israel is presented before discussing the results, for a better understanding of the environment these women operate within.

Context: Palestinian Arab Citizens in Israel

Following the 1948 War, known as *Nakba* to the Palestinians, over 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were either expelled or fled from the newly established state of Israel, leaving only 160,000 within its borders (Abu Lughod 1971; Jiryis 1976; Lustick 1980; Piterberg 2001). From 1948 to 1966, Palestinians in Israel were subjected to strict military administration and were viewed as a potential fifth column (Abu Saad and Champagne 2006). Scholars from various disciplines have extensively documented the political, economic, and social discrimination experienced by this community, as well as their subordination to the Jewish majority in nearly all aspects of society, including income, education, occupation, employment, property ownership, and community development (Kraus and Hodge 1990; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1992; Rabinowitz 2000). Consequently, the socioeconomic status of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel is significantly lower than that of Jewish citizens. Governmental and non-governmental reports, such as the Or Commission Report (2003), have extensively documented and recognized the systematic discrimination faced by this minority on a national level.

The current population of Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel exceeds two million, constituting approximately 21.1% of the country's total population. Most of this population identifies as Muslim, with smaller communities of Christians and Druze (CBS 2023). Despite being traditionally patriarchal, the Palestinian Arab community in Israel has experienced significant social transformations due to its unique position as a national minority within a predominantly Jewish country and its interactions with Jewish society (Meler 2019). This community exists along a spectrum between traditionalism and modernity (Abu Baker 2003). The level of tradition or modernity within this society impacts the distribution of family roles and has implications for women's status and their ability to progress and succeed (ibid). Palestinian Arab women in Israel are part of the Palestinian Arab population, which is perceived by the Jewish majority as part of the hostile Arab nation. As a result, opportunities for advancement within Israeli society have been limited for them. One tactic employed by the Israeli establishment was the promotion of traditional clan or tribal local political leadership to exert control over the Arab population while maintaining internal divisions as a counterbalance to the formation of a shared national identity (Abu Oqsa-Daoud 2002). These barriers have significantly hindered the social, economic, and political progress of Palestinian women, as well as the rest of the Arab population within the country (Suleiman 1998; Jamal and Kensicki 2019) resulting in a scarcity of role models for these women, among other challenges. For example, in a study conducted among the Palestinian Arab population in Israel, a direct correlation was found between the female models encountered by women and their perception of their own leadership capabilities. According to the research, presenting unfulfilled potential models to women who were forced to give up their careers for the sake of potential leadership had an impact on their perception of themselves and their ability to lead. This finding helps explain the underrepresentation of women in leadership positions among Israeli women and minority populations in particular (Baransy 2022). In other words, exposure to female models affects internal barriers, creates a sense of capability and confidence, and motivates them to pursue leadership roles.

Despite facing intersecting challenges posed by societal structures and state policies that undermine Israel's Arab minority, Arab women have made progress in terms of education, employment (Sabbah-Karkaby 2017) and political representation, yet their participation in the political sphere continues to be slow, primarily due to the complex barriers they face (Abu Baker 2017; Desyvilya-Syna et al. 2020). Nevertheless, Arab women have been able to leverage various social resources to navigate these obstacles. These resources encompass their personal attributes, professional experiences, academic backgrounds, and political engagement (Hanif 2016).

Palestinian Arab Women in Local Politics in Israel:

Palestinian Arab women in Israel embody a mosaic of religious identities, shaped by centuries of historical, geographical, and social intersections. The majority of them are Muslim, predominantly of the Sunni denomination Nevertheless, there is also a significant Christian minority that encompasses several denominations. Additionally, there exists a Druze community, which is an offshoot of Islam, but with distinct religious beliefs and practices (Halabi 2014). Bedouin women in Israel occupy a unique sociocultural space that intersects both Palestinian Arab identity and the broader Arab world's nomadic traditions (Abu Rabia-Queder 2007). Historically, the Bedouins led a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle in the Negev desert, but Israeli state policies in the latter half of the 20th century have impacted their way of life, pushing many towards a more sedentary existence in townships. The transition has influenced the Bedouin women's roles and their social statuses. This dual pull of tradition and modernity often places Bedouin women in a challenge, as they negotiate between the expectations of their community and their personal aspirations. Moreover, their economic conditions, combined with lower literacy rates compared to other Arab groups, add another layer of complexity to their experiences (Abu Rabia-Queder 2007). However, despite these challenges, many Bedouin women are active agents of change in their communities, advocating for greater rights and opportunities, yet although women have little access to public, they are politically socialized in the private space and conduct "private politics" by acting within the tribal organization and today the familial organization (Martue 2005; Abu Rabia-Queder 2007) This tapestry of religious backgrounds influences the experiences, challenges, and aspirations of Palestinian Arab women in Israel visa-vis their representation in politics. For example, while up until conducting this study, there has been no Bedouin woman local politician in any local authority, historically Christian women outnumbered Muslim and Druze women in local politics (Abu Oqsa-Dauod 2003), but the picture has changed recently (Zaher 2019), as research shows and is presented below.

The representation of Palestinian Arab women in local government is a recent development. The first breakthrough occurred in 1969 when Mrs. Violette Khoury was elected as the first female member of a local council in the Arab village of Kfar Yassif in northern Israel. She later became the mayor in the subsequent 1973 elections, marking a significant milestone. However, since then, no Arab woman has been elected as a mayor. In the same year, Mrs. Samira Khoury ran for the municipal council of Nazareth and was elected, but her term was cut short as the council was dissolved shortly thereafter (Abu Oqsa-Dauod 2003). Following these pioneers, a small number of Palestinian Arab women in Israel started to join local councils. From the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 until 1998, only

twelve Arab women served as members of Arab local councils. Between 2003 and 2018, an additional 25 women followed, with most of them having served in all-Arab local authorities, while only a few in local authorities of mixed Jewish-Arab cities (Awad personal communication June 1st, ,2023).

The profile of local Arab women politicians in Israel has undergone both quantitative and qualitative changes over the years. Until 1998, the typical profile of Arab women involved in local politics was as follows: they were usually in their 30s or 40s, married with children, hailing from political families, or married to politicians, predominantly Christian, and residing in the northern Galilee region (Abu Oqsa-Daoud 2003). However, in the 2003 local elections, there were some notable shifts in the profile of women participating in local politics. Muslim and Druze women also entered the political arena, and they were all educated and politically active through the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Jabha-Hadash), a socialist party with communist affiliations. These changes highlight the diversification and widening of participation among Arab women in local politics in terms of religious affiliation and political engagement. Nonetheless according to Zaher (2019), starting from the 2008 elections, the diversity of women involved in local politics has expanded, including women in their fifties and sixties for the first time. The elections in 2013 even saw the election of two grandmothers and two widows, which was unprecedented. Unlike previous trends, many of these elected women did not come from politically active families or have personal affiliations with male politicians. Instead, they came from average lower-middle-class families with no political background. In terms of religious representation, there was an increase in the number of elected Muslim women compared to Christian women. Geographically, more elected women represented the central part of Israel, rather than just the northern region. Educationally, not all elected women had academic training, marking a departure from the previous trend. Furthermore, politically, more women were elected from local independent lists rather than national political lists. These changes reflect a growing diversity and widening representation of women in local politics in terms of age, family background, religion, geography, education, and political affiliation. These developments indicate a turning point in conservative Palestinian Arab cultural values and perception of married and widowed women's role, especially that, according to Abu Bakr (2010), the social status of divorced and widowed women is the lowest in the Arab familial hierarchy. It was especially the 2018 elections' results that confirm this social change towards widowed women as for the first time, an elected Palestinian Arab Druze widowed woman headed a list of mostly men (Zaher 2019).

However, in addition to the lifting of some structural and cultural barriers before Arab women (Sabbah-Karkaby 2017), there was another political change

that cooccurred and which, in turn, triggered a social change in the candidates' profiles in the scene of the municipal government in both the Jewish community (Zubeda and Lavie 2015) and the Arab community in Israel (Khalaileh 2019). The law that formed the basis of this fundamental change or substantial "electoral revolution" in the State of Israel - the law of direct election to the mayorship-came into effect for the first time in the local authority elections in 1978. This law separated for the first time in Israel two structures of the municipal election system that until now were one, the election of the mayorship and the election to the municipal council. Among the several ramifications of this law are the personalization of politics and a change in the profile of local political candidates (King and Totnaor 2015), as most of the local candidates didn't represent national parties anymore, but local independent lists containing candidates showing a more diverse spectrum of personal profiles (Zubeda and Lavie 2015; Khalaileh 2019). Simultaneously, Zaher (2019) demonstrated a shift in the personal profiles of Palestinian Arab women local politicians in Israel as well over a period of time extending from 1970s until 2018.

Methodology

The qualitative research design chosen for this study is well-suited for exploring the experiences and perspectives of Palestinian Arab women in local politics in Israel. The use of in-depth face-to-face interviews as the main data collection tool allows for a comprehensive understanding of the participants' experiences, barriers, and insights. The researcher's personal familiarity with many of the participants, stemming from her own background as a former local politician, has facilitated the recruitment process. The author is aware of the fact her positionality as an insider within the research population holds significant implications for the research process and outcomes. As highlighted by scholars such Holmes and Darwin (2020), an insider perspective enables a deep understanding of the culture, norms, and dynamics of the population under study. This intimate familiarity can facilitate trust and rapport-building, leading to richer data collection and more nuanced analysis. However, the potential for bias and subjectivity should not be overlooked, as indicated by Haraway (1988). Mercer (2007) suggests that an insider's position is a 'double-edged sword' in that what is gained in one area may be lost in another. Balancing the benefits of insider insights with the need for critical distance, the researcher has employed peer review of her reflections and interpretations allowing participants themselves to authenticate the quotes I used.

The semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed for flexibility, enabling the participants to share their unique experiences while still focusing on the predetermined headings of "Before election," "During elections," and "After election." To ensure ethical considerations, the interviews were taped and

transcribed with the participants' permission. Anonymity was maintained by coding their names and not revealing specific details about ruling periods, places, or political affiliations.

The researcher's thorough reading and familiarization with the transcribed interviews, followed by the identification of categories under the predetermined headings, contribute to a structured and organized analysis process. Overall, the chosen research design, data collection method, and analysis approach provide a robust foundation for exploring the experiences and perspectives of Palestinian Arab women local politicians in Israel.

Findings and Discussion

The following section offers a broader examination of women's experience in local politics by drawing on the rich information obtained from the interviews. It presents a description of elected women's experience as council members. 15 women were interviewed about their experience prior to their election, during their term of office and their insights afterwards. Their interpretation of and commentary on their experience are thematically categorized under three headings: Before Election, During Election and After Election.

Before Election

Early community Engagement:

These elected women's political activism had its roots in extensive social activism at a very early age, as was reported by all the women interviewed. They were all socially involved within their schools, scouts' troupes, or community centers from a very early age, and most of them had even competed for either membership or leadership on student councils and had experienced school-level elections.

> *"I was always the one who planned events at school, who took major roles in school plays, who worked through the Student Union to mediate between students and the teachers ... I was always there. "*

> *"In my childhood, I was very active at school. I was a leader. I was a member of the choir, and they always gave me the leading part because I had a beautiful voice. I was also a member of the scouts ... class committees ... I was always present on every stage. "*

Indeed, research has shown that women who have a history of childhood community activity are more likely to engage in politics later in life (Lawless and Fox 2010).

Other studies have found that women who participated in youth organizations, community service projects, or student government during their formative years are more inclined to pursue political careers and actively participate in political processes as adults (Verba et al. 1995). This involvement in community activities during childhood provides a foundation for developing leadership skills, fostering a sense of civic responsibility, and nurturing a commitment to public service (Sanbonmatsu 2006). In this respect, Palestinian Arb women politicians are not different. Overall, the link between childhood community activity and women's political engagement highlights the significance of early engagement in fostering a pipeline of future female leaders in politics.

Initiation of Candidacy:

However, despite an abundant record of social activity from childhood, and varied political activism during adulthood, for many of the interviewed women about their experience prior to their elections, the decision to run for municipal office was not their own. And it turns out, not only was the initiative not theirs, but the whole idea never occurred to them. They were all approached by influential men in their parties and asked to run for office, as it became clear that lists which included women would be more acceptable to voters. List recruiters may have also been motivated by the Knesset law according to which monetary incentives were offered to lists including women in guaranteed places. Research has indeed highlighted instances where women are pushed into politics by men within their parties or lists (Krook 2010).This phenomenon, often referred to as "party gatekeeping," occurs when male party leaders or gatekeepers actively encourage or recruit women candidates to address gender imbalances within political representation (Krook 2017). While such efforts can be seen as a positive step toward gender equality in politics, they also raise concerns about tokenism and the potential for women to be perceived as "quota candidates" or mere placeholders (Krook 2010). Some of the interviewed women reported that not having a say about their placement in the list, as most of them were first time candidates and not aware of the placement procedures in their parties, and feeling "indebted", using their own terminology, to party gatekeepers for having been chosen by them in the first place, limited their scope of action in certain political moves.

> *"This unspoken approach that reminded us all the time that if it hadn't been for them –the party's men - we would never have made it- is devastating. It's as if they're saying: 'we encouraged you ...we brought you here in the first place, so we can raise you up or lower you down as we wish.'. All this dynamic is unhealthy. As long as we passively submit to the wishes of those who control and run the list construction and the election campaign, and as long as we keep having little say and control over the process, they'll never take us seriously."*

Hesitation and Fear:

Even after having been approached, most of the women expressed hesitation or rejection of the idea. Married women resisted the idea more vehemently than single ones, but almost none of them embraced the idea enthusiastically or without expressing reservations and apprehension. Many fretted that political involvement would be at the expense of their time with their families, children, or jobs. Others feared that they would not measure up to what was expected of them or that they would be a disappointment due to their lack of political acumen.

> *"They approached me and informed me of their decision to have me run for office. I freaked out. The task is not easy, I said, and I am not ready for it. It is a great responsibility and it's too big for me. What about my kids? They still need me, I said. But they pushed me into it, so I had no choice."*

> *"They pressed me a lot and assured me that the post was not particularly demanding and that they would not burden me. After many attempts of persuasion and emotional blackmail, I agreed ... and only after two years did, I realize that I had made a mistake and resigned."*

The reservations that the women expressed before accepting the offer are in line with previous research about the role of motherhood and familial obligations in curtailing women's chances of entering politics (Phillips 1995; Lawless and Fox 2010). Additionally, women may perceive themselves as lacking the necessary qualifications or experience to enter politics leading to a lack of self-confidence in their ability to succeed in a political arena dominated by men (Fox and Lawless 2005). This self-perceived competence gap can discourage women from pursuing political careers and contribute to their underrepresentation in political decision-making bodies.

During Election

Familial Support:

Regardless of the level of their hesitation and its motivation, all the women stated that their nuclear families ultimately supported them. Some of them reported assistance from their extended families as well. They all admitted that without their nuclear families' support, they would not have succeeded. In their opinion, it is a basic prerequisite for coping with and succeeding in politics. Some of the women spoke not only of support, but also of a sense of pride among family members. The children boasted about their mothers being "celebrities", as some of the interviewees put it. Familial support plays a crucial role in the success of women candidates in politics and is considered as a kind of a symbolic capital (Spark et al. 2019). Furthermore, family members, such as parents and siblings,

can provide financial support, campaign assistance, and act as influential advocates within their social networks (Murray 2014). Family support also contributes to women's self-confidence and self-esteem, as it creates an enabling environment that validates their political ambitions and capabilities (Lawless and Fox 2010). However, the sense of support and pride that the nuclear family lavished on these women faded somewhat at the mid-point of the process, when the mothers' time and energy were divided among home, work, and the public post. Complaints on the part of children and spouses were not uncommon during the campaigning and election period, placing an additional burden on these women. Support is there, as it seems to be, but not along the whole way.

> *"My husband supported me. At first, I hesitated, but he encouraged me and promised to help. My children were involved in all this. They felt pride in their mother. My parents were divided ... but my husband and children were very supportive."*

> *"Suddenly, in the middle of my term, my supposedly supporting children and husband started to voice discomfort and criticism about my public post; they lost patience and my son's performance at school deteriorated ...I felt guilty".*

The Role of Civil Society:

Another source of support reported by the interviewees was women's networking and civic society. Yet, women's support of one another was relevant only for those candidates who were official members of national political parties, in which all the members were better-acquainted and shared a history of activism. This held less true for those women who joined independent or newly constructed lists in which members were all new to each other and had very little in common. Civil society organizations were also of help to many of these women, equipping them with the proper tools for their campaigns and future posts, filling a void that political parties did not address ,as the interviewees reported. All the women interviewed claimed that they were forced to rely either on themselves, or on external assistance (such as social organizations or registration in courses) to cope with the unfamiliar environment of the new political role they were running for, as the political bodies that had nominated them had failed to support them. Campaign funding was provided by the parties represented by the women. If it weren't for that, very few of them could have succeeded, as the electoral process is costly and would have been beyond their means.

> *"During campaigning, social organizations - feminist associations - supported me. There I found support from women. But beyond that support, I also asked for help from professional bodies at my own expense."*

It has been documented that civil society organizations play a vital role in raising awareness about women's rights and the benefits of women's representation in decision-making processes (Tripp 2015). They provide training programs, mentorship opportunities, and networking platforms that empower women to develop the necessary skills, knowledge, and confidence to pursue political careers (Krook 2013). By creating a supportive environment and amplifying women's voices, civil society plays a vital role in advancing gender equality and increasing women's representation in political posts.

Awareness and self-Empowerment:
For most of these women, it was their first election and position as local politicians, apart from one woman who was serving her second term. Therefore, their awareness of the whole process of list construction, campaigning and other relevant issues was limited. They trusted party leaders and gatekeepers and accepted any place on the list that was offered to them. They did not argue or object to any decision that was made on their behalf. Thus, they played a passive role in the electoral process and had little to say or control, as they knew very little about its dynamics. The women's description of the process implied that the list compilers used them like chess pieces, moving them upwards or downwards according to their political interests.

> "*I was in sixth place on the list. I did not really understand the meaning of my place. I did not argue. I was meant to be the first woman on the list, but due to considerations of religious balance, they preferred to place a Christian woman ahead of me and I said nothing and did not even object. I thought it was how things should go. Next time I will not accept their dictations. I want a more advanced place. I deserve it ... I earned it ... I worked hard for it.* "

The elected women were not randomly chosen by party heads or compilers of the lists. They were women with added electoral value and worth. The added value of these specific women lay in the fact that they had some personal capital, either in the form of a very wide social network, an extended family, high academic status, or prominent professional standing. Though all the women interviewed had their own added value due to success on the social or professional level, and although many of them were themselves political activists, they knew very little about public posts and the legal and social environment in which they lived. The new environment required training that was not provided by their parties, yet as indicated above, they were forced to acquire it through other channels. Self-empowerment was a strong motif that surfaced in the women's accounts of their experience. They sought self-education and empowerment in order not to feel inferior to their male counterparts in the council and to strengthen their right to be there. Among the skills they stressed as imperative and essential for local council members, and which they lacked at the beginning, and sought solutions

for, they listed the following: familiarization with relevant laws and practices, budget reading and analysis, project planning and media dynamics.

> *"No one prepared me in my party for the position of a city council member. They just threw me into it. If it were not for the skills I acquired from my work, I would have been lost. How to deal with people and how to read a budget are things that we as representatives of the public need to learn and prepare for... these are things that can make a difference between a council member who feels good about herself and one who does not."*

> *"I'm not good with the media. In interviews I lose self-confidence. I missed many opportunities because of that and maybe lost much support from my audience because I never knew how to express myself well.*

As demonstrated above, self-empowerment for Palestinian Arab women in local politics entails a range of strategies and aspirations that contribute to their advancement and effectiveness within the political arena. Through seeking private lessons with professionals, empowerment courses, mentorship, as reported by them, these women often strove for increased visibility, enhanced leadership skills and performance, and the dismantling of gender biases and stereotypes. Seeking self-empowerment is an exercise of agency despite the lack of awareness and control they had over their own candidacy and campaign.

After Election

Evaluation of Experiences:
After spending one whole term at least serving in a public post as council members, the women evaluated what they had experienced differently. There were women who evaluated it as a positive experience despite the difficulties, asserting that it was eye-opening, socially enriching and politically empowering. Conversely, many others reported having had a negative experience, arguing that they were not taken seriously as women politicians, that they were under evaluated, used for electoral reasons only, and were even reprimanded if they took their role seriously and spoke their minds. One woman claimed that even though there were more women out there fulfilling their roles as politicians, the system was still very patriarchal and did not take them seriously. Another interviewee added that the system did not expect women to act as real politicians, but rather as a superficial façade purporting diversity and gender equality. Despite their criticisms, all the interviewees encouraged other women to enter politics, but also to research this field before making their decision, empower themselves and prepare their families for a time-consuming public post.

"It was a positive experience. I learned a lot through it and managed to help a lot of people, and this gives me satisfaction. My personality has not changed, but my circle of influence has expanded. This post gave me more tools to help more people. "

"I do call upon women to join local politics, but on condition that they are 100 percent convinced and want it with all their might. My advice to these women is that the initiative must be personal, and she mustn't wait for men to tell her whether she is good enough or not. She must believe in herself and her abilities to succeed in this role."

To sum up, the findings from this study provide valuable insights into the experiences of Palestinian Arab women who entered local politics. The women interviewed in this research demonstrated a history of social activism from an early age, indicating that their political engagement had roots in their extensive involvement in community activities during childhood. This finding aligns with previous research highlighting the link between childhood community activity and women's political engagement (Lawless and Fox 2010; Celis et al. 2019). Thus, early engagement in community activities can serve as a foundation for cultivating future female leaders in politics. However, it is important to note that despite their history of social activism, many of the women interviewed did not initiate their decision to run for municipal office. Instead, influential men in their parties approached them and asked them to run, motivated by the desire to create more acceptable and diverse lists of candidates. The women interviewed expressed limited control and agency in their placement on the electoral lists, which restricted their scope of action in certain political moves. The women's lack of awareness and control over the electoral process was evident, as they trusted party leaders and gatekeepers to make decisions on their behalf. This passive role in the electoral process reflects the limited political knowledge and understanding of the dynamics involved. This highlights the need for a more inclusive and empowering approach to women's participation in politics, where women have a genuine say in their candidacy and are not merely recruited to address gender imbalances or to meet electoral demands or monetary incentives.

During the election process, the support of their nuclear families played a crucial role in the success of the women candidates. The women acknowledged the importance of family support in coping with the demands of politics and felt a sense of pride among family members, thus aligning with previous research emphasizing the role of motherhood and familial obligations in limiting women's chances of entering politics (Lawless and Fox 2010). However, it was noted that this support waned to some extent during the campaigning and election period, as the women's time and energy were divided among home, work, and their public posts. Complaints from spouses and children added an additional burden to these

women, highlighting the challenges faced by women in balancing their familial and political responsibilities.

Women's networking and support from civil society organizations were also reported as sources of assistance for the women candidates. However, the level of support varied depending on whether the women were members of established political parties or newly constructed lists. Civil society organizations filled a void left by political parties, offering training programs, mentorship opportunities, and networking platforms to empower women in pursuing political careers. These organizations played a crucial role in raising awareness about women's rights and promoting gender equality in political decision-making processes. The reliance on external assistance further underscores the need for political parties to provide comprehensive support and training to women candidates to ensure their success in unfamiliar political environments. Despite their lack of awareness of electoral processes, the women expressed a desire for self-empowerment and sought to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge to excel in their roles as council members. This self-empowerment exercise demonstrated their agency and determination to overcome the competence gap perceived by many women in entering politics (Fox and Lawless 2005). The importance of self-education and empowerment in addressing the challenges faced by women in political positions cannot be overstated.

The evaluation of experiences by the women who served as council members provides valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities they encountered in their political roles. It is evident that there is a range of perspectives among the women, with some viewing their experiences as positive and empowering, while others express dissatisfaction and frustration with the system. The positive evaluations highlight the transformative nature of political engagement, with women describing their experiences as eye-opening, socially enriching, and politically empowering. They emphasize the sense of satisfaction derived from being able to help people and expand their circle of influence. This suggests that despite the obstacles they faced, these women were able to make a meaningful impact in their communities and effect positive change through their roles as council members. On the other hand, the negative evaluations shed light on the persistent gender biases and patriarchal norms that women encounter in politics. Women expressed feelings of not being taken seriously, being undervalued, and being used for electoral purposes without genuine support. This highlights the need for systemic changes to address the underlying gender inequalities and power dynamics that hinder women's participation in politics. It also underscores the importance of creating inclusive and supportive environments where women's voices are heard, respected, and valued .The interviewees also noted the challenge of balancing their political responsibilities with family obligations. This resonates

with the broader literature on women in politics, which emphasizes the difficulties faced by women in juggling multiple roles and the need for supportive structures to enable their participation. The women's advice to future candidates to research and prepare themselves and their families highlights the importance of having a comprehensive understanding of the demands and expectations of political office.

Conclusion

The evaluation of experiences by Palestinian Arab women in Israeli local politics demonstrates the complex realities and mixed sentiments they encountered during their political tenure and sheds light on the existing gap between quantitative and qualitative representation. While there may be an increase in the number of Palestinian Arab women holding political positions, their experiences reveal persistent challenges and inequalities. The quantitative representation, measured by the number of women in office, may suggest progress, but the qualitative representation, captured through the women's evaluations, highlights the ongoing marginalization and discrimination they face. The women's accounts emphasize the need to address patriarchal systems, gender biases, tokenism, and limited control over the electoral process to create an inclusive political landscape that values women's voices and contributions. The challenges faced in the Palestinian Arab community in Israel hinder the eradication of distributive injustice and political inequality within its democratic system, specifically concerning the representation of women and their interests. By examining the barriers encountered by elected women, it becomes evident how local politics, with its gendered nature, restricts women's representation and impedes the ability of women in office to assume prominent roles.

Although there may be a growing acceptance of women's engagement in municipal councils from a wider spectrum of age, religions, political affiliation, geographical location, level of education and social status, as evidenced by the subsequent themes, Palestinian Arab women in Israel still encounter various obstacles in local politics representation that they must overcome to actively participate to the fullest extent. Ultimately, the women's experiences highlight the importance of ongoing efforts to promote gender equality and empower women in political decision-making at the local level. Achieving true gender equality and representation for Palestinian Arab women in Israeli local politics requires not only increasing their numerical presence but also ensuring their voices are heard, their perspectives are valued, and their experiences shape policy decisions. The insights provided by these women can inform policy initiatives aimed at creating more inclusive and supportive political environments, empowering women to overcome challenges, and fostering genuine gender equality in political representation.

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A New Look at the Rediscovery of Botticelli in the Nineteenth Century:
The Case of Vernon Lee

Ariela Shimshon[a]

The rediscovery of artists from the early modern period in nineteenth-century Europe was a formative phenomenon in the development of the discipline of art history and had a significant influence on the visibility of contemporary cultural processes. One of the outstanding examples of this phenomenon is the rediscovery of the Italian painter Sandro Botticelli (1445–1510) in Britain in the second half of the century. This article examines the response to this phenomenon and especially that of the British author and art critic Vernon Lee (Violet Paget, 1856–1935). Her essay on Botticelli, which was published in 1882 in the *Cornhill Magazine*, followed the transfer of Botticelli's frescoes to the Louvre Museum. I argue that Lee's response reveals her recognition of Botticelli, whose art was undergoing a process of rediscovery, as symbolic capital, bearing the weight of nineteenth-century Britain's new cultural baggage. In order to achieve this, Botticelli's art had been disconnected from its natural source in fifteenth-century Italy, where it was created. While on the one hand, Lee identifies and criticizes the phenomenon of rediscovery, on the other, she exploits the discourse around Botticelli, whose reputation had received a boost as a result of this same process.

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Introduction

Vernon Lee's essay "Botticelli at the Villa Lemmi" was published in the *Cornhill Magazine* in 1882. The reason for its publication was the removal of two wall paintings by Botticelli that had been discovered in a villa in Florence in 1873 and their transfer to the Louvre Museum (Conti, 1881). In this essay, Lee condemns this operation and compares it to the amputation of a body part, a process which, according to her, kills what was once a lively and complete work of art. She argues that detaching the paintings from their original location changes their essence and distorts their interpretation. Her objection to this practice, which had become an accepted and even demanded undertaking in Western culture (Lee, 1882), stressed that she found it repugnant (Lee, 1882, p. 159).

Figure 1

Sandro B. (1475-1500), *A Young Man Being Introduced to the Seven Liberal Arts*, [Buon fresco], Paris: The Louvre Museum. Digital Image: Ariela Shimshon.

The wall paintings by Botticelli that Lee describes are today on show in the Louvre, with the titles *A Young Man Being Introduced to the Seven Liberal Arts* (Fig. 1) and *Venus and the Three Graces Presenting Gifts to a Young Woman* (Fig. 2). The wall paintings were commissioned between 1483 and 1486 by Giovanni Tornabuoni, a Florentine banker and businessman with family and commercial connections to the famous Medici family. As far as is known, the purpose of the commission was to celebrate the marriage of Giovanni Tornabuoni's son Lorenzo to Giovanna degli Albizzi. The paintings emphasize the young couple in a manner that flatters their personal characteristics, such as modesty, intellectualism, and beauty (Van der Sman, 2007).

Figure 2

Sandro B. (1475-1500), *Venus and the Three Graces Presenting Gifts to a Young Woman,* [Buon fresco], Paris: The Louvre Museum. Digital Image: Ariela Shimshon.

Lee begins the essay by stating that Botticelli's works are distasteful and that the artist himself was eccentric and unpredictable. She then makes a rapid transition from discussing the painter to describing the phenomenon of removing an artwork from its original location, focusing on the process of mobilization as a series of interconnected events. They include the discovery of the artist, the removal of his

works from their "natural" habitat, the research on them that was currently taking place, and finally, their exhibition in a new location. Unlike modern practice, Vernon Lee's comments do not differentiate these different aspects, but rather present them as a comprehensive process that has no benefits in terms of their intellectual contribution to society. In her view, the "exiling" of Botticelli's frescoes to the staircase of the Louvre caused them to lose their potential greatness, which could be blamed on those who were taking pride in this process Lee's conclusion is that the discovery and exhibition of old master works in museums is not something that modern civilization should regard as a victory (Lee, 1882, p. 173).

Lee's essay reflects a critical view of a process that was rather common in the nineteenth century. For us, her opinion offers an important glimpse into the mechanism of nineteenth-century art criticism. Lee uses Botticelli's frescoes and their relocation to the Louvre as a case study for advancing an original view regarding the status of old masters. She also uses them as symbolic capital, a modern concept coined by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu that can help us to better understand her essay in view of her cultural world and her desire to promote her own ideas.

I maintain that Lee made a conscious decision to write about Botticelli because of the "capricious" features of his work that provided an opening for nineteenth-century ideas and for criticism of previous events in the domain of English art, whose advocates relied on the discovery of old artworks and their transferal to museums.

The author's name, "Vernon Lee," is a pseudonym adopted by the British author and art critic Violet Paget, who took on a masculine persona in order to be taken seriously by the patriarchal British society of the time. Under this name, she later became known for her philosophical essays, books on art history, critical articles, and supernatural novels. Her contemporaries regarded her as "this clever woman who calls herself Vernon Lee" (Colby, 2003).[1] Lee's use of a masculine name was intended to give greater voice to her opinions in a community that was still rather conservative its appreciation of women's ideas.

In modern scholarship, Paget has mainly received attention for her attempts to advance the status of lesbians during the Victorian age and her critical approach to the Aesthetic Movement.[2] This movement developed in Europe and became established in England in the second half of the nineteenth century. Its leading representatives in Britain were the cultural critic Walter Pater (1839–1894), the artist and poet Dante Gabriel Rossetti (1828–1882), and the poet Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837–1909). Indeed, Dennis Denisoff points out that the criticism of the Aesthetic Movement with which Vernon Lee's name is strongly associated stems from class criticism and overconsumption (Denisoff, 2006). Thus, it can be

said that she focuses on aesthetics not only in the context of the canon of beauty, but also on its social aspects. In this way, she treats the subject of rediscovery as an aspect that deals not only with beauty, but also with society.

Botticelli was rediscovered in the nineteenth century and was highly esteemed in British intellectual circles. Vernon Lee was aware that her understanding of Botticelli's art was typical of the new philosophical and intellectual art critic. In her opposition to the process, she critiques the central core of the Aesthetic Movement – the trend toward artists (old masters) from the past. On the one hand, she objects to the transfer of old masters' paintings from their original locations to new ones; on the other, she exploits the discussion of the topic in order to promote her own ideas, such as, for example, enjoying the art object in the place for which it was created.

As I will show, in her essay, Vernon Lee reveals two important points connected to the nineteenth-century artistic rediscoveries. The first is that the essay is a response to the attitude of the leaders of the Aesthetic Movement, whose activists were involved in many areas, such as philosophy, literature, art, and design. Their primary interest was in cultivating esthetic knowledge within the field of art, literature, and philosophy. This aim was expressed by Walter Pater, the ideologue of the Aesthetic Movement, in the conclusion of his book *The Renaissance*, published in 1873, where he wrote: "The desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake" (Pater, 1961 [1873], p. 224). Pater's motto aroused opposition from conservative English factions (Pater, 1961 [1873], pp. 220–224).[3] The chief opponent of this doctrine was John Ruskin, who maintained that the supreme objective of beauty is the education of society (Brake, 2001). The Aesthetes were greatly concerned with the reinterpretation of old masters. Botticelli's works were among those that underwent a process of rediscovery, but opinions were divided concerning their intellectual content.

Vernon Lee's essay is a response to both Pater and Ruskin in that she rejects both men's opinions and suggests her own views. In the essay, she notes that she is never in tune (musically) with Botticelli. The reference to musical pitch can be interpreted as the two extremes of interpretative approach toward which Pater and Ruskin gravitate: Lee calls the higher ethics that Ruskin discusses a "world of dissatisfied sentiment," while she defines Pater's hedonistic world as "unpalatable sweetness" (Lee, 1882, p. 161). Thus, she exploits the debate between these two famous art critics in order to express her personal opinion of the process from an art critic's point of view. One can conclude that the purpose of the essay was not to criticize the Florentine painter's work, but rather to establish Lee's status as a first-class art critic. According to her, for economic and social reasons, large sums have been invested in collecting artworks, a process that empties regions of their intellectual beauty, impedes the understanding of the context and location in

which the works were created, and breaks their connection to the spirit of the place in which they were previously located. She equates the process of discovering artworks and transferring them to museums with that of mummification, whose end product is grandiose, but lacking in vitality and inflates the egos of certain members of society. According to her, this is done in order to serve economic and political ends, whose cost is far greater than the benefit derived from them.

The second important point emerging from Vernon Lee's essay is that it contains all the different perspectives formulated in this period concerning both the rediscovery of Botticelli specifically and the phenomenon of rediscovery in general. One may argue that Lee sees Botticelli as one of the many artists that have become "symbolic capital" to be used in the cultural field thanks to the rediscovery process. This term, which was coined in the twentieth century, provides an interesting way of examining the processes that Lee describes in her essay. Bourdieu's symbolic capital includes cultural, social, and economic domains, all of which are referenced by Lee in her review of the rediscovery of Botticelli (Bourdieu, 1984). Society's taste, as Bourdieu explains, is a social system that permits members of society to distinguish between economic and social classes by means of a system of indicators. In his book *Rediscoveries in Art*, Francis Haskell (1980) explains nineteenth-century rediscoveries in England and France as a process that developed as a result of changes in society's taste and fashions. The same is true for the changes in taste that brought about the fascination with forgotten art from earlier periods.

In the essay "Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic," Bourdieu argues that art critics are the products of the cultural field on the one hand and a part of the field itself and those who maintain it on the other (Bourdieu, 1989). In the context of the rediscovery of artists, Haskell (1980, pp. 3–6) claims that art critics have contributed to the construction and destruction of hierarchies of artists and that they are responsible for rejecting or accepting the artists into the artistic canon. Furthermore, he argues that the art critics' discoveries in these periods often stemmed from a desire for self-publicity and not necessarily from unique qualities found in the rediscovered work or artist. In the case of Lee's response to the process of discovery in relation to Botticelli's art, she did indeed work in service of the discipline of art history, but she also utilized Botticelli's discourse and intellectual aura for the benefit of self-promotion.

From Lee's essay, one can see that the understanding and discussion of rediscovered art comprise the same system of societal codes. The Aesthetic Movement's members' need for rediscovery can be explained by their desire to change the hierarchy within the conscious social structure of art lovers and to establish their own status as intellectuals and progressives. In my opinion, this is why Lee did not step outside this circle, thus allowing duality: on the one hand,

she criticizes the rediscovery process, but on the other, she uses the results of that process to publicize herself and her opinions on the attitude toward art from the past. In his work on the rediscovery of Botticelli, Jeremy Melius claims that Lee's essay discusses features of Botticelli's work that required clarification for the Victorian viewer (Melius, 2010, pp. 3–4).

In his book *Distinction* (1984), Bourdieu defines society's taste as one of the hegemony's most important tools in the fields of economics and culture. In the chapter "The Modes of Appropriation of the Work of Art," he refers to the state-run museum as a place populated by objects that can be contemplated, but that on the other hand must be seen by members of society in order that they might acquire the correct "taste" (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 267–273). Botticelli's work became one such object in the 1880s thanks to the Aesthetic Movement. When Lee published her essay, the Florentine artist, who had been quite forgotten for the last three hundred years, was at the peak of his new popularity in British intellectual circles. This popularity emerged thanks to the discussion and continuous rediscovery of his art and its reinterpretation. Several actors were engaged in this process, including members of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and art critics such as Walter Pater and John Ruskin, who were responsible for changing the perspective on Botticelli's art and gave his body of work characteristics of interpretation in relation to contemporary modern art.

Botticelli's Art under Rediscovery Process

The appropriation of Botticelli's art is discussed in an article by Wolfgang Lottes (1996), in which he cites examples of how the painter Edward Burne-Jones, the art critic John Ruskin, and the poet Algernon Charles Swinburne interpreted Botticelli's art in different ways in order to support their different agendas. Here, I will address the cases of this kind of appropriation that are relevant to the discussion of Vernon Lee's involvement. In order to understand the perspective from which Lee criticizes the actions taken with respect to Botticelli's frescoes, I will attempt to explain the processes that Botticelli's work underwent prior to the publication of her essay.

Botticelli achieved a successful career in his own lifetime: he studied painting in the ateliers of two prominent painters, Fra Filippo Lippi (1406–1469) and Andrea del Verrocchio (1435–1488), and received commissions from the wealthiest families in Florence. He was also commissioned by Pope Sixtus IV to decorate the walls of the Sistine Chapel, along with other Florentine painters. Many of his paintings were preserved after his death, some in private collections such as that of the Medici family (O'Malley, 2015). One of the interesting suggestions raised by the scholar of the early modern period Charles Burroughs is that the neglect

of Botticelli was due to Giorgio Vasari, author of the famous *Lives of the Most Eminent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects* (1888, pp. 231–240). On the one hand, Vasari lauded Botticelli's talents, but on the other, he stressed his hot and inappropriate temperament. Burroughs (2017) argues that Vasari attempted to play down Botticelli's significance in order to spotlight his own personal abilities, while according to Michael Levey's (1960) comprehensive article on the rediscovery of Botticelli, Vasari left no place for Botticelli in the art of the future. After Vasari, Botticelli was rarely mentioned in the literature. Following the opening of the Uffizi Gallery to the general public in 1769, his paintings were considered in the context of works by Italian artists from the early modern period, and he was seen as continuing the Florentine school and the work of the painter Filippo Lippi (Becherucci, 1983).[4] In 1835, the Catholic writer and moralist Alexis-François Rio referred to him in his book *De la poésie chrétienne – Forme de l'art* and described him as inheriting the vulgarity that typified Filippo Lippi's depictions of women. In Rio's opinion, only Botticelli's Madonnas were worth mentioning, due to their melancholy (Rio, 1836, p. 128). However, his work drew the attention of Elisabeth Eastlake's narrow British circle to Botticelli's Sistine Chapel frescoes (Levey, 1960, p. 295).

In 1864, the corpus of Botticelli's work was discussed for the first time at length (for fourteen pages) in a work entitled *A New History of Painting in Italy, from the Second to the Sixteenth Century*, which was written by the British journalist and diplomat Joseph Archer Crowe and the Italian painter and art expert Giovanni Battista Cavalcaselle (1864, pp. 414–429). The authors' attitude to Botticelli is mostly negative: they claim that they could find nothing in his work to justify Vasari's enthusiasm and that they had searched in vain for profound thought in his coarse paintings. The need for an ambitious project like the *New History* apparently arose as a consequence of the great popularity of early modern Italian painting in nineteenth-century Britain. Crowe and Cavalcaselle attempted to set standards for the appreciation of Italian art, but their work had the opposite effect and writers on Italian art repeatedly attempted to take issue with its content (Levi, 2019). Negative comments on Botticelli's art provoked responses from different corners of the cultural field, such as practicing modern artists, philosophers, and writers.

Vernon Lee arrived in London in 1881, when Botticelli's popularity – or more correctly, the popularity and publicity surrounding the Aesthetes and Botticelli – reached its apex and spilled outside the boundaries of writings by art critics. In William Schwenck Gilbert's opera *Patience*, which deals satirically with the advocates of Aestheticism, including Dante Gabriel Rossetti, the main character appears carrying a lily, something closely associated with Botticelli's work, and proclaims: "How Botticellian." Dante Gabriel Rossetti and the Pre-Raphaelite

Brotherhood played an important role in Botticelli's rediscovery. Alongside Botticelli, the Pre-Raphaelites also extensively researched and investigated other artists from the past.[5] When discussing the influences that the first Pre-Raphaelites absorbed from earlier artists, we need an in-depth understanding of their nature and how it was expressed in their works. If we focus, for example, on Dante Gabriel Rossetti's early works, we can identify a specific type of influence: he represents a universal spiritual act in real life here and now. We may see this by comparing Rossetti's 1852 *Annunciation* (Fig. 3)—an early work exhibited before the essays on Botticelli were published—with Botticelli's treatment of the same subject in 1489 (Fig. 4).[6] The painter reproduced the schematism of that painting using minimalist means such as a tree, a window, a lily, and two figures, but from that point, he continued in an independent fashion—his angel has no wings, glimpses of its naked body are visible beneath its robe, and the Madonna is depicted as a young redhead awoken from sleep. The work can be seen as an attempt to use the earlier work as a framework borrowed from fifteenth-century painters into which he inserts a new interpretation of the spiritual event as if it were taking place in the nineteenth century. When Rossetti translated Dante Alighieri's *La Vita Nuova* in 1847, he

— Figure 3 —————————————

Dante G. R. (1849-50), *Ecce Ancilla Domini! (The Annunciation),* [Oil on canvas], London: Tate. Digital Image: Ariela Shimshon.

did not see his work as conveying meaning from one language in another, but believed that he was recreating Dante's world within nineteenth-century reality (Alighieri, 1899 [1847]). The sublime ideas that Dante had expressed in the thirteenth century could be understood in the nineteenth century through the new intellectual language that Rosetti had created in English. In addition, the almost magical ceremonials that he used in his creative process were an expression of the Pre-Raphaelite conception of the rediscovery of artists.

In the same year that she arrived in London, Vernon Lee met Walter Pater, and they began an intellectual association that continued until Pater's death. Throughout her life, Lee described Pater as a mentor and as the unchallenged

Figure 4

Sandro B. (1489), *The Annunciation (The Cestello Annunciation),* [Tempera on wood], Florence: Uffizi Gallery. Digital Image: Web Gallery of Art, Public Domain.

expert in the field of esthetics, and Pater in turn became a critical, but faithful reader of her compositions. In her book *Vernon Lee: A Literary Biography*, the historian of the Victorian period Vineta Colby argues that this connection influenced Lee in two respects: firstly, it made her change her self-definition from art historian to art critic, and secondly, she learned a lesson from Pater's personal experience (Colby, 2003, pp. 61–77). In spite of the Pre-Raphaelites' great interest in Botticelli, it was the poet Algernon Charles Swinburne who was the first to discuss him in writing. In 1868, he published a critical essay in the *Fortnightly Review* criticizing Florentine art in which he described its female figures as being marred by "painful grace" and "fleshless beauty" (Swinburne, 1868, pp. 23–24). However, the essay is stylistically complex: instead of explaining the importance of Botticelli's work, Swinburne became distracted by decadent ideas with no

connection to Botticelli. Pater published his article "A Fragment on Botticelli," in which he skillfully describes the controversial elements in Botticelli's work and imbues them with philosophical significance, in the same periodical (Pater, 1870). This article summarizes the interest in the artist among contemporary art enthusiasts and proclaims Botticelli to be the source of a certain charm among some art lovers. Pater did not relate to Botticelli as an artist who had undergone rediscovery, but rather as the subject of renewed interest. He also made no claims for the centrality of Botticelli's work, which would not have been true to the facts. Pater focused the reader's attention on three central points. The first was the explanation of strangeness: he accepted that Botticelli's figures were strange and that he used pale colors, but he explained this as being due to him being a painter of genius who saw his work through the eyes of the spirit and conveyed the spiritual atmosphere and experience of an event, rather than portraying the event itself in a direct and primitive manner as earlier artists had done (Pater, 1961 [1873], pp. 74–75). The second point is in his description of the *Birth of Venus*, where he compares the figure of Venus, the "goddess of pleasure," as he describes her, to the figure of Truth in Botticelli's 1495 *Calumny of Apelles* (Pater, 1961 [1873], p. 76). This comparison was later used in support of the general thesis with which he concludes his *Renaissance*. The third and most important point in Pater's article points to the role of the art critic: to recognize a genius and to also be capable of explaining what is not easy to understand in his works. This point is directly aimed against Crowe and Cavalcaselle's encyclopedic documentation and asserts the superiority of an art critic who is a philosopher over one who is merely knowledgeable. No less important than the content of Pater's article was the fact that it had been published in the *Fortnightly Review*. Ever since its launch in 1865, the editors of this periodical had furthered a broad agenda challenging the authority of the official peer-reviewed journals and essays, and they had included signed articles rather than the accepted practice of anonymous reviews. This approach permitted the establishment of the periodical as a platform for the author himself in which he acquired recognition for his writing ability and rhetoric (Nash, 2010). The combination of Pater's rhetoric and his essay's place of publication, which stressed the publication of progressive ideas, enables us to understand his motives: promoting himself as an independent art critic. With the publication of Pater's essay, Botticelli was officially installed as the poster boy for the entire rediscovery process. His familiarity with and understanding of Botticelli's work, along with his ability to "normalize" the strange quality of the female figures in his works by British standards, defined the essence of being an art critic.

After the publication of *The Renaissance*, Pater was the object of severe criticism which maintained that he elevated beauty above morals, and when his own personal reputation was called into question, he was not appointed to teaching positions at Oxford. In consequence, Lee, who at the beginning of her career had

been a believer in the supremacy of pure beauty, began to have doubts and wrote that such a belief would be interpreted negatively by society. It is important to understand the character of Lee's criticism of Pater, as she nevertheless adopts the stylistic structure of Pater's writing, and her reactions are a kind of open dialogue about the concepts of Aestheticism.

The famous opponent of Pater's interpretation of Botticelli's work was John Ruskin. Ruskin began to include extensive discussions of Botticelli's work in his lectures at Oxford from 1871 onwards. According to Jeremy Melius, before Pater's book was published, Ruskin had made only isolated references to Botticelli, all of which were negative in character: in 1845, he mentioned him in his travel journal as an artist who never gives him pleasure (Melius, 2010, pp. 52–54), while in 1855, he wrote that one of the Pre-Raphaelites' mistakes was the attempt to imitate the religious art of the past, such as Botticelli's. Nevertheless, in his 1871 lectures, Ruskin responded to Pater's claims and adopted his method of focusing interpretation on strange-seeming elements. However, he gives a completely different explanation of these elements: in his opinion, what seems strange to the viewer is not the product of Botticelli's unrealistic vision, but rather a precise depiction of reality in which the figures have a moral character. According to Ruskin, the Florentine painter captures the same high morality in his paintings, which the viewer needs to learn from him. Although the *Birth of Venus* became the prime example of Botticelli's work in that period, Ruskin almost completely ignored it, and so it became a defining work for Pater and the process of rediscovery among art critics (Melius, 2010, p. 83). The debate between Ruskin and Pater revolved around their ability to explain the "strange" in Botticelli's work—an ability that characterized the new generation of art critics.

Vernon Lee made a conscious choice to involve herself in the debate surrounding Botticelli, with its links to British intellectual factions, so that she could exploit it for self-promotion as an art critic. She was aware of the symbolic capital of the "new Botticelli" and the esthetic and cultural connections that had been forged around the artist over the previous two decades. Botticelli's appropriation by the Aesthetes made him into a kind of hallmark characterizing those who showed appreciation of him as progressive intellectuals. This is why Lee opens her essay on the transfer of Botticelli's frescoes to the Louvre by demonstrating that she is capable of making her own independent analysis of the artist's images. Throughout her literary career, she deliberately adopted self-promotional tactics (Fraser, 2004). A typical example of her awareness of the use of marketing techniques is the publication of her novel *Miss Brown* in 1884, which caused a scandal among British intellectuals. In order to increase her readership, she deliberately changed her style from pseudo-historical criticism to a more popular style derived from French novels: fiction. Another marketing technique Lee employed to publicize

the novel was her dedication of *Miss Brown* to the famous novelist Henry James (Colby, 2003, pp. 97–98). The novel is full of not-so-obscure references to the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and stringent criticisms of them (Brake, 2006). The Brotherhood's representatives did not turn the other cheek, and a large number of them broke off relations with her. One of the models used by the Pre-Raphaelite painters Edward Burne-Jones and Ford Madox Brown, Marie Stillman, was portrayed in the novel as a grotesque hostess in a comic allegory of a home owned by some of the Pre-Raphaelites. In 1885, Stillman's husband William James Stillman, an American artist and art critic, composed a venomous attack on Vernon Lee in which he explicitly stated that she was ignorant about art, that her field of interest was decadent pornographic literature, and that the same was true of her personal life. The novel also created a crisis in the warm relationship between Lee and Pater, who felt that the scandal surrounding the novel might damage his personal reputation, which he took care to maintain. According to the historian of Victorian art Leonee Ormond, *Miss Brown*'s main line of criticism of Aestheticism was directed against the Aesthetes' extravagant lifestyle and the institution of marriage (Ormond, 1970). The novel was published two years after the publication of the essay on the removal of the frescoes from the Villa Lemmi, but was written almost immediately afterward. Thus, Vernon Lee attacked Aestheticism on two simultaneous fronts: firstly in *Miss Brown*, with reference to the lifestyle of British Aesthetic society and their personal connections, and secondly, in the essay under discussion here.

Vernon Lee continued her critical engagement with the issues surrounding "The New Botticelli" and his discoverers and developed her ideas in another direction. In her 1890 story *Dionea*, there is a discernible criticism and tension that is full of references to Pre-Raphaelite art, Pater's ideological attitude, and Ruskin's opposition to it. In this work, Lee describes a re-envisioning of the painting of the *Birth of Venus* by a modern sculptor. She moves along the axis between a genre that today we would call fanfiction and the philosophical genre dealing with Beauty and its limits. It was easy for her contemporaries to identify and characterize the book's cast of characters and to concentrate on the story's central moral, in which she focused her criticism of the first generation of Aesthetes and their doctrine: ritual worship of Beauty without moral boundaries and an attempt to revive the past in the present by breaking the laws of time. The heroine of the story is a child who is pulled out of the sea by fishermen in one of the Italian villages in the region of the ancient temple of Venus near Porto Venere (according to one belief, this was the birthplace of Simonetta Vespucci, who has been cast in the role of Botticelli's muse).[7] Doctor Alessandro De Rosis, who raised Dioanea, is the narrator of the story through letters to his patroness Lady Evelyn Savelli, the Princess of Sabina. Dionea rapidly becomes an outstanding beauty who engages in witchcraft, and her murderous allure causes the deaths of many men. The young

women educated with Dionea rebel and run off with men. The story comes to a climax when the modern sculptor Waldemar and his pregnant wife arrive in the village and Dionea is persuaded to model for his new sculpture. Waldemar sets up his studio in the ruins of the Temple of Venere, drags an altar stone there, and day by day invests more effort into his attempts to achieve an unsuccessful objective: using his sculpture as a means of expressing Dionea's beauty, which he describes as many times more beautiful than all his attempts. For his part, Doctor De Rosis extols the power of art, which makes him tremble with fear when confronted by Dionea's beauty. Shortly afterward, the sculptor sets fire to his studio and commits suicide, and his pregnant wife is found lying lifeless on the altar of Venus. Thus, Lee uses the mystery genre to point to the immediate dangers of the commitment to Beauty, the attempt to revive dead art, and the life combining creativity and ritual that the first generation of Pre-Raphaelites aspired to create. This is a reference to the attempt at "reviving" pictures found, for example, in John Everett Millais's work of 1852, *Ophelia*, for which the model Elizabeth Siddall spent long hours lying in a bath in order to resemble Ophelia on the point of ending her life by drowning herself in a river. In *Dionea*, Vernon Lee does not propose an alternative and leaves the question open. Her own solutions opposing the revival of the art of the past can be found in her later writing.

Genius loci as Opposed to the Rediscovery of Art

When her essay was published, Vernon Lee was twenty-six years old. She was an ambitious and well-known writer, but one whose beliefs concerning art and its objectives were not yet well-formed. Her ideas crystallized into a systematic doctrine at a later stage. In her book 1899 *Genius loci: Notes on Places*, one can understand the alternative she proposed to the rediscovery of earlier artists, historical research concerning their works, and their transferal to museums (Lee, 1899). In her essay, she maintains that visiting the Louvre cannot lead to an understanding of a work of art that is located there as a consequence of the process of isolating art from life. In order to obtain an accurate assessment and a true appreciation of art, one must walk around old cities such as Padua, Siena, or Verona (Lee, 1882, p. 171). *Genius loci* is structured like a travel guide, which was a popular genre in British society due to British aristocrats undertaking the Grand Tour, which was part of a young person's training in the "correct" taste of society (Burke, 2016). In her book, Lee explains how one can identify art's place within architecture and the history of its locations, adopting the Roman concept of *genius loci* to explain the existence of a kind of ecosystem in which nature, atmosphere, buildings, the artwork created for an area, and the area's history exist in a complete and rational unity. By recognizing this rational element (she rejected anthropomorphism and personalization of the *genius loci*), one can also understand and recognize the quality of the works found there. Thus, Vernon Lee

continues the idea of Victorian paganism proposed by Pater (Denisoff, 2021). The removal of art from this framework, in her opinion, actually disconnects the conceptual context of artworks and the influence that they should have on the viewer. In *Genius loci*, she also raises ideas that recall the concepts of modern anti-globalization: hedonistic tourism as Lee knew it was pure consumerism, which was not correctly integrated into the organic framework of nature, inhabitants, and location (Lee, 1899, pp. 197–200). In her 1909 philosophical work *Laurus nobilis*, she claims that there is no worse place for getting to know art than a gallery (Lee, 1909, pp. 164–168). Walking from room to room in museums, Lee argues, is the wrong way to get to know art; it is calcification, comparison, and analysis. The disassociation of an artwork from the location in which it was created disconnects it from the tradition within which it can best be understood. Thus, one may conclude that in her essay opposing the transfer of the frescoes to the Louvre, Vernon Lee was criticizing both the methods of knowledgeable critics who make catalogs of artworks and the cadre of Aesthetes who endeavored to use the disconnection of artworks from their source and their transfer to museums in order to "paste" an interpretation relating to themselves and their esthetic principles onto the works. So it was with Botticelli's old frescoes and with Botticelli himself: interpretations of his life and works came to define the taste of intellectual British society. The alternative proposed by Vernon Lee in her later critical writings is to leave the old artists of the past in the regions where their works were created. In this case, the fifteenth-century Florentine painter should have remained outside and should not have been used as a cultural tool.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Vernon Lee's essay on the transfer of Botticelli's wall paintings from the Villa Lemmi to the Louvre sums up the process of the rediscovery of artists as it appeared in the 1880s, when it was already a widespread phenomenon. Lee exploits Botticelli's popularity in order to express a criticism of the method as a whole. She does not refer to an isolated aspect of rediscovery, but lists all the features of the process, which derive from economic motives, social concerns, and personal ego. From her essay, one can see that she was examining rediscovery as part of the process of transferring artworks to museums and the development of research concerning them. Unlike the approach of the Pre-Raphaelites, and in contrast to Pater and Ruskin, who attempted to use rediscovery to promote their own approach to the interpretation of art, Vernon Lee was not interested in explaining the painter's ideology, since from her point of view, as soon as an artwork is disconnected from the place where it was created, it loses most of its context. She criticizes the Louvre's exploitation of the *quattrocento* artist and his transformation into one of its flagship commodities. A proof of the realization of Lee's concerns may be seen in the 1894 work *Au Louvre* by the French painter

Étienne Azambre (1855–1933) (Fig. 5). In this painting, we see the figures of two women in the museum, copying one of the frescoes discussed in Lee's essay. The work's name shows that the process by which the Louvre had appropriated Botticelli's art had reached a successful conclusion. The painting exemplifies a progressive vision in which female artists could freely benefit from copying a distinguished artist whose name had been enlisted in support of the very gallery in which it was displayed.

Figure 5

Étienne A. (1894), *In Louvre (Deux Femmes Copiant la Fresque de Botticelli, "Vénus et les Grâces Offrant des Présents à Une Jeune Fille")*, [Oli on canvas], Paris: The Louvre Museum. Digital Image: Artlex, Pablic Domain.

Notes

1 Colby (2003, pp. 130–151) describes how Lee attempted to build her own reputation in the literary world by choosing to review topics that she considered interesting and important. She took advantage of the stigma in Victorian society whereby cleverness was a pleasing feminine attribute that could prove an entertaining diversion for men.

2 See, for example, Burdett (1987), Robbins (1992). Her critical approach to the Aesthetic Movement is discussed in Ormond (1970).

3 For Pater's conception of esthetic criticism, see Ippolitova (2012) and Williams, Higgins and Brake (2002).

4 For English art lovers, Botticelli was mentioned in two seventeenth-century English sources: Aglionby's Three dialogues (1685) and Henry Peacham's The compleat gentleman (1622).

5 On the links between the Pre-Raphaelites and Italian artists, see Prettejohn (2017) and Buron (2018).

6 In this article, I discuss examples of the interpretation of Botticelli's art by the thinkers and artists of the nineteenth century. I see the painting Annunciation (Ecce Ancilla Domini) as a good example to show Rossetti's approach to the old masters. Besides Botticelli, there were a number of old masters who influenced the iconography of the painting. For more about the iconography of Rossetti's version of the Annunciation, see Magee (2011). One of the most important old masters for the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood was Fra Angelico. He is officially listed among the Immortals; a list written by Rossetti in the early days of the Brotherhood. For the list, see Prettejohn (2012, pp. 277–278). For the artists who influenced Rossetti's art, see Ormond (2006).

7 On the connection between Botticelli's art and the legend of Simonetta Vespuchi in the nineteenth century, see Cheeke (2016).

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Personal and Social Factors Related to Readiness to Take Risks While Driving Among Adolescents: Comparing Majority and Minority Groups in Israel

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Data among adolescents around the world reveals higher tendency among adolescents from minority groups to engage in risk taking behavior while driving than among majority groups (Hilton, 2006). We examined the relationships between several individual and collective coping resources which can explain behavioral intentions towards driving and readiness to take risks while driving among Jewish and Arab teenagers in Israel. The resources examined were two general salutogenic resources of personal and national sense of coherence. The study was conducted in 12 schools in northern Israel, 442 Arab (201 males) and 356 Jewish (199 males) students participated. As expected, the tendency to take risks while driving and the perception of driving as a challenge were lower among the Jewish (majority) than among the Arab (minority) teenagers. Correlations were found between some coping resources (sense of coherence and sense of national coherence) and readiness to take risks while driving. The findings suggest that sense of coherence at the personal and national level may serve as an important factor associated with behavioral intentions and risk-taking tendencies among young people, especially those from minority groups.

Keywords: behavioral intentions towards driving, readiness to take risks while driving, risk taking while driving, Israeli Arab and Jewish youth, salutogenic approach

Introduction

Adolescence is a sensitive developmental stage during which one moves from dependency on the family toward openness to the outside world and greater influence by the peer group (Romeo, 2013; Spear, 2013). In this period personal resources increase, and cognitive and emotional processes develop. However, the capability to suppress emotional responses and to make a proper and rational response in risk situations is strongly dependent on positive environmental cues (Casey and Caudle, 2013). Thus, the tension between personal coping resources that enable one to regulate behavior when faced with challenging situations and the sensitivity to positive environmental cues also increases in this period (Taubman – Ben-Ari, Mikulincer, and Iram, 2004). Moreover, this tension could be stronger for adolescents from underprivileged minority groups, who live within a complex social environment (Factor et al., 2013). Studies from all over the world indicate that adolescents, especially males, who are members of underprivileged minority groups, are involved in risk behaviors more than members of the majority group (e.g., Porter and England, 2000; Shinar and Compton, 2004).

This study sought to find the coping resources, at the personal and group level, that can explain the tendency of adolescents from both minority and majority groups to take risks while driving. While previous studies (e.g., Elfassi, et al., 2016; Sagy, Shani, and Leibovitz, 2009) employed the salutogenic approach, they mainly focused on health risk behaviors (such as smoking, drug use, drinking). The current study compared the tendency of adolescents from majority and minority groups to take risks while driving. This specific risk behavior occurs in a joint social sphere of both minority and majority groups (the roads) and therefore, we expected that the potential mismatch between the social norms of the adolescents' ingroup with the social norms of the outgroup (the national social norms), could be more powerful for underprivileged minority adolescents as compared to adolescents from the majority group. The research question was explored in the context of the ongoing national conflict between the Jewish majority and Arab minority within Israel.

Risky driving in the context of majority-minority relationships

Data from a number of studies indeed reveals that there is a significant difference between minority and majority groups in behaviors and attitudes related to road safety (Bergdahl, 2007; Campos-Outcalt et al. 2003; Hilton, 2006). Previous studies revealed that the tendency towards risky driving is a collective phenomenon and ethnic minority group members are often more likely to engage in risky driving behavior compared to the majority group in their societies (Factor et al., 2013). For

example, in the U.S., immigrants have been found to have the highest probability of risky driving behavior (Vivoda and Kostyniuk, 2004).

Similar results were found in Israel. Of 310 drivers aged 15-19 who were involved in fatal accidents in 2007-2017, 50.3% were Arabs (Arabs are a minority – comprising about 20% of the overall population of Israel), while of 788 drivers aged 20-24, 52.7% were Arabs (National Road Safety Authority, 2018). Of all young drivers injured on inter-urban roads between 2007 and 2015, the proportion of young Arab drivers ranged from 37% to 47% (National Road Safety Authority, 2016). Baron-Epel et al. (2008) found that disobeying laws, human error, and reckless driving are responsible for the high rate of involvement in road accidents among Arabs who are Israeli citizens. This tendency is stronger among adolescents, and especially among the males in this population (Shinar and Compton, 2004).

The research literature offers a variety of personal and social explanations for the disparities in risky driving behavior between minority and majority members. Social factors related to the discrepancy between the majority and minority as a source for the tendency towards risky driving include, for example, the minority's' tendency to engage in a risk behavior as a form of everyday resistance and as a rejection of the majority group (Factor et al., 2013). Personal factors, however, can also be related to various cognitive and emotional aspects of risky behavior. Examples include a tendency for risk seeking, the individuals' perceptions and beliefs about himself/herself, and the beliefs about the consequences of his/her behavior (Eherenfreund-Hager and Taubman –Ben-Ari, 2016)).

Thus, this study joins existing studies that seek to understand the higher tendency among adolescents, especially young males from the minority group, to be involved in road accidents.

The research variables:

The tendency to engage in risky driving behaviors and perceptions of dangerous driving as a threat or as a challenge

In the current study we explored two different attitudes towards driving: perceptions of dangerous driving as a threat (dangerous driving is a threat to the driver's own safety) and perceptions of dangerous driving as a challenge (Taubman – Ben-Ari et al., 2004). Perceiving risky driving as a threat means that the driver perceives it to have the potential to cause harm. Not surprisingly, it was found that a lower perception of the negative consequences among young drivers was associated with a higher frequency of reckless driving, while those who perceived risky driving more as a threat reported engaging in it less frequently (Taubman – Ben-Ari et al., 2004). On the other hand, perceiving risky driving as a challenge means that the driver perceives performance of this behavior to have positive consequences,

such as affording a sense of control, thrill, and sensation. Indeed, young drivers who viewed risky driving as challenging reported a higher frequency of reckless behavior on the road (Taubman – Ben-Ari et al., 2004). Based on the salutogenic approach we ask what the personal and collective coping resources are related to the tendency of risky driving behavior.

This study explored the personal and collective coping resources that could be related to the avoidance of risky driving.

Sense of Coherence - Antonovsky (1979) suggested sense of coherence (SOC) as a major personal coping resource that promotes health and wellbeing. SOC is defined as a global orientation that expresses the extent to which one has a pervasive, enduring though dynamic feeling of confidence that (1) the stimuli deriving from one's internal and external environments in the course of living are structured, predictable, and explicable; (2) the resources are available to one in order to meet the demands posed by these stimuli; and (3) these demands are challenges, worthy of investment and engagement (Antonovsky, 1979). Studies on adolescents have indicated that during adolescence SOC may play a protective role similar to that of the mature adult SOC especially in predicting better healthy behaviours (Carlén, 2020). Many studies over the last 40 years have confirmed the relationships between strong SOC and healthy behaviours, while a weak SOC has been associated with unhealthy and risky behavior (Eriksson and Mittelmark, 2017). For example, SOC was found to be related to negative attitudes toward alcohol use and drug abuse among high school students (Elfassi et al., 2016; Sagy, Shani, and Leibovich, 2009), while a weak level of SOC was found among drug addicts (Chen, 2009). A weak level of SOC was also found among children (Efrati-Virzer and Margalit, 2009) and adolescents (Nilsson et al., 2007) who displayed interpersonal violence and antisocial behaviors.

As far as we know, the relationship between SOC and risky driving behavior has been neglected in salutogenic oriented studies.

Sense of National Coherence - Since the specific context of the current study is the ethnic-national conflict between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel, we also explored sense of coherence at the national level. Similarly to SOC, the sense of national coherence (SONC, Sagy, 2015, Mana et al., 2019) integrates three components: *Comprehensibility*–the perception that life in one's national group is predictable, safe, and secure and the perception of one's national group actions as comprehensible and logical. *Manageability*–the perception that one's nation can assist its members, is available to them, and meets their demands and needs. Manageability is also related to the levels of confidence, trust, and satisfaction with the national institutions and systems Lastly, *Meaningfulness*–the perception that the nation gives meaning to its members by providing challenges,

goals, vision, and a shared destination. Recent studies in the period of COVID-19 revealed that higher levels of both SOC and SONC were related to better mental-health among people from different countries (Mana and Sagy, 2020; Mana et al., 2121). However, higher levels of SONC were also related to the tendency to reject the outgroup collective narratives and to adhere to those of the ingroup (Mana et al., 2019). Therefore, it seems that SONC may promote healthy behavior of not taking risks while driving but may also be more affected by the group status (minority or majority) and by their level of trust in the national authorities.

Perception of self-efficacy is defined as the degree to which the individual believes in their ability to perform a specific behavior or series of behaviors that leads to a given outcome (Bandura, 1997). Previous studies revealed that people high in perception of self-efficacy report taking more risks on the road (Taubman – Ben-Ari, 2004) and greater involvement in traffic accidents (Taubman – Ben-Ari, 2008). This tendency was stronger among adolescents: for them driving plays a major role in defining self-esteem (Taubman – Ben-Ari et al., 1999). Adolescents who perceive driving to be highly relevant to self-esteem have been found to engage in more reckless driving, while those for whom it is less relevant choose other means of enhancing self-esteem (Taubman – Ben-Ari et al., 1999). On the other hand, evidence was found for the other direction, and adolescents with high feelings of appreciation and faith in their abilities, adopt careful driving habits (Miller and Taubman – Ben-Ari, 2010).

Perceived social pressure to perform a given behavior: An individual responds to the group culture and is influenced by group processes and norms concerning issues such as responsibility, friendship, the value of life, and the attitude toward risk-taking (Taubman – Ben-Ari and Katz – Ben-Ami, 2013), as well as to media messages that encourage risky driving (Beullens, Roe, and Van den Bulck, 2011). Thus, the driving culture of the young driver's environment could influences the manner in which they choose to drive (Hakkert et al., 2001).

Trust in the police: Trust in the national authorities was found in previous studies to be related to the tendency of ethnic minorities to engage in risky driving (Ehrenfreund-Hager and Taubman – Ben-Ari, 2016; Factor et al., 2013). Factor et al. (2013), claimed that engaging in high risk behaviors is an act of resistance by which minority group members demonstrate their willingness and ability to defy the country and the majority group. These high-risk behaviors enable the minority group members to express their dissatisfaction with their status, and to demarcate the limits of the majority group's power. They create a boundary that signals to the majority group that their control over the individual has its limits (Factor et al., 2013). Factor et al. (2013) explored this question to understand the involvement of Arabs in Israel and indeed found relationships between lack of identification with the Israeli state and the Arabs' mistrust in the police. Therefore, we expected

trust in the police, to mediate the relationships between the factors that promote healthy behavior of non-risky driving (SOC, SONC, self-efficacy, perceptions of subjective norms), and the tendency to take risks while driving.

The research hypotheses

Group differences
1. We expected to find differences between the Arab and the Jewish participants: We expected that the Arab participants would take more risks while driving as compared to the Jewish participants and that they would perceive driving as more challenging and less threatening as compared to the Jewish participants' perceptions. In addition, we expected that the Jewish participants would tend to perceive the social norms regarding following the rules to drive with lower risk as stronger and to perceive the police as acting more fairly and equitably, as compared to the Arab participants. We also expected that the levels of the salutogenic factors of SOC and SONC would be higher among the Jewish participants as compared to the Arab participants.

2. We expected to find gender differences in both Arab and the Jewish samples: We expected that the tendency of females to take risks while driving would be lower, that they would perceive driving less as a challenge and more threatening, and that they would perceive stronger social norms regarding following the rules in order to drive with low risk, as compared to males in both groups.

3. We expected that higher levels of SOC, SONC, perceived subjective norms, perceived self-efficacy, and perceived driving as a threat, would be related to lower tendency to take risks while driving among both groups, while we expected perception of driving as a challenge would be related to a higher tendency to take risks while driving among both groups.

4. We expected perception of police attitude to mediate the relationships between the independent variables (SOC, SONC, perception of driving as a threat or as a challenge, self-efficacy, and perception of subjective norms) and the dependent variable (tendency to take risks in driving). The higher the tendency to perceive the police as just, the lower the relationships between the factors and the tendency to take driving risks (see figure 1).

Figure 1: The research model

Method

Participants

The participants were 12th grade pupils studying in 12 different schools in community settlements in the northern part of Israel. A total of 798 students were sampled, including 442 Arab students and 356 Jewish students. No significant differences were found between the Arab and Jewish groups in the variables of gender (201 boys, 241 girls; 199 boys, 157 girls, accordingly), age (=18, SD=0.30; X= 18.13, SD=0.37, accordingly), obtaining a driving license (about 21% among Arabs and about 15% among Jews), and in socio-economic status, as measured by numbers of rooms in the house, and number of cars (X=5.77, SD=2.10, X=2.14, SD=1.21; X=5, SD=1.36, X=1.82, SD=0.93, for Arabs and for Jews).

Measures

The study instrument comprised structured and self-reported questionnaires that were back translated (Tyupa, 2011) from Hebrew to Arabic, according to accepted translation rules.

The tendency to take risks while driving (Taubman – Ben-Ari et al., 1999)

The questionnaire measures the tendency to respond recklessly and dangerously in various driving scenarios (driving through a red light, driving at a high speed in a bad mood). It includes 10 short stories describing contradictory driving situations. For example: "You're on your way to a weekend off. A slow truck is driving ahead of you. A continuous white separation stripe separates the lane you are traveling on and the opposite lane. What are the chances, in your opinion, that you will overtake the slow vehicle?"

The scale consists of 11 values, ranging from zero (0%) to 10 (100%), which represent the percentage of chance that the respondent will take a driving risk. Taubman – Ben-Ari et al. (1999) report a high level of consistency (α = .80). For this study, minor changes were made, in coordination with the authors, in some of the short stories in both versions in order to adapt them to the age and culture of the respondents. The general index of alpha in our study was 0.90. Alpha in the Hebrew version was 0.86, and in the Arabic version it was 0.90.

Sense of Coherence (SOC-13, Antonovsky, 1979)

The 13 items, on a 7-point Likert scale, explore the participants' perceptions of the world as comprehensible, meaningful, and manageable. The α values in former studies using SOC-13 range from 0.70 to 0.92 (Eriksson and Mittelmark, 2017) and in this study the α =0.72, in the Hebrew version and in the Arabic version it was α =0.67.

Sense of National Coherence (SONC, Mana, Srour, and Sagy, 2019)

The 8 items on a 7-point Likert scale (1= totally agree, 7= totally disagree) explore the participants' perceptions of his/her own society as comprehensible, meaningful, and manageable. Internal consistency of the questionnaire was estimated at 0.80 (Mana et al., 2019) and in the current study α =0.75 in the Hebrew version, and α =0.63 in the Arabic version.

The perception of driving as a threat questionnaire (Taubman – Ben-Ari et al., 2004)

8 items, on a 6-point Likert scale (1= not at all, 6= to a very great extent) each item describing an example of dangerous behavior such as driving through a red light. For each item, the subject must answer to what extent he or she believes that this behavior endangers the driver; to what extent he or she estimates that it may cause a road accident; and to what extent he or she feels anxiety or pressure while performing this behavior. Internal consistency of the questionnaire was estimated at 0.90 (Arnfreund-Hagar, 2012) and in the current study α =0.89 in the Hebrew and the Arabic versions.

The perception of dangerous driving as a challenge questionnaire (Taubman – Ben-Ari et al., 2004)

8 items, on a 6-point Likert scale (1= not at all, 6= to a very great extent). Subjects were asked to indicate how much they experience challenge, excitement, or pleasure when performing risky driving behaviors (for example; driving through a red light). A previous study by Taubman – Ben-Ari and colleagues (2004) found α = 0.94. The questionnaire was then translated into Arabic according to accepted translation rules. Our study found that the general index of α = 0.91. Alpha in both versions, Hebrew and Arabic, was 0.89.

The perception of self-efficacy in driving questionnaire (Taubman – Ben-Ari, 2008)

19 items, on a 7-point Likert scale (1= not at all, 6= to a very great extent). The items examine the relationship between self-efficacy in driving and dangerous driving. Each item described a particular driving scenario that requires coping skills, such as "when you are in a hurry," and subjects are asked to assess their own ability to handle the situation effectively. A previous study by Taubman – Ben-Ari et al. (2008) found α = 0.93 and in the current study α = 0.95 in the Hebrew version and 0.89 in the Arabic version.

The perception of subjective norms (Elliott et al., 2003)

3 items on a 7-point Likert scale: "People who are important to me would like me to drive without taking risks in the near future" (strongly disagree – strongly agree); "People who are important to me (very strongly oppose – very strongly encourage) my driving without taking risks in the near future"; "People who are important to me think that I (do not need – very much need) to follow the rules in order to drive without taking risks in the near future." Averaging the scores of these three items provides the score for the subjective norms index. A previous

study by Arnfreund-Hagar (2012) reported an alpha of 0.84, and in the current study α = 0.73 in the Hebrew version and α = 0.67 in the Arabic version.

Perception of police attitude (Factor et al., 2013)

The Driving Resistance Questionnaire (DRQ) (Factor et al., 2013) includes measurement scales which have been applied in a variety of studies. In the study by Factor et al. (2013), the examination of perceptions regarding police attitude is based on the ladder of procedural justice; to what extent the police act fairly and equitably. These perceptions are estimated in a shortened three-item version of the questionnaire (Rattner and Yagil, 2004) in which alpha in the Hebrew version was 0.79, and in the Arabic version it was 0.81. Our study found that the general index of alpha was 0.79. Alpha in the Hebrew version was 0.78, and in the Arabic version it was 0.81.

Socio-demographic variables

Demographic information (gender, age, socioeconomic status, obtaining a driving license, and nationality) were collected.

Procedure

The data were collected during one lesson during a school day. The participants were told that the goal of the research was to examine their attitudes towards driving. The students received questionnaires in their native language (Hebrew or Arabic). The questionnaires were distributed to all students who were present in class on the day of data collection. The average time to complete the questionnaire was 45 minutes.

Ethical considerations

Approval was obtained from the ethics committees of the Ministry of Education as well as from the school principals and the parents. The researcher provided complete information about the study and explained the students' right to decide on their own whether to participate in the research. The anonymity of the participants was guaranteed, and no identifying data was collected in the questionnaire.

Results

Testing the research hypotheses

To test the first hypothesis related to the differences between Jews and Arabs, t-test analyses were conducted (see table 1). The results confirmed the first hypothesis: the Arab participants significantly tended to take more risks while driving as

compared to the Jewish participants. The Arabs participants also significantly tended to perceive driving as more challenge and less threatening as compared to the Jewish participants.

The salutogenic factors of SOC and SONC were significantly higher among the Jewish participants as compared to the Arab participants. In addition, the Jewish participants significantly tended to perceive the social norms regards following the rules in order to drive without risk as stronger and also perceived the police actions as significantly fairer and more equitable as compared to the Arab participants.

Table 1:

Differences in the means of the study variables by group

Variable	Mean Jews	SD Jews	Mean Arabs	SD Arabs	t
Sense of personal coherence	4.48	89.	4.20	92.	***4.34
Perception of driving as a threat	4.32	1.15	3.70	1.39	***6.85
Self-efficacy concept	440	1.30	4.17	1.31	*2.44
Perception of subjective norms	6.40	1.02	5.18	1.71	***12.54
Perception of driving as a challenge	1.76	.95	2.73	1.32	***11.72-
Perception of police attitude	2.69	1.06	2.47	1.15	**2.91
Sense of national coherence	4.40	1.06	3.67	1.00	***10.12
Tendency to take risks in driving	25.27	18.77	40.01	23.21	***9.95-

Sample sizes are: n=356 **(Jews)** and n=442 **(Arabs)**
*p < 0.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

To test the second hypothesis related to gender differences, t-test analyses were conducted (see table 2). The results confirmed our research hypothesis; we found that the tendency to take risks while driving and the perception of driving as a challenge were higher among males than females, and that these differences were found both in the Jewish sample and in the Arab sample. Accordingly, the perception of driving as a threat was higher among females than males for Jews and Arabs alike. Female from both research groups also perceived stronger social norm towards non-risky driving behavior. Differences between the groups were found according to self-efficacy. While the self-efficacy of the Arab females was higher than that of the Arab males, the opposite direction was found in the Jewish

sample and self-efficacy of the Jewish females was lower than that of the Jewish males.

Table 2:

Differences in the means of the study variables by gender

Variable	Range of answers	Arabs: M		SD		t	Jews: M		SD		t
		Male	Female	Male	Female		Male	Female	Male	Female	
Sense of personal coherence	1-7	4.20	4.20	80.	1.01	04.	4.5	4.44	91.	88.	79.
Perception of driving as a threat	1-6	3.22	4.10	1.27	1.34	***7.04-	4.09	4.60	1.17	1.06	***4.26-
Self-efficacy concept	1-7	4	4.31	1.20	1.39	*2.52-	4.55	4.21	1.26	1.32	*2.44
Perception of subjective norms	1-7	4.97	5.34	1.66	1.73	*2.29-	6.28	6.59	1.11	87.	**2.70-
Perception of driving as a challenge	1-6	2.91	2.58	1.30	1.31	*2.59	2.03	1.48	1.01	76.	***5.76
Perception of police attitude	1-3	2.43	2.49	1.15	1.14	5.21-	2.62	2.78	1.05	1.03	1.45-
Sense of national coherence	1-7	3.74	3.60	96.	1.03	1.44	2.78	4.2	1.10	97.	1.96
Tendency to take risks in driving	1-11	49.74	31.97	20.71	22.09	***8.66	30.24	18.9	20.56	13.94	***6.17

*p < 0.5, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Sample sizes are: n=356 **(Jews)**:157 Female, 199 Male; n=442 **(Arabs)**: 241 Female, 201 Male

The multi-dimensioned model

For the first step of testing the hypotheses related to the suggested model, we conducted correlation analyses between the research variables in each research group. The results, presented in table 3 revealed that, as predicted, among the participants from both groups tendency to take risks while driving was related to lower level of SOC, higher level of perceiving driving as a threat, lower level of perceiving driving as a challenge, and higher level of perceiving police as acting justly. Among Arabs, the tendency to take risks while driving was negatively related to self-efficacy. Among both groups no relationships were found between the tendency to take risks while driving and SONC. Group differences were found

in the relationships between the independent factors: higher levels of SOC among the Jewish participants were related to higher levels of perceiving driving as a threat and to lower levels of perceiving driving as a challenge, higher level of perception of subjective norms and perceptions of police as acting justly. For the Arabs, SOC was negatively related to the tendency to take risks in driving.

Table 3:
Pearson correlation matrix between study variables by nationality

Variable	Perception of driving as a threat		Self-efficacy concept		Perception of subjective norms		Perception of driving as a challenge		A sense of national coherence		Perception of police attitude		Tendency to take risks in driving	
	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs
A sense of coherence	.12*	.05	.01	.07	.27***	.09	-.14**	.19***	.15	.16**	.21***	.15**	.29***	-.22***
Perception of driving as a threat	-	-	.02	.31***	.26***	.23***	-.07	-.09	.07	.07	.22***	.02	-.24***	-.36***
Self-efficacy concept	-	-	-	-	.08	.21***	.04	.02	.02	.11*	-.04	.06	.01	-.18***
Perception of subjective norms	-	-	-	-	-	-	-.09	-.16**	.06	.13**	.22***	-.01	-.29***	-.27***
Perception of driving as a challenge	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.11*	.05	-.10*	-.01	.39***	.23***
A sense of national coherence	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.19***	.12***	-.01	-.03
Perception of police attitude	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.-24***	.-10*

*p < 0.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Sample sizes are: n=356 **(Jews)** and n=442 **(Arabs)**

Mediation Model

In the second step we examined the hypotheses related to the suggested model by conducting a mediation model (Hayes, 2013). The findings presented in table 4 and figure 2 revealed that for both Arab and Jewish participants, perceptions of the police attitudes as just mediated the relationships between the salutogenic factors of SOC and SONC and the tendency to take risks while driving. However, the mediating effect is partial in the case of SOC and there is a full mediation effect only in the relationships between SONC and the tendency to take risks while driving.

As expected, the Jewish sample's perceptions of the police attitudes as just also mediated the relationships between the other independent factors (perception of driving as a threat or as a challenge and perception of social norms and the tendency to take risks while driving). In the Arab sample no mediating effect was found. The results partly confirm our suggested model.

Table 4:

Regression coefficients, direct and indirect effects between the independent variables (SOC, SONC, perceiving driving as a threat or as a challenge, self-efficacy and perceive social norms) and the tendency to take risks in driving (dependent variable) through the perception of police attitude (mediator variable) in each of the samples.

Independent	Independent → Mediator	Mediator → Dependent	Independent → Dependent	Indirect effect	95% CI Indirect effect
Jews					
Sense of personal coherence	0.15* (0.06)	-1.78* (0.85)	-3.94*** (1.00)	-0.26* (0.19)	[-0.85, -0.02]
Perception of driving as a threat	0.14** (0.05)	-1.78* (0.85)	-1.56* (0.78)	-0.24* (0.16)	[-0.64, -0.01]
Self-efficacy concept	-0.05 (0.04)	-1.78* (0.85)	-0.09 (0.65)	0.09 (0.09)	[-0.02, 0.37]
Perception of subjective norms	0.14* (0.06)	-1.78* (0.85)	-2.64** (0.89)	-0.25* (0.16)	[-0.68, -0.02]
Perception of driving as a challenge	-0.09 (0.06)	-1.78* (0.85)	5.67*** (0.93)	0.15 (0.16)	[-0.05, 0.63]
Sense of national coherence	0.17** (0.05)	-1.78* (0.85)	-0.08 (0.82)	-0.29* (0.18)	[-0.81, -0.02]
Arabs					
Sense of personal coherence	0.17** (0.06)	-1.53 (0.82)	-4.06*** (1.06)	-0.27* (0.18)	[-0.73, -0.00]
Perception of driving as a threat	-0.00 (0.05)	-1.53 (0.82)	-3.36*** (0.76)	0.00 (0.08)	[-0.11, 0.21]
Self-efficacy concept	0.05 (0.05)	-1.53 (0.82)	-0.53 (0.76)	-0.07 (0.01)	[-0.36, 0.04]
Perception of subjective norms	-0.04 (0.03)	-1.53 (0.82)	-2.10*** (0.58)	0.06 (0.07)	[-0.02, 0.29]
Perception of driving as a challenge	0.02 (0.04)	-1.53 (0.82)	2.16** (0.74)	-0.03 (0.08)	[-0.29, 0.07]
Sense of national coherence	0.12* (0.06)	-1.53 (0.82)	0.37 (0.96)	-0.18* (0.14)	[-0.57, -0.004]

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Indirect effects through the perception of police attitude on the tendency to take risks in driving in the Arab and Jewish samples.

p<.05, p<.001, p<.001

Discussion

The tendency to take risks while driving among majority and minority adolescents who are living in the context of a conflict zone can be influenced by personal, social, and national factors. The current study explored this tendency in the context of Jewish majority and Arab minority teenagers who are citizens of Israel.

We explored the role of sense of coherence as a main salutogenic factor that promotes attitudes towards the healthy behavior of driving safely. Additional

personal cognitive-emotional coping resources that are relevant to the context of driving behavior (perception of driving as a threat or as a challenge, perception of self-efficacy, and perceptions of subjective norms), were examined as well as perception of collective coping resources of sense of national coherence. Perceptions of police attitudes as just were examined as mediator factor.

The first hypothesis was confirmed**.** The tendency to take risks while driving and the perception of driving as a challenge was lower among young Jews than young Arabs while the perception of driving as a threat was higher among the Jewish participants as compared to the Arab participants. Other differences that were found were that the Jewish participants' self-efficacy related to their higher ability to handle dangerous driving situations effectively as compared to the Arab participants. These findings are well represented in the accumulated data related to the high level of disobeying laws, human error, and reckless and hostile driving among the Arab population in Israel (Baron-Epel et al., 2008; Taubman – Ben-Ari, 2008).

Interestingly, the current study revealed that those tendencies are significant from the very early stages of driving experience during adolescence. Moreover Jewish and Arab participants' perceptions differed in their perceptions of social environment. It seems that for Arab participants the social environment is perceived as more encouraging to risky driving as compared to the perceptions of Jewish participants. While their closed social circles were perceived as encouraging risky driving, the police were perceived as acting unjustly. These findings could reflect the way Arab adolescents perceive risky driving as a form of resistance behavior (Factor et al., 2013).

Moreover, the salutogenic factors of sense of coherence and sense of national coherence were weaker among the Arab teenagers, and they tended to perceive the global world and their national group as less comprehensible, meaningful, and manageable, as compared to the Jewish participants. These findings support previous studies which revealed that the Arab minority has a weaker SOC as compared to their Jewish majority counterparts (e.g. **Sagy, 2014**). This finding could be explained by the weaker general resilience resources among the Arab population in Israel. Young Israeli Arabs live in an unstable environment as members of a disadvantaged minority in terms of the allocation of resources, government representation, the labor market, and many other areas (Samooha, 2015). Any possibility of improving their present or future situation is uncertain. This reality can limit them from gaining the rich consistent life experiences and personal involvement in decision-making that contribute to a strong SOC and SONC.

Regarding gender differences, as expected, we found that females in both research groups were less likely to take risks while driving, perceived driving as more threatening and less as a challenge, and perceived stronger social norms towards non-risky driving behavior, as compared to males. These finding replicated previous findings related gender differences in driving and the tendency of males to be more involved in risky driving as compared to females, as well as the tendency of females to be more likely to see a vehicle as a resource for mobility (Lerner et al., 2010) rather than a thrill-seeking tool.

Unexpected gender differences were found between the groups in the self-efficacy measures. While the self-efficacy of the Arab female was higher than the Arab male, the opposite direction was found in the Jewish sample: self-efficacy of the Jewish female was lower than that of the Jewish male. This finding is interesting since the position of Arab women in Israel is diminished on two levels: women have lower status than men in Arab society and Arabs have lower status than Jews in Israeli society (Zaatut and Haj-Yahia, 2016). Current research, however, is revealing that this situation is gradually changing, mainly among the young generation and this study's results reflect these changes as well (Gabaren, 2020). Additional research is needed to explore the gender differences.

The main aim of the current study, however, was to suggest a mediating model in which we explore the role of coping resources, cognitive and emotional factors, and the mediating factor of perception of police attitudes in predicting the tendency to take risks while driving among minority and majority group members. The results revealed that perceiving the world as well as the national group as comprehensive, manageable, and meaningful promotes attitudes towards healthy behavior of non-risky driving. However, while in both groups SOC directly predicted the tendency to take risks and the mediating effect was partial, there were no direct relationships between SONC and the tendency to take risks. Indeed, among both groups these relationships are significant only after adding perceptions of police attitudes. In addition, group differences were found between the research groups between the salutogenic factor and the other factors. It seems that among both groups, perception of the global world (SOC) or the national group (SONC) as comprehensive, manageable, and meaningful related to stronger tendencies to adopt less risky driving behaviors, and to perceive the social norms and the police as more just. These finding deepen our understanding about the role of these two salutogenic factors in predicting health behaviors. It seems that confidence and trust in the authorities are highly related with the ability to perceive the world and the group as coherent (Mana and Sagy, 2020). We can suggest that when the opposite is true, and the authorities are perceived as unjust, SONC could promote the tendency to reject the rules and the out-group. This assumption is based on previous studies that revealed the relationships between SONC and adherence to

the in-group collective narratives and rejecting the out-group one's to right-wing attitudes and higher level of religiosity (Mana et al., 2019).

In addition to the importance of the salutogenic factors in promoting non-risky driving behavior, the mediation model findings were partly confirmed. An interesting difference, however, was found between the two groups. Among Arabs, perception of police attitudes as just only mediated the relationships between SOC and SONC and the tendency to take risks. For the Jewish participants, perceptions of the police attitudes as just also mediated the other factors (perception of driving as threat or as a challenge and perceptions of social norms). According to Factor et al. (2014) we could expect that the perception of the police attitudes will be more crucial for Arabs than for Jews. It seems that for the Jewish adolescents the perceptions of the police and the Israeli authorities is less ambivalent and therefore the mediating effect is stronger among them as compared to their Arab counterparts. Risky driving behavior among young Arabs may reflect a sense of rebellion against the government and the police, especially if those institutions are perceived as representing and serving the goals of Jewish society, while practicing injustice and inequality towards the Arab society.

Study Limitations

The study population included 12th graders in high schools, only some of whom already had a driving license. Since perceptions and abilities related to driving are also based on personal exposure and experience, there is a possibility that these perceptions are premature and that it would be appropriate to examine their intentions and tendencies to take risks while driving after they have been driving for a longer period of time.

Another limitation regarding the generalizability of the results arises from the sample's representation of the minority and majority groups, which does not align with the actual population ratio.

In addition, the present study used tools translated from Hebrew into Arabic, including the questionnaire for measuring behavioral intentions (Taubman – Ben-Ari, 2004, 2008). The tool may not be sensitive enough to investigate behavioral intentions regarding driving among youth from Arab communities, and it may be more suitable for Jewish youth.

Conclusion

We compared Arab and Jewish youth and put special emphasis on understanding the tendency of young Arab drivers in light of their high level of involvement in road accidents. It seems that the tendency to take risks is related to personal, social,

and national aspects that are also interrelated. Based on the main contribution of perceptions of the police attitude, among both Jewish and Arab adolescents, we recommend taking steps to enhance the positive role of the police using education and community interventions.

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The Public Private Partnerships and Inclusive Housing in Masvingo, Zimbabwe

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Urban problems are becoming too serious to leave solely in the hands of government authorities who have no capacity to solve all them. There is therefore need for partnerships that can help in the delivery of services for increased production, safety and livability in urban areas. Partnerships have been necessitated by the need to draw resources such as wisdom and finances from all parties concerned to overcome contemporary urban predicaments. The adoption of Public, Private Partnerships (PPPs) is seen as the way to address the poor service delivery. This paper examines how the concept of PPPs has been used in the delivery of inclusive housing in the city of Masvingo. The research adopted a mainly qualitative methodology to the inquiry, where in-depth interviews and field observations were employed. The inquiry established that a lot of stakeholders were involved in Victoria Ranch Housing Scheme in Masvingo city. This has helped to make houses available to the generality of people in the City. However, the housing scheme has excluded the urban poor as the private sector developers hijacked it in their bid to maximize profits. This drove the urban poor out of the scheme as houses were priced beyond their capacity. The situation was worsened by the fact that the government did not provide a framework of how the scheme could include the city inhabitants. There is therefore need to re-engineer the concept of PPPs to introduce a moderator in the form a high authority who will make sure that there is a balance between the need for provision of the public good and the need to make profits from public good investments.

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Introduction and Background

The literature around PPPs shows that the phenomena have been defined differently by several academics, public agencies and international organization such that a universally agreed definition is rather elusive (Sobuza, 2010; Jefferies and McGeorge,2008; Hodge, 2005). The Canadian Council for PPP defines this term as "a co-operative venture between the public and private sectors built on the expertise of each partner that best meets clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards (CCPPP, 2008). Ibem (2011) says PPPs are the pooling of resources (financial, human, technical and intangibles that can include information and political support) from the public and private sources to achieve a commonly agreed goal. PPPs have also been defined as a collaborative effort among public, private based on mutual trust, division of labour and comparative advantages in responsibilities, risks and benefits (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2004; Tomlinson 2005; Shelter Enrique 2008; Goz 1986). Wallace et al. (1998) argue the private sector in that partnership should be seen as an equal partner with the public sector to provide a societal benefit.

In this paper, the working definition of PPP is the mutual and beneficial engagement of the public sector and the various private housing developers, cooperatives as well as other non-state private actors or institutions to deliver the much-needed housing. Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) goes into this partnership with the critical land resource. As it is severely constrained in terms of financial and other resources due to, among others things the damaging economic sanctions-induced difficulties, the GOZ is therefore believed to have made a very prudent approach to resolving the housing problem so commonplace in much of the urban landscape. The private entities are believed to be resource-rich as well as more efficient and effective in project implementation thus potentially complementing the GOZ in its endeavors.

Partnerships in housing are not a recent phenomenon but have gained prominence since the 1970s in the US and UK (Sobuza, 2010). Its origins in the two countries were associated with planning and urban development problems and the private finance initiatives (PFI) which primarily address considerable shortfalls in financing of such housing projects (Sobuza 2010; Maseke 2023). The PPP approach under the auspices of the PFI has become a recognised and effective way of delivery of value-for-money public infrastructure and services worldwide. PFI has been used to develop and deliver between 10% to 13% of all UK investments in public infrastructure (Sobuza 2010). Sobuza (2010) further notes that close to 100 projects are initiated or completed per year. The growing use and value of PFI has inspired many governments across the globe to adopt PPP arrangements. Many developed countries have embraced the concept and

the Australian Government, for instance, has used it to deliver several of their social infrastructure projects. Ecohome housing project in Australia is one major initiative that is a collaborative research project of RMIT University funded by the Australian Research Council grant and a number of industry partners involved (Moskalyk, 2008). In Canada, about 20% of new infrastructure are designed, built and operated under PPP arrangement and low-income housing has increasingly been viewed as one sector that PPP can efficiently and more sustainably tackle (Moskalyk, 2008). In India housing reforms in Kolkata under the PPP flagship have replaced decades of ineffective housing policy (Sengupta, 2005). PPPs have, thus, become the most prominent urban housing policy that have emerged in the last decade. From this perspective PPPPs are viewed as a contemporary housing policy that holds the promise to resolve housing problems (Payne, 1999) by bringing together both the public and private sectors, hence a celebrated institutional strategy (Ibem, 2011, Choe, 2002). Choe (2002) who argued that urban housing problems have reached alarming levels to leave them solely in the hands of government or private sectors. He further argues that there is need to draw wisdom and resources from all parties concerned. In Nigeria, PPPs have been adopted and intended to increase urban housing stock, address housing affordability and accessibility challenges (Ibem, 2011). Ibem (2011) alleges that much as the approach has provided affordable serviced plots and housing units, the houses so produced are hijacked by a few high-income elites. PPPs are further criticized for being palliative as they have contributed very little to the volume of housing units available to low-income people in Lagos (Ibem, 2009; 2011). However, in contemporary times where housing has been deeply immersed into the political economy of cities and countries, it is useful to examine the nature of partnerships because social housing has now become a lucrative area of investment (Erguven 2020, Bloom 2023, Rodgers and McAulife 2023). Successful PPPs need special arrangements that will see the intended benefits being shared between the stakeholders.

Unlike many countries from the developed and developing world, Zimbabwe has not much published literature on PPPs. It is clear from some reports that the country has 3 distinct post-independence epochs that characterised PPPs. In the first decade after independence, between 1980 and 1990, Zimbabwe embraced PPP arrangements (GOZ Report, 1986). The country was faced with huge challenges in many sectors especially housing, emanating from the colonial legacy and the rapid urbanisation that followed the start of the democratic dispensation in 1980 (GOZ Report, 1986). The magnitude of the housing problem in Zimbabwe had reached phenomenal heights. It became clear that housing problems could not be solved by the public sector alone but that cooperation and partnership between the public and private sectors was absolutely necessary in housing finance; production of materials and housing development (GOZ 1986).There were a number of PPPs

in various other areas, for instance, in institutional capacity building, mining and agriculture that involved bilateral and multi-lateral aid agencies., (the UNDP, USAID, IBRD, OPEC and CDC) (GOZ Report, 1986). The Italian and Saudi Arabia Governments have also been involved in bilateral agreements.

The second phase pertains to the mid-1990s to the year 2009 which was epitomized by an exceptionally troubled economy. The GOZ-UNDP (2010) reports that from 2000 to 2008, Zimbabwe experienced unprecedented economic and political challenges which also led to a flight of investors from the country and withdrawal of financial institutions from funding programmes and projects (GOZ-UNDP 2010). This plunged the economy and urban infrastructure into serious deterioration. There was also a brain drain of the human capital which further undermined economic recovery efforts instituted by both central and local government. The third and current epoch is the post 2010 period which is witnessing a come-back of local and international private sector to partner and forge close collaboration with GOZ in many areas such as power generation, mining, local government sector capacity building, housing among other areas. The government also proposed PPPs in hospitals where it is intending to introduce PPPs to rehabilitate and re-equip deteriorated state-owned hospitals. GOZ has no capacity to adequately fund the necessary rehabilitation and construction of new ones as required in some provinces.

This paper seeks to examine the contribution of PPPs in the delivery of housing in the city of Masvingo. Masvingo Province under which the City falls has a huge housing backlog over of over 100 000 (GOZ, 2003) where a significant backlog percentage is apportionable to Masvingo City as the provincial capital city. An on-going revolution in housing production involving 10 000 planned residential stands is underway through a PPP approach with about 10 developers involved in the National Housing Delivery Programme (NHDP). It is believed that GOZ hoped that through the engagement of the private sector there would be increased efficiencies and housing delivery. However, to date there is little evidence on how and if PPP has addressed the housing challenges.

Literature Review

The need for PPPs

PPP have emerged as the most prominent urban housing policy promising to close infrastructure, skills, efficiency, accountability and other gaps for both governments and organisations (Grimsey and Lewis 2004, Sengupta 2005). UN-Habitat (2011) views PPP as a model promoting sustainable housing and urban development for countries at all levels of economic development. Moreover, growing financial needs of urban development projects require more than what

the traditional public purse alone can sustain, hence a need for the alternative PPP development model (UN-Habitat (2011). The PPP model, therefore, offers a new governance paradigm to urban infrastructure that is multi-disciplinary and inter-sectoral in nature and holds the hope for a feasible, coordinated and more equitable policy framework.

PPPs should adopt and be guided by governing principles, chief among them being the public interest. There is need for PPP projects to be carefully planned and well-defined in scope and fundamentally clear objectives where transparency and accountability must be maintained (UN-Habitat, 2011). A selected PPP model must provide value-for-money in terms of cost and time savings. One other key principle is that PPPs must reflect the needs of the affected community and should integrate key stakeholder's interest (UN-Habitat, 2011). It is also important that the project be responsibly managed throughout with the partnership mutually agreeing and prioritizing.

Partnerships that involve the private sector often come in with many forms of delivery frameworks (UN-Habitat, 2011). The choice of model of PPP varies depending on the type of project and market sector but the overall aim remains to improve efficiency, quality of service and price (UN-Habitat 2011). PPP are normally classified in a continuum that reflects the degree of private sector involvement with one extreme end moving from pure public sector provision or government provider approach to give a spectrum of organizational models as illustrated in figure 1 below:

Figure 1

Degree of Private Sector Involvement. **Source**: The Canadian Council for PPPs as adopted from Moskalyk (2008)

From the above figure, the PPP continuum runs from a direct provisioning by government in PPP to complete privatization (Moskalyk, 2008). Allan (1999) sees the PPP continuum as running from a contribution contract with minimal risk transfer to Buy-build-operate (BBO) partnerships with complete risk transfer. In between the two ends of the continuum are several possible combinations of functions that the private sector can do that include design, build, finance, operate, maintain, own, transfer, lease, develop and buy (Sobuza, 2010).

Models and Spectrum of PPPs

Boase (2000) classifies partnerships into four categories that illustrate possible power-sharing and decision-making arrangements. The first is the formalized consultative arrangements under which government seeks out expert advice and input from private sector or community groups (consultation). There is also the contributory partnership where the public sector provides funding for development and management of a project. A third type is the community development arrangement where both the public and private sectors jointly contribute for a common goal. Lastly, the collaborative partnership which is the "true" form of PPP is where both the public and private sector agree to share the risks and the rewards of project through joint decision-making, albeit not always equal shares (Moskalyk, 2008).

A typical PPP in Zimbabwe is the Design Build where, the GOZ contracts a private developer to design and construct the project (GOZ-UNDP, 2010). Choice of model, however, also depends on the type of project and the market as well as the sector's peculiar challenges. The bottom line for PPP approaches is that their choice should satisfy the unique characteristics of each individual sector (Deloitte Research, 2006). The selection is further guided by other factors that include the project objectives, the type of asset, the abilities, experience of the parties involved in the project and ability to manage different risks.

The principal reasons for adopting a PPP model in housing and urban infrastructure development lie in the ability of the approach to offer greater value for money, cost savings, efficiency, efficiency in risk management and increased funding streams when compared with traditional methodologies (UN-Habitat, 2011).

Rationale behind or opportunities of PPPs

The involvement of the private sector and its fundamental drive for economic gain is an incentive to continually improve performance, which overall leads to cutting of project costs (UN-Habitat, 2011). Proponents of the PPPs argue that financial benefits accrue as there is greater potential to deliver quality services at lower costs

than when services are provided through public investment (Hemming, 2006). There is efficiency gain as partnering leads to pooling of expertise, resource and skills in a collaborative fashion, hence diverse strengths from diverse backgrounds (Chikomwe, 2022). For large infrastructural projects such synergies often lead to comprehensive solutions and benefits from economies of scale of production (Erridge and Geer, 2002; Ysa, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2011). Emphasis on output by the private partner also encourages innovation to take place, and new methods and approaches are devised for project delivery at lower costs (UN-Habitat, 2011).

Another conspicuous opportunity associated with PPPs is that they are designed in such a way that risk is shared between the public and private partners where a particular risk in a project is allocated to the partner best able to manage that risk effectively (Grimsey and Lewis 2002; UN-Habitat, 2011). The Canadian Council for PPPs cites procurement, design, construction, operation, permit approval, political, technical, policy and legislative, financing as well as maintenance and operation as some of the key risk areas in PPPs that need to be appropriately shared. The opportunity for efficient and equitable risk allocation should be guided by the comparative advantages accruing to each of the partners as appropriate. Based on this principle, PPP can deliver on time with the financing and material procurement, design, construction and related risks transferred to the private consortium while public sector focuses on other important policy issues like, regulation, planning and performance monitoring (UN-Habitat, 2011).

PPPs have the potential to mobilise funding for urban infrastructure in two ways. Firstly, this is possible through the potential cost-saving inherent in the PPP approach (UN-Habitat, 2011), what Sengupta (2005) attributes to 'the efficiency in production and technical and marketing expertise.' Secondly, the private sector can more easily access private financing from financial institutions. This leaves the public sector relieved and not obliged to fund the project as it is often overwhelmed by other important projects that require funding and other accountability responsibilities (ibid).

PPPs and Low-income Housing (LIH)

This section reviews the use of PPP in low-income housing to determine the opportunities and challenges in the sector and to help draw more concrete conclusions in that regard. PPP is becoming one of the most prominent low-cost housing policy and model in many countries across the globe to address huge housing backlogs in the new millennium (UN Habitat, 2011).Traditionally huge PPP programmes especially in developing countries have produced highly subsidized and high-cost solutions often for the benefit of professionals and middle-class income groups (UN-Habitat 2011).Sengupta (2005) appraises PPP as a new and promising housing reform in India significantly different from the traditional

ineffective provider- approach by government. Using the case of India's low-cost housing delivery and production under the PPP model to date is impressive in terms of costs and quality' (Sengupta. 2005:1). In spite of this rhetoric that purportedly targets low-income families, PPPs have produced minuscule in terms of quantity to meet the high demand (Sengupta 2005). Therefore, given limited resources in many countries of the global South, there is bound to be low housing production relative to the housing demand (UN-Habitat 2011).

Internationally, there is an on-going shift from the government-provider approach due to the financial constraints crippling many governments (Keivani and Werna, 2001). The state-provider approach lacks a sound economic base as it is usually tailored along subsidy lines that involve failure to recover costs (Sengupta, 2005). The PPP model is rooted in the enabling approach where governments provide support for low-income housing by inviting other parties to play a part to improve LIH. The World Bank (1993) and UNCHS (1992) have viewed that the enablement can take the form of partnership arrangements that brings together the government, government agencies, CBOs, NGOs, the private builders and the people themselves in a rather inter-sectoral collaborative manner. Many researchers have studied the feasibility of private sector involvement in affordable LIH provision (Moskalyk, 2008; Sengupta, 2005; Adegun and Taiwo 2011; Scanlon and Whitehead, 2007). They have concluded that there is great potential in PPPs to facilitate the increase in the availability of finance for LIH which can increase the housing supply levels to the low-income and needy people. The PPPs arrangements results in efficiency, lower costs of housing production quicker completion and higher service level, highly productive performance-based contracts and sharing of risk as discussed above, (, UN-Habitat, 2011). In addition, PPPs are renowned for accelerating the rate of project development and save time to deliver the low-income projects, hence efficiency (Lacobacci, 2010). UN-Habitat (2011) argued that PPP arrangement in housing allows private consortium to assume a financing risk, design and construct housing. The PPP is contrasted from the private sector's traditional role where its involvement is limited to short-term contracts while the public authority is solely responsible for service delivery. PPP recognizes the centrality of both parties to holistic collaborative housing solutions . The importance of PPP out of a variety of other types of approaches, according to Waddell and Brown, 1997, is that it is a strategy for provision of housing. Waddell and Brown (1997) further argue that partnerships can produce a range of activities which are more than the sum of its parts. LIH problems in particular are among many social contemporary problems that have resisted one sector solution but require inter-sectoral partnerships to bring in technical and managerial expertise that improves efficiency and large-scale capital injections, reduces the need for subsidies but increases responsiveness to housing consumer needs and preferences (Jamali, 2004; Ahazi and Bowels, 2004). The levels and success of PPPs varies

sharply especially in the developing world, they have generated remarkable efficiency gains in developed countries like Canada, Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UN-Habitat, 2011). As such, there is growing body of evidence that indicates that PPPs are important instruments to resolve public housing problems.

Many researchers have found that PPPs are not without complexities. Choe (2002:3) highlights some intrinsic pitfalls associated with PPP principle assumes a democratic society where "the private sector is voluntarily tied through an enlightened self-interest to social welfare". This claim is seductive as it offers the prospect that private sector is so sincere about urban problems. In the Politics of Partnerships study on urban redevelopment in New York, Philadelphia and Chicago the conventional PPP approach has done little to improve living conditions of the majority of slum dwellers but instead exacerbated inequality. The chief beneficiaries, in this instance, were the developer and the white-collar service professionals together with pro-business policy entrepreneurs. Moreover, the private partner can abuse capital mobility to gain concessions from municipal authorities which desperately need to bolster their local economies (Choe, 2002). Additionally, PPP ventures can be opportunistic, only surfacing during the bubble of economic boom but disappear in economic downturn (Choe, 2002) as happened in Zimbabwe during the period 1999-2008.

Results and Discussion

Legal, Administrative and Technical Arrangements for Operationalization of the PPP

There were some kinds of arrangements that have been put in place by the GOZ in their attempt to operationalize PPPs under the NHDP. Its provincial structures and agencies are the dominant structures involved in the operationalisation of PPPs. These structures were involved in planning, (through the department of physical planning), management (through the ministry of local government) and legal aspects of housing programme. The government through the then Department of Physical Planning, now Department of Spatial Planning, was involved in producing layout plans for the housing projects, while the provincial administrators was responsible for the management of the housing programme on behalf of the government. The government through the Land Acquisition Act was responsible for identifying land in the peri-urban areas of Masvingo and gazzetting them for compulsory land acquisition. The general expectation from the public was that the acquisition of the farms in the Masvingo City's peri-urban areas would benefit a lot of homeless people in the city as alluded by one of the respondents;

> '...we thought many disadvantaged people will benefit from the government's land acquisition…. But very few can afford the stands availed in Masvingo peri urban ..'.

What can account for emerging challenge as illustrated in the excerpt above is weak institutional arrangements that are analysed to be at variance with national housing policy and not supported by any funding arrangement. The GOZ did its best by acquiring urban and peri-urban land to meet the required several thousand housing units after the exponential rural–urban migration and operation *Murambatsvina* led to acute housing shortages. The major aim was to provide houses for every citizen especially the low income. The government intervention into housing was after realization that a lot of people were not able to access housing in the city, as a lot of people were on the housing waiting list. According to Christopher (2016), a variety of housing options prevents disadvantaged people to be relegated into slums because they cannot afford a house either to own or rent. The government therefore came in with PPP alternative arrangement to avail housing for the disadvantaged groups of the city. Housing sector has however become a highly commodified and financialised sector, which has resulted in houses being priced way out of rich of the poor (Christopher 2016, Hochstenbach 2023, Jacobs et.al 2022). The PPP arrangement in Zimbabwe has no regulatory framework to guide the housing programme, hence the programme was hijacked by private partners, who took the advantage of free land to grab it and sell to the public. The hijack is a result of commodification and asserttisation of housing sector, where a lot of investors are pouring huge investments into housing, which has developed to be a sure investment sector (Coelho et.al. 2017, Hochstenbach and Mannuel 2023, Bloom 2023). Hochstenbach and Mannuel (2023) further argued that in the Netherlands the government has to move in into the property sector to try and regulate the sector because the private sector had invaded the housing sector providing private rented accommodation instead of homeownerships. Housing has become a form of capitalism, where investors are putting a lot of money to create property-led capital accumulation, which is disadvantaging the poor from accessing houses (Schwartz and Seabrooke 2009, Hochstenbach 2023, Hochstenbach and Mannuel 2023). A regulatory framework is therefore required in PPP arrangements to make development partners obliged to provide housing for the low income, (Maseke 2023; Watson 2021; Ali et.al. 2019; Bernstock 2019). Watson (2021) argued that there is need to put in place supportive structures that will help the disadvantaged groups of the society to access city services. Bernstock (2019) further argued that a clear policy framework will create working space that will benefit all stakeholders in housing partnership. Lack of regulatory framework and guiding standards for purpose-built houses usually hampers effective inclusive housing (Zeeman et.al. 2016). Failure to create such supporting structure derails provision of inclusive housing, (Calhoun 2018). However, the major weakness of government in the Victoria Ranch Housing Scheme according to one expert in the city of Masvingo was that the peri-urban acquisition

"was politically motivated and hurriedly done and without any policy guideline and laid down standards on how it was going to implemented thereafter"

Another respondent remarked the GOZ availed land but put virtually no control on how it was going to benefit the citizens). There were no policy directions on how the housing programmes would benefit the low income and the rest of other citizens. There is very little consideration on the needs of the low income because the houses produced were way out of their reach. There were more than 10 000 homeless people in Masvingo City but the programme did not make any reference to the poor hence the housing programme ended up benefiting the politically connected land barons who grabbed the land and sold it to the public at exorbitant prices. The hijack of the government housing programme is due to the fact that housing is now central in the political economy of states and cities, where housing is seen as lucrative investment sector and is a key driver of city and national economies. Housing is therefore now the new capital accumulation process in cities, (Coerlho et.al. 2017, Jacobs et.al. 2022, Mannuel et.al. 2014)

One of the key informants said

"GOZ apparently did not know who the homeless are. It just rushed into distributing land to developers and consortiums, who happened to have political connections in the city…there was no arrangements on how the poor were to benefit"

The private land developers have no provisions for urban poor but have a purely investment intentions to maximization of profits. Investors into housing sector are there to utilize the exchange value of houses rather than providing a social service to the poor. Housing sector has developed to be a sure form of investment because of its capacity to preserve value under capitalism, hence every investor is looking for investment in that sector (Erguven 2020; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008; Mannuel et.al. 2014). The land acquisition programme in Masvingo peri-urban has therefore created land barons, who managed to grab land for free and sell to the public at exorbitant prices. They were selling the land to the public at prices, which was way out of the reach of the urban poor. The social housing programme has therefore been hijacked by capital seeking investors who are out to make huge profits from social programmes. This form of residential capitalism creates negative distributional effects of housing inequalities (Jacobs et.al. 2022). As alluded to earlier, lack of a guiding framework in the housing delivery system led to the private developers taking over the housing project and selling it to the public on commercial basis which excluded the urban poor. The prices of unserviced stands in Victoria Ranch Housing Scheme ranges from US$3500-5000.00 for stand sizes of between 200m2 to 300m2. Other bigger stands are

ranging from 800m2- 1000m2 and these stands were going for prices of between US$20 000.00- 30 000.00. These prices are too expensive for an unserviced stand, without water, sewer and electricity reticulation. Roads are also not developed because there are only farm roads servicing these stands. These prices are way above those charged by the city council for serviced stands, which ranges from US$10-15 per square meter. These prices therefore show no consideration of the urban poor. Christopher (2016) argued that housing has been marketised too highly to the extent that they have been priced way beyond the reach of the poor, mainly because housing has emerged to be the biggest financial assert in people's daily life. He further argued that investment into housing has created a new form of capitalism called residential capitalism, where investors are using housing as a capital accumulation process. The private developers in Masvingo are charging these exorbitant prices despite the fact that the land was acquired by the government and all the planning was done by the department of Physical Planning, in the Ministry of Local Government and Urban development. The GOZ has not intervened to make sure that the urban poor are included in the housing scheme. Government intervention could be through liaising with their development partners to make allocation for urban poor. The intervention of government will make sure that the use value rather than the exchange value of housing is restored to the majority of citizens and this will allow the urban poor to access housing. The commodification of housing has resulted in privatization of social housing, which has put housing affordability under pressure and out of reach for the urban poor (Hochstenbach 2023; Jacobs et.al. 2023). The government can even give a quota for the disadvantaged and poor in the housing development. It can also provide subsidies targeted to urban poor so that they can access funds to buy stands or houses through low-income loans and tax incentives to the development partners so that they are encouraged to provide low cost housing (Huang and Ren 2020). In the Dutch housing delivery system, the government stepped in to restrict property-led capital accumulation, where rented accommodation had become integrated with global capital flows to the extent that people were not able to but properties for homeownership (Hochstenbach 2023).

In any situation if the private sector is left alone to do its business, it will always make rational decisions to maximise their profits and these decisions have a lot of negative externalities that hurt the urban poor most, (Jill and Adkins, 2014). Jill and Adkins (2014) further argued that the private sector is risk averse, which always force them to avoid housing provision for the low-income. Development partners in the Victoria Ranch housing scheme were allowed too much space to dictate the development process in the housing scheme, which allowed them use market forces to determine prices of houses for profit maximisation. The use of market forces led to exclusion of disadvantaged groups of the society as the stand prices were too expensive for the low income. The state and the private

sector partnership need to strike a mutually beneficial balance characterised by symbiotic relationship (Bernstock,2019). The situation in Victoria Ranch has been compounded by the fact that the stands offered by the development partners are not serviced, which make them too expensive because the beneficiaries will again need to meet the costs of infrastructure that service these stands. High cost exclude the low income and other disadvantaged groups of the society,

(Chava and Newman (2016). Most of the developments that are coming up in this housing projects show that it is the better-off that are major beneficiaries of this housing project as the poor are easily driven out in down-raiding tendencies. Figure 1 below shows some of the structures that are coming up in the Victoria Ranch Housing Scheme. Fig 1: Some of the housing properties coming up in the Victoria Ranch Housing Scheme:

Figure 2

Source Chikomwe 2014

What is conspicuously glaring in the Victoria Ranch Housing Scheme is marginalisation of low income groups in the provision of houses because the scheme did not make provisions for low income people. The collaboration between the government and their development partners should have come up with provisions that will allow inclusive housing, where all citizens are afforded their right to access housing. Inclusive housing scheme should recognise and realise the rights of all citizen to the city (Parnell and Robinson 2012). Chava and Newman (2016) argued that PPPs should have involvement and collaborations between development partners, where involvement should identify challenges faced by inclusive housing, while collaboration tables how collective efforts can help face the challenges. Ward (2013) added that for effective inclusive housing there is need for an authority that has powers to direct development partners to provide inclusive housing. Inclusive housing should provide housing options that carters for the whole range of city inhabitants, (Nicolazzo, et.al. 2018; Huchzemeyer, 2011; Potts, 2012). A good city is one that allows realization of universal access

to urban services as a basic human right (Parnell and Robinson 2012). Parnell and Robinson (2012) further argued that in the universal access to urban services is also an entitlement of the urban poor, who should be allowed access to city services for an inclusive city. However, many governments (local and central) are poorly equipped to respond to the needs of the urban poor, hence the urban poor are disenfranchised of their right to access urban services (Chigwenya 2019, Parnell and Robinson 2012).

One of the of the land experts in the city of Masvingo said;

'…*GOZ has not put in place a meaningful framework to guide the PPP model… most of the development details were left to be determined by the development partners …. Ministry of Local Government has not put in place land management, technical and other arrangements to guide inclusive development..*'

It therefore means that the private sector was allowed to run the housing scheme on purely profit basis, where housing schemes were more focused on economic benefits rather than the welfare of human being, (Rodgers and McAulife 2023). If investors are allowed to run the show they have virtually no consideration for the poor and they will operate to maximize profits. In Namibia, PPP operations were a big failure because they had very little consideration of low income people, (Maseke 2023). Maseke (2023) argued that the government of Namibia did not put any measure to control the operation of PPPs in delivering housing, hence low income was not able to benefit from PPP arrangements, which was hijacked by the private sector who went on to produce houses that were too expensive for the low income. The investors have very little consideration of the conditions of the urban poor. The property developers in Victoria Ranch were mostly interested in maximizing their profits with no consideration of the social side of housing, as a result, the urban poor were excluded in the scheme. Putting some control in the PPP arrangements will ensure that the intended beneficiaries benefit from the projects (Maseke 2023, Watson 2021). Proper planning and design will ensure that the targeted beneficiaries get the best out of PPP arrangements (Ajayi et.al. 2023, Maseke 2023).

Another oversight observed in the operationalisation of PPPs in Masvingo City housing project is the coordination of institutions responsible for housing delivery in the city. The government, private sector and the local authority were supposed to work together and see how the development partners could come up with inclusive housing. However, an important stakeholder, the local authority was left out. The partnership is between the government and the private sector. The city of Masvingo was sidelined in the whole housing matrix. As a local authority, the city of Masvingo should have been actively involved and guiding

the whole housing delivery process, since it is the administrative organization under which this housing project falls. For effective delivery of development projects under the New Urban Agenda there is need for active involvement of subnational governments. Cities according to the sustainable development goal number 11 are now crucibles of local developments, which call for their active involvement in leading development initiatives in cities (Watson 2021, Parnell and Robinson 2012). Local governments are agents for effective delivery of important service in the city (Parnell and Robinson 2012). The exclusion of the city of Masvingo in the PPP arrangements therefore means that a lot of housing information was not included in the housing project. This includes information on the nature of housing waiting list and who is the urban poor. This information was very critical as it should have been the guiding information to achieve inclusive housing. This makes the giant Victoria Ranch PPP housing project ill-conceived and by many standards and suspected to be an initiative with political hyper-promises and manoeuvres, and suggestively entangled in typical *political party rent-seeking* and misdemeanours (Chikomwe, 2022). Most cities in Zimbabwe are under the administration of political opposition party which may explain why Masvingo City was excluded in the planning and implementation of the housing project. Several analysts including Chigwata, et al. (2019), points to untenable politics and governance thereof of cities since the year 2000 when for 'the first time in the electoral history of post-independence Zimbabwe, all urban wards and city councils were won by the opposition party. So the government might have decided to venture into the ill-conceived housing programme in order to win back their political influence in the city.

The absence of key infrastructure provision in the form of water, sanitation and proper access roads makes the housing project to operate under the banner of parallel housing albeit a unique one because there is no basic infrastructure as should be the case (Takuva, 2017). The National Housing Policy of Zimbabwe (GOZ, 2012) defines parallel development as a housing development strategy that allows for the construction of housing and infrastructure to start simultaneously. There are however several hundreds of unserviced houses which had been constructed and occupied in Victoria Ranch without basic engineering infrastructure and social infrastructure like schools, health facilities among others which is putting a lot of strain on the existing facilities in the city. The only available school was constructed by a private developer, which, because of high demand and prices excludes many children. The denied access to urban services to these urban poor is therefore a denial of right to the city (Parnell and Robinson 2012). An interview with an official from one of the schools near Victoria Ranch housing project complained

'we have now enrolled more than 4 times our normal enrollment because we want to accommodate pupils from Victoria Ranch where there are no schools ..''

In refusing to take over the administration of the Victoria Ranch housing project, the city of Masvingo has argued that it has no capacity to take the housing project on board which requires huge water and sewer augmentation which it has no capacity to bankroll. For sanitation, the housing scheme has therefore resorted to use of ecosan toilets and ventilated pit latrines as alternatives for reticulated sewerage, and boreholes as alternative water sources as shown in figure 2 below. As Ward (2013) would argue, the conditions in poor neighborhoods are not safe and livable due to the likelihood of ground water contamination.

— **Figure 3** —

Photographs 1-3 below show from left to right, the borehole water, ventilated pit latrine and the ecosan toilet in Victoria Ranch.

Source Chikomwe 2014

The housing scheme despite being almost the same size as the existing Mucheke high density suburbs, has no health and educational facilities. The only available school was taken by a private developer and he is building a private school. The school is not going to benefit a lot of poor people in the area because they are not going to afford the fees charged by the private school. Most people in the area prefer government and Council schools, which they afford but are not available. So the school going children in this housing project are mostly likely to walk long distances to near-by council and government schools in other residential areas. Lack of such important infrastructure will put pressure on the existing infrastructure and also isolate this housing scheme from the whole Masvingo city fabric because no people will like to live in areas with such unlivable conditions. These people have the right to receive important services that will allow them to live, work and play in safe and livable spaces. Inclusive housing gives beneficiaries their right to form the city (Haung and Ren 2020; Potts 2012).

The key findings from the survey that summarise the emerging perceptions; about the Victoria Ranch housing development are captured in Table 2 below. What is catchy is that key respondents acknowledge the opportunity that the land reform had presented in providing more housing to the low-income group and that the GOZ had done well by unavailing the land to develop through laid out planning process. However, the government lost the grip of the process by failing to put appropriate regulatory frameworks that guide the PPP arrangements. Lack of control machanisms will allow the private sector to run the social housing on profit making basis, which will disadvantage the low income groups, (Maseke 2023, Ajayi et.al 2023). The lack of regulatory framework in the Victoria Ranch Housing Scheme was further worsened by the sidelining of Masvingo City, as a stakeholder in the PPPs. As such the project was evaluated as untransparent and has excluded the urban poor from accessing houses in the city. The development partners selected for the housing scheme did not have sound financial resources to fund the provision of services as they are failing to provide important infrastructure to service the housing scheme. They failed to source funds from financial institutions, hence they are mostly relying on revenues collected from sale of stands.

Table 1:

Emerging perceptions from stakeholders' perspective

Rank	Theme	Excerpts from the interview
1	Increased land supply	"Much thanks to the land acquisition of peri-urban farm land for the cause of housing expansion" "Acquisition process still unfinished which threatens security of theme " "At least as many disadvantaged people can benefit from the public land"
2	Controlled development through planning survey	"GOZ is commended for not only acquiring but planning through a subdivision layout planning" "Development has also been guided through cadastral survey hence not haphazard"
3	Regulatory framework and legislative environment	"GOZ has not put in meaningful framework to guide the PPP model" "The arrangements are at the dictate of the private partners" "Ministry of Local Government has not put in place land management, technical and other arrangements to guide development"
4	Decentralization – recentralization paradox	"The PPP arrangement avoided the local authorities with GOZ "taking" back the decentralized function" "The Masvingo City Council and Masvingo Rural Council were not integrated into the planning and implementation processes until at later stages"
5	A lack of transparency in financial, and management arrangements	"Criteria for selection of developers was not strict on financial soundness" "Developers should have been mandated to opened trust accounts" "No known accounts audits done yet" "Major infrastructural services required financial capabilities of established companies for developers"
6	A need for a technically multi-disciplinary Committee	"The housing committee under the provincial administration is inactive" "The committee is merely allowing allocation of stands to developers without thoroughly vetting the developers, hence ineffectual" "It lacks experience in housing of such arrangements and lacks on-the-ground realities"

The exclusion of Masvingo city as a service provider in the Victoria Ranch housing scheme resulted in exclusion of the Victoria Ranch Housing Scheme in service provision. Table 3below shows the schedule of waste collection in the city of Masvingo, which exclude Victoria Ranch housing scheme.

— **Table 2** —

Schedule of Waste collection in Masvingo City's low-income and industrial areas.

Area	Frequency
City centre	5times a week
Mucheke high density residential area)	5 times a week
Industrial area	4 times a week
Rujeko high density residential area)	4 times a week
Mucheke bus terminus	6 times a week

Source: Chigwenya 2021

Conclusions

Housing delivery in urban areas is a daunting task that many cities are grappling with. The problem is more pronounced in cities of the global South not only because of resource constraints but the models of governance of infrastructure provision adopted. The adoption of PPPs is one of the initiative that could overcome the resource constrain. This concept can allow stakeholders collaboration, resource mobilization and sharing, that will go a long way to alleviate resource constrains in housing delivery. The government of Zimbabwe adopted the concept in the city of Masvingo, with collaborative efforts from private sector, government and community-based organizations. In the partnership, the GOZ availed land through the compulsory land acquisition of farms around the city of Masvingo and went on to produce development plans using its technical arm, the Department of Physical Planning. The land was given to a consortium of property developers. The noble initiative availed more than 10 000 stands for housing units to the prospective home seekers. However, the PPP principles were scarcely followed and done without clear policy guidance, neither had it any relationship to the national housing policy framework that prioritizes, for instance, infrastructure provision. the housing scheme has no infrastructural development, hence the settlement resembles informal settlement because of lack of essential services. This also resulted in exclusive housing, where the urban poor were left out in the housing delivery system. Lack of a guiding regulatory framework allowed the land developers to hijack the whole project and take most of the land, which was sold at exorbitant prices for own gain and this excluded the urban poor. The project also left out the major service provider, Masvingo city council. The deliberate

exclusion of Masvingo city implied the local government was not involved in the planning, implementation as well as compliance with technical and engineering aspects of the housing process. As a result, the scheme is excluded from provision of basic services such as reticulated water and sewerage and beneficiaries are resorting to using rudimentary structures such as ventilated pit latrines and ecosan toilets which makes the settlement informal.

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Book Review: *The Visual Memory of Protest*. Editors: Ann Rigney & Thomas Smits

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What makes some protest-related images more memorable than others? How does the repetition of familiar imagery serve activists while, simultaneously, also potentially undermine their efforts for recognition? What can one learn from those stories of images that returned to public consciousness years after their creation, and are now presented in wholly different contexts from the original ones? The authors of *The Visual Memory of Protest* address these and other related questions through a range of intriguing case studies of worldwide protests, in terms of their visual representations. This book stands out as highly pertinent in this current global climate, characterized by political and social upheaval, and the prevalence of media platforms that prominently feature visual content.

This book comprises three primary sections, each featuring three articles that tackle various aspects of the role of visuals and imagery in shaping the cultural memory of protests worldwide. Keeping the book focused on this topic enables a thorough, in-depth examination of the subject matter. Simultaneously, its extensive breadth and scope reveal intriguing correlations among the explored subjects. The articles demonstrate the relevance of cultural memory to a wide range of academic disciplines such as media, photography, art, gender studies, and political science. Consequently, *The Visual Memory of Protest* is expected to appeal to many researchers in various scholarly fields, thanks to its solid theoretical infrastructure and methodology use.

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As noted by book editors Ann Rigney and Thomas Smits, the significance of protests lies in their visibility, which, in turn, influences the extent and reach of their recognition (p.11). The articles in the book discuss this in various contexts. Some of the authors' main arguments deal with the impact of visuals on shaping the narrative of the protest and its leaders, and how both are remembered. There is some complexity here, as this is an era in which visual content is abundant and accessible through many platforms, "post-scarcity," as Andrew Hoskins refers to it. On the one hand, there is the potential for a visual to attain virality and give rise to diverse iterations, potentially becoming iconic and entrenched in cultural memory. Conversely, this abundance poses a challenge, making it increasingly difficult for a specific visual to stand out and secure a lasting place in cultural memory (p. 21).

Each article in the book sheds a unique, engaging light on key aspects of the subject matter, making substantial contributions to memory studies. In this review, I would like to highlight two of them, beginning with Duygu Erbil's 'Deniz Gezmiş Takes to the Streets: From Photograph to Silhouette.' Erbil's fluid and fascinating storytelling style immediately draws the reader in. This article delves into alternative media within the context of cultural memory, and focuses on visual representations of Turkish revolutionary and political activist, Deniz Gezmiş. Erbil relies on Rigney's distinction between Memory Activism, Memory of Activism, and Memory in Activism, and applies it to this case study. Additionally, the article emphasizes the critical role of context in shaping interpretation. The connection between visual creation, production, and interpretation is thoughtfully explored. Erbil illustrates how communication materialities and means of cultural production can, and according to her, should, be at the heart of the study of protest-related images that have become iconic. Erbil claims that alongside the focus on representation and identity, there is also the use of material, suggesting that the production culture of activism largely influences the visual aesthetics of protest. An image has greater memorability potential when it lends itself to copying through available means associated with protest and the DIY culture. Examples of such means include graffiti and stencils, used to create silhouettes of various figures, among other techniques.

The second article I would like to refer to is Marco Solaroli's 'Photojournalism, the World Press Photo Awards, and the Visual Memory of Protest.' This study, employing a mixed methodology, offers compelling insights into the intricate relationship between photojournalistic competitions, notably the World Press Photo Awards, and the construction of protest memory. Solaroli delves into the agenda-setting dynamics behind the selection of winning images, arguing that the jury's judgment goes beyond artistic considerations to encompass narratives, politics, and social contexts. The article raises pivotal questions about the dual

nature of press photographs as journalism and art, asking whether they merely reflect reality or actively contribute to creating new narratives. Solaroli's focus on visual motifs and recurring styles in protest photography underscores their profound impact on shaping public memory. Notably, he argues that photojournalism awards institutionalize specific models and styles, potentially diminishing the nuanced local and political contexts of protest-themed events.

That being said, a running thread between the articles would have offered readers a richer experience. This could have been achieved had the authors read the early drafts of their peers' essays in their respective sections, and weighed in on their main arguments. This kind of 'dialogue' could have lent itself to integrative discussions and contributed to profound conversations, besides the insights provided by the book editors in the introduction. While the format of a book cannot possibly compete with more interactive forms such as a panel, this approach could have made the book's content more cohesive and allowed for a deeper exploration of the interconnected aspects of the overarching topic.

The book's audience includes scholars from various research fields in social sciences, the humanities, the arts, and beyond. Given its focus on high-profile events, it is also expected to spark interest well beyond the academic community. The authors ground their work in a rich theoretical framework, relying on central and prominent researchers' insights, and skillfully applying these theories to their own work. Building on this theoretical foundation, the book's primary contribution lies in its broadening of readers' knowledge and perspectives within memory studies by forging meaningful connections across divergent academic fields such as activism, art, and media; thereby deepening our understanding of the many interplaying aspects of the visual memory of protest. Furthermore, it offers a solid theoretical foundation for further research within memory and protest. Should a future volume delve into recent protests worldwide, it will likely be as fascinating as this current volume.

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ḤAGAR | INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Call for contributions: Special issue: Contemporary Readings on Migration and Displacement

"Hagar: International Social Science Review" is an English-language international peer-reviewed journal published by the Humphrey Institute for Social and Cultural Research at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel. The journal endorses all subfields of the social sciences and the social and cultural humanities. The Journal was inaugurated in 2000 and recently published its renewed edition after a nine-year break. Managed by the doctoral fellows of the Humphrey Institute, Hagar's mission is to establish social and cultural thought as a basis for research in a variety of fields and disciplines. The journal is particularly interested in essays that employ an interdisciplinary approach to social and cultural themes and methods.

The upcoming issue of Hagar will be dedicated to the study of migration and displacement today. Recent global turmoil, such as the Ukrainian-Russian war, the Israeli-Hamas war, the Sudan civil war, and the Flight of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, as well as climate-related disasters, have called for re-examination and reconsideration of migration and forced displacement terminology, identities, norms and processes. The current issue seeks to examine questions related to dynamic borders, identities, representations, and processes, including the reconstruction of categories within Migration Studies. This involves questioning where migration starts and refugeehood ends. We welcome manuscripts from all social and humanities disciplines, encompassing both theoretical and empirical studies.

Manuscripts should consist of approximately 7000 words (including references) and follow the Harvard citation style. For the next issue of Hagar, the deadline for submission of the full papers is April 1st, 2024. Manuscripts received before the deadline will be reviewed on a rolling basis. Please direct your submission to hagarjournal@bgu.ac.il. Reviews are expected to be provided to the authors by June 2024, and the full issue is anticipated to be published in October 2024.

Co-editors for this special issue,

Yael Gordon, Shahar Livne and Manya Oriel Kagan