

Behavioral Professionals: Evidence From the Commercial Auto Insurance Industry

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Abstract

A cornerstone of the IO study of *selection markets* is that competition disciplines sellers to customize coverage and premiums optimally. But is it the case? Using data from one of the largest Israeli commercial auto insurance providers, an affiliate of a multinational insurance company, I find too little adjustment in the intensive margin. Premiums barely change with expected cost as projected by pre-determined factors (vehicle age) and signals (claim history). Furthermore, I find too much adjustment in the extensive margin; excessive denial of insurance following recent claims. Using unique grading documents, I integrate the insurer's subjective risk assessment into the study of insurance markets. I find that the insurer's risk assessment over-weighs recent claims and misevaluates vehicle age. Structural model estimates suggest that insurers enjoy incumbency advantages over their own customers, and clients are rationally inattentive to competitors' pricing unless they are faced with a price increase. Both channels allow sub-optimal behavior to persist. Finally, I find that supply-side behavioral frictions, which result in excessive denial, mainly harm *disadvantaged customers*—single-fleet clients of an old vehicle—and diminish with client's fleet size.

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1 Introduction

Perhaps the key feature of *selection markets*, such as the private market for insurance, is that consumers vary not only in their willingness to pay but also in how costly they are to the seller. Therefore, insurance providers care not only about the *quantities* of policies they sell but also about the *qualities* of the clients they cover. Market forces can fail to achieve efficiency if buyers know better than sellers how risky they truly are ([Akerlof \(1970\)](#) and [Rothschild and Stiglitz \(1976\)](#)).

It is thus not surprising that much attention in the IO literature is devoted to studying the demand side in insurance markets, and quantifying the implications of selective sorting on policy and welfare ([Cutler and Reber \(1998\)](#), [Chiappori and Salanie \(2000\)](#), [Cardon and Hendel \(2001\)](#), [Cohen and Einav \(2007\)](#), [Fang et al. \(2008\)](#), [Cutler et al. \(2008\)](#), [Carlin and Town \(2009\)](#), [Lustig \(2010\)](#), [Einav et al. \(2010a\)](#), [Bundorf et al. \(2012\)](#), [Einav et al. \(2013\)](#), [Starc \(2014\)](#), [Finkelstein and Poterba \(2014\)](#), [Hackmann et al. \(2015\)](#), [Handel et al. \(2015\)](#), [Cabral \(2016\)](#), [Mahoney and Weyl \(2017\)](#), [Cabral et al. \(2018\)](#), [Einav et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Tebaldi \(2022\)](#)). A cornerstone in these studies is that sellers customize coverage and premiums optimally. The view is that while market forces might fail to discipline buyers, competition disciplines similar, equally informed insurers; providers offer optimal coverage and premiums. However, in reality, insurers are not identical and might not be equally informed. For example, asymmetries between providers emerge as sellers and buyers know each other better than others. Market forces might fail to eliminate mispriced risk, suggesting that supply-side frictions may affect premiums and coverage.

In this paper, I offer a different perspective on the market for insurance. As in recent studies, I allow for behavioral frictions in demand for insurance. However, in contrast to the literature on selection markets, I recognize that insurers might fail to assess risk correctly and customize coverage plans and prices optimally.

With this perspective in mind, this paper studies the pricing and coverage behavior in private insurance markets. Specifically, I address four main questions. First, do large sellers in private insurance markets customize offers and prices as the IO literature predicts? Second, if not, does it reflect their biased beliefs? Third, why do market forces fail to compete away sellers with biased beliefs? Fourth, what are the welfare implications of

supply-side behavioral frictions, and whether these vary if clients are covered by individual or fleet base contracts?

To address these questions, I study the Israeli commercial auto insurance market. This market provides an excellent laboratory to study supply-side frictions for two reasons. First, we expect professional buyers to choose carefully between insurance plans and discipline sellers to customize offers accordingly. Second, the market is limited to unregulated property coverage; insurers can charge any price and deny coverage without constraints. I use comprehensive data from one of the largest commercial auto insurance providers in Israel, an affiliate of a large multinational insurance company. The data includes *all* the information available to the insurer; (i) premiums, coverage, and claim expenses by policy and client, as well as (ii) internal policy pre-renewal assessments, known as the “Go-No Go” grades. Furthermore, I obtain data on the market competitors’ premiums by generating fictitious policy applications. These datasets allow me to portray the gap between premiums and expected cost by pre-determined factors and claim history, identify the gap between objective and subjective risk assessment, and quantify its impact on coverage, pricing, profits, and welfare.

I start by providing evidence of the gap between premiums charged by the insurer and the cost of providing coverage as a function of pre-determined and stochastic factors. I find too little adjustment in the intensive margin. The insurer barely adjusts premiums per value with determinants predicting higher expected cost per value, such as vehicle age and claim history. Consequently, the insurer profits by providing coverage to new vehicles and clients with favorable past performance.

Interestingly, I find that the insurer’s adjustment of premiums per value regarding claim history is solely based on recent claims while putting no emphasis on augmented past performance, even though aggregate claim history serves as a predictive signal of future claims. In contrast, recent performance has no additional predictive power.

Next, I study whether these pricing patterns are specific to this insurer or apply to the other market competitors. Specifically, I generate fictitious policy applications using an Israeli insurance agency and examine how the premiums vary by vehicle characteristics and claim history. I find that the market-wide price patterns are comparable to those of

the insurer. Moreover, the analysis of market-wide premiums for new policies indicates substantial adjustment on the extensive margin. It is impossible to generate a premium offer for a new policy if the customer has been involved in at least two claim events over the last three years.

After providing evidence indicating that both the insurer and its competitors do not adjust premiums based on the customer's observable characteristics, I turn to the internal grading documents. Despite its richness, the observed prices are insufficient to identify the insurer's beliefs, as both supply and demand factors determine equilibrium premiums. I exploit variation in the "Go-No Go" grades and policies' observable characteristics to identify the impact of pre-determined and stochastic factors in determining the insurer's subjective risk assessment. Internal grading recommends no change in premiums—"Go"—for most policies, ignoring the predictive power of vehicle age and claim history on costs. The lack of recommended price adjustment spills over to coverage. Internal grading data recommends denying comprehensive coverage to almost half of the "No Go" graded policies rather than increasing their premiums. This is especially relevant for old vehicles and costly clients. This strategy also reflects a biased risk assessment as signaled by recent and augmented claim history. The "Go - No Go" grades are too sensitive to recent claims with almost no predictive power of future costs, conditional on the augmented history of claims.

Internal grading and premiums reflect demand and supply factors. To separate between these forces, I develop and estimate a structural model that allows customized prices and coverage to reflect the insurer's subjective risk assessment and commonly used demand and supply factors. In its simplified version, the model consists of two periods. In the first period, customers self-sort to sellers. In the second period, a wedge emerges between their insurer and other providers. Customers decide whether to renew their policies or search for an outside offer. The decision to renew depends not only on their private information and search costs but also on the supply side; their insurer's private information, subjective risk assessment, and customized offers.

I take advantage of the panel structure and the internal grading to identify and quantify the client's willingness to pay and the insurer's subjective risk assessment. As for the willingness to pay, a key concern is that premiums are subject to strategic consid-

erations. I use the panel structure of my data, which follows many clients with large fleets over multiple coverage periods, to identify an external source of variation in premiums and use that to estimate clients' willingness to pay. The across-client variation allows to condition out client-specific effect on premiums. The within-client variation allows to identify exogenous shocks in price adjustments by using predicted—rather than actual—adjustments in premiums, for those who renew their coverage (Bundorf et al. (2012)) and those who did not (Crawford et al. (2018)).

As for the insurer's subjective risk assessment, this is identified by decomposing expected profits to premiums and expected costs using a two steps procedure. First, I take advantage of the informational symmetry between the insurer and the econometrician to non-parametrically identify the expected profits for each policy by inversion of the share of recommendations (Berry (1994)). Then, using policies for which no change in premiums is recommended ("Go"), I identify the insurer's beliefs of expected cost by subtracting last year's premiums from expected profits. To further account for possible latent strategic considerations, I focus on non-fleet clients.

Three main demand side findings emerge. First, customers adversely select to renew coverage. Second, new customers are adversely selected; they cost more conditional on observables. Lastly, customers are rationally inattentive to premiums unless they incur a price increase. Both adverse selection of new customers and rational inattention of renewing consumers point to asymmetries between incumbent insurer-insuree pairs and others that allow the insurers room for error in customized prices and coverage.

As for the supply side, the insurer's subjective risk assessment, two main findings emerge. First, the insurer over-weighs recent claims without predictive power of future costs. The law of large numbers implies that demand exhibits increasing returns to fleet size, as large fleets are less likely to be affected by the insurer's biased risk assessment. Second, the insurer evaluates erroneously common pre-determined factors such as vehicle age.

Using the estimated demand and supply parameters, I analyze the impact of the insurer's biased risk assessment on coverage, premiums, profits, and welfare using a set of counterfactuals. I find that supply-side frictions mainly harm *disadvantaged customers*;

single-fleet clients of an old vehicle. A profit-maximizing firm does not deny coverage as informational asymmetries between the customer and the insurer are modest. In contrast, the insurer denies coverage to old vehicles and clients with poor recent performance, which results in lower profits. Furthermore, the clients face a substantial reclassification risk, diminishing with customers' fleet size; volatility in recent performance drops with the number of insured vehicles. As a result, customers benefit from purchasing coverage as a group.

Last but not least, do insurers adjust premiums once they learn those might be mispriced? During my study, I shared with the managerial team preliminary stylized findings pointing to possible mispricing by vehicle age. To assess the impact of information on pricing, I compare premiums by vehicle age over the covered period. I find almost no change in premiums and profits between consecutive years before the managerial team learned about my findings. In contrast, I find a moderate increase in premiums between periods once they were informed of my findings. The adjustment of prices upon learning is consistent with my findings that much of the mispricing reflects the insurer's biased assessment of risk rather than strategic considerations.

This paper contributes to the literature on behavioral firms. A growing body of research documents that large suppliers in non-selection markets customize prices too little on observable demand factors ([Orbach and Einav \(2007\)](#), [McMillan \(2007\)](#), [Cho and Rust \(2010\)](#), [Shiller and Waldfogel \(2011\)](#), [Cavallo et al. \(2014\)](#), and [DellaVigna and Gentzkow \(2019\)](#)). My paper shows that sellers in selection markets fail to customize prices also on expected cost, which is a cornerstone in the study of selection markets.

This paper also contributes to different branches of the literature on selection markets. First, this paper contributes to the literature on reclassification risk and market unraveling ([Cutler and Reber \(1998\)](#), [Hendel and Lizzeri \(2003\)](#), [Koch \(2014\)](#), [Finkelstein et al. \(2005\)](#), [Handel et al. \(2015\)](#), [Hendren \(2017\)](#), [Fleitas et al. \(2020\)](#), [Ghili et al. \(2021\)](#), and [Cuesta and Sepúlveda \(2021\)](#)). IO theory attributes both aspects to asymmetric information and regulation. In this paper, unlike the standard setting of this literature, I observe rejected customers before denial. Insurers do not adjust premiums and excessively deny customers, despite modest asymmetric information and no regulations. For individual customers, the insurer amplifies the welfare loss from reclassification risk.

This paper adds to the study of group insurance ([Bundorf et al. \(2012\)](#) and [Tilipman \(2022\)](#)). I find that group insurance may be efficient as it tends to dilute insurers' misvaluation of risk and the consequences of over-denial coverage to individual customers rather than adjusting premiums.

This paper also relates to the literature emphasizing that imperfect competition ambiguously affects welfare, unlike standard markets ([Veiga and Weyl \(2016\)](#), [Mahoney and Weyl \(2017\)](#), [Lester et al. \(2019\)](#), [Cuesta and Sepúlveda \(2021\)](#), and [Tebaldi \(2022\)](#)). I demonstrate that imperfect competition allows imperfect behavior by insurers, which might drastically change the welfare consequences. Furthermore, informational asymmetries across insurers generate market power. Therefore, a perfectly competitive outcome is implausible, even when considering a frictionless economy with homogeneous products.

This paper contributes to the literature examining the effect of demand-side frictions on equilibrium and welfare ([Sydnor \(2010\)](#), [Abaluck and Gruber \(2011\)](#), [Barseghyan et al. \(2013\)](#), [Handel \(2013\)](#), [Handel and Kolstad \(2015\)](#), [Spinnewijn \(2017\)](#), [Bhargava et al. \(2017\)](#), [Brot-Goldberg et al. \(2017\)](#), [Ho et al. \(2017\)](#), [Handel et al. \(2019\)](#), and [Gottlieb and Smetters \(2021\)](#)) by pointing out its spillover effect on supply-side frictions, such as the impact of rational inattention on the mispricing of risk.

Lastly, my paper also contributes to the literature on managerial practices, highlighting the impact of monitoring, feedback, and on-the-job training ([Bloom and Van Reenen \(2007\)](#) and [Bloom et al. \(2013\)](#)). My findings indicate that these elements improve profits even among professional sellers in a big-data industry.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the setting. In section 3, I provide descriptive statistics regarding the data I exploit in the empirical analysis. In Section 4, I provide evidence of the gap between insurer pricing and expected cost. In Section 5, I provide evidence of the gap between objective and subjective expected cost using the "Go-No Go" grades. In sections 6, I develop and estimate the demand for policy renewal. In section 7, I develop and estimate the insurer's subjective costs and supply of insurance. In section 8, I conduct counterfactual analysis to study the implications of supply side frictions. Finally, Section 9 concludes.

2 Setting

In this paper, I take advantage of proprietary for the years 2013 to 2020 obtained from a large Israeli company operating in the commercial auto-insurance market—with an annual average revenue of the insurer during sample period of \$37.5 million (in 2020 terms)—to examine the relationship between insurer pricing, perceived costs and customer’s realized costs.¹ The provided dataset includes *all* data the insurer has from 2013 to 2020. In the empirical application, I take advantage of the informational symmetry between the insurer and the econometrician, in terms of the determinants of costs and pricing. In this section, I characterize in detail the insurer’s affiliation with an international insurance company, its portfolio (in terms of both customers and products), data and business operation.

2.1 Vertical Relationship

The insurance company operates under a unique vertical relationship, compared to the standard market structure in the insurance literature in general, and in the auto insurance literature in particular. The Israeli insurance company is an affiliate of a large international insurance company (henceforth, IIC) with asset value of over \$50 billion as of December 2020. The IIC provides capacity, which allows the Israeli insurer to sell policies. This is a result of regulation in Israel, which set reserve requirements per premiums charged, in order to avoid failure of insurers to repay claims.² In terms of the division of cost and revenue, the IIC pays all claim damages (net of deductibles), while the Israeli insurer pays all additional operational costs. Revenue is split between the IIC and the Israeli insurer based on yearly agreed-upon share.

A possible concern is that the distorted incentives might lead the Israeli insurer to over-supply insurance, as claims are paid by the IIC. Thus, the IIC provides guidance on pricing by setting a lower bound on premium charged, conditional on vehicle and

¹Throughout the paper, I use and report monetary values in nominal New Israeli Shekel (ILS) to avoid creating artificial variation in the data. Annual inflation between 2013 and 2020 ranged from 0.84% to -0.63%, and the value of 1 ILS ranged from \$0.26 to \$0.29.

²Throughout the sample years, the capacity constraint did not bind. Therefore, I consider the opportunity cost of providing insurance to a different customer to be zero.

client observable characteristics. As a result of repeated interactions with the IIC, the Israeli insurer puts emphasis on the portfolio's return, as negative outcomes often lead to a lower share of revenue in succeeding years. Throughout the paper, I consider the joint profits of both the Israeli insurer and the IIC from operations in this market as a whole.

2.2 Insurer Portfolio

The insurer provides three types of coverages: (i) *Third-party Coverage*, which only covers cost of damage to third-party property, (ii) *Comprehensive Coverage*, which includes all damages to vehicle, in addition to damages covered by third-party coverage, and (iii) *Partial Coverage*, which covers the same types of damage as comprehensive coverage, excluding theft. None of these coverages cover bodily injuries to the policyholder (or to third-party). Israeli regulation mandate all vehicle owner to purchase coverage to bodily injuries through a separate, heavily-regulated policy. The vast majority of the insurer's portfolio consists of Comprehensive coverage policies—over 87% (see Appendix Figure A.1, Panel A).

The insurers provide coverage to commercial vehicles. This includes trucks, buses, mini-buses, trailers and heavy equipment (e.g. tractors, bulldozers, cranes). Approximately two-thirds of the insurer's portfolio consists of trucks (see Appendix Figure A.1, Panel B). Therefore, I focus mainly on comprehensive coverage policies for trucks throughout the empirical application.

The relationship between the insurer and clients differs in four ways from the common relationship in previously studies insurance markets. First, clients typically own a fleet of vehicles. The insurer's clientele are quite diverse in terms of clients' fleet size. More than 10% of policies are of a single-vehicle client, a quarter of policies are of clients who insured a fleet of size lower than five, and more than a quarter of the policies are of clients who insure at least 100 vehicles (see Appendix Figure A.2).

Furthermore, unlike some markets in which firms offer "take-it-or-leave-it" prices, equilibrium premiums are a result of bargaining between the insurer and the client (especially when fleet-owners). Equilibrium price-setting has both favorable and unfavorable consequences. On the one hand, premiums are endogenous and might be correlated with

unobservable (to the insurer and the econometrician) components of the demand for insurance. On the other hand, exogenous variation in pricing as a result of a firm experiment or pilot does not allow examination of its behavior, relative to profit maximizing behavior, as these prices are, by definition, non-optimal off-equilibrium premiums.

As in other markets, premiums are pro-rated. Yet, unlike standard insurance markets, comprehensive and partial coverage policies are priced in terms of *premium per value*. For instance, a premium per value of 4% implies that the customer pays 4,000 ILS for a 6-month policy for a vehicle valued at 200,000 ILS.³

Lastly, unlike the common setting in the selection market literature, there is no regulation of pricing and coverage provided by the insurer. The lack of regulation is consequential; the insurer can provide a customer any coverage at any premium, and deny coverage if it wishes to do so. Since premiums are not regulated, IO theory suggest that customer denial can only be explained by excessive adverse selection (Akerlof (1970)).⁴

2.3 Business Operations: "Go-No Go"

The Israeli insurer, operating since the 1950s, employs hundreds of workers. These include employees in the analytical team, overseen by the Chief Operating Officer (henceforth, COO) and underwriters, which are in contact with the customers, either directly or through their agents. Over the sample period, the insurer sold approximately 175,000 policies to over 13,000 different customers. Due to the high volume of customers, and employees and employees' differentiated occupational requirements and skills, the firm operates in an orderly, systematic structure.

On a monthly-bases, the COO provides the underwriters a document, which is named "Go-No Go". The document includes a grade for each policy that is about to end (usually a month or two before the end of the policy coverage contract). The grading system is defined as follows: a "Go" grade implies that the analytical team recommends to renew the customer's policy at the same premium per value and terms (deductibles). A "No-Go" grade implies that the analytical team recommends to not renew the customer's policy

³Vehicle values are usually determined by the Levi Itzhak vehicle price list, which is the standard practice by both commercial and non-commercial auto-insurance markets.

⁴An alternative explanation could be high operational costs.

at the same premium per value. Typically, a "No-Go" grade will include a recommendation on how to continue the relationship with the customer, if at all. There are four common recommendations: (i) renew policy without increasing premiums (i.e., increase deductibles), (ii) an increase in premium per value is required, (iii) do not provide comprehensive coverage (i.e., third-party only), and (iv) do not provide any coverage (deny). An example is provided Appendix Figure [A.3](#).

At first glance, the complexity of the firm's operations might seem disadvantageous. Yet, this complexity provides additional information which otherwise could have been obtained only by a survey of the analytical team employees. I take advantage of the insurer grading in the empirical application to extract insurer beliefs. Observed prices are insufficient to identify the insurers beliefs, as they are determined in equilibrium by both supply and demand forces; an insurer might increase price either because of high expected cost, or high demand for insurance. Additional assumptions are required in order to differentiate between the two. In this paper, I identify the insurer's beliefs by exploiting variation in insurer grading without any structural assumption regarding the insurer behavior.

3 Descriptive Statistics

In this section, I describe the data and provide descriptive evidence of insurer pricing and realized cost (I refer to the "Go-No Go" grades in section [5](#)). As mentioned before, the main dataset includes all the insurer's data from 2013 to 2020. The data includes (i) contract characteristics (premium, coverage type, deductibles, duration and an indicator on whether a driver under the age of 24 is allowed to operate vehicle), (ii) vehicle characteristics (vehicle value, vehicle age, vehicle type, vehicle weight and vehicle model), (iii) customer characteristics (claim history, zip code and fleet size), (iv) costs (commission and claim damages) and (v) identifying information (policy id number, vehicle license number, client id number).⁵ Using the identifying information, it is possible to track the

⁵In this market insurance policies are not tied to a specific driver, but rather to a specific vehicle. In general, each insured vehicle can be operated by any driver over the age of 24, with a valid license to operate a vehicle of that type. A client can extend the policy coverage for young drivers (between the age of 21 to 24), which in general increases the premium charged.

clients and their vehicles over time.

In the empirical analysis, I focus on comprehensive insurance policies. Column 1 in Table 1 presents summary statistics of comprehensive coverage policies for trucks (column 1 in Appendix Table A.1 presents the summary statistics for all vehicles).⁶ The sample consists of 51,684 policies. A claim is reported for roughly a quarter of the policies. The insurer enjoys a mean profit of 1,587 ILS and a profit margin of 16%, as mean premium and cost are 9,938 (or 3.33% of vehicle value) and 8,361 ILS, respectively. From the insurer's perspective, the portfolio's performance (a profit margin of 16%) is satisfactory. The insurer's positive performance is of key importance, as one cannot conclude a systematic misprice of risk by observing a failing firm. The profitable performance supports the notion that this particular insurer is not *competed away* from the market. This is complemented by the fact that the insurer is one of the largest insurers in Israeli commercial auto-insurance market and is affiliated with one of the largest multinational insurance companies.

In this paper, I examine whether the insurer assesses risk correctly, in both the intensive and the extensive margins. I examine the intensive margin by estimating the gap between the actual pricing and the expected cost as a function of the customers' observable factors. When facing a recurring customer, the insurer should adjust premiums, or maybe even deny the customer, based on changes in the observable characteristics. The evolution of observable factors can be divided into two groups: pre-determined changes (i.e., vehicle age) and stochastic shocks (i.e., claim history).

In Figure 1, I provide a first glance of the relationship between the premium, costs and vehicle age. Figure 1 presents the mean premium per value and cost per value by vehicle age (0 to 10) for comprehensive insurance policies for trucks. As apparent from the figure, the premiums do not adjust optimally over vehicle age, as the cost per value curve is on average a counter-clockwise rotation of the premium per value curve. Therefore, the insurer generates its profits by providing insurance to new vehicles, and incur losses on old vehicles.⁷

⁶In the empirical framework, I mainly focus on trucks as premiums charged by the market competitors are available for trucks only. Nevertheless, I also repeat the entire empirical analysis for all vehicle as well. The results, which are consistent to the ones analyzing insurance for trucks, are reported in the appendix.

⁷The nominal relationship between mean premium, cost and vehicle age is of similar nature. It is re-

Column 2 in Table 1 presents the summary statistics for a subset of the comprehensive coverage policies for trucks: those with a vehicle age of six, or above.⁸ This subset represent about one-fifth of this sample.⁹ In general, the share of policies that involve in a claim is not higher than that of the entire sample (column 1). Yet, the mean damage (i.e, cost of claims) per value is substantially higher, by more than 60%; The mean damage is 14% lower, yet the vehicle value depreciates by 47%. This suggests that conditional on a claim, the expected damage is not proportional to vehicle value. Unlike the mean damage per value, the mean premium per value increases by only 20%. As a results, providing comprehensive coverage policies to old vehicles (age six, and up) does not benefit the insurer, on average, but rather generate losses. Consequently, the insurer's satisfactory profit margin is derived by mostly providing coverage to relatively new trucks.

With regards to past performance, Column 3 in Table 1 presents the summary statistics for a subset of the comprehensive coverage policies for trucks: those that reported a claim in the previous period.¹⁰ This sub-sample consists of 16% of the whole sample and does not differ substantially from that of the entire sample, in terms of premium per value (3.56% relative to 3.33%), vehicle age (5.00 relative to 4.18) or vehicle value (275,954 relative to 298,659).¹¹ Yet, policies with past realized claims incur higher costs. Among policies with a reported claim in the previous period, 34.82% report a claim also in the current period (relative to 23.98%), and the mean damage is 9,345 ILS, which is substantially higher than the entire sample (6,794 ILS). Consequently, on average, the insurer exhibits losses for providing coverage in policies with a reported claim in the previous period.

So far, I divided the sample based on whether a policy incurred a claim in the previous

ported in Appendix Figure A.4.

⁸Column 2 in Appendix Table A.1 presents the summary statistics for the equivalent subset with regards to all vehicles.

⁹Appendix Figure A.5 depicts the distribution of policies by vehicle age.

¹⁰It should be noted that "reported claim" does not necessarily imply that the customer reported the claim, as third-parties usually reports claims on customers that generate third-party damages. Furthermore, throughout the analysis, I do not consider the "at-fault" side. A reported claim is defined as an event at which the insurer exhibits costs as a consequence of providing coverage to the client. In addition, column 3 in Appendix Table A.1 represents the same segmentation with regards to all vehicles.

¹¹Since the sample begins at 2013, I am not able to observed reported claims in the previous period. I take this into account in the empirical framework, and omit the 2013 policies, or policies of new clients, when conducting comparative statics with regards to past performance. About one-fifth of the policies with at least one year of documented history reported a claim in the previous period.

period. It is accustomed in the insurance market in general, and by this insurer (and its competitors) in particular, to measure the client's performance based on the aggregate *loss ratio*. The aggregate loss ratio is defined as the ratio of damages (i.e., net cost of claims) to revenue (i.e., premiums), with respect to all of the customer's past policies. In Panel A of Figure 2, I divide the sample to four groups based on the level of loss ratio (at the start of the policy) and depict the relationship between the premium per value, cost per value and the client's aggregate loss ratio. The mean cost per value increases with loss ratio. This suggests a positive and persistent relationship between past and future performance, consistent with the relationship between past and future claims. Yet, the mean premium per value does not adjust accordingly. It is flat, in both relative and absolute terms. As with claims at the policy level, on average the insurer exhibits losses when providing coverage to customers with poor past performance, while it enjoys profits by providing insurance to customers that perform well in the past, as they tend to perform well in the future as well. As with vehicle age and claims, the insurer's portfolio is profitable as the overwhelming majority of the insurer customers are beneficial—with a loss ratio of under 1; more than 82% (Panel B of Figure 2). This composition is not exogenously determined; the insurer denies customers with poor performance at a higher rate (see section 5).

To summarize, the statistics presented in this section raise two opposing findings. On the one hand, the insurer is profitable. The profit margin of comprehensive coverage policies for all vehicles is 19.65%, and 15.97% for trucks. As mentioned before, these margins are satisfactory from the insurer's perspective. On the other hand, the data presented suggest that the insurer can do better. The findings presented in this section suggest that both pre-determined (age) and stochastic factor (past performance) are correlated with higher cost per value in the future. Yet, the relationship between those factors and premium per value is quite flat. On average, the insurer's profit are generated by a specific segment of customers and vehicles. New vehicles and customer with adequate past performance are beneficial, while old vehicles and customer with poor past performance are costly to insure.

4 Insurer Pricing and Cost

In this section, I estimate the gap between actual pricing and the expected cost of policies as a function of pre-determined and stochastic factors. This section is ordered as follows. First, I analyze the relationship between premium per value, cost per value and vehicle age. Then, I examine the predictive power of past performance, and its relationship with current costs, premiums and profits. I differentiate between recent and overall past performance by considering aggregate loss ratio and previous year loss ratio. I study whether recent claim history is more predictive of future costs, and the relationship of both with pricing. In addition, I examine the competitors' pricing scheme to assess whether the documented insurer behavior is unique or similar to market-wide patterns. To further establish that the insurer misprice risk, I conduct a few robustness tests to rule out alternative channels. Lastly, I provide evidence of firm learning by examining insurer pricing after providing information on the flat pricing scheme over the vehicle life cycle.

4.1 Predetermined Changes

In this part, I examine whether the insurer adjust premiums according to the evolution of cost by vehicle age. Specifically, I quantify the relationship between premium per value, cost per value and vehicle age. I do so by estimating the following fixed-effect models.

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\text{Premium}_{\ell t}}{\text{Value}_{\ell t}} &= \sum_{a=1}^A \beta_a^p \mathbf{1}\{\text{Vehicle Age}_{\ell t} = a\} + \eta_{\ell}^p + \varepsilon_{\ell t}^p \\ \frac{\text{Cost}_{\ell t}}{\text{Value}_{\ell t}} &= \sum_{a=1}^A \beta_a^c \mathbf{1}\{\text{Vehicle Age}_{\ell t} = a\} + \eta_{\ell}^c + \varepsilon_{\ell t}^c,\end{aligned}$$

where ℓ and t index the license (vehicle) and period, respectively. $\mathbf{1}\{\text{Vehicle Age}_{\ell t} = a\}$ is an indicator of a specific vehicle age, a , and $(\eta_{\ell}^p, \eta_{\ell}^c)$ are vehicle fixed effects (with respect to pricing and realized costs). I estimate the premium and cost per value trends over the vehicle life cycle using a saturated model with fixed-effects at the license level. That is, I identify and quantify the trends using within license variation in premium and cost per value.

The results are depicted in Figure 3. The patterns are consistent with the summary

statistics provided in the previous section. The premium per value does not change substantially over the vehicle's life cycle; it increases by less than 0.5 p.p over the first seven years of the vehicle age, and by less than 1 p.p over the first ten years. In contrast, costs increase considerably over the vehicle's life cycle. The cost per value increases by more than 3 p.p over the first seven years of the vehicle age, and by more than 5 p.p over the first ten years. These patterns are inconsistent with a *perfect* insurer behavior; the optimal pricing strategy suggests that premiums should adjust according to changes in the expected cost of providing insurance. Since expected cost per value increase with vehicle age, so should the premium per value. Yet, the observed premiums per value are quite flat.¹²

The result described in Figure 3 suggest that there is limited variation in pricing *within* vehicle. It does not imply limited variation in premium per value *across* vehicles. Appendix Figure A.7 shows that this is not the case. There is substantial variation in premium per value, as expected when (i) equilibrium premiums are determined in a bargaining process between the insurer and the clientele and (ii) there is substantial heterogeneity in bargaining power, possibly due to the considerable variation in clients' fleet size.

A possible explanation to the lack of price variation over the vehicle's life cycle is related to the clientele characteristics. As noted earlier, a substantial portion of the clients purchase insurance coverage for multiple vehicles. It could be the case that the observed flatness in premiums is artificial. When providing insurance coverage to a large fleets, premiums per value are not expected to change if the client's vehicle age distribution does not vary over time, as fleet owners purchase new vehicles to replace old ones. Consequently, the lack of variation over vehicle age does not necessarily reflect a lack of adjustment in pricing, as price adjustment for fleet might not be necessary. Cross-subsidization within fleet is an alternative mechanism that can explain the documented trends. An optimally behaving insurer might not change premiums. The cross-subsidization results in clients artificially over-paying to insure new vehicles and under-paying to insure old

¹²A variant of the models in terms of nominal ILS (instead of per value) is conducted as well. Results are presented in Appendix Figure A.6, Panel A. Furthermore, a replication of the model with regards to the entire sample (all vehicle types) is reported in Appendix Figure A.6, Panel B. The estimated patterns in both variants are consistent with this figure.

ones.

I test whether the observed lack in price adjustment is solely driven by fleet cross-subsidization. I do so by examining non-fleet customers. I re-estimate the models considering only non-fleet customers. The results are reported in Figure 4. The reported premium per value and cost per value are similar in spirit to the ones in Figure 3. Although the standard errors are larger, relative to the entire sample (as expected when considering a smaller sample), the patterns are quite similar. The premium per value barely evolves over the vehicle's life cycle. It increases by less than 1 p.p over the first ten years. In contrast, the cost per value increases substantially over the vehicle's life cycle by more than 6 p.p over the first ten years. Therefore, although fleet cross-subsidization might be a complementing factor, it is certainly not the sole determinant generating the patterns in the data.

4.2 Cost Shocks

After documenting price misadjustment with respect to a deterministic factor, I examine whether the insurer adjust premiums optimally when faced with a stochastic cost. Specifically, I quantify the relationship between different current period outcomes and previous period performance.¹³ I do so by estimating the following model.

$$Y_{jt} = \beta^c \mathbb{1}\{\text{Claim}_{jt-1} \geq 1\} + X_{jt}\delta + \varepsilon_{jt}.$$

j and t index policy and period, respectively.¹⁴ $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Claim}_{jt-1} \geq 1\}$ is an indicator for whether policy j was involved in at least one claim event in the previous period. Y_{jt} indicates the current period four outcomes in question. Specifically, (i) $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Claim}_{jt} \geq 1\}$, an indicator for whether at least one claim was reported in the current period, (ii) current period damage (net claim cost) per value, (iii) change in premium per value (that is, the ratio of current to previous premium per value, minus one) and (iv) current period policy

¹³Therefore, I exclude new policies in the following empirical analysis.

¹⁴I conduct the analysis at the policy level and not the license level (as before). Not doing so would result in a selected sample. Intuitively, an insurance policy that covered a vehicle that incurred a total loss claim in the previous period would be renewed (if at all) in the current period with respect to coverage of a different vehicle.

loss ratio (damage over premium). I control for vehicle characteristics (value, age, weight, type and a young driver indicator).¹⁵

The results are reported in Table 2, panel A.¹⁶ Column 1 reports the relationship between previous and current claim outcome. The probability of at least one claim in the current period is 12 p.p higher if a claim was reported in the previous period.¹⁷ The result demonstrate that claim history serves as a persistence signal of current performance (t-stat = 15.22), even when considering a relatively naive measure of past performance.¹⁸ Column 2 reports the estimated model with regards to damage per value. Consistent with the findings in column 1, the damage per value ratio is on average 1.7 p.p higher, relative to a policy that was not involved in a claim event in the previous period.

Column 3 reports the estimated model with regards to the change in premium per value. If the insurer adjusts premium correctly, the standard model predicts that under optimal pricing, the premiums should increase with claim history as past performance serves as a predictive signal of current claims. The results suggest that this is not the case. Premiums do not significantly differ, and the coefficient is of the *wrong* sign; premium per value drop by -0.1 percent when a claim is reported in the previous period. As a result, the policy is less profitable. As expected given the results on damage and premiums, the loss ratio associated with a reported claim in the previous period is 41.8 p.p point higher (column 4).

Similar to the examination of pre-determined changes, fleet cross-subsidization may be an alternative mechanism giving rise to artificial non-correlation between the policy's current premium and past performance; clients over-pay for policies with good performance and under-pay for policies with poor performance. Furthermore, an additional channel that might explain the lacking correlation is that the insurer adjust prices based on the customer's overall performance—with regards to all policies—and does not assess

¹⁵I do not control for vehicle value when considering the outcome variables damage per value or change in premium per value.

¹⁶A replication of the model with regards to the entire sample (all vehicle types) is reported in Appendix Table A.2, Panel A. The results are similar.

¹⁷This is an interpretation based on the linear probability modeling assumption. The relationship is robust with regards to other specifications, such as a logistic and probit model (not reported).

¹⁸In the next part, I consider the customer's performance (aggregate loss ratio), which takes into account both the cost of damages of all of the customer's policies.

each policy separately. As with respect to vehicle age, I test whether large fleets might give rise to the observed non-correlation by re-estimating the model when considering solely non-fleet customers. The results are reported in Table 2, panel B. The relationship between current costs (claim indicator and damage per value) and past claims is similar to the ones reported with regards to the entire sample. In contrast, the results reported in column 3 indicate that premiums adjust based on past performance. When considering non-fleet policies, the correlation between past claims and current premiums is significant and positive. Policies that incurred a claim in previous period face a 1.7 percent increase in premiums, relative to policies that were not involved in a claim event. Despite the price increase following a poor performance, the relationship between current period loss ratio and past performance suggest that the price adjustment is inadequate. The loss ratio associated with a reported claim in previous period is 54.7 p.p higher. These results illustrate that the insurer is aware of the persistence of claim history, yet does not adjust premium sufficiently. Thus, fleet cross-subsidization cannot explain the observed patterns.

4.3 Recent vs. Older Claim History

In the previous sub-section, I study how the insurer adjust prices with regards to previous period claims. In this part, I examine how the insurer adjust prices when considering both new information and past signals. In particular, I consider the following two signals: (i) The clients' aggregate loss ratio over-time and (ii) the clients' previous year loss ratio.¹⁹ Optimal insurer behavior implies that premiums should adjust with respect to each one of the signals, based on their relative predictive power: the signal-to-noise ratio. I quantify the relationship between the two signals and different current period outcomes using the following regression model:

$$Y_{jt} = \alpha \text{Aggregate LR}_{jt} + \beta \text{Prev. Yr. LR}_{jt} + X_{jt}\delta + \varepsilon_{jt}.$$

j and t index policy and period, respectively. Aggregate LR_{jt} and Prev. Yr. LR_{jt} are the two signals: the clients' aggregate loss ratio over-time and the clients' previous year loss ratio, respectively. It is important to note the previous year performance is reflected in

¹⁹Similar to before, I exclude policies of customers with less than one year of observed history.

both variables. Yet, Aggregate LR_{jt} weighs previous data equally, without considering the recency of previous period outcomes. Y_{jt} indicates the current period (four) outcomes in question.

The results are reported in Table 3. Column 1 and 2 describes the relationship between the clients' aggregate loss ratio over-time and the clients' previous year loss ratio with current period damages: the probability of at least one claim in the current period, and current period damage per value; both at the policy level. Customer's aggregate loss ratio serves as a predictive signal of future claims. The aggregate loss at the start of the policy is positively correlated (statistically significant) with (i) the indicator to whether the policy incurs a claim at the current period (column 1: t-st=5.95) and (ii) the policy's damage per value (column 2: t-st=4.23). In contrast, the customer's previous year loss ratio is not correlated with either cost variables. The coefficient is either in the *wrong* sign, as with regards to the indicator of at least one claim in the current period (column 1:-0.0004), or substantially smaller in order of magnitude relative to the aggregate loss ratio, as the case when considering the damage per values (column 2: 0.0003 relative to 0.0055); in both cases, the coefficients are not statistically significant. The lack of additional information does not imply that recent performance is not informative, but rather that it is not more informative than older claim history. Consequently, a *perfect* insurer should only consider the aggregate loss ratio when adjusting premiums.

In column 3, I report the estimated model which quantifies the relationship between the two variables measuring previous loss ratio and the change in premium per value. The result indicates a deviation from optimal pricing. Unlike an optimally price-setting *perfect* insurer, the insurer does not increase premiums when facing a high aggregate loss ratio client. Furthermore, the insurer reacts to negative results, but considers the *wrong* signal. Premiums increase when considering a customer with a poor performance in the previous year, controlling for aggregate performance over time, despite (i) recent performance not incorporating any additional information, relative to aggregate claim history, and (ii) the insurer not adjusting premiums based on the more informative signal—aggregate loss ratio. Column 4 reports the estimated model with regards to the the policy's loss ratio. Consistent with misadjustment, policies of clients with higher aggregate loss ratios are associated with adverse results. Yet, conditional on aggregate loss

ratios, policies of clients with higher aggregate loss ratios in previous year are not associated with these results. The insurer overreacts to recent noisy shocks (previous year loss ratio) and under-weighs the predictive power of augmented claim history (aggregate loss ratio).

4.4 Market Behavior

So far, I provide evidence that the insurer misprice risk. Premiums insufficiently adjust to pre-determined changes and stochastic shocks. A possible concern is the external validity of these results. The findings are based on pricing data of one insurer (although it is one of the largest insurers in the market and affiliated with a large multinational insurance company). Observing that one insurance company systematically misprice risk does not imply that the *market* is not *perfect*. If the competitors price risk correctly, we expect that in the long-run, an imperfect insurer would be competed out of the market.²⁰

Unlike many cases where it is difficult to observe the pricing of all firms in the industry, I am able to extract prices for a large number of trucks at different age and conditions (e.g., claims) for all major competitors. I address this issue by examining the market competitors pricing scheme. I do so using data from the Israeli insurance agency *Orlan Insurance Agency (1994) Ltd* (henceforth, Orlan). As part of their business operations, Orlan has ties to the largest insurance companies in Israel (including the insurer which I obtained the data from). In order to provide competitive insurance premiums to its clients, Orlan's agents can compare premiums (and coverage terms) for new policies across all insurers (in contact with Orlan), as a function of their characteristics. Orlan's agents access the data using the *Orlanet Calculator* (henceforth, calculator), which provides information regarding offered pricing and terms from each insurance provider.²¹

Using the calculator, I generate fictitious offers for comprehensive insurance policies for 2,041 distinct trucks model-value-year triads insured between January and March

²⁰This statement is true if (i) customers treat insurance coverage as an homogeneous good, (ii) customer search does not incur any costs and (iii) incumbent insurers do not possess an informational advantage over their competitors.

²¹Orlan state that agents should not use the provided dataset in order to price renewing policies, but rather use the calculator solely for new policies.

2020.²² I use standard insurance coverage and vehicle characteristics as additional inputs necessary to generate an offer.²³ I generate two observations for each distinct vehicle model-year-value triad; (i) No claims in last 3 years and (ii) One claim in last 3 years, which occurred last year. I focus on the four largest insurers in this market; The insurer that provided me the data (denoted as "the insurer"), its main competitors (denoted as "rival 1", "rival 2" and "rival 3").

I examine the external validity of my findings in two steps. First, I assess the validity of the calculator. I do so by conducting a within insurer comparison between offered premium for coverage through the insurer (using the calculator), and actual premium charged, in order to verify that the calculator offers' premiums match the data provided by the insurer.²⁴ After verification of the calculator's validity, I conduct an across-insurer comparison of the premium offers and examine pricing trends with respect to vehicle age and claim history across the market.²⁵

I use the calculator's generated offers to conduct a comparison between the market's insurance providers. I examine the market premiums trends with respect to both predetermined changes and stochastic shocks. Figure 5 graphs the premium per value trend throughout the age distribution for the four insurers.²⁶ The results demonstrate that not only is the insurer *imperfect*, but rather the *market* is *imperfect*. Insurer and rival 1 and 2 price trend is remarkably similar; no trend in premium per value almost throughout

²²The data generating process was conducted in the beginning of March 2020, before Israel began enforcing social distancing and other rules to limit the spread of COVID-19.

²³I.e., vehicles without heavy equipment, default driver characteristics (any driver over the age of 24, excluding individuals with a criminal record or a revoked license) and no additional coverage (e.g., extensive legal defense, riots, earthquakes).

²⁴The offered premiums do not need to be identical to the ones provided for a few reasons. Mainly, the calculator suits non-fleet truck owners as it does not take into account customer's fleet size.

²⁵Panel A in Appendix Figure A.9 depicts the within comparison. The correlation is very high ($R^2=0.90$); Policies with a higher offered premium (using the calculator) are on average charged a higher price in practice (using the insurer's dataset). Yet, the coefficient is not 1 (0.8). Panel B in Appendix Figure A.9 graphs the difference between the premiums generated by the calculator relative to the data. The graph indicates that the calculator premiums trend over the vehicle life cycle is steeper than the one shown in my data. This implies that the results in this part might over-emphasize the steepness of trend in market premiums over the vehicle life cycle. As I show, this is not a concern as across-insurer comparison suggests that the market premiums per value are quite flat with regards to vehicle age.

²⁶The sample consists of 876 observations, as some of the rival insurer do not offer coverage to vehicles of specific type and weight.

the entire age distribution.²⁷ In contrast, rival 3 raises premium per value across the age distribution, which suggest that rival 3 adjust premiums similar to an optimally pricing firm. Yet, rival 3 is charging higher premiums relative to other competitors. The minimal premium per value charged by any insurance provider (not restricting to the four insurers) is quite flat throughout the age distribution.

With regards to claim history, Table 4 presents the relationship between the premium per value offered by each one of the four insurers, and the minimum premium per value in the market, as a function of claim history. The results suggest that, conditional on offering coverage, the insurer is more sensitive to previous claim history than rivals 1 and 2, as they offer the *same* premium per value, regardless of whether the customer reported one claim in the last year. Such behavior diverges from optimal pricing insurer; claim history serves as a precise signal for future performance (see Tables 2 and 3). Thus, the competition appears to differ from optimal pricing behavior as well.

Furthermore, it is impossible to generate a policy offer from rival 3—which is the only insurer to substantially increase premium per value over the vehicle life cycle—for a customer with a single claim last year (and none in the two years beforehand). The lack of provided coverage is market-wide when considering a customer with at least two claims in the last three years.²⁸ This pattern suggests that the insurers' adjustment to customer's risk is mostly on the *extensive margin* (i.e., whether to provide coverage at all) and not so much on the *intensive margin* (i.e., increasing premiums); a pattern which the insurance literature has attributed to adverse selection. I document similar patterns by the insurer in section 5.

²⁷A possible concern is that the similarities in pricing suggest that the insurer and the other two rivals coordinate premiums. I examine this issue by considering the variation in pricing of the three insurers across different observations. The results are provided in Appendix Figure A.10. The figure demonstrates that although the trends over vehicle age are similar, the premiums differ substantially within truck model-value-year triads.

²⁸Regulation in Israel limits insurers' acquisition of information by allowing them to require new customers to provide information with regards to claim history from the last three years.

4.5 Robustness

The findings in this section indicate that the insurer (and its market competitors) misprice risk for a significant segment of customers. Specifically, the insurer does not adequately adjust premiums when considering changes in pre-determined characteristics (vehicle age) or stochastic factors (claim history). A potential alternative explanation to the observed patterns in the data is fleet cross-subsidization. As I show, the documented patterns hold when considering non-fleet customers, suggesting that cross-subsidization cannot serve as the only mechanism generating the documented patterns. Furthermore, the analysis of market premiums complements this notion as the offered premiums are generated with regards to non-fleet customers. In this part, I examine two additional alternative explanations. (i) Weak predictive power and (ii) dynamic pricing strategies.

4.5.1 Out of Sample Prediction

The results so far suggest that the insurer (and market) misprice risk and underestimate the value of both vehicle age and claim history. In this part, I quantify the predictive power of vehicle characteristics and past performance, as weak predictive power suggest that disregarding the information might be optimal.

The analysis is conducted in two steps. First, I use data on comprehensive insurance policies from 2014 to 2018 to estimate a cost function. The cost function is constructed using a regression analysis without any customer or license fixed-effects. Clearly, it is possible to generate a more precise cost function. Yet, I use simple regression analysis method in order to demonstrate that even simple methods can generate beneficial cost estimates for out of sample observations. The regression model includes observable vehicle characteristics (age, value weigh class and type) and claim history (aggregate loss ratio).

Using the estimated cost function, I divide my 2019-2020 sample into 25 groups based on projected damage per value. Appendix Figure [A.11](#) reports the relationship between the mean predicted damage per value for each of the 25 groups, the premium per value charged and the actual damage per value. As the figure illustrates, the relationship between predicted and actual damage per value is almost one-to-one, which illustrates

that vehicle and customer observable covariates serve as a predictive signal of future claims. Furthermore, the figure further demonstrates the lack of adjustment in premium per value. Consistent with earlier findings, the correlation between premium per value and damage per value is less than one.

4.5.2 Dynamic Complementary

So far, I considered a static framework in analyzing the insurer's mispricing of risk. Yet, relationship between the insurer and its customers is not static. It could be the case the insurer is aware of the incurred losses, yet it continues to provide coverage since it believes the customer is profitable in the *long-run*. Excluding coverage or increasing premiums from a costly customer today might lead the insurer to not enjoy future profits, when the customer is profitable.

In this part, I examine whether dynamic considerations can explain the flat pricing patterns (relative to expected cost). I do so using a relatively simple method. First, using data from 2014 to 2015, I divide the insurer's clients into two groups. The first consists of customers with both an average loss ratio of at least 2 and their average vehicle age is at least 5; 166 customers altogether. The second consists of all other customers who purchased at least one policy from 2014 to 2015 and are not part of the first group; 3,170 customers. After classifying the costly clients, I examine how the profits are affected when these customers are dropped. Specifically, I analyze the insurer's ex-post performance if it did not provide any coverage to those customers from 2016 to 2020.

In Appendix Table A.3, I provide summary statistics on the policies of both types of customers from 2016 to 2020. The classified "drop" group consists of 1.5% of the relevant policies. These policies exhibit an average loss ratio of 1. The insurer incurs losses from providing them coverage. Their average profit margin is approximately -14%. Hence, dynamic complementary cannot be the sole channel generating these patterns.

4.6 Learning

Would the insurer change its policy if it was informed of these patterns? Is the insurer aware of these patterns? During my interaction with the insurer, I provided findings

similar to the ones presented in Figures 1 and 3. In this part, I examine how the insurer reacts when being informed that premiums do not sufficiently adjust over the vehicle life cycle.

Analysis of firm pricing scheme before and after I presented the findings to the insurer serves two purposes. First, this analysis provides an additional robustness test, as it further examines whether the documented pricing scheme reflects optimal behavior *from the insurer's perspective*. If not fully adjusting premiums over the vehicle life cycle is the optimal pricing scheme, then the information is already incorporated in the firm's decision-making. Therefore, information on flat premiums per value should not cause the insurer to react. However, if premiums adjust, then it must be the case that the insurer was not fully aware of the trends, and thus did not price optimally. Second, this part is of interest as pre and post price trend analysis allows examination of managerial practice in general, and firm learning, on-the-job training, monitoring and feedback, in particular. I examine how the insurer reacted to the provided information using the following event study model:

$$\frac{\text{Premium}_{\ell t}}{\text{Value}_{\ell t}} = \sum_{a=1}^A \left(\sum_{t=-2}^{-1} \beta_a^t \mathbb{1}\{\text{Vehicle Age}_{\ell t} \in G_a\} \right) + \alpha_a \mathbb{1}\{t > 0\} \mathbb{1}\{\text{Vehicle Age}_{\ell t} \in G_a\} + \eta_{\ell} + \varepsilon_{\ell t}.$$

ℓ and t index the license and period, respectively. $\mathbb{1}\{\text{Vehicle Age}_{\ell t} \in G_a\}$ is an indicator of a specific vehicle age group; G_a (sample is divided to five groups: 0-1,2-4,5-7,8-10, and >10). β_a^t represents the offered premium per value, by age group, before information was given to the insurer, while α_a indicates the the premium per value after information was given to the insurer. As before, the analysis includes a license fixed effect.

The results are depicted in Figure 6. The patterns for the two years before the event indicate that there is no pre-trend. The premium per value does not change substantially over the vehicle's life cycle; it increases by less than 0.2 p.p over the first ten years of the vehicle age, and by less than 1 p.p over the entire vehicle life cycle. Interestingly, the premium per value after I provided the information differs from beforehand. The insurer increases premium per value by approximately 0.5 p.p over the first ten years of the vehicle age, and by more than 1 p.p over the entire vehicle life cycle. Yet, the increase in price trend over vehicle age is inadequate. The premium per value trend over the

vehicle life cycle is still flatter than that of the cost per value; The insurer should have increased premium per value for age groups 8-10, and >10 by an additional 1 p.p.

The results are mixed. On the one hand, the significant change in premium per value indicates that the insurer mispriced risk beforehand and that the flat pricing scheme was inadequate. On the other hand, the relatively little adjustment indicates that even when the insurer is aware of the patterns, it does not fully adjust premiums. As I further demonstrate in section 5, this does not indicate that the insurer misprice risk, but rather that it prefers not to implement its beliefs on the intensive margin. Instead, the insurer prefers to exclude costly policies.

5 Insurer Grading

In section 4, I show that the insurer (and market competitors) do not adjust premiums optimally when faced with pre-determined changes and stochastic shocks. In spite of their richness, the observed prices are insufficient to identify the insurer's beliefs for two reasons. First, the observed premiums are determined in equilibrium by both supply and demand factors. The insurer might not raise the premium charged either because it believes that the expected cost of providing insurance did not change, or because an increase in premiums substantially increases the probability the customer will not renew the policy. In addition, the analysis of premiums and costs is based on a selected sample; the sub-sample of customers who choose to renew the policy and policies the insurer selects to renew. Separation might not be exogenous. The sample potentially consists only of customers who are perceived as profitable by the insurer.

I use the insurer's internal grading documents - the "Go-No Go" grading (see section 2) to extrapolate the insurer's beliefs, as "Go" grades are assigned to profitable policies, regardless of demand factors. Furthermore, the "Go-No Go" documents consists of grading of all customers, regardless of their decision to renew.

In this section, I describe the "Go-No Go" grading data, provide descriptive evidence on the relationship between insurer grading and observable pre-determined and stochastic factors, and estimate how these factors affect insurer's grading.

5.1 Summary Statistics

The "Go-No Go" grading documents are provided on a monthly basis by the COO to the insurer's underwriters, who are in contact with the customers. The decoded documents consists of 14,288 grades of policies, providing comprehensive or partial insurance to all vehicles types. The dataset consist of a sub-sample of the insurer's customer. Summary statistics are provided in Appendix Table A.4. In general, the customers for which I observe grades are more than half of the insurer's portfolio. These customers are different from those with no grade. They are substantially smaller in terms of fleet size (average size of fleet is 6.09), they are charged a lower premium per value (average of 3.03% relative to 2.32%), they are more profitable (average profit margin of 24.42% relative to 13.01%) and have a lower loss ratio (average loss ratio of 59.98% relative to 77.10%)

Table 5 presents summary statistics on both graded policies, and the distribution of insurer grading. In general, the sample consists of profitable policies (the average loss ratio is below 50%). Among the sample, 87% of the policies are given a "Go" grade (column 2). These policies are quite similar in observable characteristics to policies that face a term adjustment or rejection (premium per value, vehicle age and vehicle value). The substantial difference is previous year performance; 12% of the policies reported a claim during the policy duration and the average loss ratio is 29%, while policies that face an increase in deductibles, premiums or denied incurred losses in the previous year (i.e., loss ratio above 100% in the previous year). These statistics indicate that the overwhelming majority of policies are profitable and do not require adjustment in pricing. The rest of the portfolio requires further consideration.

Among the policies that received a "No-Go" grade, 35% require only an increase in deductibles (column 3), 21% of the policies require an increase in premiums (column 4). For the residual 44%, the analytical team recommends not to provide comprehensive coverage; either to provide only third-party coverage (14% - column 5) or not to provide any coverage at all (30% - column 6). This statistics clearly demonstrate that a substantial portion of the insurer's adjustment are on the extensive margin, by not providing comprehensive coverage instead of increasing prices.

The statistics also demonstrate that the insurer's grades are based on shocks and pre-

determined changes. In general, the insurer appreciates the importance of performance and vehicle age. The average loss ratio of policies that the analytical team recommends to increase deductibles or premiums is above 100% and the average loss ratio of policies that the analytical team recommends to deny is over 300%. As for vehicle age, the analytical team recommends to offer only third-party coverage to old vehicles, regardless of their performance. The average loss ratio among the policies that the analytical team recommends only third-party coverage is 40%—profitable policies—yet the average vehicle age is close to 10 years. Overall, the insurer beliefs are not entirely misguided. It is aware of the the importance of taking into account vehicle age and loss ratio when renewing a policy.

5.2 Regression Analysis

In this part, I examine how the insurer grades customers based on their observable characteristics. Specifically, I examine how a "Go" grade is assigned using the following probit model.

$$GO_{ij} = \sum_{a=1}^A \beta_a \mathbf{1}\{\text{Vehicle Age}_{ij} \in a\} + \alpha_{lr} \text{Aggregate LR}_{ij} + \alpha_{recent} \text{Prev. Yr. LR}_{ij} + \delta X_{ij} + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

where i and j index the customer and the policy, respectively. GO_{ij} is an indicator for whether the policy is assigned a "Go" grade. The variables Vehicle Age_{ij} , Aggregate LR_{ij} and Prev. Yr. LR_{ij} denote vehicle age, the client's aggregate loss ratio over-time and the client's previous year loss ratio, respectively. Furthermore, I consider η_i to denote an unobserved random error at the client level. I divide the sample into four groups based on vehicle age; (i) up to 1 year old, (ii) age 2 to 4 years old, (iii) age 5 to 7 years old, and (iv) age of 8 years, and above. Controls include observable characteristics; client fleet size, vehicle weight, vehicle type and underage driver indicator.

The results are presented in Table 6. In column 1, I examine how vehicle age determines a "Go" grade assignment. The insurer discontinuously reacts to vehicle age. Vehicle age affects grading mainly when the vehicle age at least 8 years. This stands in contrast to the findings in section 4, which suggest that damage per value increases continuously throughout the vehicle life-cycle. Therefore, the results indicate the insurer

erroneously reacts to pre-determined factors using simplistic rule-of-thumb rules. With regards to claim history, the insurer takes into account past performance in grading. The results in column 2 demonstrate that client's aggregate loss ratio over-time is significantly correlated with "Go" assignment. Interestingly, that client's previous year loss ratio has an additional effect on "Go" assignment, despite it not having any predictive power of future claims, conditional on augmented claim history. This is consistent with the relationship with premiums as well (as documented in section 4). These patterns do not change when estimating the effect of all variables jointly (column 3). In order to further examine whether recent year loss ratio has a substantial and persistent role in grading, I re-estimate the model while considering a sub-sample of policies: those with at least five years of data observed by the insurer on the client. The results are presented in column 4. Even though considerable information on the customer is available, the insurer does not under-weigh the importance of previous year loss ratio. This indicates that the recency bias persists and does not diminish with the insurer's data history on client.

To conclude, the results in this section suggest that the insurer does not change terms for the overwhelming majority of policies, while extensively denying comprehensive coverage from a substantial portion of policies requiring adjustment in terms. In general, the insurer is aware of the impact of vehicle age and claim history in predicting future performance. However, mistakenly, it regards vehicle age in a discontinuous fashion and over-weighs the importance of recent performance.

6 Demand for Renewal

In this section, I develop and estimate a model of customer policy renewal and cost realization. The goal of this section is to identify and quantify (i) cost of comprehensive provided coverage, (ii) customers' willingness to pay for policy renewal, and (iii) customers' private information on risk and its relation to demand.

6.1 Model Setup

At the end of the policy contract, a customer can choose to whether to renew its comprehensive coverage policy. The customer's net utility from policy renewal equals the

difference between the utility from renewing the policy with the insurer, u^1 , and the outside option, u^0 .

$$U = \underbrace{v(d) - \alpha p}_{u^1} - \underbrace{\max\{v(d) - \tilde{\alpha}\tilde{p} - k + \lambda\mathcal{I}, 0\}}_{u^0} \quad (1)$$

$v(d)$ is the utility from comprehensive coverage, which depends on the policy's expected damage, d . $v'(d) > 0$ implies that consumers are adversely selected. p is the premium per value charged by the insurer, while \tilde{p} is the expected premium per value charged by the market competitors. k reflect costs incurred by the customer when searching for offers among market competitors. \mathcal{I} is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer faces a price increase. $\lambda\mathcal{I}$ represents customer's rational inattention. Intuitively, the consumer becomes aware of the outside option and might decide to search and re-optimize when faced with a price increase.²⁹ Rational inattention is modeled as an additional component of search cost. Standard search cost generates the insurer market power. This is true for rational inattention as well. Unlike standard search cost, rationally inattentive consumers who become attentive following a price increase is a demand-side friction that might drive a profit-maximizing insurer to provide a uniform pricing scheme.

6.2 Econometric Model

I specify the net utility from policy renewal as a linear function of customer and vehicle observable characteristics, premium per value, previous period premium per value, and expected damage per value.

$$U_{ijt} = -\alpha p_{ijt} - \lambda\mathcal{I}_{ijt} + \beta x_{ijt} + \gamma d_{ijt} + \psi_{ij} + \phi_i + \varepsilon_{ijt},$$

where i , j , and t index customer, vehicle, and period, respectively. p_{ijt} is the premium per value. $\lambda\mathcal{I}_{ijt} = \mathbb{1}\{p_{ijt} - p_{ijt-1} > 0\}$ represents customer sensitivity to price increase. x_{ijt} are vehicle and client observable characteristics. d_{ijt} is the policy's expected damage per value. γ represents customer selection based on expected damage. Specifically,

²⁹In this model, I consider rational inattention, but unlike [Ho et al. \(2017\)](#), I do not estimate the increase in premiums necessary to cause the customers to be attentive. Instead, I set that increase to zero, which match both the uniform pricing in the data and the recommendation regarding a "Go" grade assignment.

$\gamma > 0$ implies adverse selection; customers with a higher utility from renewing their comprehensive insurance policy tend to cost more. ϕ_i and ψ_{ij} represent customer-level and license-level unobserved demand component which are fixed over time, respectively. ψ_{ij} is unobserved license-level demand component which might be correlated with premiums, while ϕ_i is an exogenous unobserved client-level demand component; ϕ_i is normally distributed, $\phi_i \sim N(0, \sigma_\phi^2)$. ε_{ijt} represents variation in unobserved demand factors across the client's vehicles and over-time, which follows a logistic distribution.

Equation 1 suggests that the net utility from policy renewal is non-linear. Some customers search among market competitors, while others decide not to purchase comprehensive insurance at all. Data limitations do not allow to determine whether the customer decides to purchase a policy from a competitor. Furthermore, I do not obtain competitor's pricing scheme for all types of vehicles (specifically, all non-truck vehicles). Nevertheless, competitor offered premiums are a function of observable characteristics, all observed by the econometrician. Therefore, βx_{ijt} takes into account search costs k , utility from renewal $v(d)$, and competitor's pricing scheme \tilde{p} .

With regards to expected damage per value, I adopt a specification similar in spirit to Einav et al. (2013). Damage per value follows a pseudo-standard Gamma distribution according to the following exponential expected value:

$$d_{ijt} = \exp(\delta x_{ijt} + \nu_i), \quad (2)$$

where ν_i represents customers' private information regarding risk, which is constant over time.³⁰ ν_i is normally distributed, $\nu_i \sim N(0, \sigma_\nu^2)$, independent of observable characteristics x_{ijt} . This is an appropriate modeling fit as the damage per value is heavily skewed, conditional on claim, characterized by a significant number of small-scale claims, in terms of damage per value (see Appendix Figure A.12). The unobserved constant structure im-

³⁰Cohen and Einav (2007) use a Poisson distribution to fit the policy's number of claims. This implies that the claim process is both state-independent and independent of conditional damage. Since the main goal is to estimate the relationship between consumer demand and insurer's cost of providing coverage, I use a pseudo-standard Gamma distribution which accommodates both (i) the possibility of no damages at all, which occurs quite frequently, and (ii) possible dependence between the number of claims and the conditional damage of claims. In practice, I take into account the duration of each policy by estimating a pro-rated variant of Equation 2; $d_{ijt} = \exp(\tau_{ijt}(\delta x_{ijt} + \nu_i))$, where τ_{ijt} is the duration of the policy. See Online Appendix for extensive discussion of modeling assumption and estimation process.

plies that the damage per value varies over time, yet the unobserved component is fixed, as in [Einav et al. \(2013\)](#). This modeling assumption allows to take into account policies that are not up for renewal (for instance, ones that exhibited a total loss event) when estimating Equation 2.

The logistic distribution assumption implies that the probability of renewal, denoted by $R_{ijt} = 1$, is described using the standard logit model.

$$\Pr(R_{ijt} = 1 | X_{ijt}, d_{ijt}, \phi_i, \psi_{ij}) = \frac{\exp(-\alpha p_{ijt} - \lambda \mathcal{I}_{ijt} + \beta x_{ijt} + \gamma d_{ijt} + \psi_{ij} + \phi_i)}{1 + \exp(-\alpha p_{ijt} - \lambda \mathcal{I}_{ijt} + \beta x_{ijt} + \gamma d_{ijt} + \psi_{ij} + \phi_i)}$$

Identification

I discuss how variation in the data identifies the model. Identification of damage per value is established in the literature.³¹ The effect of observable characteristics on expected damage per value— δ —is identified by variation in realized damage per value across clients' and vehicles' characteristics, as in [Cohen and Einav \(2007\)](#), [Bundorf et al. \(2012\)](#). Identification of heterogeneity in clients' private information of cost— σ_v —is established by within-client correlation across the client's different policies, as in [Einav et al. \(2013\)](#).

The main identification challenge is to estimate consumers' willingness to pay with observational data. I observe adjustment in premiums between consecutive coverage periods for a non-random sample of vehicles. Premiums are determined in equilibrium by both supply and demand forces. I address this issue in two steps. First, premiums might be correlated with vehicle-specific unobserved component, ψ_{ij} . I take advantage of the population of clients, that contains a large number of fleets with multiple vehicles over multiple coverage periods, and treat license-specific unobserved determinants of premiums as fixed rather than random. In the spirit of [Crawford et al. \(2018\)](#), I estimate the following (log) premium equation.

$$\log(P_{ijt}) = \Omega X_{ijt} + F_{ij} + \zeta_{ijt} \tag{3}$$

F_{ij} reflects license-specific determinant of log premium charged by the insurer. I use the

³¹See [Einav et al. \(2010b\)](#).

license fixed-effect estimated in the premium model above as a proxy for constant demand unobservable, $\psi_{ij} = \rho F_{ij}$, to control for the license-specific constant-term which endogenously sets premium.

Another concern is that the change in premium charged over-time is correlated with unobserved demand factors that vary within client or vehicle, over-time. I deal with this challenge using the fact that premiums are explained remarkably well by the premium equation above—Equation 3— $R^2=0.98$. The panel structure allows me to use predicted, rather than actual, premiums and impute premiums for those who renew their policy, as in [Bundorf et al. \(2012\)](#), as well as for those who do not, as in [Crawford et al. \(2018\)](#). Specifically, I consider the following renewal probability:

$$\Pr(R_{ijt} = 1 | X_{ijt}, d_{ijt}, \hat{p}_{ijt}, \hat{f}_{ijt}, \phi_i) = \frac{\exp(-\alpha \hat{p}_{ijt} - \lambda \hat{\mathcal{L}}_{ijt} + \beta x_{ijt} + \gamma d_{ijt} + \rho \hat{f}_{ijt} + \phi_i)}{1 + \exp(-\alpha \hat{p}_{ijt} - \lambda \hat{\mathcal{L}}_{ijt} + \beta x_{ijt} + \gamma d_{ijt} + \rho \hat{f}_{ijt} + \phi_i)}. \quad (4)$$

$\hat{f}_{ijt} = \frac{\hat{F}_{ij}}{V_{ijt}}$ and $\hat{p}_{ijt} = \frac{\hat{\Omega} X_{ijt}}{V_{ijt}}$ are the predicted premium license-specific constant-term and time-varying term, respectively. Identification of both price sensitivity, α , and sensitivity to price increase, λ , are established using variation in the predicted time-varying premium component, \hat{p}_{ijt} , and its relationship to the previous period predicted value term, $\hat{\mathcal{L}}_{ijt} = \mathbb{1}\{\hat{p}_{ijt} - \hat{p}_{ijt-1} > 0\}$. As with cost, the effect of observable characteristics on renewal— β —is identified by variation across clients' and vehicles' characteristics, and heterogeneity in clients' demand component (which is independent of premiums)— σ_ϕ —is established by within-client correlation across the client's different policies, as in [Einav et al. \(2013\)](#). Lastly, the selection parameter, γ , is identified using within-client variation in observable characteristics that determine the damage per value and explain renewal. To see this, consider a vehicle characterized by a low mean expected damage per value at the current period and a high mean expected damage per value at the next period. Adverse selection implies that the willingness to pay for insurance will increase with private information regarding cost; the increase in damage per value between periods for costly clients with high probability of a claim event will be higher than customers with low probability of a claim.

Estimation proceeds in three steps. Initially, since some policies are not renewed, I do not observe their vehicle value. I predict the (log) vehicle value as a function of previous

period value and vehicle type, and treat it as data; both for those that renewed and those that did not. The new vehicle value is well explained by the preceding one (see Appendix Table A.6). Then, I generate the predicted premium per value and predicted increase in premium per value using the estimates of Equation 3 - (see Appendix Table A.7). Lastly, I jointly estimate Equations 2 and 4 via Maximum Simulated Likelihood, similar to the approach in Train (2009). I estimate the parameters in the policy renewal and damage equations maximum likelihood using the observable client and vehicle characteristics x , predicted premium per value \hat{p} , dummy indicator for an increase in predicted premium per value \mathcal{I} , and realizations regard damage per value and policy renewal. To estimate σ , I use 200 Halton draws for each client: 100 with respect to unobserved demand component and 100 with respect to private information regarding cost (as in Train (2000)). I then exploit the normal distribution density to derive the likelihood function. See Online Appendix for more details.

6.3 Results

Estimation results are provided in Table 8.³² The cost estimates regarding vehicle age and claim history are similar to those documented in the reduced-form analysis. Expected damage per value increases sharply with vehicle age, and aggregate loss ratio also plays a significant role in predicting future claims.

In contrast, previous year loss ratio does not provide any additional information, conditional on augmented data. In addition, new customers are adversely selected; customers who joined the insurer in the last year tend to cost more, conditional on observables. These results demonstrate that the incumbent insurer enjoys an comparative information advantage, as past performance is not shared across the market and competitors observe only recent claims.

As for the demand, the estimation of the structural model indicates that customers adversely select to renew policies. Private information regarding customer cost of coverage is associated with a higher renewal probability. Yet, it should be pointed out that asymmetric information is quite modest.

³²The estimated coefficient fit both the expected damage per value and renewal probability quite well. See Appendix Figure A.13.

Price elasticity estimates suggest that customers are sensitive to premium charged. Moreover, they are very sensitive to an increase in premiums per value (relative to previous period). Coefficient suggest that an increase in premium per value is equivalent to an additional increase of 0.4 p.p in premium per value, which is about 10 percent of the average premium per value charged. The demand-side friction both generates the insurer market power and incetivize uniform pricing scheme.

7 Insurer Pricing and Cost

In this part, I develop and estimate a model of insurer policy assessment and supply of coverage. The goal of this part is to identify and quantify the insurer's subjective expected cost of providing coverage and the process of choosing between increasing premiums and rejection, when an adjustment in terms is perceived as necessary.

7.1 Model Setup

When the policy contract is about to end, the insurer has three options with regards to policy i ; (i) "Go" - the analytical team recommends to renew the policy with the same premium as previous period, (ii) "Adjust" - the analytical team recommends renewing the policy but not in the current terms—increasing premiums and/or deductibles—and (iii) "Reject" - the analytical team recommends not to provide comprehensive coverage. The profit margin, denoted by Π_i under each alternative, denoted by A_i , is defined as follows:

$$\Pi_i = \begin{cases} \Pi_i^g = 1 - \frac{d_i}{p_{-1i}} & \text{if } A_i = \text{Go} \\ \Pi_i^a = q_i(\Delta p_i) \times \left(1 - \frac{d_i}{\tau(\Delta p_i) \times (p_{-1i} + \Delta p_i)}\right) & \text{if } A_i = \text{Adjust} \\ 0 & \text{if } A_i = \text{Reject.} \end{cases}$$

d_i is the insurer's perceived damage per value of policy i . p_{-1i} is policy i 's previous period premium per value. Δp_i is the optimal increase in premium per value by the insurer when adjusting prices. $q_i(\Delta p_i) \in [0, 1]$ is the renewal probability in case of an increase in

premium of $\Delta p_i > 0$.³³ $\tau(\Delta p_i) \in [0, 1]$ represents exerted costs incurred by the insurer in case of an adjustment in terms.

The recommendation is intended to maximize the expected profit margin. Therefore, the optimal strategy is equivalent to selecting the recommendation that maximize π_i , defined as:

$$\pi_i = \begin{cases} \pi_i^g = \log(p_{-1i}) - \log(d_i) & \text{if } A_i = \text{Go} \\ \pi_i^a = -\log(z_i) & \text{if } A_i = \text{Adjust} \\ 0 & \text{if } A_i = \text{Reject,} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

where $z_i = 1 - q_i(\Delta p_i) \times (1 - \frac{d_i}{\tau(\Delta p_i) \times (p_{-1i} + \Delta p_i)})$.

Before describing the econometric model, I illustrate the implications of high adjustment cost on the supply of insurance. Adjustment costs affect customers as an increase in $\tau(\Delta p_i)$ reduces π_i^a . Therefore, adjustment cost both reduce the probability of a price increase, and increase the probability of denial of coverage. These outcomes jointly determine the effect of supply-side frictions on the consumer surplus. When π_i^g is sufficiently large, the consumer would benefit from these frictions. In contrast, customers who the insurer perceives as costly, i.e., low π_i^g , are less likely to be offered coverage. Furthermore, supply-side frictions might negatively effect low cost customers as well; a good customer might be involved in a claim event. As a result, customers with a high volatility in outcomes are prone to denial, while customers with modest volatility are not.

³³This implies that I am normalizing the probability of renewal to be one in case a "Go" grade is given. Allowing the renewal probability to be lower than one does not change the analysis.

7.2 Econometric Model

The insurer's decision can be re-expressed as determined by the customer's observable factors $X_i = (p_i, x_i)$.

$$\pi_i = \begin{cases} \pi_i^g = \underbrace{\log(p_{-1i}) - \log(d(X_i))}_{\pi^g(X_i)} + \varepsilon_i^g & \text{if } A_i = \text{Go} \\ \pi_i^a = \underbrace{\log(z(X_i))}_{\pi^a(X_i)} + \varepsilon_i^a & \text{if } A_i = \text{Adjust} \\ 0 & \text{if } A_i = \text{Reject.} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

Identification of the model requires independence between the observed and unobserved factors. Formally:

$$\varepsilon \perp X.$$

This assumption holds if the insurer does not have any informational advantage relative to the econometrician. I.e., no omitted variables. The rationale for the identification strategy of the structural model is based on the fact that I observe *all* of the information documented by the insurer, which implies informational symmetry. The main challenge in identifying π is that unobserved demand factors might be correlated with client's and vehicle's observable characteristics. These include undocumented "soft information" ([Crawford et al. \(2018\)](#)) and strategic factors. Specifically, (i) the insurer might know more about the customer's willingness to pay than the econometrician—as reflected by client's and vehicle's observable characteristics (which include premiums)—and (ii) strategic considerations, which include fleet cross-subsidization and possible marketing incentives, as providing coverage to a large fleet might serve as an advertisement that attracts new customers. As done in the reduced-form analysis, I address these challenges by focusing on non-fleet customers.

As a result, $\pi^g(X)$ and $\pi^a(X)$ are non-parameterically identified ([Berry \(1994\)](#)). Furthermore, since "Go" grade assignment implies a recommendation to renew policy with the same premium per value, identification of $\pi^g(X)$ permits identification of the insurer's

risk assessment, both in terms of level (group) and slope (selection).

$$\begin{aligned}\pi^g(X) &= \log(p_{-1}) - \log(d(x, p)) \\ &= \log(p_{-1}) - \underbrace{\log(d(x, \bar{p}(x)))}_{\text{Group cost}} - \left(\underbrace{\log(d(x, p)) - \log(d(x, \bar{p}(x)))}_{\text{Selection}} \right),\end{aligned}$$

where $\bar{p}(x)$ is the average premium per value charged by customers of observable characteristics x . Given the model specification, the perceived cost function is identified using variation in characteristics across groups and within variation in premiums. Variation in group observable characteristics, x and $\bar{p}(x)$, identifies the insurer's perceived cost of providing comprehensive coverage to the mean customer of group x . Variation within group in premium charged identifies the perceived selection by the insurer. The one-to-one relationship between $\pi^g(X)$ and $\log(d(x, p))$ demonstrates that identification of the perceived cost function depends on the significant proportion of policies assigned a "Go" grade, for which demand forces do not play a role. If all policies are assigned either an "Adjust" or "Reject" grades, it is not possible to identify the perceived cost. To see this, consider two policies: one that is assigned an "Adjust" grade, and the other a "Reject" grade. I cannot identify whether the rejected policy is denied coverage due to supply forces, i.e., higher cost of providing coverage, or demand, i.e., lower willingness to pay. The same holds for two policies with different recommendations regarding the magnitude of increase in premiums. The offset of demand forces when a "Go" grade is assigned allows for extraction of the insurer's subjective risk assessment.

While the data is rich enough to extract the insurer's perceived costs, it is insufficient to separately identify demand forces and supply frictions determining denial. To see this, for any price increase from p to \tilde{p} , the insurer's profit margin, including adjustment cost, is $q(\tilde{p} - p) \times (1 - \frac{d}{\tau(\tilde{p}-p) \times \tilde{p}})$. Identification of adjustment costs, $\tau(\cdot)$, is only possible when the renewal probability is (or approaches) one. Yet, both data limitations, specifically as the number of recommended adjustments are quite scarce, and consumers sensitivity to a price increase do not allow to quantify both channels using, for instance, an identification at infinity approach.³⁴

³⁴The recommended increase in premiums are quite discrete as well. Distribution of recommended price increases can be found in Appendix Figure A.14.

Despite the non-parametric identification, estimation is conducted using some parametric assumption. Similar to demand estimation, I assume that the expected damage per value of policy i is defined using an exponential term.

$$d_i = \exp(\tilde{\delta}x_i + \tilde{\rho}(p_i - \bar{p}(x_i)))$$

Examination of both $\tilde{\delta}$ and δ permits comparison between the objective and perceived determinants of damage per value. As a result, $\pi^g(X)$ is expressed using a linear term, while $\pi^a(X_i)$ is estimated using a linear function as well. Furthermore, I assume $\epsilon_i^g = \sigma(\epsilon_i^g - \tilde{\epsilon}_i)$ and $\epsilon_i^a = \sigma(\epsilon_i^a - \tilde{\epsilon}_i)$. $(\epsilon^g, \epsilon^a, \tilde{\epsilon})$ are i.i.d and follow a Type-I extreme value distribution. The model is estimated using a multinomial logit model.³⁵

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_i^g &= \frac{1}{\sigma}(\log(p_{-1}) - \tilde{\delta}x_i + \tilde{\rho}(p_i - \bar{p}(x_i))) + \epsilon_i^g \\ \pi_i^a &= \frac{1}{\sigma}(\beta_0 \log(p_{-1}) + \beta_x x_i + \beta_p \bar{p}(x_i)) + \epsilon_i^a \\ \pi_i^r &= \epsilon_i^r\end{aligned}$$

7.3 Results

The results are presented in Table 9. In the first column, I examine how vehicle age determines a "Go" grade assignment. The insurer discontinuously evaluates vehicle age. The insurer does not take into account vehicle age, as long as it is below 8 years, while not assigning a "Go" grade for a substantial portion of old vehicles; age 8, and above. This result is consistent with reduced-form analysis findings of the "Go" grade assignment (see Table 6), while it is in contrast to the estimation results of the cost function in Table 8, which suggest that cost of providing coverage increases throughout the vehicle life cycle.

With regards to past performance, the insurer perceives claim history as a predictive signal regarding future claims. The probability of a "Go" grade assignment is lower for policies with a reported claim in the previous period and higher aggregate loss ratio. As documented in Table 6, the insurer puts additional emphasis on previous year's performance, despite the fact that estimation results of the cost function (see Table 8) indicate

³⁵This implies that identification of the subjective cost function components are independent of $\pi^a(X_i)$'s function form.

that this is not a predictive signal. The over-weight of previous year loss ratio affects customers heterogeneously, depending on their fleet size. Single-fleet customers are exposed to substantial volatility in their performance. A good driver might incur high damages. Large fleets are less exposed to this risk; as fleet size increases, the probability of extreme events diminishes, suggesting that the insurer assessment and pricing scheme might be advantageous for large fleets, yet disadvantageous for a single-fleet customer.

Lastly, the coefficient regarding selection $\tilde{\rho}$ indicates that the insurer perceives substantial adverse selection. Customer paying more than the average premium paid, based on its observable characteristics, has a lower probability of its policy being assigned a "Go" grade, although cost estimates suggest modest private information.

In Figure 7, I present a comparison between the insurer's subjective determinants of cost, $\tilde{\delta}$, and the objective cost function δ . The figure indicates that insurer under-weights factors such as new customer indicator and vehicle age groups below 8 (age 2 to 4 and 5 to 7). Yet, the insurer does over-weights various factors. Mainly, previous year's loss ratio (although it has no predictive power), aggregate loss ratio, especially that of a loss-generating clients (i.e., loss ratio above one), and vehicle age, if it at least 8 years old.

To summarize, the insurer is aware of the importance of vehicle age and claim history as determinants of future performance. Yet, it misevaluates vehicle age in a discontinuous fashion and over-weights the importance of recent performance. Two key conclusion emerge. First, the results in this part further demonstrate the importance of considering not only the intensive margin, but the extensive margin as well. Second, the insurer's biased assessment harms disadvantage customers; those that purchase comprehensive coverage for a single, old vehicle.

8 Counter-Factual Analysis

Using the structural estimates of the demand for policy renewal and the insurer's behavior implied by the "Go-No Go" grading, I conduct a few counterfactuals, in order to assess the implications of supply-side behavioral frictions. The analysis is conducted under the assumption that the market competitors do not respond to changes in the insurer's be-

havior, as I do not estimate the cross-substitution patterns between market competitors' pricing scheme and net utility from policy renewal. The counterfactual analysis is conducted by drawing 200 Halton values; 100 values for the private information regarding cost, and 100 values for unobserved demand factors.

I start by examining the premium per value charged for providing coverage for the average truck-owner, who was charged a premium per value of 3.5 p.p in the previous period. The results are presented in panel A of Figure 8. I present three different pricing schemes. The blue curve is the optimal pricing scheme, that is, the profit-maximizing premiums. The red curve is the optimal pricing scheme, while restricting that premiums per value do not change throughout the possible states. The green curve is implied by structural estimation of the insurer's behavior (see Table 9). The results in Figure 8, panel A indicate that asymmetric information is quite modest, as the average truck-owner is not denied coverage by either an unrestricted or uniform-price restricted profit-maximizing insurer throughout the vehicle life-cycle. As with expected damage per value, profit-maximizing insurer increases premiums per value with vehicle age. In addition, a profit-maximizing insurer does not increase premium per value for a new vehicle. This demonstrates how rationally inattentive consumers might cause a profit-maximizing insurer to provide a somewhat uniform pricing scheme.

The insurer behavior implied by the "Go-No Go" grades differs substantially from that of a profit-maximizing insurer. The insurer does not change premiums up until the age of 8, and then rejects the policy. The rejection occurs despite the limited selection, suggesting that the insurer excessively denies customers, relative to a rational insurer facing customers with private information of cost. It is not adverse selection that generates rejection, but rather firm practices; under-adjustment of the intensive margin spills over to the extensive margin. The insurer forgoes profits. In particular, the insurer could have increased profits by 7 percent if it would have acted as a profit-maximizing firm.

In panel B of Figure 8, I examine the pricing scheme for a single-fleet truck owner following different claim realizations. I consider the observable characteristics of the average customer, characterized by a loss ratio of 70 percent. Note that a single-vehicle customer with an expected loss ratio of 70 percent, who is a profitable customer on average, exhibits loss ratio of 200 percent, or above, at a probability of 11 percent. That

probability diminishes substantially when considering a fleet of vehicles with the same loss ratio.

As in the case of a new vehicle, optimal pricing does not change following a significant positive realization (loss ratio below 50 percent). Yet, the premium per value changes substantially after a negative realization. The premium almost doubles after an outcome of loss ratio of 200 percent, or above. As mentioned before, asymmetric information is quite modest, as the average single-fleet truck-owner is not denied coverage by an unrestricted or uniform-price restricted profit-maximizing insurer following any claim realization.

As with vehicle age, the insurer behavior implied by the "Go-No Go" grades extensively deviates from that of a profit-maximizing insurer. The insurer does not change premiums for loss ratio below 200 percent, and rejects the policy when above. This is despite the limited selection, suggesting that the insurer excessively denies customer, as with old vehicles. The insurer forgoes profits of 16 percent by deviating from profit-maximizing behavior. Furthermore, the net consumer surplus from facing a behavioral insurer, relative to profit maximizing firm, is negative. This is not surprising as the probability of denial by the behavioral insurer is higher than the probability that only the profit-maximizing firm would increase premiums. The insurer's biased assessment regarding recent claim history and the lack of adjustment on the intensive margin harms disadvantage customers; those that purchase comprehensive coverage for a single vehicle. The probability of facing a denial drops substantially with fleet size, suggesting the demand is increasing return to scale. Identical single-fleet customers benefit from purchasing coverage as a whole, independent of price bargaining or risk pooling incentives.

9 Conclusion

A cornerstone in the study of risk and insurance is that providers price correctly. In this paper, I inquire whether this is the case. Using data from the one of the largest Israeli commercial auto insurance providers, I find too little adjustment in the intensive margin. Premiums barely change with expected cost as projected by pre-determined factors (vehicle age) and signals (claim history). Furthermore, I find too much adjustment in the extensive margin; excessive denial of insurance following a negative realization. Using

unique grading documents, I integrate the insurer's subjective risk assessment into the study of selection markets, in general, and insurance markets, in particular. I find that the insurer's risk assessment over-weighs recent claims and misevaluates vehicle age. Structural model estimates suggest that insurers enjoy incumbency advantages over their own customers, and clients are rationally inattentive to competitors' pricing, unless they are faced with a price increase. Both channels allow sub-optimal behavior to persist. Finally, I find that supply-side behavioral frictions, which result in excessive denial, diminish with client's fleet size. This implies that disadvantage single vehicle owners are harmed by supply-side frictions, while purchasing insurance coverage as a whole dilutes those losses and might even generate benefit. The spillover of the lack of intensive-margin adjustment on the extensive margin raise important concerns regarding policy intervention.³⁶

The results in this paper document the importance of considering both behavioral frictions in *selection market* analysis, and implementing IO structural tools in behavioral economics. The insurer's subjective beliefs regarding the cost of providing coverage differs from the objective assessment. Moreover, the implied behavior suggest over-adjustment on the extensive margin and under-adjustment on the intensive margin, relative to that implied by state-of-the-art IO analysis. With regards to behavioral economics, examining solely the premiums might be quite misleading. When only considering the intensive margin, one might erroneously conclude that the insurer does not take into account observable characteristics when assessing risk. IO setting which considers both the intensive and the extensive margins is essential to identify and quantify the effect of biased beliefs.

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
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
Figures

Figure 1: Summary statistics of premium and cost per value by vehicle age




Notes: The figure describes the relationship between premium per value, cost per value and vehicle age. The vertical axis depicts premium per value (in blue) and cost per value (in red) for comprehensive coverage policies for trucks from 2013 to 2020. The horizontal axis depicts the vehicle's age. No controls are added. Both variables are standardized to an annual term policy. Premiums, costs and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure 2: Summary statistics of client loss ratio




Panel A: Premium and cost per value by client loss ratio



Panel B: Distribution of policies by client loss ratio


Notes: The figure describes premium per value and cost per value by client loss ratio and the sample distribution of client loss ratio. In Panel A, the vertical axis depicts the premium per value (in blue) and cost per value (in red) for comprehensive coverage policies for trucks from 2014 to 2020. The horizontal axis depicts the vehicle's age. No controls are added. Both variables are standardized to an annual term policy. Premiums, costs and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Sample is divided to four groups: "0-0.5" client loss ratio (aggregate damage over aggregate premium) is up to 0.5, "0.5-1" client loss ratio is above 0.5 and below 1, "1-2" client loss ratio is above 1 and below 2 and "2 +" client loss ratio is above 2. Panel B reports the distribution of the sample among the four groups of client past performance.

Figure 3: Premium and cost per Value by vehicle age




Notes: The figure reports the estimation results of a fixed-effect (license level) saturated regression of premium per vehicle value (in blue) and cost per vehicle value (in red) on vehicle age. Each vehicle age, from 0 to 10, has a unique coefficient. The vertical axis depicts the two dependent variables. The horizontal axis depicts vehicle age. The solid lines represent the regression coefficients. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence interval. Confidence interval constructed using robust standard errors, clustered at the client level. The sample include comprehensive insurance coverage policies for trucks from 2013 through 2020. Premiums and costs are normalized to an annual policy length. Premiums, costs and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure 4: Premium and cost per Value by vehicle age for Non-Fleet Clients




Notes: The figure reports a robustness regression estimation results of the model presented in Figure 3, for non-fleet customers, as defined by the insurer: Number of vehicles insured via any type of coverage by client at a given year is less than five).

Figure 5: Market-wide premiums Per-Value by vehicle age




Notes: The figure reports the relationship between market premiums per value and vehicle age. Market-wide premiums are collected via fictitious policy offers generating via Orlan insurance agency's platform (Orlanet Calculator). The sample consists of 876 distinct vehicle model-age-value for the top four insurers in the market (the insurer which provided the data and its three main competitors), without any reported claim in the last three years. The horizontal axis depicts premiums per value. The vertical axis depicts vehicle age. The curves are the coefficients of a saturated regression of premiums per value on vehicle age. The dashed line depicts the minimum premium per value in the market (not restricted to the four insurers). Premiums and values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure 6: Premium Adjustment Based on New Information




Notes: The figure reports the estimation results of a fixed-effect regression of premium per vehicle value and cost per vehicle value on vehicle age. Observations are divided to five groups based on vehicle age. $T = 0$ indicates the timing at which the insurer was provided information regarding the miss-adjustment in pricing over the vehicle life-cycle. The vertical axis depicts both the premium and cost per value variables. The horizontal axis depicts vehicle age. The red and orange line represent the estimated premium per value before information was given. The blue line represent the estimated premium per value after information was given. The black dashed-line indicates represents the cost per value. The sample include comprehensive insurance coverage policies for trucks from 2013 through 2020. Premiums and costs are normalized to an annual policy length. Premiums, costs and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure 7: Comparison of Objective and Subjective Cost Estimates




Notes: The figure reports the estimation results of both the objective cost function, as reported in Table 8 and the insurer's perceived cost, as reported in Table 9. The vertical axis measures the coefficient of the subjective cost components, while the horizontal axis measures the coefficient of the objective cost components.

Figure 8: Counterfactual analysis



Panel A: Vehicle age



Panel B: Claim

Notes: The figures above provide two counterfactuals. In Panel A, I examine the trend in premium per value (measured on the vertical axis) over vehicle life-cycle (measured on the horizontal axis). The counterfactual analysis is conducted for the average truck owner, who paid 3.5 p.p premium per value. In Panel B, I examine the trend in premium per value (measured on the vertical axis) over different realizations of current year loss ratio (measured on the horizontal axis). The counterfactual analysis is conducted for a single-vehicle truck owner with an average loss ratio (0.7), who paid 3.5 p.p premium per value. The blue curve indicates the optimal pricing, the red curve indicates the optimal pricing, conditional on uniform pricing, and the green curve indicates the pricing strategy based on the behavior implied by the "Go-No Go" grades, as presented in Table 9.

Tables

Table 1: Summary statistics of comprehensive coverage policies for trucks

	(1) All	(2) Vehicle Age ≥ 6	(3) Claim $_{t-1} \geq 1$
Policies	51,684	15,506	8,358
Share	100%	30.00%	16.17%
Weighted Share (by Premium)	100%	18.86%	15.96%
Mean Premium	9,938	6,246	9,811
At least 1 claim	23.98%	23.78%	34.82%
Mean Damage	6,794	5,861	9,345
Mean Commission	1,557	1,012	1,577
Mean Profit	1,587	-627	-1,111
Profit Margin	15.97%	-10.04%	-11.32%
Mean Vehicle Age	4.18	8.93	5.00
Mean Vehicle Value	298,659	160,383	275,954
Mean Premium per Value	3.33%	4.01%	3.56%

Notes: The table reports summary statistics of comprehensive coverage policies for trucks between 2013 and 2020. The first column reports statistics for all policies, the second column describe the statistics for policies with vehicle age of six or above, and the third column describe the statistics for policies with at least one claim at the previous period ($\text{Claim}_{t-1} \geq 1$). Profit margin is defined as mean profit ($=\text{premium}-\text{damage}-\text{commission}$) over mean premium. Mean premium per value is defined as premium over vehicle value. Mean damage is the mean damage of customers' claims (net of deductibles). Vehicle value, premium, commission, paid claims, and profit are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Vehicle age measured in years. I exclude from the sample observation with an error, change in vehicle within the policy, change in coverage terms over the policy and policies that did not end, or that lasted for less than 30 days (without a claim).

Table 2: Policy outcomes and past performance

Panel A: Entire Sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\text{Claim}_t \geq 1$	$\frac{\text{Damage}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	$\% \Delta \frac{\text{Premium}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	Loss Ratio_t
$\text{Claim}_{t-1} \geq 1$	0.122*** (0.008)	0.017*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.418*** (0.049)
log(Value)	Y	N	N	Y
Vehicle Age - 2 nd order	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Weight Class	Y	Y	Y	Y
Driver Underage Indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	32,870	32,870	32,870	32,870
R-squared	0.022	0.009	0.034	0.006
Panel B: Non-Fleet Policies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\text{Claim}_t \geq 1$	$\frac{\text{Damage}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	$\% \Delta \frac{\text{Premium}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	Loss Ratio_t
$\text{Claim}_{t-1} \geq 1$	0.118*** (0.013)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.547*** (0.101)
log(Value)	Y	N	N	Y
Vehicle Age - 2 nd order	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Weight Class	Y	Y	Y	Y
Driver Underage Indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	8,372	8,367	8,367	8,367
R-squared	0.023	0.009	0.014	0.006

Notes: The table reports the relationship between previous claim history and current outcomes. Panel A's sample includes all non-new comprehensive insurance policies for trucks. Panel B's sample includes only comprehensive insurance policies for trucks of non-fleet clients (number of vehicle insured via any type of coverage by client at a given year is less than five). $\text{Claim}_{t-1} \geq 1$ is an indicator that equals one if at least one claim has been reported with regards to the policy at the previous period. $\text{Claim}_t \geq 1$ is an indicator that equals one if at least one claim has been reported with regards to the policy at the current period. $\frac{\text{Damage}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$ denotes damage (net claim expenses) per value at the current period, $\% \Delta \frac{\text{Premium}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$ denotes the percent change in premium per value at the current period, relative to previous period ($\frac{p_t - p_{t-1}}{p_{t-1}}$, where p is the premium per value) and Loss Ratio_t denotes the current period policy's loss ratio, measured as damage over premiums. Controls include (log) vehicle value, vehicle age (2nd order), vehicle type, vehicle weight class, and driver underage indicator. Vehicle value, premium, damage and loss ratio are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Vehicle age is measured in years. Robust standard errors, clustered at client level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3: Policy outcomes and past performance: Recent vs. older

	Panel A: Entire Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\text{Claim}_t \geq 1$	$\frac{\text{Damage}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	$\% \Delta \frac{\text{Premium}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	Loss Ratio_t
Client's Aggregate Loss Ratio	0.0357*** (0.0060)	0.0055*** (0.0013)	-0.0023 (0.0022)	0.1483*** (0.0314)
Client's Previous Yr. Loss Ratio	-0.0004 (0.0017)	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0033** (0.0017)	0.0067 (0.0152)
log(Value)	Y	N	N	Y
Vehicle Age - 2 nd order	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Type	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Weight Class	Y	Y	Y	Y
Driver Underage Indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	35,765	35,765	35,765	35,765
R-squared	0.009	0.007	0.009	0.004

Notes: The table reports the relationship between previous claim history and current outcomes. Sample includes all comprehensive insurance policies for trucks from 2014 to 2020, with at least one year of performance history. Client's aggregate loss ratio is the client's ratio of total damages (starting 2013) per total revenue (starting 2013). Client's previous yr. loss ratio is the client's ratio of previous year total damages (net claim expenses) over the previous year total revenue (paid premiums). $\text{Claim}_t \geq 1$ is an indicator that equals one if at least one claim has been reported with regards to the policy at the current period. $\frac{\text{Damage}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$ denotes damage (net claim expenses) per value at the current period, $\% \Delta \frac{\text{Premium}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$ denotes the percent change in premium per value at the current period, relative to previous period ($\frac{p_t - p_{t-1}}{p_{t-1}}$, where p is the premium per value) and Loss Ratio_t denotes the current period policy's loss ratio, measured as damage over premiums. Controls include (log) vehicle value, vehicle age (2nd order), vehicle type, vehicle weight class, and driver underage indicator. Vehicle value, premium, damage and loss ratio are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Vehicle age is measured in years. Robust standard errors, clustered at client level, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 4: Policy Outcomes and Past Performance: Recent vs. Older

	Dependent Variable: Premium per Value				
	(1) Insurer	(2) Rival 1	(3) Rival 2	(4) Rival 3	(5) Min. Price
Constant	0.0379*** (0.0003)	0.0380*** (0.0002)	0.0369*** (0.0002)	0.0476*** (0.0005)	0.0358*** (0.0002)
1 Claim Last Yr (3 yrs)	0.0028*** (0.0004)	0.0000 (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0003)	.	0.0004 (0.0003)
≥ 2 Claims Last 3 Yrs
Observations	1,752	1,752	1,752	876	1,752
R-squared	0.0270	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0009

Notes: The table reports the relationship between market premiums per value and claim history. Market-wide premiums are collected via fictitious policy offers generating via Orlan insurance agency's platform (Orlanet Calculator). The sample consists of 876 distinct vehicle model-age-value for the top four insurers in the market (the insurer which provided the data and its three main competitors). For each one, I generate two observations. One without any claim in the last three years and one with one claim in the last three years, which occurred last year. Note that the Orlanet Calculator does not generate policy offers for the case of at least two claims in the last three years. Columns 1 through 4 present the relationship between claim history and premium per value offered by the top four insurers in the market, while column 5 describes the relationship with regards to the minimum premium per value in the market (not restricted to the four insurers). Premiums and values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Summary statistics of the Go-No grading

	(1) All	(2) Go	(3) Inc. Ded.	(4) Inc. Prem.	(5) TP Only	(6) Deny
Policies	14,288	12,478	625	386	258	541
Share	100%	87.33%	4.37%	2.70%	1.81%	3.79%
Premium	9,028	8,965	8,762	10,809	7,251	10,368
Policies With Claim	15.39%	12.29%	36.32%	37.82%	20.54%	44.18%
Damage	4,320	2,558	9,635	12,208	2,924	33,845
% Loss Ratio	47.85%	28.53%	109.96%	112.94%	40.32%	326.45%
Vehicle Age	4.16	4.02	4.39	4.12	9.80	4.35
Vehicle Value	260,601	261,628	242,907	305,377	167,203	269,947

Notes: The table reports summary statistics of insurer grading for all comprehensive and partial coverage policies between 2018 and 2020. The first column reports statistics for all policies, the second column describe the statistics for policies that received a go grade. Columns 3 through 6 describe the statistics for policies that received a no-go grade. Column 3 describe the statistics for policies that the operational team recommends a change in terms without increasing premiums (increase deductibles), column 4 describe the statistics for policies that the operational team recommends a price increase, column 5 describe the statistics for policies that the operational team recommends to offer only third-party coverage (i.e., not to provide comprehensive coverage) and column 6 describe the statistics for policies that the operational team recommends to deny. Variables are defined as in Table 1.

Table 6: Probability of Go grade

	Probit Model. Dependent Variable: $Go = 1$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age 2-4	-0.023 (0.014)		-0.020 (0.014)	-0.024 (0.017)
Age 5-7	-0.026* (0.014)		-0.023* (0.013)	-0.026 (0.017)
Age 8+	-0.093*** (0.017)		-0.086*** (0.016)	-0.094*** (0.020)
Client's Aggregate Loss Ratio		-0.032*** (0.010)	-0.032*** (0.010)	-0.072*** (0.014)
Client's Prev. Yr. Loss Ratio		-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.007)
Fleet Size	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Type	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Weight Class	Y	Y	Y	Y
Driver Underage Indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sample	All	All	All	History ≥ 5
Observations	14,288	14,288	14,288	9,586
Pseudo R-squared	0.03	0.12	0.13	0.12

Notes: The table reports the relationship between previous claim history, vehicle and assignment of go grade. Sample includes all comprehensive and partial coverage policies with an assigned insurer grading between 2018 and 2020. The dependent variable is equal with if the operational team assigned the policy with a Go grade. The explanatory variables consist of three age variables: (i) Age 2-4, a dummy variable that equals one if the vehicle age is between 2 and 4, (i) Age 5-7, a dummy variable that equals one if the vehicle age is between 5 and 7 and (i) Age 8+, a dummy variable that equals one if the vehicle age is 8, or above. There are two explanatory variables with regards to claim history: (i) client's aggregate loss ratio, which is the client's ratio of total damages (starting 2013) per total revenue (starting 2013) and (ii) client's previous yr. loss ratio is the client's ratio of previous year total damages (net claim expenses) over the previous year total revenue (paid premiums). Both are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Controls include fleet size of client, which is defined as the number of vehicles insured by the client at a given year, vehicle type, vehicle weight class and an indicator for permitted underage driver. Estimation is conducted using a probit model. Coefficients reported are marginal effect at mean. Column 1 through 3 include the entire sample, while column 4 includes the sum-sample of policies with at least 5 year of history recorded (starting 2013). History is measured as the sum of years each of the client's policies are observed. Robust standard errors, clustered at client level, are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 7: Structural estimation results: demand-side

Cost				
Joined Last Year	.254***	(.063)	Claim Last Yr. (Vehicle)	.280*** (.056)
Aggregate Loss Ratio:			Previous Yr. Loss Ratio:	
< 0.5	(omitted)		< 0.5	(omitted)
≥ 0.5 and < 1	.287***	(.068)	≥ 0.5 and < 1	.079 (.067)
≥ 1 and < 2	.356***	(.088)	≥ 1 and < 2	-.071 (.084)
≥ 2	.513***	(.143)	≥ 2	-.021 (.132)
Vehicle Age:			σ	.072 (.047)
0-1	(omitted)		Observations	107,737
2-4	.295***	(.059)	Clients	19,860
5-7	.649***	(.066)		
8+	.846***	(.070)		
Demand				
Price Sensitivity (per value)	-125.8***	(3.83)	Observations	71,546
Increase Sensitivity	-.610***	(.027)		
Selection	1.310***	(.337)		

Notes: The table reports the results of the structural estimation of the demand for insurance. The top panel presents the main estimates of damage per value. The bottom panel present the main estimates of renewal. Joined last Year is an indicator that equals to 1 if the client purchased its first policy from the insurer in the last year. Client's aggregate loss ratio is the client's ratio of total damages (starting 2013) per total revenue (starting 2013). Client's previous yr. loss ratio is the client's ratio of previous year total damages (net claim expenses) over the previous year total revenue (paid premiums). $\text{Claim}_t \geq 1$ is an indicator that equals one if at least one claim has been reported with regards to the policy at the current period. Claim last yr. is an indicator that equals to one if the vehicle was involved in a claim event in the previous period. Price sensitive is measured in premiums per value. Increase sensitivity is an indicator that equals to one if the policy faces an increase in premium per value. Selection measures the relationship between the unobserved client-level damage component and the unobserved client-level demand component. Premium, damage and vehicle value are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). σ measures the magnitude of heterogeneity in unobserved client-level damage component.

Table 8: Determinants on insurer's grading

	Damage per Value		Renew Comp. Coverage	
Premium per Value			-162.991***	(8.834)
License Avg. Premium per Value			123.330***	(7.288)
Vehicle Value (in 100,000 ILS)			0.124***	(0.013)
Price Increase			-0.718***	(0.032)
<i>Age groups:</i>				
0-1	(omitted)		(omitted)	
2-4	0.219***	(0.070)	-0.594***	(0.037)
5-7	0.522***	(0.073)	-1.188***	(0.045)
≥ 8	0.725***	(0.074)	-1.423***	(0.049)
<i>Client's Aggregate Loss Ratio:</i>				
[0.5, 1)	0.348***	(0.070)	-0.237***	(0.049)
[1, 2)	0.436***	(0.089)	-0.681***	(0.066)
≥ 2	0.600***	(0.147)	-0.723***	(0.109)
<i>Client's Prev. Yr. Loss Ratio:</i>				
[0.5, 1)	0.108	(0.069)	0.230***	(0.034)
[1, 2)	-0.046	(0.085)	0.334***	(0.042)
≥ 2	-0.005	(0.132)	0.418***	(0.072)
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Claim}_{i\ell t-1}) \geq 1$	0.311***	(0.058)	0.652***	(0.031)
Comp. Coverage	0.202*	(0.112)	0.332***	(0.056)
Fleet Size	-0.0004**	(0.0001)	-0.0019**	(0.0002)
Underage Driver	0.056	(0.076)	0.081*	(0.044)
Joined last yr.	0.196	(0.171)	0.433**	(0.204)
History (in 1,000 yrs)	-0.017	(0.011)	0.001	(0.013)
Selection		1.079***	(0.284)	
Client unobs. s.e.	0.061	(0.056)	1.741	(0.041)
Observations	91,603		73,171	
Log Likelihood	-8696		-33756	

Notes: The table reports the results of the structural estimation of the demand for insurance. The left column presents the main estimates of damage per value. The right panel present the main estimates of renewal. Joined last Year is an indicator that equals to 1 if the client purchased its first policy from the insurer in the last year. Client's aggregate loss ratio is the client's ratio of total damages (starting 2013) per total revenue (starting 2013). Client's previous yr. loss ratio is the client's ratio of previous year total damages (net claim expenses) over the previous year total revenue (paid premiums). $\mathbb{1}(\text{Claim}_{i\ell t-1}) \geq 1$ is an indicator that equals one if at least one claim has been reported with regards to the license at the previous period. Price increase is an indicator that equals to one if the policy faces an increase in premium per value. Selection measures the relationship between the unobserved client-level damage component and the unobserved client-level demand component. Premium, damage and vehicle value are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Client unobs. s.e. measures the magnitude of heterogeneity (standard errors) in unobserved client-level damage and demand components. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.


Table 9: Determinants on insurer's grading

	Go		Adjust Terms		Deny
$\log(p_i)$	1.223***	(0.461)	1.549***	(0.568)	
$\log(p_i) - \log(\bar{p}(x))$	-1.555***	(0.531)	-2.566***	(0.652)	
<i>Age groups:</i>					
0-1	(omitted)		(omitted)		
2-4	-0.015	(0.209)	0.074	(0.245)	
5-7	-0.282	(0.244)	0.427	(0.280)	
≥ 8	-2.297***	(0.267)	-2.457***	(0.351)	
<i>Client's Aggregate Loss Ratio:</i>					
[0.5, 1)	-0.552**	(0.220)	0.258	(0.267)	
[1, 2)	-1.393***	(0.204)	-0.205	(0.258)	
≥ 2	-2.476***	(0.220)	-0.984***	(0.283)	
<i>Client's Prev. Yr. Loss Ratio:</i>					
[0.5, 1)	-0.964***	(0.286)	0.341	(0.335)	
[1, 2)	-1.211***	(0.261)	0.232	(0.309)	
≥ 2	-1.544***	(0.230)	-0.098	(0.285)	
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Claim}_{it-1}) \geq 1$	-0.466***	(0.175)	0.326	(0.209)	
Comp. Coverage	0.051	(0.206)	0.115	(0.270)	
Fleet Size	0.035	(0.070)	0.184**	(0.086)	
Underage Driver	-0.501*	(0.272)	-0.694**	(0.338)	
New Client	0.196	(0.171)	0.433**	(0.204)	
History	-0.017	(0.011)	0.001	(0.013)	
Constant	8.943***	(1.659)	4.818**	(2.054)	0
Observations	6,347				
Log Likelihood	-1954.2				
Pseudo R-squared	0.266				


Notes: The table reports the relationship between policy's observable characteristics and insurer grading. Sample includes all comprehensive and partial coverage policies with an assigned insurer grading between 2018 and 2020 for non-fleet policies (i.e., policies for clients with a fleet size below 5 during the relevant year). The insurer's alternatives are (i) "Go", which means the operational team recommends to renew policy with same terms, (ii) "Adjust", which means the operational team recommends to offer a policy with increased premiums or deductibles, and (iii) "Deny", which means the operational team recommends to deny comprehensive coverage. The explanatory variables consist of vehicle age variables, client's aggregate loss ratio, and client's previous yr. loss ratio, as defined in Table 6. $\log(p_i)$ is the policy's log premium per value and $\log(p_i) - \log(\bar{p}(x))$ is the difference between the policy's log premium per value and the log average premium per value paid for a policy with same observable characteristics. Additional explanatory variables include, $\mathbb{1}(\text{Claim}_{it-1}) \geq 1$, an indicator for a claim event at the policy level at the previous period, comprehensive coverage dummy variable, underage driver indicator, fleet size, history of client with insurer and new client indicator (joined last year). Estimation includes controls for vehicle type and weight class and year. History and vehicle age are measured in years. Premiums, damages and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Estimation is conducted using a multi-nominal logistic regression model. Analytical asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A Appendix A

Figure A.1: Policies by coverage type and vehicle type




Panel A: Coverage type



Panel B: Vehicle type

Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of policies by coverage type (Panel A) and vehicle type (Panel B). The sample include all insurance policies for all vehicles from 2013 through 2020. Policies are weighted by premiums, measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure A.2: Distribution of policies by client's fleet size




Notes: The figure reports the distribution of all insurance policies from 2013 to 2020 by client's fleet size. Client's fleet size is defined by the number of total insurance policies purchased by the client in a given year. The distribution of policies is weighted by policy premium. Premiums are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure A.3: Example of a "Go-No Go" grade document

	הערות	תאריך סוף פוליסה	תאריך תחילת פוליסה	פוליסה
Check	✓	2/29/2020	3/1/2019	390342117419
Same as last year	חידוש ללא שינוי	2/29/2020	3/1/2019	390344197219
Do not decrease	אין לרדת מתעריף\תנאים קיימים	2/29/2020	3/1/2019	390344983119
Increase third party deductible to 7000	יש להעלות אקסס צד ג' ל-7,000 ₪	2/29/2020	3/1/2019	390342188019
Increase premiums by 7.5%	יש להעלות תעריף ב-7.5% מאשתקד	2/29/2020	3/1/2019	390880039719
Offer third party coverage only	צד ג' בלבד	2/29/2020	3/1/2019	390343082519
Due to claims do not renew	לאור מצב תביעות לא ניתן לחדש באמצעותנו	2/29/2020	3/1/2019	390342820819


Notes: The figure reports an example of a "Go-No Go" grade document. The first column (from right) indicates the policy id number. The second column is the date at which the policy began. The third column is the end date of the policy. The fourth column is the "Go-No Go" grade. In the fifth row I provide a translation of "Go-No Go" grade from Hebrew. The top three rows are policies that received a "Go" grade, while the bottom four rows are policies that received a "No-Go" grade.

Figure A.4: Summary statistics of premium and cost in nominal value by vehicle age




Notes: The figure depicts the premium (in blue) and cost (in red) in nominal values for comprehensive coverage policies for trucks from 2013 to 2020. Vertical axis depict premiums and costs in 1000 New Israeli Shekel (ILS). No controls are added. Both variables are standardized to an annual term policy. Vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure A.5: Distribution of trucks by vehicle age




Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of comprehensive coverage policies for trucks by vehicle age. The sample include insurance policies for trucks from 2013 through 2020. Vehicle age is measured in years.

Figure A.6: Alternative specifications of premium and costs by vehicle age




Panel A: Nominal Values



Panel B: All Vehicle Type

Notes: The figure depicts a variation of the analysis conducted presented in Figure 3. Panel A depicts premium (in blue) and cost (in red) in nominal values, instead of normalized by vehicle value. Vertical axis is measured in 1000 ILS. Panel B depicts a model identical to that of Figure 3, but includes all vehicles in sample, rather than only trucks.

Figure A.7: Distribution of premium per value



Notes: The figure depicts the distribution of premium per value paid for trucks with comprehensive coverage policies. The sample include all trucks with comprehensive coverage from 2013 through 2020. Premiums, which are normalized to an annual policy length, and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure A.8: Orlanet Calculator

ביטוח משאיות מקיף **COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE FOR TRUCKS**

תקופת הביטוח

תאריך תחילת הביטוח: 13/02/2020

תאריך סיום הביטוח: 31/01/2021

תקופת הביטוח: 11 חודשים 18 ימים

פרטי הרכב

שנת ייצור:

קוד דגם לוי יצחק:

שדה רשות, ניתן להזין ולטעון את נתוני הרכב

דגם הרכב:

VEHICLE MODEL CODE

שימוש במכשיר עבודה:

VEHICLE MODEL

ערך המשאית:

HEAVY EQUIPMENT

OLD / NEW

רכב חדש / רכב משומש

בחירה

VEHICLE WEIGHT

משקל בטון:

סוג בעלות:

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

VEHICLE YEAR

חדש או משומש:

יצרן הרכב:

VEHICLE BRAND

משקל בטון:

סוג בעלות:

VEHICLE VALUE

Panel A: Inputs

הצג פרטי ביטוח

תקופת הביטוח: 11/03/2020-28/02/2021

חברת ביטוח	תנאי הפוליסה	הערות	עלות פרמיה לתקופה המבוקשת	מס' תשלומים	סימון להזמנת ביטוח
ממרה מבטחים	הג תנאי פוליסה הג דרישות מיגון		תעריפי מנרה מבטחים מיועדים לסוכנים הפעילים בחברת ממרה מבטחים באורלן	4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
קש	הג תנאי פוליסה הג דרישות מיגון		תעריפי קש מיועדים לסוכנים הפעילים בחברת קש באורלן	4	<input type="checkbox"/>
כלל ביטוח	הג תנאי פוליסה הג דרישות מיגון		תעריפי כלל ביטוח מיועדים לסוכנים הפעילים בחברת כלל ביטוח באורלן	4	<input type="checkbox"/>

השוואת הצעות

ההצעה שבחרת

ממרה מבטחים	סה"כ	11,074 ש"ח
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11,074 ש"ח

הצג פרטי ביטוח

תקופת הביטוח: 11/03/2020-28/02/2021

חברת ביטוח	תנאי הפוליסה	הערות	עלות פרמיה לתקופה המבוקשת	מס' תשלומים	סימון להזמנת ביטוח
ממרה מבטחים	הג תנאי פוליסה הג דרישות מיגון		תעריפי מנרה מבטחים מיועדים לסוכנים הפעילים בחברת ממרה מבטחים באורלן	4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
קש	הג תנאי פוליסה הג דרישות מיגון		תעריפי קש מיועדים לסוכנים הפעילים בחברת קש באורלן	4	<input type="checkbox"/>
כלל ביטוח	הג תנאי פוליסה הג דרישות מיגון		תעריפי כלל ביטוח מיועדים לסוכנים הפעילים בחברת כלל ביטוח באורלן	4	<input type="checkbox"/>

השוואת הצעות

ההצעה שבחרת

ממרה מבטחים	סה"כ	11,074 ש"ח
-------------	------	------------

11,074 ש"ח

שינוי פרטים

שמור תוצאות

שלח תוצאות


שלח לחתימה דיגיטלית

אישור והמשך להשלמת פרטים


Panel B: Outputs

Notes: The figure depicts the process of generating fictitious comprehensive policy coverage for trucks using the Orlanet Calculator. Panel A describe the input process, and panel B illustrate the outputs.

Figure A.9: Premium comparison of Orlan pricing of insurer vs. actual premiums




Panel A: Orlan and Actual Pricing



Panel B: Difference by Vehicle Age


Notes: The figure in Panel A presents scatter and the regression coefficients and 95% confidence interval of a within-insurer comparison in order to validate the Orlanet Calculator pricing offers match the data provided by the insurer. 2,041 observations included. For each observation, I calculate the Orlan pricing using the average of both no claims in last 3 years and 1 claim in last 3 years, which occurred last year. Estimated slope equals 0.80 (0.01). R-square = 0.90. The red curve is the 45 degree line. Prices (premiums) are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). The figure in Panel B depicts the mean difference between Orlan premiums and actual premiums by vehicle age.

Figure A.10: Market-wide premiums - Insurer, Rivals 1 and 2




Notes: The figure reports the distribution of premiums offered by the insurer and its two main competitors. Premiums are calculated using the Orlanet Calculator. The horizontal axis depicts all 876 observations with distinct vehicle model-age-value characteristics. I use the premium offered for the case of no claim in the last three years. The vertical axis depicts the premiums charged by each insurer, scaled by the lowest premium offered by the three competitors. The lowest premium offered is normalized to one. Prices (premiums) and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure A.11: Out of sample prediction of costs




Notes: The figure reports the relationship between premium per value, predicted damage per value and actual damage per value. Using data on policies from 2014 to 2018, I estimate a cost function (using regression analysis) by the following observable vehicle characteristics (age, value weight class and type) and claim history (aggregate loss ratio). Based on the cost estimates, I divide my 2019-2020 sample to 25 groups based on projected damage per value. The vertical axis depicts predicted damage per value (in blue) and premium per value (in red). The horizontal axis depicts the actual damage per value. The solid blue and red lines represent the regression coefficients of actual damage per value on predicted damage per value and premium per value, respectively. The dashed line is the 45-degree line. Premiums, damages and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Figure A.12: Distribution of conditional damage per value




Notes: The figure reports the distribution of conditional damage per value - that is, damage per value if at least one claim occurred - for comprehensive and partial coverage policies for all vehicles from 2013 to 2020. Damages and vehicle values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).


Figure A.13: Model fit



Panel A: Distribution of damage per value




Panel B: Avg. damage per value by groups



Panel C: Relationship between predicted and actual renewal

Notes: The figure reports the model fit. Panel A depicts the predicted and actual distribution of damage per value. Panel B depicts the relationship between predicted and actual mean damage per value. The sample is divided to groups based on the category variables vehicle age, aggregate client loss ratio, client's previous year loss ratio, and new client indicator. Figure presents group with at least 300 observations. Panel C depicts the relationship between predicted probability of renewal and renewal. Controls are variables included in demand estimation.

Figure A.14: Distribution of recommended increase in premium per value



Notes: The figure reports the recommended increase in premium per value, for all policies that the analytical team recommends a price increase. Premiums and values are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS)

Table A.1: Summary statistics of comprehensive coverage policies for all vehicles

	All	Vehicle Age ≥ 6	Claim _{t-1} ≥ 1
Policies	102,372	33,378	12,347
Share (by Premium)	100%	32.60%	12.06%
Weighted Share (by Premium)	100%	19.13%	13.95%
Mean Premium	7,463	4,710	8,635
At least 1 claim	18.26%	16.55%	30.63%
Mean Damage	4,998	4,021	8,062
Mean Commission	998	668	1,027
Mean Profit	1,467	21	-1,084
Profit Margin	19.65%	0.45%	-5.26%
Mean Vehicle Age	4.78	10.22	5.08
Mean Vehicle Value	270,456	151,123	279,721
Mean Premium per Value	2.76%	3.12%	3.09%

Notes: The table is a replication of Table 1, consisting of comprehensive coverage policies for all vehicle types.

Table A.2: Policy outcomes and past performance - all vehicles

Panel A: Entire Sample				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\text{Claim}_t \geq 1$	$\frac{\text{Damage}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	$\% \Delta \frac{\text{Premium}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	Loss Ratio_t
$\text{Claim}_{t-1} \geq 1$	0.103*** (0.007)	0.013*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.350*** (0.038)
log(Value)	Y	N	N	Y
Vehicle Age - 2 nd order	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Type	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Weight Class	Y	Y	Y	Y
Driver Underage Indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	65,031	65,031	65,031	65,031
R-squared	0.051	0.009	0.023	0.003
Panel B: Non-Fleet Policies				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\text{Claim}_t \geq 1$	$\frac{\text{Damage}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	$\% \Delta \frac{\text{Premium}_t}{\text{Value}_t}$	Loss Ratio_t
$\text{Claim}_{t-1} \geq 1$	0.104*** (0.011)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.004)	0.463*** (0.094)
log(Value)	Y	N	N	Y
Vehicle Age - 2 nd order	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Type	Y	Y	Y	Y
Vehicle Weight Class	Y	Y	Y	Y
Driver Underage Indicator	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	12,715	12,715	12,715	12,715
R-squared	0.029	0.009	0.029	0.005

Notes: The table reports the results of the estimation model presented in Table 2, with regards to all vehicle types.

Table A.3: Summary statistics by customer classification

	Drop	Keep
Policies	74,456	1,102
Customers	3,170	166
Mean Premium	5,843	5,274
Mean Damage	3,658	5,252
Mean Commission	768	752
Mean Profit	1,417	-730
Profit Margin	24.26%	-13.83%
Loss Ratio	62.60%	99.58%

Notes: The table reports summary statistics for all policies from 2016 to 2020. The policies are classified to two groups. "Drop" includes policies of clients that incurred a loss ratio of at least 2 between 2013 and 2015 and their average vehicle age is at least 5. "Keep" includes policies of clients that did not incur a loss ratio of at least 2 between 2013 and 2015 or their average vehicle age is below 5. Profit margin is defined as mean profit (premium-damage-commission) over mean premium. Loss ratio is defined as mean damage of customers' claims (net of deductibles) over mean premiums. Premiums, commissions, damages and profits are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS).

Table A.4: Summary statistics of policies of graded customers vs. rest

	All	Graded Customer	Not
Policies	109,630	55,868	53,762
Share (by Premium)	100%	50.96%	49.04%
Weighted Share (by Premium)	100%	56.27%	43.73%
Mean Premium	7,371	8,138	6,573
Mean Damage	4,973	4,882	5,067
Mean Commission	965	1,269	650
Mean Profit	1,432	1,988	855
Profit Margin	19.43%	24.42%	13.01%
Loss Ratio	67.47%	59.98%	77.10%
% Comprehensive	93.38%	95.20%	91.49%
Mean Vehicle Age	4.83	4.95	4.72
Mean Vehicle Value	275,594	268,580	282,883
Mean Premium per Value	2.67%	3.03%	2.32%

Notes: The table reports summary statistic to all comprehensive and partial coverage policies for all vehicle types between 2013 and 2020. The first column reports statistics for all policies, the second column describes the statistics for a sub-sample of the data consisting of all clients which at least one of their policies has a documented grade. Column 3 describes all other policies with regards to the other customers. Profit margin is defined as mean profit (premium-damage-commission) over mean premium. Loss ratio is defined as mean damage of customers' claims (net of deductibles) over mean premiums. Vehicle value, premium, commission, damages and profits are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Vehicle age is measured in years. I exclude from the sample observation with an error, change in vehicle within the policy, change in coverage terms over the policy and policies that did not end, or that lasted for less than 30 days (without a claim).

Table A.5: Insurer grading and policy renewal

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$\Delta \frac{\text{Premium}}{\text{Value}}$	$\Delta \text{Ded. TP}$	$\Delta \frac{\text{Ded. Own}}{\text{Value}}$	Third Party	Renew
<i>Recommendation:</i>					
$\Delta \frac{\text{Premium}}{\text{Value}}$	0.8550** (0.3496)	-2.4199 (18.210)	0.4113* (0.2203)		
$\Delta \text{Ded. TP}$	-0.0003 (0.0003)	0.7162*** (0.1135)	0.0009 (0.0007)		
$\Delta \frac{\text{Ded. Own}}{\text{Value}}$	-0.0015 (0.0022)	0.2434 (0.2588)	1.0853*** (0.0080)		
Go	0.0015 (0.0009)	0.1290 (0.1513)	0.0016 (0.0015)		
Increase Ded. Only	0.0028** (0.0011)			-0.0273* (0.0159)	0.0310 (0.0458)
Increase Premium		0.0822 (0.1418)	-0.0005 (0.0016)	-0.0155 (0.0159)	-0.0223 (0.0506)
TP Only				0.1487*** (0.0493)	0.0061 (0.0416)
Deny				0.0663 (0.0572)	-0.6703*** (0.0205)
Vehicle Age Included	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	8,652	8,652	8,652	10,080	14,282
R-squared	0.0630	0.1753	0.4894	0.1179	0.0822

Notes: The table reports the relationship between the analytical teams recommendation and the terms of renewal. The dependent variables are the change in premium per value (column 1), the change in deductible with regards to third-party property damage (column 2), the change in deductible with regards to own property damage, normalized by vehicle value (column 3), an indicator as to whether the policy has been renewed with only third-party coverage (column 4) and whether the policy has been renewed at all (column 5). The explanatory variables, in order, are the recommended change in premium per value, the recommended change in deductible with regards to third-party property damage, the recommended change in deductible with regards to own property damage (normalized by vehicle value), an indicator as to whether the policy received a "Go" grade, an indicator as to whether the analytical team recommends to not renew policy at current terms but does not require a premium increase ("Increase Ded. Only"), an indicator as to whether the analytical team recommends to not renew policy at current terms and requires a premium increase ("Increase Premiums"), an indicator as to whether the analytical team recommends to not renew policy with comprehensive coverage ("TP Only") and an indicator as to whether the analytical team recommends to deny coverage from customer ("Deny"). Premiums, deductibles are measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS). Changed in third-party deductibles are measured in 1000 ILS. Controls include vehicle age (saturated control). Robust standard error are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.6: First stage prediction of log value based on previous previous year log value

Vehicle type	Coeff.	s.e.	R ²	Obs.
Truck	0.895	(0.001)	0.98	39,599
Heavy eq.	0.936	(0.002)	0.97	5,267
Trailer	0.923	(0.002)	0.90	17,058
Bus	0.898	(0.001)	0.99	7,378
Mini-bus	0.836	(0.002)	0.95	9,665
Heavy eq. add-on	0.929	(0.004)	0.92	4,270

Notes: The table reports the results the first stage estimation: prediction of log value based on previous year log value. The vehicles values are estimated separately for the five vehicle type group. Furthermore, value of heavy equipment add-ons are estimated separately. Vehicle values are measured in 100,000 New Israeli Shekels (ILS). History measured in 1,000 years.

Table A.7: First stage prediction of log premium

IIC min price	0.496***	(0.056)	Claim Last Yr. (Vehicle)	-0.006***	(0.001)
Aggregate Loss Ratio:			Previous Yr. Loss Ratio:		
< 0.5	(omitted)		< 0.5	(omitted)	
≥ 0.5 and < 1	-0.003**	(0.002)	≥ 0.5 and < 1	0.002	(0.002)
≥ 1 and < 2	-0.004*	(0.002)	≥ 1 and < 2	0.021***	(0.003)
≥ 2	0.003	(0.004)	≥ 2	0.021***	(0.005)
Vehicle Age:					
0-1	(omitted)		log(Value)	0.222***	(0.013)
2-4	-0.017***	(0.001)	log(Total Value)	0.446***	(0.013)
5-7	-0.068***	(0.002)	Partial Coverage	-0.240***	(0.008)
8+	-0.065***	(0.003)	Underage driver	0.017***	(0.004)
			Joined last year	0.004**	(0.002)
History	-0.023	(0.002)	Joined 2 years ago	-0.004**	(0.001)
Observations	101,019				
R-squared	0.978				
Within R-squared	0.662				

Notes: The table reports the results the first stage estimation: prediction of log premium per value. The regression includes client and license fixed effects, in addition for year, vehicle type and vehicle weight dummies. IIC min price is the international insurance company minimum price, based on the observable characteristics. The sample excludes third-party coverage policies and 2013 policies. Premium measured in New Israeli Shekel (ILS) and vehicle value measured in 100,000 New Israeli Shekels (ILS). History measured in 1,000 years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.