



ISRAELI CENTER FOR THIRD SECTOR RESEARCH  
BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV

**CIVIL SOCIETY**  
during the  
*Second Lebanon War*

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## **A. Introduction**

### **A.I. Research rationale**

The Second Lebanon War brought civil society and its organizations into the headlines and spurred debate about the role of third sector organizations and their relationship with the Government and local authorities.

The Government decided not to activate the national state of emergency regulations and therefore, Government offices and local authorities did not have the necessary funding to effectively operate the home front (The Knesset, Committee for External Affairs and Security, September 2006). Consequently, civil society and its organizations were to play a central role in this situation. The media described how the State abandoned its weakest citizens and emphasized that the State "left various humanitarian organizations to cope with the struggle of survival of the elderly, immigrants, children and the poor" (Netta Sela, YNET, 13.8.2006). Ruth Sinai (Ha'aretz, 24.8.2006) also commented that "the State found itself impotent, entirely dependant upon civil society due to the privatization of large segments of its social, educational and health services". Sharon Shachaf (Globes, 28-29, August 2006) compared the Government's lack of functioning to that of the United States government following the Katrina Hurricane in New Orleans during the previous year. She wrote:

*"It's not clear why Israel has tens of plans in case a kite accidentally crosses the border from Egypt, but that the office of finance does not have one plan in case hundreds of thousands are stranded in bomb shelters, unable to get to work or feed their families".*

During the second week of the war, the existence of a new and important phenomenon, worthy of research, understanding and documentation, was already apparent as was the fact that the research process needs to be initiated immediately. Since the commencement of privatization in Israel during the last two decades (Ruth Sinai, Ha'aretz, 24.8.2006; see also Gidron, Bar and Katz, 2004, pp.117-140), this is the first war whereby the civil society played such a central role. The role that civil organizations played during the war, in light of Government's inaction on the home front, demands the investigation of the relationship between these organizations and the State as well as the need to develop a comprehensive policy with regard to these relationships through the inclusion of the organizations in the policy making process. As well, it is important to note that changes in such organizations' activities, in their work environments, in their cooperative arrangements and other changes that the organizations may have experienced during this period may have long term effects on the characteristics, roles and sustainability of such organizations.

The goal of this research was to gain an understanding of the roles and functioning of civil society, including civilians and their organizations, during the war. Thus, the research examined

a number of topics:

- How Israelis reacted to the events in the North, and who they believe is responsible for coping with humanitarian crises that may result from events such as those that took place during the war.
- How did the organizations adjust their activities to the emergency circumstances.
- How did their response affect their functioning, resources and administration.
- An understanding of their relationship with the Government and local authorities during the war.
- Their attitudes as to the proper role of third sector organizations during times of emergency as well as during normal times.


This research is multi-stage and examines the continuity of patterns that appeared during the war and the long term consequences of changes in the activities of organizations. In addition, the research is planned to contain an international comparative element relating to the roles and functioning of organizations in other countries following large scale disasters.

## **A.2. Characteristics of the North**

During the second Lebanon War, the Northern region was subject to daily missile and rocket attacks. Approximately 4,000 rockets were fired on the Northern region of which about one fourth landed in populated settlements resulting in the deaths of 52 civilians. Hundreds of thousands of civilians became displaced and those remaining were forced into bomb shelters and protected areas that in many cases were not adequately prepared.

Most of the Northern District is within the affected area as well as part of the Haifa region, from Kiryat Shmona and Nahariya in the North until Afula and Hedera in the South. This affected region comprises 22% of the area of the State of Israel and is home to 1,715,000 residents; approximately one fourth of the State's population.

Map 1: The Haifa and Northern Districts



The towns and villages of the Northern District have a unique demographic composition:

- Of the 1,185,000 residents in the Northern district, 53% are Arabs and 47% are Jews, in comparison to 19.5% Arabs within Israel's general population.
- The Arab population is not homogeneous: 71% are Muslims, 15% are Druze and 14% are Christians.
- In many of the Jewish localities, there exists a large proportion of immigrants from the 1990's: Tiberius: 17%, Yekonam Ilit – 25%, Carmiel – 93%, Maalot Tarshicha – 36%, Nahariya – 20%, Nazareth Ilit – 45.5%, Acre – 20%, Afula – 29%, Kiryat Shmona and Shlomi – 18% each. This data is in comparison with the fact that 15% of the general Jewish populations are recent immigrants.
- In the Northern District there are 412 settlements of which 81 are urban –local municipalities (cities and towns) in which 994,800 residents reside. The remainder is comprised of agricultural settlements of which the majority is organized under the umbrella of regional municipalities. In addition there is an unknown number of unrecognized Arab settlements.
- The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) categorized settlements in the country into 10 socio-economic clusters, according to a diverse set of variables including sources of income, educational level, employment, etc. The first cluster is the lowest and the tenth is the highest. The population of the Northern District is mostly concentrated in the four lowest clusters: 73.7 percent of the district's urban population resides in 59 settlements belonging to these clusters, in comparison to 43 percent of the general Israeli urban population. Such data attests to the region's weak socio-economic status.

## **B. Methodology**

The research utilized two research methods: A telephone survey of the adult population in Israel in order to investigate the public response to the situation in the North, and a series of semi-structured interviews with key persons within third sector organizations.

### **B.I. Sampling procedure**

#### **Research sample:**

The public opinion survey was administered via the telephone and a representative sample of 502 Israeli adults was interviewed (sampling error - +/-4.5%). The sample was random and weighted by age groups. The main focus of the data analysis was the comparison between those residing in the North (comprising 25% of the sample) and residents of the country's other regions (comprising 75% of the sample). Likewise, the report includes various community characteristics based on socio-demographic background variables.

The survey was conducted on the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> of August 2006, during the two days immediately subsequent to the cease fire. During this time, many residents of the North had already returned to their homes. It should be noted that the survey's response rate for the Northern residents did not significantly differ from that of those residing in other regions of Israel.

#### **The organizational sample:**

Thirty seven organizations (38 interviewees) participated in the research (See Appendix A). The interviewees had senior level roles within the organizations such as "managing director" or "board chairperson". The organizations were selected using a non random layered sample across various fields of practice. This convenience sample does not claim to represent all the third sector organizations or all fields of operations. Nonetheless, the sample represents a wide variety of organizations from the perspective of organizational size, discipline, and type of activities (services, advocacy, and funding). Therefore, noting necessary caution, it is indeed possible to draw some general conclusions from this sample. The many similarities that emerged in the interviews with organizational leaders in the sample indicate that these similarities are more than merely coincidental, and we can assume that if additional organizations were included in the sample, we would reach similar conclusions.

The sample included national and local organizations that responded in various ways to the situation in the North: organizations that provided food and other in-kind assistance, organizations providing services to special needs populations (such as the disabled), organizations that provide assistance to victims of terror, advocacy organizations, civil rights organizations in the Arab

community, foundations, community centers, youth movements and organizations providing informal or supplemental education. Likewise, a cluster of organizations and city representatives in one local authority in the country's center were also examined in order to gain a better understanding of an entire urban system that hosted the residents of the North. Despite their overwhelming schedules during the war, approximately 97% of the organizations that we approached understood the importance of this research and immediately acceded to our request.

*Table 1: The organizations in the sample*

<b>Type of Organization</b>	<b>Number of Interviewees</b>
Organizations supplying food*	6
Organizations providing services to special needs populations (including organizations providing assistance to victims of terror)	6
Advocacy organizations and civil rights organizations in the Arab sector	6
Foundations	5
Community centers**	4
Youth movements and the informal education sector	5
Cluster of organizations in a town in the center of the country	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>

\* Including one organization not directly involved with food distribution but who participated in the establishment of a confederation of a number of food organizations.

\*\* One organization was also included in the cluster of organizations in a town in the center of the country.

## **B.2. Research tools**

Research tools include:

- A telephone survey using a structured questionnaire
- In-depth interviews using a semi-structured questionnaire

### **The telephone survey**

The telephone questionnaire was in Hebrew and included 13 questions of which ten dealt with the public's philanthropic behavior – contributions and volunteering – directly relating to the war in the North. The questions differentiated between the residents of the North and the residents of other parts of the country. The remaining questions dealt with public opinion regarding the functioning of civil society organizations and the Government in times of emergency (For the survey questionnaire, see Appendix B). The questionnaire was appended to an omnibus survey

that was carried out by *Hanoch and Rafi Smith – Consulting and Research, Ltd.* during the evening hours in the two days immediately following the ceasefire.

### **The organizational questionnaire**

The interviews with the organizations were carried out using a semi-structured questionnaire (For the complete questionnaire, see Appendix C). The interviews took place during the war and the work was quickly executed in order to achieve maximum data collection.

The questionnaire focused on the following topics:

- General information
- Changes in the organization's operating patterns: scope and type of activities, types of populations, initiative and commitment, collaborations, and resources
- Evaluation of organizations' and municipalities' implementation efforts
- Comments and recommendations regarding the functioning of organizations during times of crisis in comparison to the functioning of the Government and the municipalities.

The interviews were analyzed in three distinct stages – identification of characteristics shared by all the organizations within fields of practice included in the sample; identification of general themes and characteristics shared by all the organizations, regardless of field of practice; a repeated test of the findings per field of practice in comparison to the general themes.

### **B.3. The Research process**

Research data was collected in the field in a "real time" framework during the war. The survey was administered immediately following the war and the interviews were conducted during the war's final two weeks and the week following the ceasefire. In order to reach the maximum number of organizations in a short time, a large research team was formed, comprised of 7 researchers working simultaneously.

Each researcher contacted organizations via the telephone, concisely explained the research topic and process and requested permission to interview. The majority of interviews were conducted in person at a place and time convenient for the interviewees. In a few cases where a personal interview could not be arranged within a reasonable time frame, telephone interviews were held. The length of each interview was between one and two hours.

This research is multi-stage and will be continued:

- Stage one – Data was collected during the war.
- Stage two will include follow up of the patterns of activity and collaborations that appeared during the war and an examination of the long term ramifications on the organizations'

activities. During this stage, additional organizations, that due to the pressures of the war were not able to participate, may also be included.

- Stage three will be comprised of international comparisons regarding the functioning and roles of third sector organizations contending with emergency humanitarian crises such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, Hurricane Katarina, the Tsunami, and the SARS epidemic in Canada. We will examine how the involvement of organizations during times of emergency affects public policy with regard to state of emergency preparedness and how the local context and the Government's policy affect the activities and strength of the organizations.

## C. Survey Results

The survey's goal was to examine the public's response to the needs of the residents of the North during the war and to examine their views about third sector organizations and their roles in comparison to the roles of the Government during a state of emergency. The survey examined the public's patterns of philanthropy during the war. On the one hand, it investigated who and to what extent volunteered, contributed or offered hospitality with regard to the situation in the North. On the other hand, the survey examined what the residents of the North actually received as a result of this "volunteering spirit". As mentioned above, the survey was fielded on days two and three following the ceasefire – therefore, respondents were close enough to the war in order to clearly recall events, and most of the residents of the North had already returned to their homes.

### Major findings:

- Donating and volunteering – 43% of the public donated and 11% volunteered specifically within the context of the war in the North.
- Hospitality: 25% of households claimed to have hosted families from the North – just 5% hosted strangers.
- The differences between the Jewish and Arab publics – The donation rate was higher among Jews but the rate of volunteering was higher among Arabs.
- There are no differences between the secular and religious – The usually observed differences in favor of religious and ultra-orthodox Jews were not found in relation to donating and volunteering in the context of the war. This finding suggests that such participation during the war was considered a civil-secular issue rather than a religious one.
- Differences between high and low income populations – high income earners donated more than low income earners but low income earners volunteered more than their high income counterparts.
- The organizations as mediators – commercial organizations and third sector organizations played a central role in the mediation between donors, volunteers and hosts, on the one hand, and the needy residents of the North, on the other.
- Municipalities adopted the role of mediators between donors and volunteers and those in need. However, their prominence, from this perspective, was less than that of the third sector organizations and commercial organizations. The scope of their involvement was valued more by the residents of the North than by the donors and volunteers.
- There are major discrepancies between the reported scope of donations and hospitality and what the residents of the North claimed to have received.
- The third sector's activities during the war greatly improved its public image.
- Israelis believe that it is the Government's responsibility to respond to social needs during times of crisis, but also that despite this responsibility, during this war, primarily the organizations of the third sector adopted this role.


### C.I. The public's donations

The questions in the survey related to donations earmarked for the residents of the North during the war. Whether these donations were made in lieu of routine donations was not investigated. This question will be examined in a comprehensive survey about the Israeli public's donating and volunteering practices that will be released later in the year. The questions related to all household donations.

**The populations' rate of donations** – 43% of Israeli households donated – money, food, equipment – for the welfare of the residents of the North. In other words, approximately 800,000 families in Israel donated for the good of the residents of the North. In the Center and the South, the rate of donations reached 49%, that is, every other household donated. Also, the residents of the North donated, although obviously their rates of donations were significantly lower – 26%. One third donated money and two thirds of the donations were in-kind – food, equipment, medicine and more.

**Who transferred the public's donations to the residents of the North?** Approximately one fifth of the donors did not need the assistance of mediators and reported that they directly transferred the donations to those in need (Figure 1). Of the donations that were transferred via organizations, the role of commercial organizations particularly stands out. Specifically, the major supermarket chains played an important role in transferring the public's donations – 41% of the donations were transferred by commercial organizations and of this, more than half through the supermarket chains. In second place were the third sector organizations that transferred about one fourth of the donations. The local authorities were far behind with only 5% of the donations being transferred through them.

Figure 1: Rates of donations and volunteering according to mediating party



## **C.2. The public's volunteering**

The survey asked about "participation in volunteer activities relating to the situation" since the commencement of the war in the North.

*Scope of volunteering* – One in nine (11%) respondents participated in some sort of volunteering (no significant difference was found between residents of the North and the rest of the country). Half of those participating did so within an organizational framework. These figures are relatively high when compared to the Israeli Center for Third Sector Research's 1997 survey (Shye, Lazar, Duchin and Gidron, 1999) which found that approximately one third of all volunteers in Israel do so within an organizational framework. This finding points to the fact that the war situation expanded the roles of civil society organizations as intermediaries and vehicles for the philanthropic behavior of the public. Apart from that, generally much volunteering occurs by chance and is mediated through the volunteer's social network. In the present case, only a minority of the volunteers had existing ties with residents of the North, and therefore, the importance of organizations that could mediate between the donor and the donee was increased. Those volunteering through organizations were divided equally between third sector organizations and municipalities. Seemingly, the municipalities did not disappear all together, but rather, some of them altered their patterns of activity from that of service providers to mediators between service providers and citizens within their jurisdiction.

*What did the volunteers actually do?* Many provided technical assistance such as preparing food packages, distribution of donations to recipients, transporting those in need, etc. Such activities represented 38% of respondents' volunteering actions. A similar number provided personal and social services (taking care of the elderly, entertaining children in bomb shelters, providing emotional assistance, etc.). Another notable activity involved fundraising which constituted 9% of the volunteering activities.

## **C.3. Hosting the residents of the North**

During the war, the media was full of stories about families that hosted strangers from the North. According to the survey findings the scope of this phenomenon was less dramatic. Although a quarter of surveyed households did indeed host residents of the North, the vast majority (20%) hosted friends or family. A mere 5% hosted strangers. In most cases, the connection between the hosts and the guests was made directly, without the assistance of any organization. In most cases, where there was a need for mediation to connect with the residents of the north, they relied on the municipalities. Regarding this topic, the role of third sector organizations was limited – they mediated in a mere 13% of the cases.

#### **C.4. The receiving party**

The residents of the North (25% of all respondents) were asked if they received assistance or hospitality that they did not routinely receive. The question was: "Since the commencement of the war in the North did you or any household member receive anything free of charge, that under normal circumstances you would not have?" The scope of assistance reported by those on the receiving end was less than that reported by the donors. This finding is not surprising and can be explained by a known problem in polls – a tendency of those surveyed to report behaviors that are considered socially desirable. In addition, not all donated items always arrive at their destinations due to logistical reasons, and also those on the receiving end do not always identify the assistance as such or understand that it was the result of a donation. The gap was most noticeable with regard to the scope of hospitality: 30% of the residents of the North reported that they were hosted free-of-charge during the war. Calculations using this data would yield a total of 160,000 families. The number of households that claimed to have hosted families from the North is approximately three times this number. This can be explained by two factors, the most important being that many of the residents of the North were hosted by a number of hosts during their "refugee" period, thereby explaining the major part of this gap, but it is possibly also because not all of the families that were displaced during the war had already returned to their homes by the time we conducted our survey.

Of the residents of the North 14% received aid, in particular material and technical assistance such as equipment, food, medicine and transportation. Of the respondents that reported receiving assistance from organizations, approximately half of the donations were transferred to them via third sector organizations and the other half via commercial organizations. From the reports of the residents of the North, it appears that the municipalities had greater weight with regard to assistance than that reported by the donors and volunteers. According to recipients' reports the municipalities acted as intermediaries for donations in one third of the cases – a rate similar to that of the third sector organizations but a bit more than businesses.


#### **C.5. Demographic characteristics of the donors and volunteers**

*Age:* Donations and volunteering were most common among those aged 30-50.

*Religiosity:* Traditional and observant respondents donated on a slightly higher level than secular or ultra-orthodox respondents (See figure 2). This finding is surprising because various studies conducted on the patterns of philanthropy of the Israeli public found that the level of donations increases with level of religiosity. However, the observant and ultra-orthodox, during normal times, tend to donate primarily to religious goals – synagogues, yeshivas, etc. It is possible that war related donations were considered primarily a secular issue, and thus, the traditional differences between the secular and the observant were blurred. Together with this, amongst the

volunteers, stand out those respondents that defined themselves as ultra-orthodox (13%), and observant (15%). Their levels of volunteerism is higher than those who defined themselves as secular (11%) and traditional (9%), although these differences are still lower than what is normally found – in the Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey (CBS, 2005) the ultra-orthodox donated three times as much and the observant donated twice as much as those who declared that they are secular (36%, 27% and 13% respectively).


Figure 2: Rates of donors and volunteers during the war according to religiosity and nationality



**Nationality:** The rates of donations among Jews were higher than among surveyed Arabs – 44% of Jews claimed to have donated in comparison with 30% of Arabs (Figure 2). This finding corresponds with our findings from the 1997 survey whereby 82% of Jews and 57% of Arabs donated. In this realm, the finding which is surprising concerns volunteerism: the rate of volunteerism amongst surveyed Arabs was 17% in contrast to 11% amongst Jews. This finding is in contrast to the 1997 survey which found that Arabs tended to volunteer less than their Jewish counterparts (28% amongst Arabs and 33% amongst Jews). Similarly, the Central Bureau of Statistics' Social Survey found that the Arab population volunteered less than the Jewish population (CBS, 2005).

**Socio-economic status:** A correlation was found between income level and willingness to donate – 36% of those whose wages were less than the national average donated during the war, while nearly half of those whose wages were above the national average donated (49%). Amongst those whose wages were significantly above the national average the donation rate rose to 57% (See figure 3). However, it appears that those in the lower income brackets felt no less responsibility to assist the residents of the North. Those in lower income brackets, while possessing limited ability to donate money or in-kind, boasted significantly higher rates of volunteerism than those in the higher income brackets. 17% of those whose income fell under the national average volunteered, in comparison to 10% of those whose income rose above the national average. It seems as if during the Second Lebanon War there existed a natural divide in the philanthropic behavior of Israelis – those with available funds tend to donate money and the rest tend to donate their time.

Figure 3: Rates of donations and volunteerism during the war according to income levels



It is interesting to note that amongst low income earners volunteering activities were carried out through organizations with greater frequency than was previously recorded (for instance in the Central Bureau of Statistics Social Survey and ICTR's 1997 survey). By and large, those in lower income brackets tend to volunteer independently or informally and not through organizations. In the case of the war, this situation was reversed such that for each person with income far below the national average that volunteered independently, two others volunteered by via an organization. Once again, it is possible to explain this phenomenon by addressing the volunteers' social networks. Because most people from low income brackets do not have broad and varied social networks as many of the high income earners do, they did not have viable options other than to be aided by organizations in order to volunteer their time on behalf of the residents of the North.


**C.6. Public opinion**

*The public image of third sector organizations:* One of the obstacles that Israeli third sector organizations face with respect to recruitment of public support is their problematic public image. The survey examined the effect of the organizations' response to the crisis in the North on their public image. Findings illustrate that the third sector organizations' activities during the war significantly and positively affected their public status. 38% of those surveyed indicated that their opinion regarding third sector organizations improved and most replied "greatly improved". In addition, it was found that this trend was most prominent among those who donated as well as amongst those who benefited from the donations. This finding suggests that there is a correlation between the organizations' improved public image and the willingness of the public to donate to them and to utilize their services.

***Attitudes regarding the roles of the civil society and the Government during times of crisis:***

We found great discrepancies between who the public believes carried out the majority of the work in response to the needs of the residents of the North and who they believe should have assumed this role (Figure 4). Most of the respondents believe that this should have been the Government's role (87%, another 5% believed that it was the role of the municipalities) and only 2% of the respondents believed that third sector organizations should carry out most of the work. This finding is not new. In the 1997 survey, 56% of respondents agreed that if the Government would function as it should, there would be no need for donations. Despite this, the vast majority of the public believes that most of the work was indeed carried out by the third sector – civil society organizations (40%), citizens (18%) and individual business owners (14%). Only a small minority (2%) believed that commercial organizations carried out most of the work.

*Figure 4: Attitudes regarding the roles of civil society and Government in times of crisis*



## **D. Interview Results**

### **D.I. Patterns of Activity**

#### **D.1.A. Changes in the organizations' activities during the war**

The most outstanding characteristic of the organizations' functioning was their extreme flexibility with regard to adapting their activities in order to meet the new needs and adjust to the new circumstances. The organizations' flexibility was predominately apparent in the four following fields:

1. Decision making and the initiative to act
2. Types of activities during the emergency period
3. Location of activities during the emergency period
4. Scope of the activities and target population

#### **The decision making process and the initiative to alter activities**

*The decision to take action* – The organizations' response and the decision to act were immediate. Most organizations commenced action during the first week of the war. The remaining organizations began operating during the second week when it became apparent that the war would continue for an extended period. The decision making process with regard to altering or expanding activities to the North was quick and simple and immediately following this process (or during the process itself), the organizations commenced action. Many organizations indicated that the decision to act was "natural", and derived from the organization's values. Regarding the decision making process, the general tone was determined by those responsible for program implementation – the general manager or project managers.

Two distinct modes stand out in relation to the decision making process and the initiative to act: *The informal model* is the most common and was apparent in approximately 80% of organizations: Most organizations attested to the fact that the change "simply happened", the decision making was carried out primarily on an operational level and the organizations set out to work without an organized program. A number of organizations had difficulties describing their decision making process; when was the decision made and by whom. All organizations convened the board of directors or the managing committee but most did so at a later time, subsequent to commencement of operations. Decision making in the remainder of the organizations was based on a formal model: In 8 of 37 organizations interviewed, the organization's management (management, secretariat, board) met and formally decided about the change in activities, focus areas and method of operations prior to the organization's implementation in the field of the new decisions. Amongst these, education organizations were most predominant. Three such organizations convened the secretariat in order to decide about the organizations' activities.

Because the Government did not activate the official State of Emergency, and because most organizations did not have predefined organizational procedures for emergencies, the decision making process was not clear or organized, but rather, developed during the war, according to identified needs. Most organizations functioned in an Ad Hoc manner without preplanning, and some of them continued this pattern of action throughout the emergency period. Nonetheless, one third of the organizations indicated that they held staff meetings at a greater than normal frequency, mapped the needs and managed activities.

*The initiative to alter activities* at the beginning of the war derived from three distinct sources: In most cases, the organizations themselves initiated the adaptation of activities, or alternatively, simply began to function according to a new format. In certain cases the initiative was derived from bodies funding third sector organizations (for instance, philanthropic foundations or Zionist movement institutes). These bodies offered organizations funding for defined activities; thus setting in motion the activities. A less common source of initiative to the adaptation of activities came from the field: Just three organizations indicated that requests from the field served as a motivating factor setting activities in motion.

*Decisions regarding type of activities* – The decision as to what types of activities should be undertaken was not easy for the organizations. The major difference that was found was between organizations that decided to focus on activities in areas that they have a strategic advantage and to function exclusively in them and organizations that attempted to respond to every need they became aware of. One example of this is the youth movements. One of the movements decided to provide help everywhere, in any way and in every field, and another movement focused on the area in which they normally work. Thus, one movement functioned in a wide variety of activities – volunteering in bomb shelters, distribution of "treats" and food packages to soldiers, entertaining children that were hosted in Yeshivas, visiting the injured and offering support to bereaved families, as well as the organization of study and prayer in various places. The second youth movement functioned exclusively in two areas, namely, volunteering in bomb shelters and running children's day camps. The chosen strategy effected the scope of their activities: The focused youth movement was able to reach and operate children's and youth programming on a much wider level than the second youth movement or other organizations that dealt with many topics.

Another example involves the differences between two interviewed advocacy organizations. One of them decided to focus on the type of activity that they regularly deal with, although with regard to different needs – mediation between the citizen and the authorities and pressuring the authorities to fulfill their obligations. This decision was derived from an accurate understanding of the organization's abilities and limitations and the understanding that other organizations are able to carry out other tasks better than they could. The second organization continued to carry out its normal advocacy activities but added on to its programming the providing of direct services, established a helpline, became involved in transportation and hospitality and more.

The decision was based on a feeling of responsibility to the organization's target population and from a desire to respond to all needs. The first organization evaluated its ability to respond to the presented needs as a total success, whereas the second organization claimed to have successfully responded to a small percentage of the presented needs.

It appears as if organizations that focused on the area in which they have an advantage were better able to utilize the resources available to them and reach a greater number of people.

### **Adaptation of activities versus routine activities**

In terms of the transformation of activities, it can be seen that almost immediately following or simultaneous to the decision making, the organizations turned their operations and resources to activities that focused on assistance to the North and its residents. From the nature of the adapted activities, it is possible to differentiate between organizations that changed their field of operations and organizations that intensified their existing operations. Amongst the organizations that altered their area of operations, it is possible to differentiate between two groups: organizations whose wartime activities were linked to their continuous activities and organizations that adopted totally new activities.

Two characteristics that appeared in all organizations were the addition or intensification of activities and reorienting towards the social, physical and emotional situation of the North's residents. This phenomenon was observed in every investigated group and all organizations with respect to resource allocation, the activities, target population and location of activities. Following is a summary of the changes in activities according to types of organizations:

- ***Organizations providing food:*** All organizations, with the exception of one, normally deal with food distribution and focused on this activity throughout the war. The organizations intensified their operations and adapted them to the needs dictated by the war. However, they did not adopt new activities but rather continued with food distribution and material assistance.
- ***Organizations providing services for special needs populations:*** These organizations also altered their activities to focus on the needs of the North. These organizations also continued working in their normal fields of operations. The change entailed primarily intensification of their operations and in particular, an expansion and increased flexibility of assistance to new populations and the establishment and expansion of help lines.
- ***Informal education:*** In this area, the altering of activities was more evident. Although the organizations continued to work with children and youth, they implemented activities different from their usual operations. One of the organizations focused on camps for children from the North. This activity was also new but strongly linked to the organization's routine operations. Another activity transformation involved work in the bomb shelters. Two of the organizations

operated coordinators and volunteers who conducted social activities (mostly children's entertainment) in the bomb shelters; an activity that was not in their routine repertoire. It is important to note that due to the situation, the organizations immediately ceased their Northern based usual day camp programming, even prior to their decisions to initiate activities on behalf of the residents of the North.

- **Foundations:** In this group, there were two major changes. The first one revolved around the collaborations amongst the various foundations, in particular through the framework of the Foundations' Forum (See also the description in the collaborations chapter), and the second change involved a foundation that began to implement projects and provide services in addition to its usual funding role. In addition, a predominant change involved the reallocation of resources to the needs in the North and preparation for fundraising during the post-war period. The interviewed foundations indicated that they reallocated funds to additional areas that they do not normally fund. In addition, the foundations reported that their activities in the North were, for the most part, an addition to their usual or planned activities and not instead of them.
- **Advocacy and rights:** The advocacy and rights organizations may be divided into two groups: organizations that are involved in the promotion of peace and advocacy organizations working for social change, including two organizations working for the promotion of civil society in the Arab population. Peace organizations intensified their existing programming and changed the focus of their activity to the war situation. With respect to advocacy, a number of organizations maintained their usual activities and others totally transformed their operations and began working in humanitarian aid, provision of services, running help lines and other activities that are not in their usual inventory of operations. The activity of rights organizations in the Arab sector was especially prominent. They activated organizational emergency protocols that were developed subsequent to the events of October 2000 and transformed their operations accordingly.
- **A cluster of organizations in a central town:** the organizations' wartime efforts were based on existing activities. Some of the organizations that functioned in the city hosted residents of the North. Certain organizations intensified their existing activities (organizations that routinely dealt with material aid) and others functioned in a significantly different manner than their norm (organizations for social change). Likewise, some organizations carried out activities different from those of routine times such as the distribution of packages to the residents of the North and soldiers as well as the rendering of assistance to women whose husbands had been recruited under the emergency regulations.
- **Community centers:** All community centers performed activities different than those normally carried out. The transformation was a result of organizational flexibility and speed. The different activities were extensions of their normal activities during peacetime.

The ability to effectively transform activities was most apparent with regard to organizations that had protocols for emergency situations. Examples include organizations that functioned during the disengagement in the Gaza strip and developed a mechanism for assisting the evacuees as well as organizations that generally deal with the rights of the Arab population and had developed emergency protocols as a result of the events of 2000. These organizations altered their activities during the war in accordance with their pre-developed protocols and reported that such adaptations were quite easy for them as a result of the familiar mechanism.

It is possible to see that the emergency situation affected organizations in various ways in accordance with their location and their type of routine activities. For instance, food distribution organizations turned their efforts to the North and organizations that dealt with informal education were forced to halt their normal activities in the North such as summer camps and adapt their activities to the new reality. Routine activities in the country's North were halted due to the orders of the home front headquarters. This phenomenon was particularly apparent with regard to community centers that were forced to stop all their routine activities in lieu of other operations. Another example is the activities in the country's center which focused on the absorption of persons displaced from the North on one hand, and the activities in the bomb shelters of the North that were carried out by community centers and other educational organizations on the other hand.

The majority of organizations continued to work in their familiar fields. However, approximately one third of the organizations carried out activities that were significantly different than those that they normally perform. For instance, some foundations and advocacy organizations began to provide services and certain social change organizations concentrated on hosting the displaced.

***Changes in the venue of activities:*** The organizations dealt with two distinct issues with regard to the venue of activities: The cessation of routine activities in the North and the commencement of new activities in the North and the Center, according to the situation.

The home front headquarters' orders to close branches and to stop all outdoor activities in the area affected by missile and rocket attacks, coupled with the mass flow of residents and organizational activists from the North to the center, caused a cessation of all routine activities in the North. Some of the organizations attempted to continue the activities that were stopped through conducting projects in the center focused on the residents of the North or through the intensification of the activity in their branches in the country's center. On the other hand, the emergency situation in the North altered the activities and most organizations operating in that region focused their activities on the needs that arose in the Northern settlements and the residents that remained. The activities in the center focused on hosting families, children's activities, advocacy and preparation of food and aid packages. The activities in the North concentrated on material assistance and the support of people in bomb shelters. Certain organizations focused on the transferring of Northern residents to activities in the center.

In an attempt to examine the organizations in accordance with their field of activities, it is possible to see that material aid organizations functioned almost exclusively in the North. Advocacy organizations primarily functioned in the center; the cluster of organizations in the central town focused their activities locally. Organizations that work with special needs populations were divided amongst themselves: The organizations that assist people with functional limitations - the physically and mentally challenged rendered services in the North such as distribution of equipment and home visits in addition to intensifying their activities in the center and the south. Organizations that work with at-risk youth altogether ceased their Northern activities and expanded their operations in the center and the south. The informal educational organizations worked simultaneously in the North within the bomb shelters and in the center through the establishment of activity hubs for children of the North. The community centers worked locally and functioned both in bomb shelters and activity hubs beyond the line of fire.

***Scope of activities:*** In spite of the fact that, in general, the organizations were not able to provide exact data regarding the scope of their activities, all organizations reported increases in the scope of activity and the number of clients. All organizations reported an increase in the number of requests. Advocacy organizations pointed to a significant increase in protest activities, partially due to an increase in the level of involvement of activists and members. In fact, both activities and involvement increased as the war continued and public criticism increased. The foundations also reported increased grantmaking to a wider target population as well as to new target populations. Organizations working with special needs populations reported significant increases in the scope of referrals.

Certain organizations provided information about the scope of activities during the interviews and other organizations were unable or not interested in providing information regarding scope of activities. One food distribution organization sent 45,000 packages to soldiers, residents of the North and Northern residents that were staying in the center. The organization provided between 1,400 and 1,500 meals per day (in contrast to 1,000 meals per day, routinely provided). Other material aid organizations did not provide numerical data ("*We sent more food but there was no time to record*", "*We don't have control, don't know exactly, everything we received we sent on*"). One of the foundations reportedly hosted 300-400 families, the minority in private homes and the rest in the Kfar Silver Village boarding school. The organizations in the central city hosted approximately 1,000 Northern residents. One of the educational organizations entertained about 4,000 children and youth from the North and hosted approximately 200 families of the police and security forces. One of the youth movements ran summer camps for at least 15,000 children and youth from the North.

### **The target population:**

In addition to the increase in the number of referrals and clients, organizations reported changes in the target populations. Many organizations that under normal circumstances have regular clients opened their doors to those who aren't usually identified with the organization. The organizations in the central town normally work with welfare populations, but reported that the arriving populations were more challenging than usual (with an average of nine children per family). Mostly, organizations that work with special needs populations did not report changes in this realm. The one exception here is organizations that work with at-risk youth expanded their activities to include families. The community centers worked with new target populations. Religious organizations reported hosting secular populations. Organizations that focus on trauma insisted on continuing their work with the intended target populations but found themselves increasingly working with children and youth. The foundations reported the allocation of resources to additional populations. In the field of informal education, the services were provided to youth who are not normally affiliated with the organizations. Advocacy organizations reported an expansion of their usual clients and service users.

*Dissemination of information:* The organizations used diverse means to inform the public about organizational activities. Dissemination channels included advertising through the local authorities, announcements in bomb shelters, advertising through the media, mutual referrals through organizational help lines and the participation in telephone listings published by other organizations. Some of the organizations, relating to the public exposure received during the war, expressed hopes to increase their clientele.

### **D.1.B. Resources**

The activities during this time of emergency demanded more resources than are available to the organizations during normal times. Despite the difficulties, the organizations succeeded in obtaining the necessary monetary and human resources, though at times, this success came at the sacrifice of alternative programming.

### **The use of organizations' monetary resources**

To all the organizations it became clear that the funding of extra activities is not possible using their current budgets. However, this did not slow down their activities. The organizations decided to proceed and thus, proceeded, and engaged in fundraising parallel to carrying out the necessary activities or at a later phase. 17 organizations reported using their monetary reserves or other organizational sources, although just 6 organizations reported decreasing or cancelling activities due to costs. Some of the organizations reported that they lost income due to cancelled activities in the North or activities that were cancelled in order to enable assistance to the residents of the North. Most of the organizations indicated that they provided temporary funding and that they

expect that their costs will be covered later by funds from various sources that the organization was promised during the war. A small number of organizations even indicated that there was a surplus. Even those organizations that reported cutbacks claimed that the cutbacks did not threaten the stability of the organization.

The situation was different with regard to the advocacy organizations. Their budgets are more flexible and allow for reallocation of resources so long as the mission and ideology of the organization are respected. In these organizations, the budget is allocated according to the priority of issues at a specific point in time and because the war and its repercussions were the burning issues at the time, resources were marked for such activities and there was no need for additional fundraising (It should be noted however, that advocacy organizations that significantly increased their activities or added new activities did need to fundraise).

## **Fundraising**

Most organizations did need to fundraise due to their increased costs. Some of the central trends included:

- A. Fundraising from abroad through foundations from abroad that function in Israel or directly from foundations and donors – primarily based on personal acquaintance or past cooperation. All the foundations reported special fundraising efforts in order to support their activities. These efforts were carried out primarily abroad.
- B. Fundraising (Monetary and in-kind) in Israel – The organizations received donations from foundations, private individuals and businesses. The donations from the latter included both monetary funding and in-kind contributions that were needed such as: food, entertainment kits, medicines, etc. A number of organizations pointed out the significance of the business sector's contribution and expressed hope that this would mark the beginning of future collaborative actions. The vast majority of organizations did not mention the Government as a source of funding during the war.
- C. Fundraising from Diaspora Jewry – Diaspora Jewry returned to its traditional role – quick fundraising for aid programs during times of crisis. This was carried out through a number of channels: fundraising through the traditional organizations – The Jewish Federations (through the Jewish Agency) and the Joint Distribution Committee. In contrast to their usual means of distribution which includes Government involvement, in this case, the Joint and the Jewish Agency dealt directly with the organizations, without Government involvement.
- D. E-fundraising and fundraising through direct mailings.

In some cases, the process was reversed – the funding organizations initiated the contact with organizations and guaranteed funding for specific activities for the benefit of the residents of the North. This initiative was particularly apparent with regard to informal education, where the funding party initiated the request for collaboration. The funder covered the costs of the activities and the organizations were responsible for executing the programs such as the running of day camps and other activities for the children of the North.

## **Human resources**

***Paid employees:*** All the organizations experienced significant expansions with regard to personnel, primarily the existing staff who worked overtime and cancelled summer vacation plans. Some organizations hired additional employees. In most cases, employees worked without knowing whether they would be compensated for their work. Nonetheless, most organizations reported that the employees invested tremendous efforts in order to help the residents of the North. In addition, in all cases there was pronounced mobility of human resources to new war related tasks – both from a geographic and professional perspective. For example, with regard to the foundations, the research staff served as liaisons between the foundation and the organizations as well as helped pack kits for the North. In organizations that served special needs populations, virtually the entire staff was reassigned to crisis-related activities and entire staffs relocated from the North to the Center in order to carry out tasks. In other organizations the staff operated in a different manner – large teams traveled to the North to distribute food and equipment.

The organizations were also characterized by flexibility of work modes and the finding of creative solutions in order to realize activities such as working from home in cases where the place of work could not be opened, working during the night, working from bomb shelters and the utilization of buildings and equipment of other organizations that had adapted their resources to cope with the situation in the North.

***Volunteers:*** The unique character and strength of the third sector became apparent during the war through its ability to recruit large numbers of volunteers in a short time.

Most organizations reported dramatic increases in the numbers of volunteers and the scope of volunteerism. This increase was experienced by advocacy organizations, food distribution organizations, informal education groups, community centers and the cluster of organizations in the central town, who all attested to dramatic increases in volunteerism – from hundreds to thousands. In organizations that need specially trained volunteers the increase was less significant. In such organizations, existing volunteers invested more time, recruitment efforts were reduced and the organization relied on existing volunteers and paid staff.

The volunteers undertook various roles such as traveling north to distribute food, equipment and to visit bomb shelters, replacing enlisted workers, the running of various centers throughout

the country and the running of camps. In addition, they manned telephone help lines, helped with laundry, ran kids' clubs, donated equipment, packaged food items, assisted in transporting people and products and joined protest activities.

The majority of our interviewees expressed satisfaction with the volunteering spirit within the organization. They felt that the organizations' and volunteers' dedication and sense of responsibility exceeded their expectations. The volunteers operated with an intense desire and did everything in their power to further the organization's activities, including opening branches and help centers – even in locations where the home front command center ordered people not to go to work – endangering themselves and working around the clock. Many of the organizations noted that without these volunteers the activities could not have taken place.

Some of the organizations debated ethical dilemmas with relation to enlisting volunteers in emergency situations, and in certain cases they even decided not to use volunteers. Organizations debated about the ethical dilemma of employing volunteers "under fire" and noted the intricacy of using volunteers in life threatening situations. For these reasons, some organizations chose not to use volunteers or to at least not to direct them, but rather enabled volunteers to function, if they chose to. In addition, the interviewees noted the situation's effect on the volunteers – using volunteers in times of crisis may expose them to difficult emotional situations and therefore, their activities during the war may have psychological implications that should be addressed. Some of the organizations developed and implemented workshops about coping with trauma in order to support the staff and volunteers as well as offered support and guidance subsequent to the war.

### **D.1.C. Collaborative actions**

The crisis resulted in collaborative actions among organizations that were expressed in various ways. The massive demand from the field and the need to map services, to maximize their efficiency and reach recipients caused the organizations to initiate collaborations, to respond to calls for cooperation or to strengthen existing collaborative actions. The organizations' social network formed the basis for collaborative actions and thus, the majority of relationships formed during the war were based on past collaborations with other organizations.

#### **Existing or new collaborative actions**

All the organizations in the research reported collaborative actions with other groups during the war. It is possible to see that during the war, organizations from all three sectors worked together. Most obvious were collaborations with foundations and private donors as well as with other third sector organizations. Although to a lesser degree, collaborative actions also existed with government or municipalities and with business firms.

In most cases, collaborative actions took place in an ad hoc manner, according to the demands that arose in the field. However, in a significant number of cases the collaborations were contracted or formally programmed. The contractual form was most evident in organizations that collaborated with the Joint Distribution Committee and with the Jewish Agency. In cases where the relationship was not formalized, the organizations emphasized that the various demands that derived from the field caused them to be flexible and to constantly change their reactions and thus, they had difficulties consolidating a program: "*Things were frantic and there were constant changes*". In many instances, attempts were undertaken to formalize activities or meetings were held to coordinate amongst the organizations and to provide current updates, and some organizations succeeded in partially formalizing the collaborations during the war. Apart from spontaneous collaborations amongst organizations, the following patterns were prominent:

- Numerous coalitions among organizations were formed such as "Israel Together", the Foundation Forum and the coalition that the organizations we studied in the central town had formed. Existing forums intensified their activities and worked together to pool resources, to map needs and to improve the organizations' abilities to respond.
- Collaborations between foundations and organizations were common, and were based on an understanding of complementary roles, whereby the foundations concentrated on resource development and funding and the organizations carried out the projects in the field. The Jewish Agency and the Joint Distribution Committee were major players and partnered with a large number of organizations. A substantial number of organizations noted the importance of this relationship and the fast response of the funding organizations to needs that arose from the field.
- Collaborative actions amongst advocacy organizations: The organizations expanded existing collaborative partnerships with other advocacy organizations and to a lesser extent, formed new partnerships. Civil rights organizations in the Arab sector even attempted to form new relationships with Lebanese organizations and international governmental organizations in order to carry out humanitarian work in Lebanon.

***Collaborative actions with the third sector:*** Most of the collaborative actions amongst third sector organizations involved a division of labor based on the organizations' expertise. For instance, advocacy organizations divided their work based on the organization's expertise such that some concentrated on public relations, some on organizing protest events, others on mass mobilization etc. Service organizations and the cluster of organizations in the central town divided the work according to professional specializations. The collaborative actions between foundations and organizations were divided according to the character of the organization – funders need "field organizations" and the latter need resources, and thus collaborations between third sector organizations and foundations were usually based on the completion of roles: the former execute and the latter fundraise and finance. For example, organizations involved in

informal education provided activities including training and volunteers and the funding agency mobilized funds from American Jewish communities and covered the cost of the children's stay at camp.

New collaborative relationships worked well when the organizations complemented one another or when the collaborative action was based on certain expertise and each organization worked in the field that it was familiar with. In contrast, when the fields of activities were similar to one another, competition arose between the organizations with regard to activities or resources and collaborations were less successful. In some instances, achieving collaboration was difficult due to power struggles and attempts to monopolize the publicity and success for the benefit of one organization. One example involves food distribution organizations that attempted to form a coalition in order to increase effectiveness. However, as a result of inter-organizational competition, the cooperation did not always work well.

**Collaborative actions with the public sector:** Regarding collaboration with municipalities, various patterns were noted. In some cases, the collaborations were marginal whereas some respondents testified to successful collaboration including the provision of information, assistance, funding and guidance. In certain cases, the municipalities were powerless and the organizations helped them function. Municipalities that function well under normal circumstances succeeded in functioning during the war, whereas, those that have trouble functioning under normal circumstances also had difficulties during the war. Other Governmental organizations were mentioned such as the social security agency, certain army units and the ministries of education, health and welfare that were involved in the organizations' activities during the time of crisis. However, most organizations felt that the power of Governmental offices was lessened and they had difficulties functioning. In many instances, their functioning was limited to coordination amongst organizations and referring persons seeking assistance to the third sector. Notably, advocacy organizations tend not to collaborate with municipalities and Governmental organizations, with the exception of one organization that invited a representative from a Government agency to participate in its steering committee.

***Collaborative actions with the business sector:*** Although this type of collaboration was mentioned less than others, a number of patterns existed:

- ***Donations*** – Businesses and manufacturers aided organizations and donated money as well as in-kind donations such as equipment, toy kits, hygiene products, food and other products.
- ***Client referrals*** – Organizations providing services to special needs populations contacted similar organizations in the commercial sector in order to refer clients that needed assistance.
- ***Joint cost absorption*** – A new form of collaboration between foundations and businesses involved the purchasing of products at cost from manufacturers, thereby enabling foundations to purchase more equipment.

***Standpoints about collaborative actions:*** Most of the organizations expressed their satisfaction with the collaborative actions that took place during the war and spoke of their importance to the organization's activities and successes during this period. Civil rights organizations in the Arab sector and religious organizations utilized existing collaborations and coalitions that were established for times of emergency and activated in the past, proving themselves successful. Foundations were satisfied with the deepening of relationships with organizations: "until now the relationship was basically platonic and now it is more real". Organizations of the informal education system were happy to collaborate with the Jewish Agency. From within the cluster of organizations in the central town many organizations noted the community feeling that was formed, the cooperation between religious and secular organizations that usually do not work together and the spirit of volunteerism that accompanied the activities.

Nonetheless, a small number of organizations reported that the collaborative actions were not successful because of mendacious motivations, personal interests, power struggles and attempts to achieve publicity through the media.

## **D.2. Evaluating the activities**

### **Task accomplishment**

Organizations that provided services in the North evaluated their success differently than those organizations that provided services outside the line of fire, advocacy organizations and foundations. The latter defined their success in responding to requests and needs as complete or nearly complete: "*We responded 100% to what was asked of us*"; "*We succeeded in voicing the public's standpoint and in affecting the public dialogue about the war*", "*One hundred and twenty percent*".

In contrast, organizations that functioned in the North evaluated their activities as less successful. Although they exerted great efforts, expanded their activities to previously unknown scopes, and exhausted their organizational capacity, the needs were much greater than the organizations were able to cope with or respond to adequately. The interviewees indicated that when they reached the populations in need, additional needs and persons in need were exposed: "*As more volunteers were brought in the needs increased as did volunteer burn out*". Therefore, feelings of frustration were intensified: "*We did all we could but it was just a drop in the sea*". From a different viewpoint, feelings of ambiguity were voiced: "*I don't know, It's impossible to know. What are the parameters? It is possible to say that we reached our goals: love of the people, converting bomb shelters into community centers and leverage for the authorities, but the feeling is that it is not possible to satisfy the needs*".

The organizations distinguished between completing tasks that they defined for themselves and the comprehensive situation. Their general feeling was that they were filling the role that the Government should have: The organizations could assist in completing the scope of needed services but are not

able to complete the tasks alone. They are convinced that the Government's failure to participate in the provision of services and a solid foundation for such provision by third sector organizations is the central factor explaining the difficulties in effectively responding to all the needs that arose during the war. Criticism was expressed about the Government's and the municipalities management of the situation, in particular regarding their failure to provide accurate information about the nature and scope of arising needs. Lack of coordination, specifically, the Government's failure to coordinate aid efforts, was presented as an additional obstacle to meeting needs.

### **Long term effects on the organizations**

In spite of the fact that most organizations that worked in the North felt that their efforts were insufficient and that the organizations exerted tremendous efforts to implement special programming, most organizations anticipate that this period will carry predominantly positive implications for them. The most prominent implications mentioned by a large number of organizations included:

- ***Improved organizational efficiency and intra-organizational planning and coordination*** – The interviewees noted that coping with projects of such enormous scope provided them with experience and knowledge that they can utilize in future activities. Many of the organizations claimed that their experience during this period will help them work in a more planned manner, specifically with respect to long term planning. A minority of organizations decided to develop a plan of action for emergency situations or to formalize the work plan that was developed during the war.
- ***Improvements in organizational cohesion*** – Some of the organizations claimed that intra-organizational communication improved as a result of activities during this period, that organizational cohesion increased and that work processes improved. There was also a reported increase in the organizations' solidarity and as well as an improved sense of responsibility and involvement of members, workers and volunteers.
- ***Improvements in the inter-organizational network*** – An additional benefit of this period was the strengthening and broadening of organizations' external connections. Many of the organizations claimed that the collaborative activities with similar organizations as well as with different types of organizations, including the Government and municipalities as well as funders were strengthened. As we will mentioned later, the organizations hope to preserve the collaborative relationships that were set up or strengthened during the war.
- ***Improvements in image and positioning*** – The interviewees indicated that the activities that were carried out, particularly in light of the helplessness of the public authorities, served to improve the image and positioning of the interviewed organizations as well as the entire third sector. The organizations stated that their image improved in the eyes of the Government, donors and funders as well as the general public:

*"What was good about this war is that the third sector was transformed into an element that cannot be ignored anymore. It is not possible to ignore its importance, abilities and strength in emergency situations";*

*"The connection with the Government proved the importance of our organization; in the Government they are learning to value this";*

*"People in the city and the country are now more familiar with the organization".*

In addition, organizations that work with vulnerable populations emphasized that the activities also served to improve the image of the populations because the public witnessed that such population segments also volunteer and are able to help themselves.

- ***Improvements in resource development*** – The connections that were made with new funding sources, particularly with Diaspora Jewry, and the public image assist in resource development – *"The donors believe that they have a reliable and professional partner"*.
- ***The promotion of volunteerism*** – Organizations state that the public understood the importance of volunteerism and this will bring forth the promotion of volunteerism in the future, both in their particular organizations and in Israeli society in general. In addition, they noted that the volunteers' sense of responsibility was strengthened. They also note that the organizations' volunteer base was expanded and that they expect to enjoy long term benefits as a result – *"We plan to recruit the new volunteers for additional activities and continue our connection with them"*. Organizations also stated that the activities undertaken during the war expanded their scope of operations to include new activities and target populations and that this expansion may help in recruiting new activists and strengthen the organization's status.
- ***The influence on public policy*** – The advocacy organizations pointed out that the war, the helplessness of the Government and the response of the organizations returned the issue of the State's responsibility to its citizens and the problems associated with the reduction of the welfare state to public debate. According to them, the war created a *"new policy environment"* and system of new political pressures that may lead to rethinking certain issues.
- ***The development of social capital*** – Finally, various interviewees provided different expressions of the contribution of this period to social cohesion and the building of civil society. Certain organizations stated that the activities increased feelings of community and social cohesion beyond the specific organization and mediated between organizations deriving from varying populations that did not get along previously. Examples include the secular and religious as well as among the religious between the observant and ultra orthodox.

Not all the ramifications of this period were perceived by the interviewees as positive. Some of the organizations must cope with the consequences of the war on their clients as well as on their organization and expect that it will take time and resources until the effects are reduced. Among the

mentioned challenges are:

- ***Coping with the residents' problems in "the day after"*** – Organizations that work with the protection of rights pointed to the "day after" as a tremendous challenge even larger than they faced during the war. They expect that the full extent of the problems will emerge after the war and they will need to assist those injured by the war to establish their rights. Organizations that provide services in the field of health note that rehabilitative care continues long after the ceasefire. Organizations engaged in emotional support attest to a similar problem – for them the end of the war is just the beginning of their work and they must prepare for the increased demand. Also, organizations that provide social services but not necessarily deal with post trauma recognize that coping with the emotional consequences of the war on their clients will require planning and special resources. Other organizations absorbed damage both with regard to infrastructure and personnel and must deal with these consequences. Some organizations emphasized the heavy emotional burden that was placed on their workers and volunteers as a result of working under stressful conditions and with vulnerable populations.
- ***Changes in economic-social policy*** – Some of the organizations are concerned about possible negative consequences of the "new policy environment". It's clear to them that the price of the war will be paid primarily by the weakened segments of the population and the cutbacks will occur in the social realm and not affect the security budget. They expect that the situation will dramatically increase the need for their services and that the budgetary cutbacks will make it difficult for them to provide these services.
- ***The social effects of the war*** – Community organizations noted the leadership crisis that arose as a result of the war's failures, and foresee that this will inhibit their ability to work within the communities and will bring forth ongoing challenges.
- ***Management and organizational problems*** – The organizations noted that the need for new brainstorming and organization in light of the new circumstance will drain resources and energies and will negatively affect their routine activities. They also emphasized monetary concerns and estimated that the budgets intended for activities throughout the year will be reduced due to use of organizational reserves during the war, including equipment that was intended for use during the entire year and loss of income as a result of cancelled activities. As a result, the coming year's activity planning will be harmed due to the redirection of resources and attention during the war: "We didn't have time or energy to plan the coming year."
- ***Criticism of third sector organizations*** – Advocacy organizations and particularly Arab organizations noted the public criticism against the organizations in that they cooperated with the Government without criticism, that they weren't efficient enough and that through their activities they allowed the Government to shun its public and social responsibilities. One organization noted that "*As a result of the chaos, they [the municipality] succeeded in giving a place to every organization and enjoyed the reality that they were thus freed from many tasks and did not spend even one Shekel*".

## **Retaining changes in activities**

Since many organizations saw the changes in activities as leading to long term positive results, they intended to preserve some of the changes. First and foremost, they hoped to preserve and formalize the collaborative contacts that were formed and strengthened during the war. A number of organizations noted that they are interested in formalizing and making permanent the emergency preparedness forums that were established with their colleagues and to utilize them in order to coordinate and plan activities during both routine times and times of emergency. The interviewees enumerated that in particular, they will preserve the protocols and collaborative actions that worked in the past and were broadened during the war (for instance, joint activities that were carried out during the disengagement and once again during the war).

In contrast, some of the organizations, in particular advocacy organizations and some of the larger service organizations testified that they intended to return to their pre-war activities. This phenomenon is particularly prominent amongst the peace and the advocacy groups that dramatically altered their activities and began supplying services in lieu of advocacy. However, the return to normalcy is not always as simple as they hoped it to be. Pressures exist from within the organization as well as from the clients to continue their new activities, even if these activities are not in par with the organization's original identity. The situation brings forth a difficult dilemma amongst the organizations. Even the organizations that are working to return to their former routines, intend to do so through the adaptation of their activities to the new realities. For example, organizations that provide human services intend to address the topic of post-trauma by training their workers to relate as such to their clients. The peace organizations are hoping to return to their work relating to Palestinian issues but are intending to also deal with issues relating to the Northern borders and the relationships with Syria and Lebanon.

## **Evaluation of the third sector's functioning in comparison to the public sector**

The interviewees' assessments of the functioning of the third sector during the war were significantly better than their assessments of the functioning of the Government and municipalities. The interviewees pointed out a number of prominent characteristics relating to the functioning of organizations that they believe justify such a positive assessment and voiced strong criticism regarding the functioning of various public bodies. Together with this, in a nearly unanimous manner, the interviewees claim that the organizations, in effect, carried out the role of the Government and argue that if things were as they should, the Government and municipalities would have carried out the major portion of the third sector's activities during the war.

It should be noted that our interviewees were less critical of municipalities than of Government. In their view, the municipalities' level of functioning wasn't uniform, and to some extent, the interviewees identified with the municipalities' financial distress and difficulties during the war. Little criticism was also voiced against civil society organizations.

The interviewees' main message was that the Government was almost completely non functional while the organizations functioned to the best of their abilities. Assessments of third sector organizations most often included praise regarding their flexibility and quick response. This assessment was voiced by the organizations themselves as well as by the foundation representatives interviewed whose perspective is more systemic and critical due to the fact that they are familiar with the activities of many organizations. Massive criticism was voiced regarding the Government's functioning in that it did not react as it should have and if it did function, its activities were too little and too late: *"There is no doubt that civil society organizations reacted quickly and their reaction was relevant to the needs. The Government took its time to establish the welfare headquarters and the headquarters of the Office of the Prime Minister"*. Furthermore: *"The nonprofits proved themselves....there were no lengthy processes of back and forth, committees....with us, it was from now to now"*. Others added: *"It is easier for nonprofits from the perspective of financial management, availability of budgets and fundraising. In nonprofits, the decision making process is fast – the nonprofits thought and during one day implemented and by the first day, they were there. They have the ability to skip the red tape since they aren't dependant on protocols as is the State who only after an entire month was successful in establishing a tent camp in the Yarkon Park"*.

A different issue which yielded praise for the organizations and criticism towards the Government and the local authorities involved the commitment and sense of responsibility toward the public. The interviewees positively noted the organizations' commitment, the functioning in the line of fire of both employees and volunteers and their responsiveness. One foundation representative said: *"The need to mobilize for action and for social contribution is part of the organizational culture (of nonprofits). There was no need to market the need – just to respond."* In contrast, with regard to the public authorities the prominent characteristic was abandonment and a total absence of the service system. One of the interviewees noted: *"On an individual basis, the people in the municipality responded – They brought food from their homes, etc..., however on a system wide level, the municipality wasn't there – they did not spend a shekel"*. A different interviewee answered the question about the ability of the *Ministry of Welfare* to coordinate and map the organizations that functioned in the field: *"The Ministry of Welfare– what's that?"* According to other interviews: *"There was a vacuum that was filled by social organizations"*, *"The municipalities and the State's weakness was exposed"*, *"The Government failed....abandoning the home front"*, *"There was a total bankruptcy of the Government in respect to assisting its residents, it is appalling"*, *"The public authorities did not function whatsoever. I am not aware of anybody that functioned in an organized manner... we moved after two days – and they – nothing"*. The overall description regarding the workings of the Government and the authorities is of physical absence from the field – offices did not open, people were not there, and services were not provided. Strong criticism surrounds the fact that the Government did not declare war and thus, did not implement systems that were ready to deal with situations such as this such as the inter-ministry protocols for working with volunteers of the emergency preparedness regulations. As reflected in the words of the interviewees, the authorities and the Government did not convey a sense of responsibility towards the public, they avoided responsibility and were pleased by the participation of third sector organizations since they were able to count on them to continue and thus, avoid all actions and financial expenditures.

Further criticism involved crucial data needed to respond to needs. Certain organizations assessed that one of the issues that burdened them more than any other with regard to responding to the needs of the residents of the North was the lack of organized information about what the needs were, where they were located, information that was in the hands of municipalities, in the hands of the education and welfare ministries but was not available in order for the organizations to reach the many residents in need. The municipalities did not demonstrate "control on the ground" , did not know which needs were not yet met, which services were available and existing, which authorities were functioning and which were not, and how the organizations worked and what services they offered. Large organizations that functioned in the North on a large scope pointed out that the situation created a coordination problem amongst the organizations including redundancy in some places and service gaps in others. The authorities had no organized mapping, knowledge or experience. An additional problem was the authorities' difficulties in coping with the many organizations that were working on the ground, a difficulty that was intensified due to problems of control and lack of information within the authorities. There were also instances of amateurish management and even corruption within the authorities.

From the testimony of the interviewees, the functioning of public agencies was not uniform. There were Government offices that responded a bit quicker, and recognized the need to assist the organizations in the field with respect to coordination and funding, although their actual participation was limited and in the best cases, came to fruition only in the final week of the fighting. In this respect, there were a few references of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Welfare. Towards the Ministry of Education there was primarily criticism. With respect to the municipalities, some of the interviewees stated that authorities that functioned relatively well during normal times, functioned relatively well during the war. Together with this, most of the decision making in municipalities was not organized, activities were usually the initiative of individuals and in some cases, it was the community center that ran the activities and not the municipality. Some organizations identified with the difficulties of the local authorities. The interviewees from the Arab organizations pointed to the budgetary difficulties of the Arab local authorities and said that this problem made it difficult for them to function and coordinate. In the central town it was said that city hall wanted to help but lacked resources, and had to rely on "*shady deals*" to obtain equipment (such as mattresses) since the warehouses for times of emergency did not open.

Some criticism was also heard regarding the third sector. It should be noted that such criticism were very few. A number of organizations criticized the lack of coordination between organizations which resulted in redundancies in services in certain areas and locations, on the one hand, and a lack of services in other fields or locations. In addition, there was criticism about struggles over resources, prestige and publicity. Interviewees from Arab organizations claimed that the organizations did not respond quickly enough and were not critical enough with regard to the Government.

### **D.3. Attitudes and recommendations of third sector organizations**

#### **The roles of the third sector and civil society during times of war**

All interviewees shared the view that the responsibility for the activities that were carried out by the organizations should have fallen on the Government, and that the organizations' abilities to satisfy all needs, even if their functioning was optimal, was limited. The entry of some Governmental bodies, however delayed, was considered as proper and important: "It's good that in the end the Government adopted a leadership role", said one of the foundation representatives.

All interviewed organizations strongly conveyed the belief that they do not hold the responsibility for providing services to the population in case of emergency, and that such activity is the Government's exclusive responsibility: at the most, organization's may have a complementary role. In essence, in many cases, this standpoint reflects frustrations regarding the reality in more peaceful times as well.

*"During regular times everyone relies on the nonprofits and this is the way it is during times of crisis as well"; and also: "The role of organizations should be backup and support; filling gaps. First response with regard to instances where the large public system takes time to respond; In marginal cases where the public system cannot reach; In actuality, it was not like this at all and the described situation is true during all the days of the year".*

One of the interviewees also reserved criticism for third sector organizations and the roles that they take on:

*"It would be appropriate to define this according to roles (of the organizations) as providing support and back up, as completing the public system. It would be appropriate to place the volunteer bodies in their correct place. They also have to accept this and not have false pretenses".*

One interviewee expressed his frustration regarding the situation, *"the organizations became the backbone and the Government functioned on the margins"* and claimed that the reverse situation is the ideal. Together with this, many asserted that the third sector does need to participate in the effort because of its proximity to the population and because of its ability to quickly activate various resources.

However, even if the perspective is that all responsibility is the Government's, different views were expressed regarding how the third sector should be integrated into the effort of providing services during emergency situations, taking into consideration the sector's structural advantages.

It is possible to present these views on a continuum where **one end** represents the perspective that the role of third sector organizations during times of emergency is to place pressure on the Government to fulfill its role and it is not the third sector's role to provide services in lieu of the Government, thus

providing Government with a safety net. Along with this perspective one finds also opposition to inter-agency coordination, especially if the State is the coordinating body, as it is perceived as jeopardizing the organizations' autonomy. It is not surprising that the above described perspective was shared exclusively by organizations whose only role is advocacy, and criticizing Government is their bread and butter throughout the year. These organizations normally do not provide direct services or receive requests for aid, so they experience the distress of individuals to a lesser extent. **On the other end** of the spectrum lies the view that in cases of emergency, third sector organizations need to be integrated in a comprehensive system of response, coordinated by government on both national and local levels. This view is held, by and large, by organizations who during normal times are tied to Government activities and work in coordination with Government agencies. **Between these two extremes** lies the perspective that third sector organizations need to "fill the gaps", each in its area of expertise, and to care for the special needs populations (the disabled, the elderly, etc...) with which they are familiar. Their activities need to be part of a comprehensive system of services provided as part of the national emergency response system: "*Everyone has his own niche – every nonprofit is good at something else. We need to build a system of how to work in the locality and divide the work in an efficient manner*". This perspective also maintains that it is not the Government's responsibility to organize the third sector organizations; if during times of emergency a need arises for a system of coordination, such a system needs to be voluntary – by third sector organizations. This perspective is shared primarily by organizations that aid specific populations and also advocate on their behalf; such organizations do not receive (or receive limited) of public funding.

Notwithstanding, even organizations that claimed that it is the Government's responsibility to provide for the population in the home front, do not recommend that third sector organizations should "*stand on the sidelines*" and not assist in the process. In essence, times of emergency reflect an outstanding situation in which there exists a natural tendency for everyone to behave in a way different than the norm due to witnessing the distress of others. Empathy towards individual suffering is a universal human attribute. Throughout the world, when an emergency situation occurs, taking various forms, we witness an increase in the levels of philanthropy and volunteerism of individuals within the society, who portray greater levels of identification and readiness to "give of themselves" than they do during routine times. This phenomenon occurred at this time in Israel as well. It isn't surprising that also third sector organizations, characterized by activities relating to contributions and volunteering during routine times, cannot remain idle. This remains true even if they criticize the functioning and role of the Government and feel as if they are carrying out the Government's work. The way they see it, if they had chosen to wait until the Government would assume its inherent role, the wait could have been in vain. The cynics claimed that the Government was aware of this and thus such readiness to respond is a type of negative incentive for government action. Together with this, without empathy for the individual and a readiness to help, we would be left with a third sector that is calculated but not considerate, political yet not humane, busy with rivalry and not solidarity. Even those that would like the third sector to be more calculating don't want to see it cross such borders.

## **The organizations' recommendations**

The organizations' recommendations about future preparations for emergency situations focused on two topics: the need to gather data about needs and resources, preferably on a local level, and the need to coordinate amongst the groups providing services in order to avoid wasting resources and guaranteeing that aid is received by all in need.

**Collection of data:** Lack of information or incomplete information about the needs of the population in the conflict zone and of the evacuees in the country's center and south, on the one hand, and about resources (monetary, human and organizational) on the other hand, contributed to the ineffective provision of services and wasted resources. Complaints about shortages of food, medicines and diapers in bomb shelters received extensive publicity. On the other hand there were an abundance of resources that "looked for" takers. A truck full of carrots, donated by a supermarkets chain, arrived in Nahariya, and no one was available to receive it. In the end, the driver unloaded the carrots next to one of the shelters because *"he was not about to return to Tel Aviv with the goods"*. Also, the private foundations who received requests for aid from both individuals and organizations, wished they could utilize information that would have enabled them to better respond to needs.

The need to address the lacking information was mentioned by many respondents. One organization recommended establishing a central body that will function during routine times, and would assemble basic data about all the organizations, their fields of operations and contact information. A different organization mentioned a similar idea to be carried out on a local level:

*"There is a need for some central body that will know about all existing activities. We need to be more ready for next time. We should establish a data base – a list of all reliable and responsible organization and their expertise"*.

The following statement of one foundation director reflects the frustration from the point of view of someone that wanted to help:

*"A reliable source of information from which the needs may be ascertained is missing. There was anarchy – everyone received emails and telephone calls but there wasn't any data. Large organizations such as the Association of Community Centers were able to fulfill major roles because they have an infrastructure throughout the country. Also, the Joint Distribution Committee and the Jewish Agency utilized them."*

One of the interviewees spoke about data whose role isn't limited to a specific organization but rather to the coordination amongst organizations:

*"There is great importance in receiving an accurate map of existing services in the field – of the public sector and the third sector. Only when there is a clear picture of existing services can a framework for coordination be established"*.

**Coordination:** Within the Israeli system for the coordination of activities during times of emergency exist clear regulations with regard to the distribution of food, the activation of volunteers, etc. As known, this framework was not activated since its activation requires an official declaration of war. Such a declaration has repercussions on the Israeli economy internationally and thus, it was avoided. In the absence of a clear Governmental framework that took responsibility on the provision of services, there was no alternative framework and in practice, each organization had to establish its own way. In a number of municipalities a "social HQ" was established that attempted to coordinate amongst the involved groups, but in others no such system existed.

The need to coordinate the activities of organizations during emergency times was raised by most of the interviewees and their answers point to four prominent models:

1. Such coordination is the role of the Government, whether or not an official state of emergency is declared. The Government needs to prepare action plans for emergency situations. It also needs to activate umbrella organizations and of course, coordinate all efforts with the municipalities.
2. Coordination efforts should be the responsibility of municipalities who are in direct contact with the population. In the opinion of one of the interviewees: *"A local coordinator should be appointed, perhaps an emergency committee that is not too large with three members from the municipality and another three from the larger nonprofits. There should be a staff capable of quick action like those existing in the territories; in case of a crisis – within 12 hours the committee meets and there is an organized response from all the municipal functions"*.
3. The Government or the municipalities should not coordinate the activities of the third sector; if this happens there is interference and impairment of their autonomy. The Government should not formally define the relationship between third sector organizations during emergency situations. According to one interviewee, there is place to sign a compact between the Government and the third sector and under such a framework to relate to various issues potentially arising in emergency situations.
4. There should be an attempt to find an emergency coordination framework for the third sector on a local scale – possibly in the form of "roundtables" of all the organizations working on the local level. Such a framework, if it would exist throughout the year, would enable proper functioning during emergency situations as well.

In conclusion, we can state that in the opinion of all our interviewees, regardless of who they think holds the responsibility to establish a framework of coordination, it is necessary to prepare for emergency situations in time and not wait until an emergency is at hand. If the Government wishes to include the third sector within such a framework then they need to include them in the process of defining the framework as well.

## **E. Discussion**

In spite of the fact that the humanitarian crisis that occurred in Israel during the war was unique, we are discovering similarities between the reactions of third sector organizations in Israel and such organizations faced with disasters and emergency situations throughout the world. Yet it also differs from most of the crises referred to in the literature on the role of third sector organizations in emergencies. The crisis in the North was progressive in that it lasted for many days and the needs that arose as a result of it did so during the war and demanded action "under fire". In the majority of disasters described in the literature and research, there exists an acute event such as a natural disaster or a terror attack, whereby coping with the humanitarian crisis is subsequent to the event. Nonetheless, in all such humanitarian crises, third sector organizations (in literature about humanitarian response they are referred to as non-governmental organizations – NGOs) had crucial roles. Third sector organizations were present in the responses in humanitarian crises following natural disasters such as the earthquakes in Iran, India and Japan, mudslides in the Philippines, the Tsunami in the Indian Ocean and after the hurricane in New Orleans and the Caribbean Islands. They were also involved in coping with the tragic consequences of manmade disasters such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City (Derryck and Abzug 2002; Christoplos, Mitchell and Liljelund 2001). In effect, the scope of assistance provided by non governmental organizations during some of the catastrophes of the 1980's and 1990's was of much greater proportions than the UN was able to raise (Bennet 1994). As in these international cases, also in Israel, third sector organizations boasted an impressive scope of involvement in the provision of humanitarian aid to the residents of the North as well as the evacuees during the war. Even though complete and accurate data is not available, it is possible to assume that dozens or even hundreds of organizations were active in the North and aided displaced persons in the country's other regions, and provided a wide variety of services, beginning from the most basic such as food and shelter as well as the protection of rights, community work and psychological treatment. From the interviews that we performed, we understand that the scope of the activities of the involved organizations was particularly large and that they employed many more workers, activated increased numbers of volunteers and spent significantly more funds than in their routine peacetime activities.

Clearly, the third sector's actions during the Second Lebanon War were not routine. Nonetheless, the intensity of the emergency situation and the powerful involvement of the third sector together with the emphasis that the absence of the public sector placed on their involvement brings to the fore major questions regarding the functioning and roles of these organizations in both times of emergency and routine times. From the findings derived from the interviews with the managers of organizations and the survey, certain general issues were raised. The first involves the question of the unique characteristics of the third sector and what these characteristics have to do with their place with regard to humanitarian response during times of emergency and crises or even during routine times. The second question is the nature of the relationship between the Government and the third sector in Israel –what do the events of the war tell regarding the relationship between the Government and the third sector? With regard to this issue, the question asked is what is the ideal place of the third

sector within the national system during times of emergency and what needs to be considered with respect to the sector's integration. Finally, what are the long term effects of the activities during the war on the organizations?

### **E.I. Unique characteristics of the third sector**

The third sector has structural advantages that are derived from its special character and that can explain the wide variety of roles that the sector fulfills within the society and economy (see, Kramer 1981; Slamon, Hems and Chinnock 2000).

- **Flexibility:** Due to its organizational structure that integrates formal and informal aspects, organizations are flexible and able to adapt themselves to changing circumstances and offer new solutions to old problems.
- **Autonomy:** They enjoy relatively high levels of autonomy from political, managerial and financial perspectives that allow them to work with issues that other sectors are not able or interested in working with because such actors do not find economic or political justification (or usefulness) in doing so.
- **Credibility:** Limitations on the distribution of profits, their involvement in the promotion of social goals and the public's involvement within the organizations as members or volunteers reaffirm their credibility in the eyes of the public.
- **Responsiveness:** In many cases third sector organizations emerge from within the communities that they serve and community members participate in activities as volunteers, activists or employees. Thus, they have a deep understanding and relationship with the communities which they serve and are also deeply committed to their advancement. In addition, many third sector organizations were established with altruistic motives that also serve as contributing motives.
- **Expertise:** Due to their monetary and organizational limitations, third sector organizations tend to focus on a particular population group, issue or intervention technique. This focus causes them to become experts in their fields.
- **Civil Society:** Third sector organizations are a part of civil society – they promote volunteerism and social participation and thus empower communities and individuals and contribute to the development of their social capital. They act as mediating organizations, at times bridging between the citizen and the political system, and at times acting as a buffer between the citizen and the Government.

However, the organizational characteristics of the third sector may also yield limitations making it more difficult for them to reach their goals. Five main limitations include:

- **Particularism:** Due to their tendency to focus on a specific target group, the organizations may exclude other social groups or increase the polarization between different social groups.
- **Paternalism:** The fact that third sector organizations provide services on a philanthropic basis and not on a legal basis may increase dependencies on the part of those receiving aid.
- **Amateurism or overspecialization:** A risk of reduced managerial capacity and organizational professionalism exists among third sector organizations that are based on volunteers. On the other hand, in third sector organizations that rely exclusively on professionals and whose work doesn't include members of the community which they serve, exists a risk that the clients, members and laypersons within the organization will not have adequate opportunity to affect the organization's goals and policies.
- **Resource dependency:** Third sector organizations suffer from chronic shortages of funds that may cause them to develop dependence on outside sources of aid (such as philanthropic foundations or Governmental agencies) and their meek budgets make it difficult to effect an extensive impact on social problems.
- **Accountability:** Since such organizations often have numerous stakeholders with differing and at times conflicting interests, it is difficult to identify on whose behalf the organizations function and to whom they are accountable.

Several of these characteristics were expressed in the organizations' activities during the war. Similarly to what was witnessed in various humanitarian crises throughout the world, the organizations in Israel responded quickly to the new circumstances and expressed great flexibility in their abilities to modify the character of their work and to broaden the scope of their activities and target populations. Their flexibility is expressed especially in their ability to mobilize human resources for the new activities. In particular, this flexibility was apparent with regard to volunteers – the ability to recruit such large numbers of volunteers in a short period of time grants great flexibility at low cost. Also, the behavior of the paid staff that increased the scope of their work immediately, occasionally receiving only partial compensation, is characteristic of this sector. They were also flexible in their ability to raise funds for the activities and products distributed to those in need. The flexible organizational structure enabled them to adapt themselves to the changing conditions and the complexity of the occupational and financial structure allowed them to mobilize resources that the Government or commercial organizations were not able to – donations and volunteers.

One of the factors that enabled organizations to adapt their activities to the new needs was the considerable autonomy that characterizes them. The devotion to action on behalf of the residents of

the North was displayed in all cases as an independent initiative of the organizations, that was brought about as a reaction of the identification of needs on the ground and identification of the public system's weakness. The initiative that the organizations demonstrated and their ability to activate a broad and varied system of services testify to the organizations' independence. In other words, evidently, the organizations are not dependent on anyone and are able to function as they wish in order to advance issues and services that they consider to be necessary. The organizations are very much aware of the importance of their independence and meticulously defended their autonomy when they were asked what their roles need to be in relation to Government and how would it be possible to coordinate between their activities and those of the Government.

The organizations' tendency to specialize in a specific field or target population was expressed by the collaborative actions among the organizations that recognized the importance of such specializations, as well as in the value of the experience organizations accumulated in their particular fields of operations. This recognition was expressed in the collaborative actions in which the division of labor was based on the organizations' specializations, thus enabling the organizations to increase the efficiency of their response to the presented needs, the available resources and in many instances, to complement one another. Together with this, at times the specialization was also a source of difficulty for the organizations, particularly if they attempted to broaden their activities beyond their specific 'comfort zone'. As we saw, organizations that continued to function within their fields of knowledge were generally more effective than organizations that stepped beyond their parameters.

Their integration within civil society was expressed in a number of ways. A rather large portion of the public volunteerism and contributions were channeled via third sector organizations. On the one hand, the organizations offered people a framework through which they could bring forth their identification with the distress of the residents of the North and on the other hand benefited from their ability to mobilize the public's inputs. Through their own actions, the organizations proved their commitment to their target populations in particular, and to the population in need in general. They responded to the demands for services and aid that arose from the field and already in the first days of the war reacted to the situation, made organizational decisions and functioned on various fronts. They took risks and funded activities using their current budgets. The employees and volunteers demonstrated their support and also took personal risks. Moreover, the organizations reported about the volunteers' intense desire to participate in the activities and about new volunteers who arrived in order to help the residents of the North. The deficient functioning of the public sector left behind many unmet needs. Individuals and the third sector mobilized to fill this gap in light of the great hardships that they observed.

The organizations did not demonstrate greater familiarity or closeness to the populations in need than did the local authorities. In fact, the organizations admitted requesting information from the local authorities in order to identify and reach those in need of their services, considering the fact that the local authorities have greater familiarity with the local populations.

Several limitations of the third sector that are mentioned above were confirmed by our findings and others were not. The particularism that characterized third sector activities was not affirmed by our findings. Nearly all the organizations in the sample broadened and varied their target populations beyond those they serve during their routine activities. A substantial number of organizations were significantly less particularistic than they were during routine days and it may even be said that they demonstrated greater universalism than the Government. Furthermore, the majority of organizations responded to all who turned to them, even if they were not part of their regular target population. Contrastingly, the Government was willing to evacuate only the disabled placed in State institutions, and many of the municipalities were willing to assist only those that remained in municipal bomb shelters and refused to help residents in private bomb shelters, claiming that the private shelters are not under their responsibility. Of interest here is also the attempt of a number of organizations, and not exclusively Arab organizations, to offer humanitarian assistance to the residents of Lebanon. However, it should be noted that the universalistic tendencies described above are only partially accurate when the Arab population is concerned. Although it seems that more organizations offered services to the Arab residents of the North than do so during normal times, the number of organizations that related to the needs of the Arab residents of the North was small.

The amateurism that at times characterizes third sector organizations was not absent from our findings. A substantial portion of the organizations functioned without a work plan, without evaluating the program's efficiency and effectiveness and without a system of feedback between the field and the headquarters. Although improvisations and the informal management style enabled the organizations to be flexible and to respond quickly and did not prevent them from providing a complex array of services, it is reasonable to assume that protocols and appropriate management tools and greater readiness for emergency situations would have improved their ability to respond to needs.

However, the limitation that most hindered the organizations' capacity was the chronic lack of financial resources. Those organizations that were present in the field, under fire, felt that they did not succeed in responding to all needs and requests. They emphasized that they are dependent on fundraising from outside sources in order to fund such large scale operations for an extended period of time, since they do not have financial reserves that they may access. Due to the fact that funding from philanthropic sources is also insufficient to support such a large scope of services for an extended period, and is certainly not enough to confront a catastrophe of greater scale, it was clear to the organizations in this study that the Government needs to help. However, the Government hesitated to comply and in many cases in which it did comply, it did not do so in a generous manner. The budgetary distress of the organizations will continue to burden them for a significant period of time following the end of the war because they must continue to provide services and cope with the long term ramifications of the emergency situation long after the public empathy will have faded away and after the impending budget cuts for social services that will surely follow.

## **E.2. Third sector-Government relations**

The Government possesses a critical role in enabling the third sector to cope with the social needs in the wake of humanitarian disaster (Christoplos, Mitchell and Liljelund 2001). In the Second Lebanon War the State failed to coordinate actions and information that would have substantially influenced the success of aid activities of the other actors. The abilities of the authorities to coordinate actions and information greatly influenced the quality of the response to the needs of the affected population – municipalities that functioned well during routine times succeeded in better aiding the organizations' activities. The Government's refusal to accept responsibility for the residents of the North not only angered the public but also left third sector organizations alone in the field, without logistical and monetary aid that Government could provide in order to improve the scope and quality of services.

The Government's absence from the social arena during the days of the war and its handing over this arena to third sector organizations dramatically illustrates the changes that have occurred in the Israeli welfare state during the past decade, and in particular regarding the relationship between the State and the third sector. The Government's avoidance of responsibility and lack of response to the needs of its residents during a humanitarian catastrophe demonstrates the State's retreat from responsibility for the welfare of its citizens in general. In certain situations the Government even ordered Government employees in the North to cease their activities and the residents of the war zone were left to their fates. It became clear during the war that the Government implicitly and explicitly expected that the third sector would deal with the humanitarian crisis. This confirms that policy towards the third sector in Israel has moved beyond a corporatist model whereby the State utilizes and directs the third sector (Gidron, Bar Katz 2003, pp. 197), to a policy where the State shirks from its social responsibility and leaves the third sector alone in the arena. The leaders of the interviewed organizations do not hide their displeasure with this policy and point out that it is not only apparent during times of emergency, but rather, characterizes the relationship between the State and the third sector throughout the year. Hence, this policy does not have support from the public or from the third sector; the contrary is true. This finding places in question the adoption of such policies in Israel.

## **E.3. The role of the third sector in major emergencies**

According to the majority of those interviewed it is imperative to develop a system of emergency response that would include third sector-Government collaboration. They add that even if the third sector assumes a role in the emergency response system, the overarching responsibility for putting up such a system falls on the Government. The interviewees voiced various opinions regarding the nature of such collaborations; however, all agreed that its development needs to be carried out prior to the next (and imminent) crisis. Indeed collaboration between the Government and the third sector was presented in literature dealing with the participation of the third sector in emergency preparedness as the right way to address humanitarian crises (The Greater Washington Task Force on Nonprofit

Emergency Preparedness 2003, Bennet 1994; Von Bernuth 1996). The various researchers offered different principles for establishing joint actions, as follows:

- Collaborative actions need to include the coordination of activities and the division of roles between the Government and third sector and between the various third sector organizations themselves, the sharing of information about the needs of those affected by the crisis and about the available capacities and resources, in addition to logistical and monetary aid from Government.
- The system of coordination needs to be multi-level from the local to the national and international levels.
- The response system needs to be based on expertise so that each partner in the system can utilize the experience and knowledge that was developed in the past as well as its built-in advantages.
- It is important that the coordination will not take place only during times of crisis. It should be based on an ongoing system of communication and collaborations between the sectors.

Our findings indicate that, in Israel as well, the third sector has an important role in responding to emergency situations, however, this role does not need to include the assuming of all responsibilities for the needs of the population because the Government needs to be a part of this responsibility and also because the third sector's limitations prevent it from carrying out this responsibility by itself in a desirable and acceptable manner. Together with this, we have seen that the third sector has advantages that allow it to more efficiently carry out some of the necessary tasks during times of crises; among them is the ability to quickly respond to needs without delays.

Our findings revealed tension amongst the organizations regarding the recognition of the need for coordination and the need to maintain autonomy. Despite the differences of opinions amongst advocacy organizations and funding and service organizations, all agreed about the importance of maintaining organizational autonomy. Indeed, when developing systems of coordination and emergency preparedness one needs to be careful to protect the autonomy, flexibility, quick response and the other special characteristics of third sector organizations that contribute to their abilities to respond to the needs of the population.

The organizations emphasize that the coordination needs to occur both on the local and national levels. Their experience reveals that the municipalities that were able to better coordinate were also better at meeting the majority of the needs of most of those in need. Most claimed that the information about needs and distress lies primarily in the hands of municipalities and thus, they need to be integrated in the system of coordination, particularly with respect to information. Together with this, they also claim that the municipalities had difficulties identifying the resources that were available to them and had difficulties taking advantage of them in an organized fashion. This brings up the need for coordination on the part of the organizations as well. Likewise, such coordination needs to

be on a local and national level, thus, as we found that in many cases the organizations providing services on a local level are national organizations that do so in numerous locales simultaneously.

Therefore, there is room to examine what constitutes the optimal division of tasks between the Government and the third sector. However, such division of tasks should not be determined by one player, but rather through agreement and through a dialogue amongst the organizations and Government agencies. The responsibility for the development of a system of coordination should not be placed on the organizations who don't have the inherent responsibility for such and who also don't have the Government's system-wide perspective or administrative capacity. However, the organizations should not passively wait for the Government to carry out this task. If the organizations take on a passive role, most likely the relationship pattern that will be incorporated into the system will not consider their abilities, needs and limitations. Moreover, many respondents indicated there is no point in developing systems of coordination for emergency situations prior to agreement about the relationship patterns between the Government and the third sector more generally. According to them, the system of coordination for times of emergency needs to be based on a comprehensive agreement between the Government and the third sector that would recognize the importance of the third sector and define its relationship with the Government in all circumstances and not just during times of emergency. The principles of such a compact could serve as a basis for the development of specific policies in numerous areas including emergency preparedness.

#### **E.4. Ramifications of the war for the third sector**

Very little is known about the long term effects of taking part in aid efforts during humanitarian crises on third sector organizations. Various studies that evaluated the affects of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on the organizations that functioned in the affected area and in New York, in general, found that the crisis had negative long term ramifications on the organizations (Derryck and Abzug 2002; AFP 2002; Seley, Wolpert and Motta-Moss 2002). One year subsequent to the attack, one of every three organizations that were involved in responding to the populations needs reported that they had to cutback activities due to their actions during the crises. In this case, the humanitarian crisis was worsened by the economic crisis in the background – the organizations were already experiencing economic distress and the intensive activities following the attacks added to their existing difficulties. The organizations had to cope not only with the immediate needs that were increases as a result of the tragedy but also with long term increases in demand, with long term negative trends regarding available funding for the third sector and with the uncertainties brought on by the event, particularly with respect to public policies about long term rehabilitation and aid.

From within this context, it is surprising to discover that the vast majority of the organizations we studied expect that the war will positively affect them. The most prominent consequences mentioned by the greatest number of organizations were increased organizational efficiency and improvements in intra-organizational coordination, strengthening and broadening of the organization's external

connections, improvement of their inter-organizational network, improvements in the image and visibility of the organizations and of the third sector in general, improvements in the ability to raise funds due to their improved public image and the relationships they formed with new funding sources, specifically with Jewish communities in the Diaspora. That being the case, the question must be asked as to how accurate is the organizations' forecast. Most likely, the organizations will have to cope with the consequences of the war on their budgets, employees, volunteers and clients. There is a need for further research to examine this question – a study that will examine the long term ramifications of this period on the rates of public contributions and volunteerism, on the organizations' financial situations, on the public policy toward the organizations, on the public's confidence towards the organizations and the Government, etc. These questions will be addressed in a further study that we are planning.

## **E.5. Conclusion**

This study examined the functioning of third sector organizations during the Second Lebanon War and the public reaction to the humanitarian crisis that was brought on as a result of the war. What we learned from this study about the contribution of the third sector to emergency response highlights the importance of these organizations in coping with social needs aroused by the war situation, and especially when the functioning of the Government is far from satisfactory. The role that the third sector assumed during the war illustrates the importance of taking such organizations into consideration when preparing an emergency preparedness system. It is also important to preserve the strengths and capacities of the organizations to function after the period of emergency, so that during future crises they may aid those in need. All these need to be taken into account when the Government examines the state of affairs during the war and the policies that should be implemented in relation to such humanitarian crises. The Government needs to recognize the importance and contribution of the organizations during times of crises and the importance of preserving their unique characteristics that enable them to contribute – flexibility, autonomy, innovation and more. As well, the Government and the third sector need to take into account the limitations that hinder the efforts of third sector organizations to successfully cope with crises of such scope, and to guarantee that the Government fills the gaps that remain with respect to coordination, information or funding. In order to guarantee that the Government and the organizations will be able to collaborate during times of crises, a specific plan of action is insufficient. There is a need for a comprehensive agreement and principles about the relationship between the Government and the third sector that will guide their joint work during routine times and form a basis for the development of specific collaborations during times of crises. It is imperative that the organizations' input be taken into consideration not merely during the implementation of such a plan but also during its development.

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Office of the Prime Minister:

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Central Bureau of Statistics, District Maps:

[http://gis.cbs.gov.il/price\\_05/district.pdf](http://gis.cbs.gov.il/price_05/district.pdf)

## **Appendix A:**

### **List of organizations interviewed in the study**

1. Enosh – The Israel Mental health Association
2. Ittijah - Union of the Arab Community Based Organizations
3. AKIM - National Association for the Habilitation of the Mentally Handicapped in Israel
4. The Joint Distribution Committee, JDC-Israel
5. Gush Shalom
6. The Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel
7. The Israel Association of Community Centers
8. The Israeli Volunteering Council
9. Working and Studying Youth (Hano'ar Ha'oved Ve-Halomed, youth movement)
10. International Fellowship of Christians and Jews
11. Hesed MiZion (Charity from Zion)
12. Yad Sarah
13. Yedid – The Association for Community Empowerment
14. Israel Be'yachad (Israel together)
15. Lev Echad (One Heart)
16. Le'Ma'an Achay (For my brethren)
17. Le'Mitnadev (For the volunteer)
18. The Disabled Struggle Headquarters
19. Bnei-Akiva Yeshivas' Center in Israel
20. Table to Table
21. One Family (Mishpaha Achat)
22. Matan – Your Way to Give
23. Safed Community Center
24. A community center in a central town
25. NATAL – Israel Trauma Center for Victims of Terror and War
26. SELA – Assisting the community
27. Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel
28. Municipality in a central town
29. ELEM – Youth in Distress in Israel
30. Foundations' Forum
31. Pitchon Lev – Assisting with Love in Israel
32. Kehila (Community) – For Cultural and Social Correction in Israel
33. Schusterman Foundation
34. Be-Kavod Foundation of the Progressive Judaism Movement for Social Responsibility
35. Peace Now
36. Sha'aley Torah (Steps of Torah)
37. Beney Akiva Youth Movement in Israel

## Appendix B: The Survey Questionnaire

### Civil Response to the Crisis in the North

The following questions deal with the response of organizations and citizens to the situation resulting from the war in the North.

#### Contributions and Volunteering – Questions for all respondents

1) *Since the commencement of the war in the North have you donated money or in kind to the residents of the North who are not friends or family?*

- A) Donated money
- B) Donated food or equipment

2) *Through what channel did you make the donation?*

- A) Directly, without mediation
- B) Through a social organization or nonprofit (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- C) Through a commercial enterprise (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- D) Through a municipality or other public agency (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- E) Through an individual

3) *Since the commencement of the war have you participated in any volunteer activities related to the situation?*

- A) No
- B) I volunteered in a nonprofit organization (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- C) I volunteered in a municipality or other public body (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- D) Other (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

4) *What did you do during your volunteering experience?*

5) *Since the commencement of the war in the North have you hosted guest residents of the North without payment?*

- A) Yes, family or friends
- B) Yes, others
- C) No

6) *Who mediated between you and your guests?*

- A) The connection was direct, without mediation
- B) A nonprofit organization (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- C) A municipality or other public agency (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- D) A commercial enterprise (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- E) An individual (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

## **Contributions and Volunteering – Questions for the residents of the North only:**

*1) Since the commencement of the war in the North have you or any of your household members received any sort of aid, free of charge that you otherwise do not normally receive?*

- A) No
- B) We received material aid
  - 1) Money
  - 2) Equipment, food or medicine
  - 3) Transportation
- C) We received non-material aid
  - 1) Psychological/medical treatment
  - 2) Legal counsel
  - 3) Help for children
  - 4) Counseling or other treatment (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

*2) From whom did you receive the aid? (you may select more than one answer)*

- A) Friends or family
- B) A social organization or nonprofit (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- C) A municipality or other public body (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- D) A commercial enterprise (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- E) A private individual (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

*3) Since the commencement of the war did anyone host you or your household members free of charge?*

- A) No
- B) Yes, friends or family
- C) Yes, other people
- D) Yes, hotel or other organized guest facility

*4) Who mediated between you and your hosts?*

- A) The connection was direct, without mediation
- B) A social organization or nonprofit (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- C) A municipality or other public body (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- D) A commercial enterprise (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)
- E) A private individual (Describe: \_\_\_\_\_)

## **Attitudes – Questions for all respondents**

*1) As a result of the events in the North has your opinion changed regarding the third sector?*

- A) Significantly changed for the better
- B) Slightly changed for the better
- C) Did not change
- D) Slightly changed for the worse
- E) Significantly changed for the worse

2) *In your opinion, who carried out most of the work with regard to coping with the needs of the residents of the North?*

- A) The Government
- B) The municipalities
- C) Nonprofit organizations
- D) Commercial enterprises
- E) Business people
- F) Citizens
- G) No one
- H) Other
- I) Don't know
- J) Don't want to answer

(Describe:\_\_\_\_\_)

3) *In your opinion who should have carried out most of the work with regard to coping with the needs of the residents of the North?*

- A) The Government
- B) The local authorities
- C) Third sector organizations
- D) Commercial enterprises
- E) Business people
- F) Citizens
- G) No one
- H) Other
- I) Don't know
- J) Don't want to answer

(Describe:\_\_\_\_\_)

## Appendix C: Organizational Questionnaire

### Civil Response to the Crisis in the North

Name of organization \_\_\_\_\_ Name of interviewee \_\_\_\_\_ Role of interviewee \_\_\_\_\_  
Telephone \_\_\_\_\_ Cellular \_\_\_\_\_ Email \_\_\_\_\_  
Name of interviewer \_\_\_\_\_ Date of interview \_\_\_\_\_

#### A. Organizational activities during routine times

1. What are the organization's main goals?
2. What are the organization's main projects or tasks (those that utilize the bulk of organizational resources)?
3. What is the main geographical area in which the organization provides services?
4. Does the organization have branches in the North or provide services to the residents of the North during routine times? Do you function in the Western Negev region?
5. Who comprises the organization's normal target population?  
specific gender  
specific nationality, ethnic or cultural identity  
specific socio-economic class or strata  
specific profession or occupation  
persons with a specific problem such as substance abuse, disability, etc.  
specific social group such as immigrants  
specific age group

#### B. Organizational activities during the present crisis

##### Activities and services

1. What activities and services are you providing these days, and how does it differ from your routine activities?
2. Have you added on new activities, cut back or reduced existing activities or modified existing activities to fit the new situation?
3. Is there a change in the geographic location of your activities and/or clients?

4. Is there a change in the scope of activities and/or clients?
5. Is there a change in the type of activities that you run?
6. Is there a change in the target population that you serve?
7. How do you reach the residents of the North? Have you advertised the new activities and if so, through what media?

#### Preparing for the organization's activity changes

1. Who initiated the change? Was it in response to external request (other organization, municipality, Government office, business, residents) or was it an internal initiative?
2. How did the organization decide about the changes in activities?

#### Collaborative actions

1. In light of the situation, did the organization participate in new collaborative actions and were there changes in existing collaborative actions?
2. Please describe two of your most important new collaborative actions:  
With what types of organizations do you conduct collaborative actions (nonprofits/businesses/public organizations; in the zones of conflict or outside the conflict zones)?  
Who initiated the collaborative action (or the change in the existing collaborative action)?  
What is the division of work between the participating organizations?  
Was an organized plan developed for the collaboration or was it ad hoc according to circumstances?

#### Resources

1. From where did you raise funds for the extra activities?
2. Did you utilize the organization's reserve funds?
3. Did you cut back budgets earmarked for other purposes?
4. What changes took place regarding the allocation of the paid workforce to carry out the organization's tasks?
5. What changes occurred regarding the allocation of volunteers to carry out the organization's tasks?
6. Did the organization carry out a special effort for recruitment of resources (money, equipment, employees, volunteers)? From what sources?

### **C. Evaluation**

1. To what extent did your organization succeed in responding to the demand and the needs that arose during the crisis?
2. What do you estimate will be the long term ramifications of this period on your organization?
3. Do you believe that the organization will adopt some of the changes on a permanent basis? New collaborations, etc.
4. Do you believe that the changes in activities that took place during this period will affect the organization's sustainability and its ability to fulfill its roles in the future?
5. How do you compare the functioning of civil society organizations to that of the public authorities in response to the new situation?
6. How do you assess the ability of the municipalities to cope with the situation, with the input of the civil society organizations and with activity coordination? Can you provide an example to support your view?

### **D. Conclusions and recommendations**

1. In your opinion, what should be the role of civil society organizations in preparedness and response during times of crises?
2. Should organizations that have direct contact with the crisis (i.e. through their field of operations or location) have a different role than other organizations?
3. Do you think that the roles of nonprofits with regard to preparedness and response during times of emergency need to be formally defined crises?
4. In your opinion, what is the correct way to make more efficient and to coordinate the response to the population's needs during times of crisis?