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time he immigrated to Eretz-Israel in 1904, up to the beginning of World War I. In this early period, he stressed the ability of the individual as well as the people to make a free choice and to work their way towards redemption all by themselves.

During the war period, Gordon adopted an altogether different approach. In the letters that he sent from Eretz-Israel to the Diaspora during this period, he described the war as an apocalyptic event that would save the world from the deformity inflicted upon it by human civilization.

After the end of the war, Gordon himself went through a deep personal crisis. This period was characterised by bitter arguments with some of his closest comrades. Yet the last phase of Gordon's writing (1918-1922) was his most fruitful one, and his philosophy became more systematic. At the center of his thought stood the individual who could fulfill his destiny and attain the image of God by becoming a self-sufficient human being. This is the man who is really free. He is able to change the world and redeem it together with his fellow members of *Am-Adam*, the Nation of Man, who attain the image of God.

considering the fact that the total Jewish population numbered less than 100,000.

The author of this article defines four groups within this community of writers, according to their literary generations and as they consolidated in Odessa and Warsaw, the centers of modern Hebrew literature, until the breakout of World War I. The four generations as mapped in this article are:

1. The writers who made their debut before 1880-1890 and who expressed the literary norms of the *Haskala* and *Hibat-Zion*. Their public venue was the right-wing daily paper *Doar Hayom*.
2. The writers who expressed the norms of the Hebrew classics: Ahad Haam, Mendele and Bialik. Their venue was the liberal daily *Haaretz*.
3. The younger generation which included amongst others Brenner and his followers. They were connected to the workers' movement, especially to the *Hapoel-Hatzair* party.
4. The modernist generation of Hameiri, Lamdan and Shlonski. At the time under discussion their influence was only marginal. They were split in their political inclinations.

The second and third groups were the most important. The authors in these groups sympathized with the workers and their organizations, but there were constant tensions between the writers and the workers due to the differences in their incomes and standards of living. Most of the writers gained their livelihood by teaching. Many of the young writers, during this period, suffered internal conflicts, wanting simultaneously to express themselves in writing and to prove themselves as manual laborers and political activists in the service of the workers' movement.

The formation of *Histadrut Hasofrim* (the Writers' Organization) in mid-1921 marked a greater solidarity amongst the writers, but this was at the expense of their affinity with the workers.

Stages in the Development of A. D. Gordon's Doctrine of Redemption

Gad Ufaz

This paper examines three phases in the development of A. D. Gordon's doctrine of redemption. The first can be traced in the essays he wrote from the

in his life, he adored him to the end of his days. In his early poems he was the 'good boy', expressing what he believed would be approved by his father. In his home a hysterical admiration for Bialik prevailed. The author assumes that Shlonsky's revolt against Bialik, in the mid-1920s, enabled Nathan to make the mental break from his father's depressing dominance.

For three years, prior to his departure for Paris, he stopped writing poetry. Apparently he tried 'cleansing' himself by a process of nausea and silence.

Having arrived in Paris and distanced himself from his father's home for a lengthy duration and since he was partially independent, he grew to recognize his basic internal depression and began to inquire into it. He let himself go with liberating delusions and became more open and comfortable about himself. He resumed his writing and began to express the struggle to kill 'the good boy inside him', a struggle that would later be eloquently manifested in his poetry.

In his Paris poems he began to vent his longing for sunny Tel Aviv. Both cities, Tel Aviv and Paris, from then onwards, serve as the backdrop for his poetry. He adopted the genre of the urban vagabond (*flâneur*), the best examples of which are found in the poems of Verlaine and Baudelaire. The fears of the *flâneur* are expressed in the poems of his early maturity. Though this image was not in keeping with the social and ideological world from which he came - where a man was supposed to strike his roots in his chosen homeland - Alterman sensed the potential for his self-liberation which was embodied in the *flâneur*. At the same time, he recognized the contradiction between this self-liberation and the national, social and cultural collective redemption which he wished to attain as the son of his father, son of the Zionist homeland and one who is to continue the line of Hebrew writers. This contradiction was to become a central theme of his work. Adopting the *flâneur* from French poetry and partially identifying with him was a critical step in his path to self-discovery which enabled him to evolve into a great poet.

The Community of Hebrew Writers in Eretz-Israel, 1918-1923

Pinhas Ginossar

During the *Third Aliya*, 1918-1923, there were about sixty Hebrew men of letters 'who were considered' active in Eretz-Israel. This is of significance

importance (see the 1945 Council in Sede Eliyahu), and in the 1940s -1950s, the idea of loyalty to the collective enterprise appears in the educational curriculum. The interweaving of both ideas, in theory and in practice, in the religious kibbutzim, may be called a 'balanced compromise'. The actual tension which has existed between the two ideas, in the religious kibbutzim for all these years, may have enabled this movement to adapt to internal and external changes. This being especially crucial in these times of a multidimensional crisis within the kibbutz movement, as described in the last part of the article.

* We thank Dr. Yuval Dror for assisting the late Prof. Bar-Lev in completing the last version of the manuscript.

'The Miracle of the Butterfly Evolving from the Worm': The Young Alterman's Way to his Poetic Mission

Dan Miron

Nathan Alterman was the greatest poet of his generation but there was nothing in his childhood or youth to point to his future repute. The author of this paper discusses the development of Alterman's personality and poetry in the first twenty years of the poet's life. This paper uncovers the difficulties the young man had to overcome in order to evolve from a superficial verse maker into the creator of deep and authentic poetry.

When Nathan was four years old his family was forced to flee from Warsaw as the German army advanced towards the city. Their wanderings led them as far as Moscow, the Ukraine and Roumania, finally reaching Tel Aviv in 1925 where Nathan was enrolled into Herzliya Gymnasium. Upon completing his high-school education he was sent to France to study agronomy. He spent his first year abroad in Paris. His behavior, until he reached Paris, was that of an introvert, lacking self-confidence and *joie de vivre*. His poems then were fluent but devoid of originality. Until 1926 Nathan was an epigone of Bialik. From 1926 the influence of Jabotinsky's translations can be discerned in Nathan's verses. There is no sign that he was impressed by the modernist poetry of his time.

The young Alterman repressed, in his behavior as well as his poems, his sexual maturation. The figure of his energetic and practical father was dominant

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within the Teachers' Union, from which the High-School Teachers' Organization separated in 1958. This was a result of the two teachers' organizations competing with each other over employment conditions and pay. The author claims that the struggle for the teachers' salaries was not waged between the state party which scorned the power and authority of the *Histadrut* and the *Histadrut* party which curtailed the state's jurisdictions, but between the two schools within *Mapai* who struggled to form and shape the Israeli society, both within the State and the *Histadrut*.

High-School Education in the Religious Kibbutzim - Between Collectivism and Individualism

Mordechai Bar-Lev*

The author of this article defines the dilemma of collectivism versus individualism, both as a kibbutz social dilemma and an educational one. This is a particularly significant dilemma in the Jewish religious high-school education system in two district high-schools (existing since the early 1950s), Sede Eliyahu in the north of Israel, and Yavne in the south. The issue arose again in the 1970s regarding the establishment of a third district high-school, in Gush Etzyon.

This research is a follow up to, but different from the author's previous research. It focuses on five structural topics that keep cropping up, concerning individualism as opposed to collectivism: 1. The learning period (12 years?) and the lack of selectivity in the policy of accepting students; 2. General education and the matriculation exams; 3. Concern for the talented and the policy of differentiation in trends; 4. Labor and its place in the educational curriculum; 5. Religious Jewish studies in the high-school and the *Yeshiva* world. Also, the issue regarding the establishment of a third religious kibbutz school, or the dispersal of the students among other educational settings (*Yeshiva*, high-school, etc.).

Analyzing the discussions in the Religious Kibbutzim Councils (Sede Eliyahu in 1945, Lavi 1959, Ein Hanatziv 1976, Lavi 1986 and Yavne 1992), concerning the above mentioned topics, reveals two salient characteristics of the phenomena; perception of individualism as a fundamental inspiration in the educational system, long before the other kibbutz movements recognized its

provisional principalship, the internal and external deliberations about the goals of whether to strive for a 'middle' or 'higher' institution. Also, the attempts to be absorbed by the Hebrew University of Jerusalem or by the Reali Secondary School; c. The directorship of Engineer Shlomo Kaplansky (1931-1950) - The making of the Technion's higher academic status permanent, while integrating courses of lower levels of training, according to the Zionist national needs.

Five national and academic issues are raised in this article: 1. The academic and national status of the Technion; 2. The Technion's connections with the Hebrew University; 3. The size and scope of the target population of the Technion; 4. The German, British and American academic 'ideal types' as models for the Technion; 5. The central role of the directors of the Technion in leading the institute, particularly during the formative years, as well as maintaining the academic independence of the Technion while answering the national needs (The Technion's early dilemmas are also characteristic of the development of technological education in many other countries).

Two kinds of *Mamlakhtiyut* - 'Statism': Relations Between the General Federation of Labor and the Teachers' Union

Eyal Kafkafi

Undoubtedly, upon its establishment, the Teachers' Union was imbued with a sense of a national mission. But, this organization quickly went through a process of routinization which turned it into a labor union that sought to improve employment conditions. It was also characterized by its militancy and vested interests.

In contrast to Lev Louis Greenberg who discerns between an attitude of *Mamlakhtiyut* a kind of 'State party' so to speak, whose aim was to break up the General Federation of Labor (the *Histadrut*) into various labor unions and to nationalize, or privatize the 'labor economy' - *Meshek Haovdim*, and a 'Histadrut' attitude, the author of this paper favors an even more complex attitude regarding the relations between the *Histadrut* and the State, in the 1950s and 1960s. The author describes the contrasts and struggles between the two social-political systems within *Mapai* by means of the case of the division

conflicts arose due to the fact that the national consensus regarding the image of the new Jewish generation, growing up in Eretz-Israel, was that the youth were to be productive, preferably farmers; sturdy; deeply rooted in the *Yishuv* and the land; capable of defending both self and homeland, thus becoming an integral part of the developing Israeli-Jewish culture. Those who opposed the establishment of the Hebrew high-schools maintained that encouraging the new Eretz-Israeli intellectual to become westernized, and by directing him or her to take the matriculation exams, opened up possibilities for pursuing academic studies. They feared that this trend would likely reinforce the image of the Diaspora Jew - an image they were so desperately anxious to change.

The article reviews the different ways of coping with this dilemma: A strong desire to be an integral part of the consensus, on the one hand, and participating in shaping an Israeli intellectual, on the other. Among the steps which were taken to overcome the contradiction were: Introducing youth movement activities into the gymnasiums, emphasizing the appropriate leadership functions which were meant for the students in the future, attending labor camps to assist agricultural settlements and establishing contact with Mikveh Yisrael, the agricultural school. At the same time, a great deal of importance was placed on a strict educational curriculum wherein students were encouraged to turn to academic studies, not only in Eretz-Israel but also abroad.

Consequently, despite all the controversies, these steps enabled them to achieve their goal, namely, to bridge the gap between the stated educational objectives which undermined the consensus and the practical educational work.

The Early History of the Hebrew Technion in Haifa, 1902-1950 - From the Plan of a 'Jewish Institution of Higher Learning' to the End of Kaplansky's Directorship

Yuval Dror

The author of this article divides the history of the Hebrew Technion in Haifa, from its inception to 1950, into three main periods: a. The planning and establishment stage (1902-1920) - Including the programs of Ezra (*Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden*) and the Zionist Organization for training technicians at the middle level; b. The Technion's first decade (1921-1931) - Covering the

The Political Connection: Israeli Political Parties and the Memory of the Holocaust in the 1950s

Yechiam Weitz

The aim of this paper is to present the various attitudes that existed within the Israeli political circles in the 1950s towards the Holocaust of European Jewry. The four main positions were: The radical; the patronizing; the consensual defensive and the enigmatic.

The radical stand characterized the political extremes. *Maki* on the left and *Herut* on the right. The patronizing stand was that of the Zionist left - *Mapam* and *Ahdut-Haavoda*. The consensual stand was taken by *Mapai*, the party in power, and the enigmatic stand was that of the ultra-religious. At the beginning of the '50s, the patronizing position was most dominant. It was expressed in the controversy that took place with Nathan Alterman regarding the *Judenrat*, as well as in the memorial ceremonies for the parachutists, held on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of their missions. Halfway through the '50s, following the verdict of the Kastner trial the dominant attitude became that of the radicals, both on the right as well as the left.

The consensual stand started to prevail only at the beginning of the '60s, during the Eichmann trial. This was an event that drew total agreement and was not a focal point for disputes or contention. Moreover, the trial became a turning point from which Israeli society's attitude towards the Holocaust became far less controversial and far more appeased and reconciled.

The First Hebrew Gymnasiums - Fulfilling Zionism Versus Widening of Horizons

Nirit Reichel

In this article, the author describes the controversies which accompanied the establishment of the first Hebrew high-schools in Eretz-Israel. The very first was Herzliya Gymnasium, established in Jaffa in 1906, followed by the Hebrew Gymnasium in Jerusalem (1909) and the Reali School in Haifa (1914). The

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However, from the summer of 1949, a considerable number of Jews were settled in the town. Moreover, the Israeli authorities planned to establish a new town, to be named after the Biblical Ashkelon, whose archaeological remains were close to Al Majdal's site. The new town was to serve as a regional center for a newly planned Jewish agricultural settlement system.

National Health Insurance and the Medical Profession: The Struggles in the Early 1950s

Abraham Doron

The paper deals with the first attempt to introduce national health insurance in Israel in 1951, and the role that the medical profession played, at the time, in blocking the passage of the proposed legislation.

In the early 1950s, the Israeli government sought to introduce its first national insurance program, a part of which was also a health insurance scheme. The doctors opposed the proposed legislation because in their view it did not serve the best interests of their profession. Their main demands were that the sick funds (*Kupot Holim*) be excluded from the operation of the scheme; that assurances be given to employ every doctor ready to practice under the new scheme; that there will be free choice of doctors by the patients; and that the doctors employed by the scheme will also be allowed to engage in private practice.

Under the particular circumstances at the time, and due to the assistance of the Progressive party, a minor partner in the government coalition, and the rather ambivalent and indecisive position of the dominant *Mapai* labor party towards national health insurance, the doctors succeeded in preventing the inclusion of the planned scheme in the proposed legislation. The case study presented here shows the power of the medical profession to ensure that changes in the social organization of the health services would necessarily have to take into account the demands and interests of the profession.

The exclusion of health insurance from the broader national insurance program introduced in the early 1950s played a decisive role in shaping the face of Israel's health care system for years to come. Only more than four decades later was a national health insurance scheme adopted.

The National Institutions consented in principle to the policy of bloc settling of the Religious Kibbutz. But this bloc was not determined in the southern frontier expanses according to the preferences of the Religious Kibbutz. Its lack of political clout, as well as the inferior strength of *Hapoel-Hamizrachi*, its supporting movement, compelled the Religious Kibbutz to compromise and settle in places which were not necessarily of its own choice.

The Religious Kibbutz could not control the rate of completion of the southern bloc (or the other blocs). Its various political undertakings, its size and its internal set of priorities influenced the rate of the development of the blocs. Moreover, this development was also influenced by the settlement programs of the National Institutions. They were in charge of land purchasing as well as deciding where and when to establish new points. The Religious Kibbutz, as were the other Kibbutz movements, was in fact dependent upon the settling factors of the National Institutions.

Ashkelon: Populating the Abandoned Arab Space and the Planning of an Early Development Town

Arnon Golan

At the end of the 1948 War, vast abandoned or sparsely populated Arab areas were included within the territory of the newly established State of Israel. The Israeli government was interested in densely populating these areas with Jewish inhabitants, in order to block an anticipated return of Arab refugees that could have jeopardized the existence of Israel. Also, to absorb the influx of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants.

During the second half of 1948 and the first months of 1949, tens of thousands of Jews were settled in abandoned urban areas in the central parts of Israel. Additional housing solutions were essential for the extension of the absorption process. These were to be found in the peripheries of Israel.

Located in the southern coastal plain of Israel, the Arab town of Al Majdal was chosen by the Israeli authorities for the settlement of Jewish immigrants as early as December 1948. Due to its location in the periphery, and to the fact that some 2,000 inhabitants of its pre-war 11,000 Arab residents remained in their houses, only a small number were actually settled on the site of the partly abandoned Arab town.

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included special training of pilots and officers, as well as the strengthening of special combat units of the Israel Defense Forces, with regiments of Jewish volunteers from the Diaspora. About 1500 volunteer soldiers were trained in Czechoslovakia from Autumn 1948 to Winter 1949, in order to help the *Yishuv* in carrying out the burden of the war. In the end, these regiments did not take part in any of the military operations because the war ended. David Ben-Gurion, as the Head of the 'Supreme Command' refused to recognize these volunteers as a unique brigade in the army and only accepted them as individuals.

On the basis of prevailing documentation, the article addresses various issues which are relevant in understanding the motives of the volunteers to join the IDF. The author of this article raises the question as to the true motive of these soldiers: Were their actions based on patriotic sentiments, to help the young Jewish state? Or, in contrast, was this a political ploy, a 'communist plot' to create a 'red stronghold' in Palestine following the British evacuation?

The Establishment of the Southern Settlement Bloc of the Religious Kibbutz, 1943-1947: A Chapter in the Populating of the Eretz-Israel Frontier by the Religious Kibbutz

Yossi Katz

From 1937 to 1948 the Religious Kibbutz established three settlement blocs; in the Beit-Shean Valley, in Gush Etzion in the Hebron Mountains and in the Western Negev. Each bloc was comprised of three kibbutzim. The fact that all these settlements were established on the frontiers of Eretz-Israel was not due to any preference of the Religious Kibbutz, but was the outcome of three factors: 1. The Religious Kibbutz was founded in the 1930s and was therefore relatively late in joining the settling process of the Zionist movement; 2. At the time, for political and security reasons, the National Institutions of the *Yishuv* preferred to settle the frontier areas; 3. The settling policy of the Religious Kibbutz was to bind at least three of their kibbutzim to each bloc.

Be'erot Itzhak, the first settlement of the Religious Kibbutz in the south was established in 1943. Being part of the settling policy, it served to encourage the foundation of another two settlements in the southern bloc, Kfar Darom (1946) and Sa'ad (1947).

Changes and a Turning Point in the Zionist Executive and the Jewish National Fund, 1914-1918

Zvi Shilony

In this paper, the author discusses the changes that took place within the leadership of the Zionist movement in the course of World War I. With the outbreak of the war, the Zionist Executive was split among four different centers: Berlin, Copenhagen, The Hague and New York. At the same time, a fifth center was beginning to emerge, much to the detriment of the others. This office in London, headed by Dr. Chaim Weizmann, gradually gained power and at the end of the war was recognized as the official Zionist Executive.

Parallel to this process, the management of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) was given to an 'Interim Executive Committee' situated in the neutral Hague, as the JNF Board of Directors, based in Germany, could not continue to function. The Interim Executive Committee soon became the policy maker and the planning center of the JNF. So much so, that after the war it became the second Directorate of the JNF.

Meanwhile, the Palestine Office, in Jaffa, which was the official representative of the JNF in the country, became the most reliable source of information for the Interim Executive Committee. It was also the initiator of most of the plans and steps that were taken in Palestine in order to overcome the crises that arose there due to the war. The fact that the Palestine Office was right there on the spot where the Zionist settlement efforts were taking place proved to be crucial for the directors who sought an autonomous status regarding the planning and management of the settlement projects. Thus the Palestine Office became the nucleus of the main opposition to the Interim Executive Committee.

The Czech Brigade: A Communist Conspiracy or a Brethren's Alliance?

Jacob Markovizky

Czechoslovakia played an important role in supplying material and technical assistance to Israel during the War of Independence, 1948-1949. This aid

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attention to Israel's security predicament, invoked the memory of the Holocaust and compared Nasser with Hitler. He also made an urgent request for American security guarantees. Though Kennedy disagreed with Ben-Gurion's grave assessment of the current situation, he ordered the administration to explore options of providing Israel with security guarantees in return for an Israeli commitment not to go nuclear. Such a quid-pro-quo - security guarantees for atoms - was at the heart of McCloy's mission to the Middle East. The mission was aborted due, in part, to Ben-Gurion's sudden resignation.

The Kennedy / Ben-Gurion exchange was fateful in shaping the limits of both Israel's nuclear policy and American non-proliferation policy for years to come. In retrospect, it determined the essential parameters - resolve and caution - that have guided Ben-Gurion's successors to this day. The seeds of Israel's posture of nuclear opacity were planted.

Leadership and Leaders of the *Poalei-Zion* Party in Russia: From its Inception to the October Revolution

Matityahu Mintz

This paper is an attempt to determine the characteristics of the social-democratic *Poalei-Zion* leadership (Borochov's followers), and to pin-point their problems at different stages up to the breakout of the Bolshevik October Revolution. The author discusses the kind of leadership that crystallized at the initial stages and during the underground period of the party, until the end of the 1905 Revolution; the process of turning the leadership into a kind of 'Foreign Liaison Office', which came with the depression and atmosphere of liquidation which seized the revolutionary organizations in 1907-1913, and the destruction of the cells by the Czarist domestic secret services. Also discussed in this paper is the chain of events that restricted the status of the traditional leadership by driving the intellectuals into a corner and by elevating the cafe-sitting party apparatchiks to high power. Following the February Revolution, only a few of those leaders found their way back to the steering circles of the party. Although, apparently, the party in Russia honored their names and memories, they were gradually pushed out of the leading organs. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution upset the process and only concealed it. Against this background, the author also adds several remarks concerning the changes in Borochov's position in the party.

Thus, Israel became the guardian of Hussein's regime and several months later a new chapter in Jordanian-Israeli relations was opened by secret meetings with the King.

While in the first decade of Israel's existence (1948-1958) Ben-Gurion expressed his doubts regarding Jordan's viability and the permanent nature of its borders with Israel, during the next five years (1958-1963) his new orientation bent towards Jordan was formed. The author concludes that while Ben-Gurion was shaping his 'New Look' on Jordan, his views regarding the nature of a solution in the West Bank, in case Jordan were to lose its control over this area, were persistently maintained by him. Namely, an autonomous entity linked with Israel and the Israeli army stationed on the Jordan River. He voiced this view in 1949, in October 1956, in July 1958 and again on 19 June 1967, following the Six-Day War victory.

Kennedy, Ben-Gurion and the Battle Over Dimona, April-June 1963

Avner Cohen

In the months April-June 1963, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben-Gurion were engaged in a secret dialogue on vital matters to both leaders. Kennedy raised his concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, requesting American bi-annual visits at Dimona to start soon. Success or failure in curbing Israel's nuclear development seemed to him critical, both regionally and globally. Under American pressure Ben-Gurion repeated his commitment that Dimona was exclusively for 'peaceful purposes' and agreed to annual visits at Dimona. However, this concession did not satisfy Kennedy who continued to press the issue. On the day of Ben-Gurion's resignation, 16 June 1963, Kennedy's most threatening letter was about to be delivered.

Based on recently declassified primary documents, both from the United States and from Israel, it is possible now to reconstruct, narrate and analyze this unknown dialogue between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion in great detail. The paper starts by setting the background for the exchange. It suggests that Israel's nuclear development was the underlying theme of the dialogue. Ben-Gurion did not want to risk a confrontation with a determined American president. He first tried to dodge Kennedy's request. Then (in two separate letters) he called

The Change in D. Ben-Gurion's Attitude Towards the Kingdom of Jordan

Moshe Zak

On 15 October 1956, US President D. Eisenhower directed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to forewarn Israel's Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, not to be pushed by extremists to take control of Jordanian territory west of the Jordan River. Later on, at a National Security meeting on 11 December 1958, President Eisenhower inquired of Mr. A. Dulles, Head of the CIA, whether the latter had additional information indicating a connivance between Jordan and Israel. These two divergent remarks by the American president do not display an exact portrait of the concrete events that happened at the time, but they convey a far-off echo of the gradual change in Ben-Gurion's concept regarding Jordan's territorial integrity. Furthermore, on 23 July 1951, Ben-Gurion discussed with Foreign Minister M. Sharett the necessity of convincing W. Churchill of Israel's need to extend its border to the Jordan River. But, on 14 September 1960, the Prime Minister transmitted a message to King Hussein stating: 'Israel believes that an independent Jordan under the leadership of the King is the vital interest of Israel' (Revealed for the first time).

The author of this paper claims that the new concept of the advantages of maintaining Jordan's independence arose from Ben-Gurion's intentions to strengthen the anti-Nasserist forces in the Middle East. It was molded in three crises that confronted Jordan:

1. Following the 1958 coup d'etat in Baghdad, Israel, fearing that the anti-Hashemite revolution would expand into Jordan, was enticed to take deterrent measures by advancing its army to the banks of the Jordan. At this juncture, Ben-Gurion made his historic decision to refrain from any action that might endanger Jordan's stability.
2. In 1960, on the verge of a military confrontation with Syria, King Hussein requested some Israeli assistance.
3. In 1963, following the joint Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi declaration, anti-Hashemite disturbances erupted on the West Bank. A takeover of Jordan, by pro-Egyptian Palestinians, was feared. In order to maintain the status quo, Ben-Gurion initiated military and diplomatic measures. In a letter to President Kennedy he asked explicitly that the US 'prevent the fall of Hussein's regime'.

methodological consequences and finally suggests that the history of every age should be identified with the whole 'circle of conversation' among all the various historiographies written from the diverse present points of interest in history, on the basis of a common understanding of the nature of history and of its scientific methodology.

'Shattering of Illusions': Initial Contacts Between the Zionist Movement and the Maronite Community in Lebanon

Eyal Zisser

The article focuses on the contacts between the Zionist Movement and the Maronite community in Lebanon prior to the declaration of the State of Israel and immediately after its establishment. The author examines documents from Israeli, as well as other archives, which reveal intensive Zionist-Maronite contacts, including an agreement signed between the Maronite church and the Jewish Agency in 1946. Also, continuous contacts with some Maronite prominent figures, such as Emile Edde and Archbishop Ignatius Mubarak, and finally secret contacts between Israel and the Lebanese Phalanges between 1947-1951. These intensive contacts led many to the assumption that the contacts should be considered as the key to the understanding of the Israeli involvement in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s. However, close examination of the archival material, as well as the general Lebanese and Israeli context of that period, shows that this was not the case. The Lebanese leaders with whom Israel had contacts were not real interlocutors and were intent on promoting their own interests, rather than an Israeli-Maronite understanding. Furthermore, most of the Maronite community was opposed to the idea of an Israeli-Lebanese alliance and sought close relations with the Arab world. On the Israeli side, it seems that there was not a clear and concrete policy towards Lebanon at that time. To sum up, these series of contacts were separate and insignificant both on the Lebanese side as well as on the Israeli side.

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jubilee issue of *Davar* dedicated to Buber in 1928. From this, Sadan continues to discuss *Davar*, and in particular the editorial cooperation that existed between Berl Katznelson and Moshe Beilinson. Sadan remarks about the way that Berl regarded *Davar* and 'Am Oved' Press as educational means to improve the public's tastes and values.

Sadan concludes his lecture with an appeal to researchers to discuss Berl Katznelson as a writer, and not as a party-activist, for literature was central to his life.

The History of the 'Post-Historical' Age

Eliezer Schweid

The author starts with an analytical description of the recent challenge offered by the 'New-Historians' to the philosophical conception of History, and to the scientific methodology of 'established' historiography of our age. He exposes the crisis of historiography as a historical development against the background of the political, social and cultural destructive effects of World War II, and against the new constructive efforts to overcome the crisis through Post-Modernistic strategies. Namely, the collapse of historicism and its substitution by the new empiricistic methodologies in the social sciences, which are centered on the present and are basically a-historical.

The author reviews critically the ways in which the post-war academic historians tried to respond to these challenges and analyzes the recent critical approach of the 'New Historians' as an expression of disappointment both from the political, social and cultural achievements of our age, and from the failure of modern historiography to fulfill its political and cultural functions, especially in the shaping of an overall understanding of problems in the present and of the general orientation of the leading elites. The author reviews the suggestion of the New Historians on this background and shows that they too only conclude the results of the same failures, turning against the very foundations of historical thinking as it has been developed in western civilization since antiquity.

The author proceeds with a philosophical re-construction of the basic distinctions of western historical thinking. In that context he re-defines the distinction between History, as a 'cultural memory', and Historiography, as a reflexive critical memory. Then he develops, in general terms, some

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A Trio and its Focus: More about Berl Katznelson

Dov Sadan

(Edited and Prepared by Avner Holtzman)

The point of departure for this lecture was the centenary which marked the birth of three major figures with whom the revival of the State of Israel is so closely associated: David Ben-Gurion, Itzhak Tabenkin and Berl Katznelson. The description of Sadan making his acquaintance with each one of them is interwoven with the growth of his Zionist consciousness (within the framework of *Hapoel-Hatzair*) and the reconstruction of his way to Eretz-Israel. Albeit, the main part of the lecture is devoted to the personality and the deeds of the 'focal point' of this Trio - Berl Katznelson. A special chapter covers Katznelson's first steps in Eretz-Israel, his relations with Y. H. Brenner, and in particular his hesitation whether to choose agriculture as a way of life, or to study in a *Yeshiva* in Tsfat. This deliberation, between a life of religious belief to one of non-religious pioneering, is presented here as evidence of Katznelson's intriguing personality and his depth of intellect and as a matter of principle in the portrayal of the generation as a whole. As a kind of antithesis to Berl Katznelson, Sadan presents Martin Buber who was identified with and admired by circles of Zionist youth, ever since he had published his article 'Zion and the Youth' in 1918, but his avoidance of making *Aliya* until the eve of World War II, which contradicted his Zionist teachings, tarnished his image for them. In order to illustrate the ambivalent attitude of the Eretz-Israel labor movement towards Buber, Sadan analyzes the contents and composition of the special

- * This paper is based on a lecture, by the late Prof. Dov Sadan, which was presented at the Ben-Gurion Research Center, in Sede-Boqer, in November 1986. Unfortunately, Sadan's notes were not kept. The lecture as presented here is based on the taped recordings made at the time it was given by Sadan, with corrections and footnotes by Avner Holtzman.