Abstracts

The split in Ein Harod as Reflected in the Press

Yonatan Gur-Dick

This article focuses on the split in kibbutz Ein Harod that occurred between 1951 and 1955, as reflected in *Davar* and *Al Hamishmar* newspapers. The split in Ein Harod is an extreme manifestation of the split in the Hakibbutz Hameuhad movement. It contained all of the components that constructed the split in the movement—such as radical politicization of the kibbutz and its members, and the transformation of the kibbutz and the movement into a battleground between the Mapai and Mapam parties—alongside local aspects related to Ein Harod's local biography, which deepened and transformed the rift in the kibbutz to a long, agonizing saga.

This article tells the story of Ein Harod in the first half of the 1950s as reflected in two of the labor movement's most prominent newspapers of the time: *Davar*, which was identified with the Histadrut and Mapai; and *Al Hamishmar*, Mapam's daily newspaper. This approach allows us, among other things, to read the split's plot as did its contemporaries and to understand how its various participators wished to portray the events. In addition, significant insights regarding these newspapers emerge from this analysis.

'Sulam' and 'Haolam Haze': Two Political, National, and Cultural Alternatives in the First Decade of Israel's Independence

Oded Peled

The first decade of the State of Israel is generally described as a period dominated by Mapai, the ruling party, and by David Ben-Gurion, the country's authoritative prime minister, who together decisively and successfully implemented their Zionist vision and governmental stands and policies. Although Mapai's rule was supported by most of the political sectors and groups in Israel's public sphere, an in-depth review reveals that several independent voluntary groups that were also active during this period aspired to change the political system. These groups remained on the political and societal margins and their vision was not realized, yet they managed to influence several important political and civil issues. This article focuses on two of these groups: the Sulam circle, headed by Dr. Israel Eldad-Scheib, and the weekly newspaper, Haolam Haze, headed by Uri Avneri. Most of the work of these groups was concentrated in journalism and critique essays, with the aim of creating a significant change in the new state's spirit, vision, and worldview. These groups' activities were grounded in their strong belief that the situation and functioning of the Israeli state was worse under Ben-Gurion's regime.

Although these groups were at the opposite sides of the ideological-political map during those years, a careful examination of their worldviews and beliefs reveals numerous similarities in their geostrategic understanding, their civil, social, and cultural positions on the Israeli state in the 1950s, and their positions on the desired civil model for the Israeli state and its national-cultural identity. These similarities are highlighted in two of the major programs that these groups developed: Sulam's 'Kingdom of Israel' (Malhut Israel) vision, and the 'Semitic Space'/'Semitic Peace' vision, advanced and supported by *Haolam Haze*. Nonetheless, the basic differences in the worldviews of these two groups remained, specifically their position on obedience to state law

and the use of violence and terror to achieve ideological and political goals. *Haolam Haze* rejected the use of violent means and focused on a public campaign designed to receive results in the long run, while many Sulam activists, including their leader Eldad, supported illegal acts and political violence on specific occasions.

Account Still Owed: The Activities, Politics, and Attempted Assassination of Israeli Minister David Zvi Pinkas

Ayala Shklar

This paper is a study of David Zvi Pinkas, former *Mizrachi* National Religious Party leader and Israeli Minister of Transport (1951-2), who served in many public roles throughout his life and was among those who established the ideological foundations for the State of Israel at its inception. In the summer of 1952, Pinkas was the target of the first assassination attempt in the history of the State of Israel. Pinkas survived the attempt but died suddenly of a heart attack two months later. This paper focuses on the following research questions: What were the key features of Pinkas' political ideology and politics? Is there any connection between Pinkas' unique ideology and politics and the fact that he was the first Jewish target of an attempted political assassination in the State of Israel? Does the particular political course that he represented have a connection to the way the Israeli public reacted to the assassination attempt? Can this affair enhance our understanding of religious-secular relations in the political realm during the transition stage from Yishuv to state, and the controversy surrounding the Jewish nature of the state, and if so - how?

Israeli Rock Band 'Kaveret' Marks a Transition in Israeli Identity

Noa Kanarek-Gilboa

Kaveret (Beehive) is considered to be one of the most successful Israeli bands of all times, and, both as a band and as individual musicians, has had a tremendous impact on shaping Israeli rockpop music. The article examines the key elements in Kaveret's unprecedented success and its musical and artistic singularity. Alongside the account of the band's history, I examine the changes in Israeli society from 1967 to 1973. My research approach combines two complementary disciplines, social-cultural history and musicology, which allows the reader to understand the historical and social context of musical developments and insights. The article examines the connection between the band's music and hegemonic mainstream music of the period, while focusing on the band's innovativeness and its ability to fuse a global, contemporary, harmony-rich sound with more traditionalfolkloristic musical elements. The band combined young, spirited art with the more traditional Sabra culture that still dominated Israeli society in the early 1970s. Kaveret, both musically as well as textually, marks a clear trend in favor of styles and contents related to the Western popular culture of the time. In this sense, Kaveret marks a cultural tipping point in the transition from early traditional Israeli society and its more self-conscious and selfcritical version

Ben-Gurion, the Korean War, and the Change in Israeli Foreign Policy

Gangzheng She

The following article discusses the dramatic change Israeli foreign policy underwent during the Korean War period, and the role of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in this process. The "non-identification" policy, a priority of the Israeli government since the State's establishment, was challenged by the inception of war in the Korean Peninsula and the United Nations' subsequent resolutions and forceful intervention. Contrary to the belief that Israel abandoned its neutrality immediately following the outbreak of the Korean War, this article asserts that the shift was quite a long process, and that the *de facto* change in Israel's foreign policy was not implemented until mid-1951. Initially, Ben-Gurion compromised with the moderates and overran all dissenting views in order to support the UN resolutions; but the moderates, led by Moshe Sharrett, halted his more activist intentions to fully align Israel with the West. However, as the Korean War developed and the American stance became sterner, the non-identification policy could no longer guarantee that Israel would receive the urgently needed aid it sought from the U.S. In light of these developments, Ben-Gurion's proposition to forgo neutrality gradually gained an upper hand in debates on Israel's foreign policy. Israel's eventual UN vote in favor of an embargo on China marked a historically significant shift in its foreign policy during the early statehood period.

Before It Was Special The Gradual Shift in US-Israel Relations in the Final Years of Eisenhower's Presidency

Amber Taylor

Many observers of American Middle East policy have looked to 1962, America's sale of Hawk missiles to Israel, and Kennedy's subsequent pronouncement of a "special relationship" with the Jewish state as marking a turning point in US-Israel relations, one that meant the beginning of a friendship that continues to the present day. The topic is one of great interest to a wide array of scholars who seek to locate and describe the origins of that relationship. This article uses various secondary and primary sources to argue that the relationship finds its roots in the Eisenhower administration of the 1950s. Despite Eisenhower's determination to foster closer relations with the Arabs in a bid to curb Soviet influence in the Middle East, and a turbulent first term in which Israel's efforts at strengthening ties with the United States brought little more than frustration, the reality of Israel's strategic importance soon became apparent to Washington, and a closer relationship began to develop between the United States and Israel. Emphasizing the importance of Eisenhower's insistence on strategic versus cultural appreciation of Israel, this article will consider the events and motives that opened the way for the development of the "special relationship" before it was declared special.

The Israel Education Fund as a Catalyst in the Development of Secondary Education in Israel's Periphery in the 1960s and 1970s

Esther Suissa

This article is an attempt to unfold an important and relatively unknown chapter in the history of secondary education in Israel's periphery in the 1960 and 1970s by analyzing the creation and work of the Israel Education Fund since its establishment in 1964 and up to the end of the 1970s. The creation of the Fund was the result of cooperation between the United Jewish Appeal, the Government of Israel, and the Jewish Agency of Israel, in answer to David Ben-Gurion's request to find a solution to the dire need of secondary education in the periphery of the State of Israel. Until the creation of the Fund only 12% of the State's inhabitants studied in secondary school frameworks with of youth centers and vocational schools solely in the development towns, with no option of academic or iyuni education. The reasons for this were the educational ideology of education ministers headed by Zalman Aranne together with a lack of tradition of privately funded schools that existed in the center of the country.

A significant improvement in the mid-1960s when the Ministry of Education implemented the model of the "comprehensive" or *mekif* high school, including academic secondary education in the development towns. This article shows that the decisive change was a combination of the implementation of the comprehensive school model on the one hand, and the financing of 94 comprehensive schools, 11 public libraries, 31 youth centers and JCCs (Matnasim), and 93 kindergartens, during 1964-1971 at a total sum of \$60 million the Israel Education Fund's contribution to education in the periphery on the other hand