

ISRAELIM

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ABSTRACT

A Liberal Intellectual or Integral Nationalist? Outlines of Ze'ev Jabotinsky's Intellectual Biography

Gal Hadari

Ze'ev Jabotinsky was and still is a controversial figure in academic research. Over the years, various researchers have described Jabotinsky as a hero or a villain. The article deals with the intellectual biography of Vladimir Jabotinsky until the First World War. An attempt was made to trace the intellectual influences that shaped his worldview, and especially his national outlook. The purpose of this article is to present the intellectual influences on Jabotinsky prior to 1914 in relation to his national perception and the question of his labeling. This paper argues that no unequivocal statement about his categorizing can be made, but understanding that the related concepts of Nationalism and Race in his thought are much more complex than previously described.

The 'London Agreements' – The Failure of the Back-Channel Negotiation in Unifying the Zionist Movement

Kobi Dvir

The political conflict between the Labor and Revisionist movements has occupied the agenda of the Zionist movement since the 1930s and is still relevant. Since the beginning of the conflict, negotiations were held between the two movements in order to resolve it. A back-channel

negotiation took place at the end of 1934 between the leaders of the two movements, David Ben-Gurion and Ze'ev Jabotinsky, and resulted in the signing of three agreements, known as the "London Agreements", aiming at resolving the conflict.

This article examines both the factors that led to the success of the negotiation between Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky, and the factors that led to the failure in implementing the agreements and achieving a resolution of the political conflict. The results of the negotiation should be examined from two contradicting aspects: one is the negotiation itself, which succeeded – three agreements that could have been considered as the heralding of a new era in the Zionist movement were signed; the second is the rejection of these agreements by the Labor movement, which led to failure in resolving the political conflict.

The importance of this article derives from the explanations it provides for one of the most important events in the history of the political conflict within the Zionist movement. It is innovative in the way it examines the 1934 negotiation, through conflict-resolution and negotiation theoretical instruments, and offers explanations of these events.

The research method I have used in order to implement the conflict resolution theories in the case-study was qualitative content analysis, alongside using archives, biographies, and historical sources. The memories of the two leaders were the basis for the comparison of facts.

Jews-Muslims Relations in Samuel's Tomb – A Peaceful Coexistence, or a Preservation of Public Interests Through Relative Peace-Keeping?

Maayan Salomon Gimmon

Samuel's Tomb (Hebrew: Kefer Shmuel HaNavi; Arabic: Nabi Samwil) is a sacred site to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, located near Jerusalem. Throughout history up to today, believers have prayed and performed their different religious rituals side-by-side within the premises of Samuel's tomb. Today the religious site is used mainly by Jews and Muslims. There are no security arrangements or any official agreements intended to control the use of Samuel's Tomb as a holy site by followers

of the different religions. Even so, the relations between Muslim and Jewish visitors to the site are relatively quiet; the prayers and religious ceremonies are often performed simultaneously, usually keeping a respectful order and peace on the site. Nonetheless, throughout history the history of religious activity has not been free of confrontation.

So far, most articles published regarding Samuel's Tomb have discussed the biblical, historical, or archeological aspects of the site. Articles have scarcely discussed Jewish-Muslim relations. Recently, Prof. Yitzhak Reiter published an article in which he discusses, what he claims to be, a state of coexistence in Samuel's Tomb. Reiter claims that Samuel's Tomb is an "oasis amid the desert", an island of peaceful cohabitation between Jews and Muslims, an exceptional situation considering the tension, conflict, and confrontation characteristic of Israeli reality.

The following article focuses on investigating the relationship between Jewish and Muslim visitors to Samuel's Tomb, and on reexamining Reiter's claim to coexistence. A review of historical, archeological, and journalistic literature and interviews with people working and praying in the site reveals a reality different from that presented by Reiter. The conclusion of this article is that the use of the term "coexistence" to describe the situation in Samuel's tomb is an exaggeration. In effect, conflicts, confrontations, and rivalry over control have been part of the reality in Samuel's tomb throughout history and are still apparent today. And yet, it must be stated that a relatively peaceful state of affairs does exist in the site. However, it appears that this relatively peaceful state of affairs in Samuel's tomb is kept due to many reasons, one of which is the common interests of Jewish and Muslim visitors. It is a state of relative peacefulness, which is not very much like coexistence.

Below and Above the Surface:
Disparities in Israel's Daily Press Coverage of the Fishermen
and Naval Commandos in the Kishon Affair

Ella Ben-Atar

The research question addresses differences in the way the Israeli quality and popular press covered two social groups in Israel.

The case study at the center of the research is known in public discourse as “The Kishon Affair”, which was exposed in an investigative report published in the daily Yedioth Ahronoth, and claimed a possible connection between pollution in the Kishon River and the incidence of cancer in naval commandos who came into contact with it. A similar claim was also made in the legal struggle of the Kishon fishermen against the petrochemical plants in the area.

The study examined the differences in the media coverage of the fishermen and that of the naval commandos in Yedioth Ahronoth and Ha’aretz, and reveals that both newspapers considered it important to put the issue on the media agenda, but the commandos gained a high level of exposure in all the criteria in contrast with the scant representation the fishermen gained.

The discussion of the study’s findings raises questions about the media’s moral and social role, and the possible influence of media coverage on the polarization and schisms currently existing between marginal and elite groups, and on shaping the image of Israeli society.

The Voice is Dayan’s Voice, but the Hands are the Hands of Zeira – Why the ‘Special Means’ were not Activated on the Eve of Yom Kippur War

Adam Raz

The article deals with the days before Yom Kippur War and is divided into two parts. The first part addresses three questions: whether and when “special methods” were implemented – dubbed “the national insurance policy of Israel” – to produce intelligence? Is Eli Zeira, the head of Military Intelligence, deliberately misled his superiors, Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan (among others) when he gave them to understand that the “methods” were working? What were the chances that the “methods” will give the warning that could have prevented the surprise? The author refers to all the evidence found in literature, open archive, and to the historiographical debate that has developed around the issue and determine that the “methods” were close and Zeira indeed misled his superiors when he gave them to think

otherwise (that the “methods” not provide any indication that Egyptians face war). The author argues that the category “conception” used for 40 years to explain the reasons for the failure of intelligence is irrelevant and not convincing as explanation to Zeira action.

The second part of the article attempts to answer the question why the methods were not use and why Zeira misled his superiors when he gave them to understand that the measures are activated. The author doubts the claim that Dayan did not know that the methods were not active. The author argue that Zeira actually served Dayan political line – a Policy that was controversial among the political leadership. The author claims that Dayan knew – despite what it says in the literature – the “methods” weren’t activated, because he was interested the war will begin in a situation where Egypt and Syria attack Israel first and the last is required to stop and stabilize a new defensive line as a new political and military reality that severe the status quo. The realization of Dayan “defensive” policy didn’t require accurate information about the opening hour of fighting. Dayan argues that regular forces can stand alone for the first days of fighting.

The author shows the historical roots of Dayan policy and is opposition to use the territory occupied in 1967 as item for negotiation. Against Dayan were Golda and Dado. The Last opposed Dayan’s stagnation strategy and sought that the war will be used to achieve strategic target as a lever to achieve peace agreements. They opposed the Israeli withdrawal in the first days of the war, as Dayan recommended, and sought that the Egyptian army will be defeated in the war. This is why the information the “methods” could provide were denied from them.

