

Moshe Shemesh

The Palestinian Society in the Wake of the 1948 War: From Social Fragmentation to Consolidation

THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE 1948 War between the Arab states and Israel created deep social, demographic, and political crises within Palestinian society: two major products of the war were the refugee problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the Palestinians were left without responsible leadership that both the Palestinians and the Arab states could accept as representative. “Palestine,” or “*Filastin*” as a geo-political entity vanished from the map of the Middle East. The Eastern part of Palestine, which was occupied by the Arab Legion, was formally annexed to Trans-Jordan in April 1950 and called the West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The other part of Palestine, which was occupied by Egypt, was not annexed to Egypt, but was called the Gaza Strip or officially “the Palestinian land under the control of the Egyptian Army.”

At the Arab League Council in March 1959, Egypt initiated the notion of the revival of the Palestinian entity. In September 1963, the Arab League Council nominated Ahmad al-Shuqayri as *Filastin* representative at the Council instead of Ahmad Hilmi, who had died in June of that year. It was only in January 1964, however, that the first Arab summit’s decisions on the Palestinian entity paved the way for Ahmad al-Shuqayri to establish the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in June 1964. The PLO was designed to represent the Palestinians and symbolize their political-national issue rather than the Palestinian refugee problem.¹

The year 1959 witnessed three important Palestinian phenomena. In October 1959, the organizational structure of the Fatah organization was established in a meeting of its founders.² In the same year the organ of Fatah, the monthly *Filastinuna*, was published in Beirut and, in November,

فلسطين

نظرات الى الوطن السليب




هناك .. فلسطينا

شون العبدون ان فرقتنا لثباتنا

نداء الحياة

The monthly *Filastinuna*, Beirut January 1960.
[With eyes towards the plundered homeland]



فلسطيننا



العدائي

The monthly *Filastinuna*, Beirut August 1963

the General Union of the Palestinian Students was set up in Cairo. Six years later, on 1 January 1965, the Fatah organization embarked upon its “*fida’i*” activities against Israel, and additional “*fida’i*” organizations were established and joined the armed struggle. Thus the first half of the sixties witnessed a new phenomenon—the advent of the new Palestinian national movement led by a young nationalist leadership. In 1968 all of these organizations took over the Palestinian establishment (the PLO) and have been leading the Palestinian national movement ever since. But it was Fatah that became the “backbone” and leader of both the national movement and the Palestinian establishment—the PLO.

Western researchers, as well as Arab and Palestinian scholars who have studied the Palestinian national movement, tend to view the fifties as a period when Palestinian society was submerged in the doldrums. The middle sixties, however, were seen as the period of the Palestinian awakening, when national expressions acquired overt and tangible form.

Yehoshafat Harkabi, in his accomplished, scholarly, documented study “Haffalastinim: Metardima le-Hit’orerut,” surveyed Palestinian writers’ publications during the years 1961–1966, which discussed the Palestinian society in the wake of the 1948 catastrophe [*al-Nakba*]. Among the writers were Mustafa al-Dabbagh (who published his book in 1965), Niqola al-Dir (1964), Subhi Yasin (1964), Lutuf Ghantous (article, 1965), Walid al-Qamhawi (1962), Nasir al-Din al-Nashashibi (1962), and Naji ‘Alush (1964).³ These writers, as Harkabi suggested, tried to answer the following questions: (a) What happened after 1949 to the group into which Palestinian society disintegrated and how did they develop socially and politically? (b) How did their mood change as years went by and their hopes and expectations were unfulfilled? (c) How did the Palestinians emerge as a political factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict? Harkabi summed up the answers of these writers as follows: “From October 1948 until the founding of the PLO in 1964, the voice of Palestinians as an organized group was muted. . . . In the fifties there was little inclination on the part of the Palestinians to organize themselves. . . . It seems that the Palestinian awakening must be related not to the revolutionary mood of the period after 1956, but rather to the later period of the regression of Arab nationalism (i.e., the early sixties).⁴

It is my argument that the fifties (1949–1959) were not characterized by social and political quiescence, but by the opposite. The decade of the fifties constituted the “formative years” of the new Palestinian national movement—a period when its tenets, aims, and characteristics were shaped and later embodied in the *fida’i* organizations. The results of the 1948 War

immediately set into motion political and social processes that brought about the new Palestinian nationalist awakening.

One of the central questions that must be addressed is the way in which a fragmented refugee society succeeded in creating a militant national movement. How did the new Palestinian national movement manage to enlist the masses in a liberation struggle and win general popular support? How was the movement able to withstand severe crises almost from the moment of its inception, survive, and reap impressive achievements?

The enlistment of Palestinian society for nationalist goals expressed social solidarity, and solidarity was one of the key elements in the new Palestinian national awakening. I intend, in the following, to trace a number of factors that contributed to Palestinian social cohesion in the wake of the repercussions of the 1948 War.

At the outset, one may emphasize that the 1948 catastrophe [*al-Nakba*] was, and still is, the severest trauma the Palestinians had experienced since their “first” national awakening during the 1920s. This trauma was relayed from one generation to the next, from the fathers (the “*al-Nakba* generation”) to the “*al-Nakba* sons” (also known as the “liberation generation”) and to their descendants, including the current generation, whose members stamp the word “*al-Nakba-1948*” on their t-shirts. The trauma has become embedded in the Palestinian collective memory, especially among the *al-Nakba* refugees and their offspring. Thus this collective memory, including other themes, such as *al-’awda* [the land, the armed struggle], has been a major force in shaping the new Palestinian identity. Collective memory has the same role in determining the tenets and aims of the new Palestinian national movement. As such, it becomes the cement that strengthened Palestinian solidarity.⁵

The fragmentation of Palestinian society following the 1948 War led to the transformation of social networks. The extended family [*hamula*] and the immediate family, which had been traditional sources of social stability and community framework, disappeared altogether. Whole villages and entire families were often broken up and dispersed, and those who ended up in the refugee camps were for the most part split apart.

As a group, the refugees feel themselves socially displaced much more than economically dispossessed. The center of the refugee’s world prior to his uprooting had consisted of personal and traditional affiliations to home, family, *hamula*, and community, in addition to livelihood. Before their disruption, these ties had been his main source of security and psychological equilibrium.⁶

The primary factor in creating Palestinian social solidarity was “the Land” [*al-Ard*]—“land” in the sense of a complete value system beyond physical possession. “The land” was, and remains, the central pillar of Palestinian collective memory, especially among the refugees. Before 1948, Palestinian society had been primarily agricultural, so that the land constituted the Palestinian’s entire world. In this light, the enormity of the refugees’ trauma may be understood; their departure from *Filastin* also meant the loss of their land. This loss and the desire to return became the strongest unifying factors in exilic Palestinian society. From the refugees’ descriptions of “the land,” it is clear that it was transformed into an ideal far removed from its 1948 reality. For the *al-Nakba* generation, dispossession from the land was co-tangent with the loss of social status and the sense of differentiation from their new surroundings. These feelings of loss and shame were intensified when the refugees were accused by local Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank of having sold the land to Jews, and they were thus regarded as property-less people.⁷

No wonder, then, that the call to “Return” [*ʿAwda*] burned in the hearts of the first generation of 1948 refugees. The slogan was, however, perceived only passively. The first generation still believed that the return would come about once the Arab states fulfilled their promise to liberate the land. Over the years the lofty dream of return converted into a living myth for fathers, sons, and the following generations. The Arab media fed the refugees with promises of the return to their homes. Radio programs aimed at the refugees ended with the catch phrase “We Shall Return” [*innana ʿa-idun*]. Schools and refugees camps were decorated with images of cities and villages in Palestine, and textbooks, too, were replete with pictures of homes, Palestinian scenery, and the “We Shall Return” slogan.⁸ Parents and children were identified not only by their given names but also by their place of origin in *Filastin*. Children retold stories about their villages in *Filastin* that they heard from their parents. Palestinian newspapers in the Gaza Strip and the Arab press were filled with poetry of yearning along with idealistic descriptions of the Land.

Against this backdrop, an idealized image was formed of everything connected with the refugees’ previous-owned land—their homes, villages, orchards, river beds. Palestinian literature in the 1950s, especially poetry, sang of the beauty of the fields and gardens in *Filastin*:

The Land pure and clean,
 The valleys green,
 The grape vines, olive groves, mountains,
 and citrus trees in blossom . . .⁹

The refugees asked themselves:

When shall we return to our villages, cities, our gardens and homes?
When shall we return to the one and only place where we wish to live and die?
We await the moment of our return to our good land.¹⁰

In the early 1950s, the Palestinian press appearing in the Gaza Strip and Jordan abounded with such yearnings and idealistic descriptions. In 1952, the Gaza newspaper, *al-Raqib*, published a letter, which was probably written by a Palestinian refugee, about Jaffa, entitled “Dreams of Truth [or reality]”:

On the wings of memory I arrive in the good land, the same land where I grew up as a child. I remember tranquil Yafa that I loved. I remember the beautiful love-struck brides. I remember the streets overflowing with crates of merchandise from neighboring countries. I remember the lovely streets and high buildings. I remember all these things until I feel my heart melt from these distant wonderful memories . . .¹¹

In another letter, under the title “remembrance,” which was sent to the same news-paper, a refugee wrote about the orchards in *Filastin* “which were gold in the daylight and silver in the darkness of the night.”¹²

Thus *al-Awda* [the Return] became the center of the refugee’s daily experience. Tibawi, in his study *Vision of the Return* (1963), wrote about the publication of collections of poems that displayed nostalgia and affection for *Filastin*. He came to the conclusion that “the sense of ‘Return’ is no less intense than in the biblical verse: If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand wither! . . .” Tibawi realized that “an amazing similarity existed between the Palestinians’ longings for their homeland and the yearnings that gave birth to Zionism.” He called this feeling “Neo-Zionism”; that is, Arab Zionism whose goal is the return to the Palestinian Homeland.¹³

Bruhns investigated a group of refugees in 1955 and came to the conclusion that only 10 percent were willing to accept a permanent solution that was not based on a return to their original dwelling places. Bruhns concluded that this was because most of the refugees believed that “to accept a permanent solution, as Israel desired, meant an acceptance of defeat and permanent exile.”¹⁴

The Norwegian couple, Galtung, arrived in the Gaza Strip on a study project in 1964. They also came to the conclusion that the refugees rejected any attempt at improving their standard of living because it might be inter-

puted as acceptance of permanency or as proof of their vacillation about returning. According to the Norwegian sociologists,

It is difficult to imagine a social group with a more homogenous perception and definition of the past and present than the refugees in the Gaza Strip. Regardless of age, income, educational level, or social status of the persons we spoke with, their definition seemed to be the same at least as far as they wanted to present it to foreigners.¹⁵

The desire for the “Return” grew stronger in the second generation of Palestinian refugees, the “liberation generation”—or, as it was also known, the “revolution generation”—that began to assume responsibility for the national struggle. It was the *al-Nakba* sons who took the lead in the new national movement and acted as its popular base. For them, however, the meaning of “return” went through a metamorphosis. They no longer held any expectations that the Arab countries would liberate *Filastin*; instead they pinned their hopes on the Palestinian people to lead the struggle. Thus, “*Filastin* Liberation” became synonymous with “The Return” [*’Awda*] in an activist sense. The roots of this change stemmed from the “new” Palestinian national awakening that had given birth to the *fedaiyun* organizations, headed by *Fatah*, the leader of the “new” Palestinian national movement. Impressive gains were soon being won in the armed struggle. The word “liberation” formed a major ideological element in the names of all of the Palestinian organizations that rose in the 1960s: “The National Liberation Movement,” “The Popular Liberation Front,” “The Arab Liberation Front,” and “The Palestinian Liberation Front.”

The politicization of refugee life also contributed to social solidarity. Slogans such as “The Return” or “The Liberation of the Land” epitomized the key concern on the Palestinians’ daily agenda, especially among the refugees. The *al-Nakba* sons developed a keen sense of political acumen—perhaps more developed than anywhere else in the Arab world. It should be emphasized that the *al-Nakba* generation was characterized by a larger number of educated people than generally found in Arab society; a percentage of academically trained people that approached that in Israel.¹⁶ Today Palestinian society can continue to claim the most sensitized political awareness in the Arab world.

Another contribution to Palestinian solidarity was the consensus of opinion regarding the primacy of national issues and the rejection of all attempts to deal with social problems. *Fatah* determined that,

Will-power in the liberation of the land is a binding force that demands everyone to make the highest sacrifices for returning the stolen land . . . The liberation movement's slogan was: "Everything for the Liberation of the Land—Rejection of Ideological Differences."¹⁷

The will to mobilize and devote the entire Arab and Palestinian potential for revolution calls for the rejection of any discussion on social problems in the "Palestinian state" until the liberation stage is over.¹⁸ According to *Fatah*,

This kind of a debate could cause dissension in the revolutionary forces by searching for long-range phrases that have no relevance to the present reality.¹⁹

The Palestinian people are going through a national revolution, not a social revolution. There are different types of struggle for each of the two goals.²⁰

Fatah claimed that, "the social slogan does not excite the masses nor move them to armed revolution."²¹ It was this view that brought *Fatah* to the leading position in the new Palestinian national movement.

Samir Ayub, a Palestinian sociologist who has studied the Palestinians in Lebanon, has come to the conclusion that,

The Palestinian saw only the political aspect of his reality and ignored his daily life where there was no hope of change other than by solving the political problem. Arab bourgeois thinking was reflected in Palestinian minds in the form of political slogans void of any social content. A clearly defined social agenda was missing from the political programs of the Palestinian organizations and popular institutions such as workers federations, student associations, and women's groups, etc. Palestinian revolutionary slogans were mainly national political slogans whose [two] goals were the liberation of the land and the return of political sovereignty.²²

Cognizant of the importance of internal solidarity in the liberation struggle, *Fatah* leaders decided as early as 1958 that:

More than anything else we need a unified Palestinian alignment; a unified internal Palestinian front; a unified Palestinian entity; as well as a consensus of opinion among all Palestinians in all areas despite the numerous problems involved . . .²³

Solidarity developed as a result of the Palestinians' alienation and isolation in their new environment—negative feelings that paradoxically served to strengthen their national consciousness and identity. Anis al-Qasim points out that the dominant feeling among the Palestinian refugees was alienation and estrangement in their new Arab surroundings:

What the Palestinians found in Arab countries was not what they expected from their brethren, and this came as a bitter disappointment. Only small, weak, women's organizations offered them help. The refugees encountered hostility and suspicion in the Arab states and were accused of scrounging free meals off the tables of their Arab neighbors.²⁴

The Palestinian floundered, not because he had emigrated, but because he had forfeited his home and could not become part of his new environment even if he wanted to. A Palestinian could not escape his own alienation.²⁵ Moreover,

The Palestinian was constantly belittled because of his weakness, fear, and loss of self-respect. For a long time it was said that he was decaying like the living-dead. He was blamed for selling out his homeland and he was compared to his [courageous] brother in Algeria in a way that insulted the Palestinian and glorified the Algerian.²⁶

So, the Palestinians were regarded as second-rate citizens:

The political, legal, and social treatment that the Palestinians received in the Arab environment confirmed their feelings of inferiority. They developed a sense of social alienation towards local society and an unwillingness to fit in with it. For the Palestinians, redemption lay not in the improvement of living standards, but in the release from suffering in the new reality.²⁷

Thus, Fawaz Turki, in his *The Disinherited*, explained very thoroughly the refugee's feeling of alienation:

If I was not a Palestinian when I left Haifa as a child, I am one now. Living in Beirut as a stateless person for most of my growing-up years, many of them in a refugee camp, I did not feel I was living among my "Arab brothers." I did not feel I was an Arab, a Lebanese, or, as some wretchedly pious writers claimed, a "southern Syrian." I was a Palestinian. And that meant I was an outsider, an alien, a refugee and a burden. To be that, for us, for

my generation of Palestinians, meant to look inward, to draw closer, to be part of a minority that had its own way of doing and seeing and feeling and reacting. To be that, for us, meant the addition of a subtle nuance to the cultural makeup of our Palestinianness.²⁸

Despite potential economic benefits, refugees in camps on the West Bank explained their refusal to move to nearby cities as based on their feelings of isolation, alienation, insecurity, and inferiority in the new environment. "I prefer to stay with the refugees," was the typical catch-phrase that reflected their mind-set.²⁹ According to Halim Barkat's study on social alienation in Arab society, it seems that the Palestinians were more alienated than any other group.³⁰

Thus, while under these circumstances it would have been natural for the Palestinian refugees to lose their identity and be absorbed in the Arab environment, the opposite occurred, perhaps due to the sense of common fate, social solidarity, and the revolt of the second *al-Nakba* generation. When combined, these factors contributed to the preservation and strengthening of Palestinian identity at all levels of society, most particularly in the refugee camps. Over time the refugees adapted to their new conditions and developed the ability to endure their sense of alienation and confusion from the break-up of their social structure. Social estrangement merely strengthened their awareness of being Palestinian and sharing a common fate. Here lie the roots of the emergence of the new Palestinian national awakening. *Fatah* was correct in claiming that "the persecution of the Palestinians in the Arab countries contributed to the preservation of the Palestinian personality and non-absorption in the immediate environment."³¹

The liberation struggle demanded the total mobilization of Palestinian society, and, in the second half of the 1950s, this meant mobilizing the second generation of refugees for national goals. The success of this enlistment was due to the strengthening of solidarity in Palestinian society. A new Palestinian identity was emerging: a new personality that no longer represented the cowering Palestinian who had fled his homeland, but the fighting Palestinian—the *fida'i*—who was willing to sacrifice his life for the national goal.

"The new Palestinian personality" may be seen as a mythical, spiritual expression of the material side of the new Palestinian nationalism. We read of the Palestinian who "rose from the dead" after years of absence from the Middle East political arena." This new, assertive, nationalistic personality evolved in reaction to the alienation, persecution, paternalism, and

oppression that had comprised the Palestinians' fate. These negative syndromes were the breeding ground, as it were, for the "return of Palestinian honor." The main drive of the leaders of the new Palestinian national movement was to radically change the stigma of "refugee," "exile," "parasite," "impotent," "oppressed." The movement, therefore, announced a two-fold goal: "the liberation of the Palestinian man," and "the liberation of Palestinian land."

The *fida'i* became the symbol of the new Palestinian appearing in national literature. In an article entitled "The Revolutionary Personality" that was published in the *Fatah* organ in January 1970, it was stated that:

For the oppressed . . . who have lost their land and their hope, the armed Palestinian revolution sees no alternative other than forcing on the world stage a fighting Palestinian figure, who is reappearing after twenty years of oppression, cruelty and submission, to struggle for his right to live on his land . . . He presents to the world a tough, resourceful, fighting Palestinian figure who will not negotiate or surrender until he returns [to his people] the land of peace [*Filastin*] and the signs of justice, freedom, and equality.³²

At a public gathering, Abu Iyad declared that "our people is not the one that bear the refugee identity, [our people] carries the fighting *fida'i* identity."³³

Another key concept around which Palestinian society consolidated was that of the "armed struggle." It became the activist path for liberating the land and it characterized the second *al-Nakba* generation in contrast to their fathers, the generation of catastrophe. The second generation united around the idea of armed struggle and conveyed the message back to the first generation. For the new Palestinian national movement, the central concept was: "armed struggle," or, to paraphrase Descartes, "I fight, therefore I am." This was the essence of the new Palestinian identity. The leaders of the new movement believed that armed struggle was the only means of realizing their goal—the establishment of a Palestinian state on all of the land of *Filastin*. Armed struggle was in fact a revolt against conditions in the refugee camps. From this perspective, the eagerness of the second *al-Nakba* generation years later, as parents, to send their children into the streets against Israeli occupation, becomes clear. The rock-throwing children of the Intifada symbolized this revolt.³⁴

The armed struggle also symbolized the new Palestinian's independence of action without recourse to the assistance of Arab countries. At the same time, however, the movement sought to drag [*tawrit*] the Arab

states into war with Israel in the hope of regaining their lost honor. In this spirit, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad, one of the founders of *Fatah*) recorded in his memoirs:

Our suspicion of Arab countries, whether conservative or progressive states, has led us to the conclusion that armed struggle must be planned, organized, and waged by every Arab against Israel. The new role of the Palestinian *fedayeen* is to return the sense of pride to their people and [raise the Palestinians'] status among other Arab nations.³⁵

In this way the armed struggle became the framework for national unity and the widespread enlistment and solidarity of Palestinian society.³⁶

In conclusion, the social cohesion of the Palestinian refugees during the 1950s was linked with the new national awakening. Both were mutually strengthening. The outstanding expression of social solidarity was the massive support given to the new Palestinian leadership and the unbounded faith it won among the Palestinian population. Beginning in the mid-1950s we observe the near-total mobilization of the Palestinians for attaining their national goal.

NOTES

*This chapter is the product of research on "The Palestinian National reawakening 1949–1964" funded by Israel Science Foundation founded by the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities .

1. On these developments see, Moshe Shemesh, *The Palestinian Entity 1959–1974: Arab Politics and The PLO*, second (revised) edition, London 1996, pp. 37–54.

2. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), *Filasini Bila Hawiya* (Kuwait, no date) 61, 70.

3. See Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Haffalastinim: Metardima le-Hit'orerut* [The Palestinians: From Quiescence to Awakening] (Jerusalem, 1975). For an English version of this booklet, see Yehoshafat Harkabi, "The Palestinians in the Fifties and Their Awakening as Reflected in Their Literature," in Moshe Ma'oz (ed), *Palestinian Arab Politics* (Jerusalem, 1975). Among the books surveyed by Harkabi were: Mustafa al-Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, v1 (Beirut, 1965) part 1; Niqola al-Dur, *Hakadha Da'at wa Hakadha Ta'ud* (Beirut, 1964); Subhi Yasin, *Tariq al-'Awda ila Filastin* (Cairo 1960); Lutuf Ghantous, "Athar al-Tarkeeb al-Tabaqi fi al-Qadiya al-Filasiniya," *Dirasat 'Arabiya*, November–December (1965). Walid al-Qamhawi, *al-Nakba wa al-Bina' fi al-Watan al-'Arabi* (Beirut, 1959/1962); Nasir

al-Din al-Nashashibi, *Tadhkarat 'Awda* (Beirut, 1962); Naji 'Alush, *al-Masira ila Filastin* (Beirut, 1964).

4. Harkabi, *Haffalastininim: Metardima le-Hit'orerut*.

5. On the concept of Collective Memory see, Maurice Halbwachs, *La Mémoire Collective* (1950); English version, *The Collective Memory*, New York, 1980.

6. F. C. Bruhns, "A Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes," *The Middle East Journal*, 9(2) (Spring 1955).

7. Shiloah Institute, *Mahane Plitim Begev haHar* [Refugee Camp in Jilazoun] (Tel-Aviv University, 1974 (1968)) [Hebrew].

8. A. L. Tibawi, "Visions of The Return: The Palestine Refugees in Arabic Poetry and Art," *The Middle East Journal*, 17,5, (Autumn 1963).

9. al-Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin*, 139.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Al-Raqib* (Gaza), 17 September 1952.

12. *Al-Raqib* (Gaza), 17 February 1952.

13. Tibawi, "Visions of The Return."

14. Bruhns, "A Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes."

15. Ingrid and Johann Galtung, *A Pilot Project From Gaza*, Institute For Social Research, (Oslo, February 1964) 10.

16. See Nabeel Sha'ath, "High Level Palestinian Manpower," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 1.2, (Winter 1972); also, Jamil M. Tahir, "An Assessment of Palestinian Human Resources: Higher Education and Manpower," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14.3, (Spring 1985); also, Anis al-Qasim, *Min al-Tih ila al-Quds* (Tripoli, Libya, 1965) 21.

17. Fatah, Maktab al-Ta'bi'a wa al-Tanzim, Brochure No. 7, For Political Cadres' Course, The Second Program, Revolutionary Vanguard, n.d., n.p., p.3.

18. *Fatah, al-Thawra al-Filastiniya*, No. 22, January 1970, 10.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Khalid al-Hasan, a Fatah leader, in an interview in *Shu'un Filastiniya*, No. 64, 1971, 281–2.

21. Fatah, *Min Muntalaqat al-'Amal al-Filastini*, Brochure No. 1, in the series of *Dirasat wa Tajarib Thawriya*, August 1967, 64–6.

22. Samir Ayub, *al-Bina' al-Tabaqi lil-Filastiniyin* (Beirut, 1984) 275–6.

23. Unpublished notebook dated 1958, Cairo, on Ideology and Strategy, probably written by one of *Fatah's* founders.

24. al-Qasim, 20–2.

25. *Ibid.*, 17.

26. al-Dur, *Hakadha Da'at wa Hakadha Ta'ud*, 261.

27. Shihada Yusef, *al-Waqi' al-Filastini wa al-Haraka al-Niqabiya* (Beirut, September 1976) 18.

28. Fawaz Turki, *The Disinherited, Journal of Palestinian Exile* (New York, 1972) 8.

29. Shiloah Institute, *Mahane Plitim Begev Habar*, 115 [Hebrew].
30. Halim Barakat, *Mawaqif*, Cairo, No. 5 (July–August 1969) 18–44.
31. See *Fatah* booklet, *'Ulaqat al-Thawra al-Filastiniya bi al-Thawra al-'Arabiya wa al-'Alamiya*, n.d., n.p., p. 3.
32. *Al-Thawra al-Filastiniya*, No. 22, January 1970, 9.
33. Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), in a mass-gathering held in Amman to commemorate the 15 May, *Voice of Fatah* (at Dera'a-Syria), 16 May 1971.
34. On the concept of Armed Struggle, its meaning and developments, see Yezid Sayigh, *The Armed Struggle and The Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993* (Oxford, 1997).
35. Abu Iyad, *Filastini Bila Hawiya*, 68–9; see also the monthly, *Filastinuna*, the organ of Fatah, Beirut, issues 1959–1964.
36. See Rosemary Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* (London, 1979) 152–4.