Where, Where to, and When in the Occupied Territories:  
An Introduction to Geography of Disaster  

Ariel Handel

Over the past nineteen months since the Intifada began my space has been constantly narrowing. First it became too dangerous to go for walks in the hills around Ramallah, then I stopped being able to drive to Israel, then driving between the Palestinian towns and villages was prohibited. Now I cannot even step outside the door of my house. The perimeters of my house are all that is left for me of Palestine that I can call my own, and even this is not secure.
— Raja Shehadeh, *When the Bulbul Stopped Singing: A Diary of Ramallah under Siege*

Therefore, the people planning weddings in this country—may their numbers increase—designed invitations that included all the information about their beloved daughter or son…the announcement of the wedding and its location, everything except the details of when the joyous event would take place—the day of the week, the date, and the hour. All these were to be added by hand, in keeping with the circumstances…. Only when the curfew was lifted would they fill in the missing details on the invitation and send it as quickly as possible to the invitees…. This new custom includes writing three or four dates, and the invitee knows that should a curfew be called on the first date…then the event will take place on the next date, and so on.
— Azmi Bishara, *Yearning in the Land of Checkpoints*

Space has been at the core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the beginning of Zionism. That is why maps and tables of land area are often used to describe the conflict. From the United Nations partition map, through that of the 1948 state of Israel, up to the sophisticated maps presenting the depth of Israel’s control of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), one can see the Palestinian space shrinking as the Israeli space keeps growing. According to these cartographic depictions, the
OPT makes up about 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine, the territory of the former League of Nations British Mandate of Palestine, and large parts of it are taken up by settlements, roads, military zones, and nature reserves. Of the West Bank’s land, 41.9 percent is under direct control of the settlements; Area C, in which full military and civilian Israeli control still prevails, forms an additional 18.1 percent of the overall land space of the Occupied Territories.

These maps present concretely Israel’s expansion at the expense of the Palestinians, and their importance is clear. Nevertheless, this manner of mapping has a few weaknesses and is even more remarkable in light of the state of affairs in the OPT today. First, these maps assume that both sides—Palestinian and Israeli—share the same space. This is a problematic assumption, which will be discussed below. Second, underlying the maps is the assumption that the conflict is a zero-sum game in which every piece of land taken from one side is added to the balance of the other. That assumption—which makes it possible to portray areas in the map as “Israeli” or “Palestinian” and to mark clear boundaries distinguishing one from another—causes confusion by creating an imaginary symmetry between the two sides. The significance for Palestinians of a defined Palestinian area is not the same as the significance for the Israelis of a defined Israeli area. These weaknesses derive from the fact that the maps present the absolute value of the space instead of its use value.

The absolute value of space is what can be measured by uniform distance units, for example, the aerial distance between two points, which is basically indifferent to occurrences in the measured space. The use value, however, refers to the actual possibilities for using a given space. If an impassable wall stands between points A and B, no matter what the absolute distance is between them, the actual distance taking into account the use value would be infinite.

Although one may consider as well the economic use value of a space (for example, whether it contains minerals or is located in an attractive real-estate zone), the political use value of a public space, and so on, I wish to deal with the basic use of space: how one can move in it. All other use values presuppose that primary value and are conditioned by it. Accessibility and centrality produce political and economic value; transportation expenses over space are embodied in the price of goods and are dependent upon movement possibilities in the space. Since my main concern is movement—specifically, human movement in space—it is clear that the spatial use value always embodies time. Road paving between two points doesn’t change the distance in kilometers, but shortens significantly the actual time it takes to travel between them. In the same manner, a blockage on the road lengthens that time, since the blockage contains an inherent postponement. The mode of movement, therefore, greatly influences the use value. Flying
in a jet plane bears no similarity to walking or riding a horse on the ground, either in terms of the speed of movement or in terms of the route. Another important primary assumption is that human time is always a scarce resource. In the twenty-four hours of a day, one must sleep, eat, work, and so on. From the basic fact that each movement in space is also a movement in time, it follows that scarcity of time disables space, as well. That is, there is a limit to the possible distance between one’s home and work, since one must move between them and allow sufficient time in each for sleep and work.  

Mapping use values is much more complicated than mapping absolute values, but people do it regularly. Every departure of a person from their house assumes a more or less clear idea of the place, direction, and estimated time to the destination. People moving in space use cognitive (imaginary) maps that reflect their acquaintance with an area, that is, a sense of orientation, knowledge of different locations, routes, and bypasses, and tacit assumptions about different use values of distinct spatial units within that area. Having such a map in mind, they may gauge their movement according to its mode and speed, the destination’s location, the time of departure, and so on. That map’s stability—the routinization of daily activity in space and time—is the very basis of what Anthony Giddens calls “ontological security.” Repetitiveness connects the individual and the outside world and gives the former the faith in the continuity and stability of the latter. It is critical for the individual’s sense of security and stability, as well as for the building and preservation of long durée social institutions.  

Two main limitations dictate modes of spatial use: the organization of physical space and the regulations that govern its use. The organization of physical space includes possible movement routes (entrances, streets, highways, railways, and so on) and the limits imposed on them (doors, barriers, traffic lights, and so on). The regulations that limit the use of space are those defining movement options and restrictions within the given physical possibilities (cars are not allowed on sidewalks, train travel requires a valid ticket, driving is on the right side of the road, and so on). A knowledge of both the physical organization and the rules governing use is a necessary condition for the creation of a cognitive map of a person’s environment.

In the OPT, as I will argue, due to constant changes in both the physical space and the regulations governing its use, the stability of the space dissipates, and it is nearly impossible to create a map of use values. Therefore I will describe the spatial conflict in Israel/Palestine in a different way: as a dispute not over land units, but over the very possibility of using the space. From the fact that the built area of the settlements is 1.7 percent of the West Bank’s land, that the “settlements’ boundaries” are 6.8 percent of the land, and that the sum of Israel’s direct holdings
in the West Bank is 42 percent, it is impossible to understand how life and movement are distorted in the rest of the area. What follows will show how the Israeli side, with its combined military and civilian occupation, strengthens its own spatial stability at the expense of that of the Palestinians. While Israeli use values in the OPT, with the fenced settlements and the wide, fast, and blockage-free roads that they enjoy there, are more stable than ever, the effective Palestinian space disintegrates and dissipates.

This leads to an inversion of the usual arguments concerning space and society. Public space is usually treated as structured, planned, supervised, and controlled (or at least, such are the pretensions of the ruling power), while human movement is treated as something that resists structured, planned, rational control. Michel de Certeau, for example, describes the way pedestrians use unplanned shortcuts or avoid moving in places where they should be moving according to rational plans. Plans can never predict all movement possibilities, and down-up deviations occur even in the most planned space. In the OPT, in contrast, the ruling power itself produces rhizomatic, changing, and fluid space, while the users are the ones who struggle to reintroduce predictable features into their living space.

The first part of what follows will try to demonstrate the current spatial state of affairs in the OPT, and, paradoxically, will try to draw a map of the unmappable and present averages of the unaveragable. All the maps to be shown will be contingent and temporary and represent only the principle of temporariness and contingency. These are maps that, in principle, are not up to date even on the day of publication and that actually were not accurate at any time.

The second part will suggest a historical reading of the Israeli domination of Palestinian spatial use values from the occupation of the Palestinian territories in June 1967 until the situation developed that is described in the first part. This second part will shed light on the process of producing physical space that is gradually charged with usage regulations. Those involved in the production of Israeli space, I will argue, understood the importance of the point and the line when loaded with both active and passive spatial control and management practices. The deployment of settlements, outposts, and of roads, coupled with differential rules governing the use of space, enabled control technologies to develop in the OPT.

THE SPATIAL STATE OF AFFAIRS

Various kinds of movement restrictions have been imposed in the OPT over the years. Most of them were personal (that is, prohibiting specific people from moving in certain parts of the OPT or from entering Israel) or limited in time (a curfew on a specific village or a limited blockade for the duration of a specific military
operation). Generally speaking, beginning in 1972, when the “general exit permit”
was granted, Palestinian movement was not limited within or outside the OPT.
The situation changed in the First Gulf War, when a total closure of the OPT was
imposed for forty-one days. During the 1990s, closure became institutionalized as
the rule, with the exit permit as the exception. At the same time, restrictions were
imposed on passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

During the middle of the 1990s, Israel began imposing internal closures (keter)
on various parts of the OPT. These closures were neither permanent nor stable, but
the very idea of the division of the land and the institutionalization of checkpoints
became permanent features. The division of the territory required movement-con-
trol technologies, which became refined with the passage of time. They included
many kinds of barriers (manned checkpoints and physical obstacles, such as earth
mounds, concrete cubes, empty or sewage-filled trenches, iron gates, fences, and
walls), as well as various, frequently changing passage regulations (some of them
official and requiring numerous permits, others imposed ad hoc, without being
published or institutionalized in any form).

Following the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, movement
restrictions increased drastically, and the OPT was dissected into many dozens of
frequently changing “land cells.” As of January 2006, in the West Bank, there were
fifty-eight manned checkpoints and 471 unmanned blocks.6 “Surprise checkpoints,”
consisting of a jeep or armored vehicle and a small number of soldiers, are not
included in these numbers, though their disruption of life is even greater than that
of the permanent roadblocks, for which it is possible to prepare and to estimate
the time needed to get through them. According to a report of the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), at the beginning of
2006, there were, on average, 100 surprise checkpoints per week. In addition to all
the aforementioned barriers are dozens of kilometers of fences alongside roads on
which Palestinian movement is prohibited and, of course, the Separation Wall.

The checkpoints map, printed by OCHA every two to three months, is not only
out of date by the time it is published, but cannot be up to date at any given
moment. Since data collection takes time, and the array of barriers changes so
quickly, by the time the Nablus segment of the map is being prepared, the data
collected in the Hebron region are no longer accurate. According to the organi-
zation, ninety-five physical barriers were added between November 2005 and
January 2006. As stated above, however, there is no way of knowing when these
were added or what the real data were at the time of printing. Local newspapers
and radio broadcasts report the daily barrier situation along with the weather
forecast in order to give the closest possible approximation of the movement
options for the day.
The outcome of the barriers is that the space becomes divided into small cells, and passage between them is nearly impossible. In the West Bank, there are some areas to which entry is nearly impossible: East Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, the “Seam Zone” (the area trapped between the Wall and the Green Line). In the northern part of the West Bank (especially from Nablus to the north), entry is permitted only to inhabitants of the area. At night, the IDF raids East Jerusalem neighborhoods as well as villages in the Jordan Valley and in the Seam Zone, expelling to the other side of the checkpoint Palestinians who cannot produce an ID card bearing the same address as the location where they are found.

The rest of the West Bank is divided into dozens of cells, and movement between cells, as will be discussed below, is difficult, slow, and unpredictable. As a result, Palestinians decrease their affinities to “distant” areas (usually no more than a few kilometers away). People choose work and attend schools in accordance with the location of checkpoints. Housing prices “before the checkpoint” rise drastically in comparison to those “beyond the checkpoint.” In Hebron, a few weeks before their due date, pregnant women move from the Israeli-controlled part (H-2) to the Palestinian side (H-1) so as to be able to reach the hospital in time and avoid giving birth at one of the checkpoints.

For a realistic view of the division of space, on the closures map, we can draw the cells whose inhabitants must get through certain checkpoints (Map 1). Since each checkpoint is located on a specific crossroad through which the population of the cell must pass, the picture that emerges is reminiscent of a stream-drainage basin. As of January 2006, there were 101 cells. Since this map represents the movement of vehicles, it shows all unmanned barriers (such as gates, trenches, mounds of earth) as impassable.

Map 2 presents the possible movement routes between the cells. Points signify land cells. Lines signify possible passage routes—for example, if the two cells are separated by a manned checkpoint allowing vehicles to pass. Where the road leading out of a cell is blocked by a physical barrier, the cell is marked as being closed. We must, however, qualify this map. First, it is reasonable to assume that there are roads that bypass these blocks. Not every dirt road is marked on the maps, and it is impossible to indicate all possibilities of movement. But the bypass roads are far from being a solution to the problem. There are few of them, they are difficult to traverse, and the IDF is constantly on the lookout for them so as to block them, as well. The second qualification is that in a few places, there are underpasses below the Israelis-only road, which allow the movement of cars between cells by avoiding the barriers at road level. But this qualification has its own qualification and has to be limited, as well. Each of these underpasses has a built-in-advance iron gate, which means that passage through them is always conditioned. The third

...
qualification is that movement between cells is not always strictly impossible, but it is discontinuous. That is, at many of the barriers there are “back-to-back” taxis; passengers get out of one taxi, cross the barrier on foot, and get into another taxi. Clearly, however, this mode of travel lengthens the travel time and increases its cost significantly.

Some important things can be learned from Map 2. The most obvious of these is the number of cells that are completely cut off from neighboring cells. Most West Bank inhabitants cannot drive their own cars or travel continuously beyond their immediate surroundings. Moreover, the cells that are connected to others are arranged like a train, so that one cell is connected to the second, which is connected to the third, and so on. Hardly any land cell is connected to more than one other cell. The significance of this fact for the Palestinian wishing to pass through several land cells is that the possibility of movement through each cell is essentially “contained” in the preceding cell. Thus, a blockage in one cell will prevent movement overall. It should be noted that in at least some of the places in which it seems that there is free passage (such as the Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, the Seam Zone, and the northern West Bank), this freedom applies only to inhabitants of the area. Thus, the power of the surprise checkpoints becomes clearer, because they can further reduce the connection between different areas and divide each land cell into many subcells.
Let us now take a small segment of the map (Map 3) and test its spatial use values for a Palestinian and for a settler traveling on similar routes between adjacent points (Beit Furik to Salfit for the Palestinian; Itamar to Ariel for the settler).

As can be seen quite easily, the Palestinian has much less space per time unit. And since time, as we have pointed out, is a limited resource (there is a fixed number of hours available for work, study, family, sleep, and so on), the Palestinian has absolutely less space than his neighbor the settler. The situation only worsens under a curfew or tight internal closures. In addition, passing through checkpoints with a private vehicle requires a permit that is available only to a few. Only 3,412 Palestinians (of 2.3 million West Bank inhabitants) hold a valid permit for passing with their vehicles through internal West Bank checkpoints. Thus, taxis have become the major enablers of movement, especially between cells. Since in many

### Map 3
Comparison of distance and travel time for a settler traveling from Itamar to Ariel and a Palestinian traveling from Beit Furik to Salfit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ITAMAR–ARIEL</th>
<th>BEIT FURIK–SALFIT</th>
<th>CHANGE PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aerial distance</td>
<td>~ 14 km</td>
<td>~ 17 km</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road distance</td>
<td>~ 17 km</td>
<td>~ 24 km</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel time</td>
<td>~ 11 minutes (at an estimated speed of 90 km/h on a fast road)</td>
<td>~ 3 hours, 24 minutes (at an estimated speed of 60 km/h on an old, narrow road and factoring in three checkpoints involving delays of about one hour each)</td>
<td>1854%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
places taxis work in “back-to-back” mode, requiring passengers to change taxis at each checkpoint, the time for pedestrian passage and taxi exchange must be added to the total travel time.

An even bigger problem than the long travel time for the 24-kilometer journey is the inability to predict the probable length of that time. I have calculated the passage time through each of the checkpoints as one hour, but this number has no significance. In many reports concerning the movement regime in the OPT one can find a statement of the kind “the journey that once took fifteen minutes now takes more than two hours.” From the point of view of a Palestinian passenger, these averages, too, are essentially meaningless. When travel from point A to point B can take between one hour and two days, there is no practical purpose in calculating averages. In a few areas, movement has been institutionalized in a way that creates a reasonable standard deviation for travel time. But for a person needing to pass through several checkpoints, uncertainty is multiplied by the number of checkpoints, thus making planning a day nearly impossible.

Map 4 shows the journey of Litfiyeh Jaludi, a woman with kidney problems, from the village of Faqqu’a, near Jenin, to Altuni Hospital in Nablus, on June 7, 2001.11

What is the distance between Faqqu’a and Nablus? The aerial distance is about 35 kilometers, but as we have already seen, aerial distances are not useful...
to the average person. Let us look, then, at the distance by paved road. It is about 10 kilometers longer. On June 7, 2001, however, the real distance for Jaludi was 125 kilometers!

It is reasonable to assume that Jaludi, a sick woman who needs dialysis three times a week, knows the shortest and most efficient way to get to the hospital. Let us follow her route on that day. Jaludi and B’Tselem investigators left Faqqu’a and headed south. Near the Shavei Shomron settlement, they encountered a manned checkpoint where the IDF soldiers refused to allow them to pass. Although Jaludi and the investigators made clear that she is sick, the soldiers steadfastly refused her passage. Jaludi and the investigators had to drive back and try to find an alternate route to the hospital. Only after encountering two unmanned barriers, which lengthened their journey significantly, and driving over rough dirt bypass roads, did they manage to reach the hospital.

It is clear that on any given day—when temporary or permanent checkpoints are removed or added, when other soldiers man the checkpoint, when the level of alert is different, when the checkpoint bypass road is open or blocked, and so on—the distance will vary greatly. The distance can vary from forty-five kilometers to infinity, which occurs when the road is blocked, and reaching Nablus from Faqqu’a is impossible. The time is even more variable than the distance, since the waiting time at any of the checkpoints can range from minutes to weeks, and there is no way of estimating it in advance.

Torsten Hägerstrand, a Swedish geographer, developed a graphic method for describing human movement in space and time. A schematic graph of this kind looks like this:
The horizontal axis indicates space and the vertical axis indicates time in twenty-four hourly units. Person A sleeps at his home until 7:00, then drives to work (moving in both space and time), stays there until 16:00 and then drives back home. As can be seen, the traffic load is greater in the morning, so the travel time is longer, and the graph’s gradient is steeper. Person B, who works with person A, lives farther away from the workplace, but since he owns a fast motorcycle, he can leave his home at a later hour and still reach work on time, and his movement gradient will be more moderate. These graphs can be drawn at different resolutions for both time and space. Graphs can be sketched in units of seconds and meters or, as done by Hägerstrand himself, in “life routes” of people, from birth to death, where the space resolution is on the level of migration between cities and countries. Illustration 2 is a schematic representation of the spatial movement of a settler and a Palestinian.

The settler in option (a) drives the same distance to work as the Palestinian, but can work more hours. In option (b), the settler devotes the same amount of time to travel as the Palestinian, but can work farther away (that is, this settler has more options regarding the place of work).

But this graph, again, is misleading. The fact that on average it takes more time for a Palestinian to traverse the same distance as the settler does not describe the real situation. Let us have a look at a higher-resolution graph, describing several possible situations of at a checkpoint.

Illustration 3A shows slow, but steady movement; 3B shows a one-hour delay of nonmovement and then quick release of the jam; 3C shows an encounter with a
closed checkpoint; 3D shows an encounter with an open checkpoint, but just as the person reaches it, after an hour’s delay, he finds that he is not allowed to pass. In both of the last cases, the workplace remains beyond the person’s reach.

These four situations, of course, do not cover all possible options, and many variations could be made in each of them. Illustration 4 will show one possible variation of a man moving through four different checkpoints from his home to work, the university, or the hospital.

Illustration 5 shows what happened at the a-Tufah checkpoint when many inhabitants of the al-Mawasi area of the Gaza Strip were unable to return home while the checkpoint was closed for fifty consecutive days. These people, nevertheless, came every day, from morning to evening, to see whether the checkpoint had opened.14
WHERE, WHERE TO, WHEN?

The cumulative implication of the facts reviewed above is that Palestinians spend most of their time in movement (standing in line, in that model, is movement at zero speed). A Palestinian must wake up earlier and returns home later in order to work fewer hours. The Palestinian wastes his day in moving for the sake of waiting and in waiting for the sake of moving, without knowing whether he will even manage to arrive and if so, when. The ordinary person, or for that matter the settler, leaves one place, such as home, on the way to another place in pursuit of work, family, entertainment, or study. For the settler, the way itself, short or long, is only a road, a placeless place connecting different places. This contrasts with the Palestinian, who leaves home very early and wastes most of the day in placeless places, lacking in interest or in significance as reference points. As Azmi Bishara puts it in *Yearning in the Land of Checkpoints*, “The question ‘Where are you?’” loses its meaning, “because life in the shadow of the checkpoints [has] turned it into a foolish, at times even taunting question. For where else could one be under such circumstances? If a curfew was imposed, people would be at home, and if there was no curfew, there was the choice of their immediate surroundings or the checkpoint, since moving from city to city had become nearly impossible.” The question “Where are you?” becomes foolish simply because the Palestinian is actually always in a nonplace. Absurdly, the checkpoint itself, the ultimate placeless place, becomes the main reference point. Everything, both space and time, is measured in terms of before and after the checkpoint, and there are no assurances that another checkpoint will not pop up around the bend. This situation makes attempts at movement nearly absurd. In despair, Palestinians reduce movement to the necessary minimum. Many Palestinians have not been beyond their village entrance for years. Illustration 6 shows the remaining space left for an ordinary Palestinian with respect to various closure situations. The settler is used as a “control group” in order to show the potential of spatial movement without forced closures.

The question “Where?” is not the only one to lose its meaning. The question “Where to?” becomes obsolete, as well, in a place where one does not know whether to head east or north to reach a destination in the south (see Litfiyeh Jaludi’s route on Map 4). Given that the roads that actually connect points change frequently and that planning the day ahead is nearly impossible, it is hard to ask “Where to?” Regarding the question “When?” there is no need for further discussion. Palestinians cannot say when they will reach work or come back home from it. The standard deviation around the average is so high that the answer will be almost meaningless.

Every human activity takes place in time and space, and the questions “Where?” “Where to?” and “When?” are both the trivial and the necessary conditions
for any individual or social activity and social coordination. Changes in time and space, therefore, aﬀect the human activities occurring in them. According to Anthony Giddens, routine in space and time is a basic element of daily social activity. Routinization is crucial for creating ontological security, which is established and preserved by these daily activities. Repetitiveness connects a person with the outside world by making the former believe in the continuity and stability of the latter. Routinization is crucial, then, for both the individual and for long durée social institutions; its absence is harmful to both the individual and society. When there is no routine, one’s faith in one’s own stability and in the existence of one’s inner core seems to dissipate. The same happens in relation to society. Giddens analyzes situations in Nazi concentration camps in order to show the extent to which the breach of routine produces radical ontological insecurity. He cites Bruno Bettelheim: “It was . . . the inability to plan ahead because of the sudden changes in camp policies that was so deeply destructive.”

Hägerstrand talks about another kind of limitation on human movement above the purely physiological—the need for sleep or for food at regular intervals, and so on—which he calls “coupling constraints.” These refer to activities undertaken jointly with other people. Physiological constraints are thus further limited by the need to coordinate activities with other individuals in order to achieve a goal that can be done only in a group. Therefore, to the hardships of the uncertainty and unplanability of time, one must add the impossibility of coordinating a joint activity, let it be work, school, research, or a purely social meeting.

The decomposition of space by Israeli policies in the OPT undermines the ability of Palestinians there to work, to produce, to sell, to buy, to study, to heal, to know someone, to keep in touch, to organize, to coordinate, to resist, and to fight. The limits on movement imposed by both physiological and coupling constraints in the OPT have produced what must be called a “geography of disaster.” A disaster in this sense is defined as a large-scale event in which suffering and loss occur together with partial or total collapse of the systems of space and time. In periods of disaster, regular patterns and rules are suspended, but not canceled or permanently changed, since the disaster is, by definition, limited in time (and space). During that time, however, it is hard, if not impossible, to discuss patterns or rules, to coordinate, and to synchronize expectations. A government in a disaster zone is expected to restore routine and order and is judged, among other things, by the amount of time it takes to achieve this. The situation in the OPT can be defined as a “continuous disaster,” since, as noted above, uncertainty has become the only true certainty, and its end is nowhere in sight.

The geography of disaster, in our case, is not the description of the spatial characteristics of a disaster area, but rather the main source of the disaster. Exerting
control by means of space aims mainly at preventing organization, coordination, resistance, and fighting, but it necessarily also prevents people from working, producing, selling, buying, studying, healing and being healed, socializing, being intimate, and being friendly. The authorities, in this case, are not trying to restore order, but are acting instead as the main producers of chaos. In other words, Israeli order is preserved by the systematic destruction of Palestinian order.

I began by drawing a distinction between the absolute value of space as measured in square kilometers and the use value of that space. As we now can see, Israel controls the OPT by means of a systematic suspension of Palestinian spatial use values in that space. From this spatial analysis, it becomes clear that the Palestinians and the Israelis do not share the same space. Israeli use values in the OPT are completely different from Palestinian ones, and actually, as will be shown in the next section, the former were created purposely in order to reduce the latter. The two spaces, Israeli and Palestinian, overlap, both being limited in absolute terms by the same reference points, yet the difference in use values nullifies the argument that these are actually parts of the same space.

The tight control of the Palestinians attained through the systematic destruction of the continuity of space and time would be hard to achieve otherwise. Relatively speaking, Israel does not invest a lot of money in direct military occupation. The control technology is simple and nearly primitive, consisting of mounds of earth, trenches, and a few jeeps. In relative terms, not much violence is invested in the economy of domination. The number of Palestinian fatalities, when seen in light of the duration of the conflict, is not high in comparison with the numbers in other armed conflicts. The generation of uncertainty has been found to be a simple, cheap, and effective technology. It is simpler and cheaper to impose arbitrary and highly fluid movement prohibitions while intentionally avoiding signposting, documentation, or notification to the controlled population about the prohibitions, than to build walls and fences. When a Palestinian does not have a clue as to which zones are open for passage and what the open-fire orders are regarding someone passing through a prohibited zone, it is reasonable to assume that this Palestinian will avoid movement altogether. Next, I will address how control has been refined to the point of maintaining this situation of continuous disaster.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DOMINATION OF PALESTINIAN SPACE

As we saw above, use values for a space are determined by two main factors: the physical organization of the space and the rules governing its use. Both are determined, with varying levels of success, by the power that controls public space. In other words, the possession of space and the right to formulate the rules for its use
give the authorities the power to determine the spatial use values. Thus, an effi-
cient ruling power can overcome numerical and territorial inferiority. In the OPT,
space has been organized and rules have been fixed in a way that enables Israel to
dominate effectively a territory in which it seems to be inferior. The settlers make
up less than one-tenth of the West Bank’s population, and the built area of the
settlements are less than 2 percent of its land, and yet Israel rules with the pen-
etration and intensity that we have discussed above.

The purpose of this historical overview is not to examine former modes of con-
trol and space management or even to provide a chronological description of the
limitations on Palestinian movement, including what existed prior to the current
situation. The goal here is to show how the spatial array of the OPT (as deter-
mined by the IDF, the settlements, and legislation) made possible the current use
of movement-disruption technology.

The description, therefore, should not begin with al-Nakba, the “disaster,” as
the Palestinians call the events that led to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948,
or with the military administration of the Palestinian citizens of Israel (1948–66). All
these fall under the classic category of the struggle over territory and tell us little
about the current situation of numerous cells, barriers, and borderlines. The history
presented here is important for understanding how one jeep can close an entire
land cell and how a tiny outpost can exert influence over a large space. In other
words, what follows aims to show the power of the clever use of dots and lines.

To explain better how a space can be dominated by clever deployment and
use practices, I will begin with a historical example. In his book about the history
of barbed wire, Reviel Netz describes how it was used to take control of space.24
When the barbed-wire fence was first invented during the 1870s, it was designed
for containing herds of cattle and delimiting their grazing. The first time it was
used explicitly to control people and to win a war over space was during the Boer
War (1899–1902).25 In that war, Britain fought to protect its interests in South
Africa, particularly the newly discovered gold mines. The first battles against the
Dutch settlers were quickly settled in favor of Britain. Then, however, the Boers
started to organize in small “commando” units of horseback-mounted riflemen
who attacked the British forces and bombed the railways, the major means of con-
voying goods and military forces at the time.

To protect the railways, the British used barbed wire, which at the time was
used to keep trains from crashing into animals. Thick barbed-wire fences were
stretched along the rails, which, as in every other British-dominated area, criss-
crossed the territory. Small guard posts, about one kilometer apart, dotted the wire
fences. The method succeeded beyond all expectations. The new technology had
created spatial enclaves, allowing domination over a large territory with relatively
few troops. A few soldiers could now successfully delay and even fend off a quite large commando unit.

Netz discusses the manner in which the railway network was converted into a tool of spatial control by means of lines (railways) that connected dots (train stations). Once the linear network was surrounded by barbed wire, a "topological inversion" occurred, so that the lines connecting the stations became lines separating one area from another. The South African savanna was divided into relatively small land cells, enclosed on all sides by barbed wire. The network of fenced railways was later used as the passive base from which British military forces were deployed for "sweeping activities" in which they "cleared" the villages out of the separate land cells. The inhabitants were moved to "concentration camps," which were also surrounded by barbed wire. The space was divided and cleared, the inhabitants were restricted to specific areas where they could live, and thus the entire land became British.

This historical example resonates strongly with how Israel exerted control over the OPT. In the OPT, this process began with a freezing of spatial organization and a limiting of legitimate Palestinian space solely to the built areas. After these Palestinian "islands" were delineated, major portions of the remaining land were declared to be Israeli by defining them as "state lands," "fire zones," or "nature reserves." This gave Israel a hold that was sufficient for organizing the continuous space in which the Palestinian villages were scattered.

![Illustration 7](image-url) Once the railways are fenced they become separation lines, dividing the savanna into relatively small cells.
The isolated settlement points, sowed by Israel over the years, grew in a strange manner, with an emphasis on maximal linear spread, so as to divide the Palestinian areas. Connecting those dots by lines—wide paved roads—completed the topological inversion to create isolated land cells, with movement between them controlled, if not prohibited. Starting from the relatively passive formation of lines and dots, the IDF developed an offensive approach to defense. Eventually, this led to the IDF’s pulling the small amount of land still left to the Palestinians out from under their feet by declaring some of them illegal residents in their own homes.  

The Israeli takeover must be understood as a combined military and civilian occupation; neither a military nor a civilian occupation alone could explain the extreme situation that characterizes the control of Palestinian space. The situation arose from the ongoing process of acquiring land in order to build a settlement, then acquiring more land in order to protect it. The newly acquired “defense area” is quickly settled by civilians, prompting the army to acquire more land in order to protect the civilians, and so on. The combined civilian-military process of achieving domination over the territories thus involved possessing a growing amount of land, coupled with changing the manner of possession from de jure to de facto, and taking advantage of the possession of the land to impose spatial-use regulations that make possible additional spatial takeovers. All this results in a reduction of Palestinian use values: from building restrictions, to movement restrictions, and finally to residency restrictions.

LIMITING THE PALESTINIAN “ISLANDS”

Two legislative orders from the early years of the occupation begin the takeover story. The first, in 1968, froze registration of land titles by West Bank inhabitants. Israel justified this move by citing the need to avoid harming the rights of Palestinians who had left the West Bank during the 1967 War and who therefore would not be able to prevent the title from being registered in someone else’s name. For various historical reasons involving, among other things, the wish to avoid tax payments and the existence of traditional communal agricultural practices, more than 70 percent of West Bank lands were not registered in any way before the order was given.

The second order, in 1971, changed the 1966 Jordanian planning law known as City, Village, and Building Planning Law, No. 79. This change in the planning legislation had a great impact on spatial growth in the West Bank, because it redefined permitted locations for building and development. Actually, this was not a matter of replanning, but rather of adopting unplanning as a policy. The Supreme Planning Council became a unit of the Civil Administration once all authority for planning was handed over to the IDF area commander and all the Jordanian and

WHERE, WHERE TO, AND WHEN

197
Palestinian officials on the council were replaced by Israelis, most of whom were either military officers or representatives of the settlers. The council received exclusive and complete authority over outline plans, detailed plans, building permits, setting the boundaries for villages and cities, and so on. The regional and rural planning committees were disbanded, leaving all authority in the hands of the Supreme Planning Council, whose decisions could no longer be appealed.

Thus, Palestinian planning and development were frozen. Since the Israeli occupation, not a single outline plan has been made, and the only valid regional outline plans are those for the regions of Jerusalem and Nablus dating from 1942. Though needs and the social and economic realities have changed drastically since 1942, these outline plans still form the guidelines for permit approvals. Of 424 villages in the West Bank, only one, Taibeh, has an approved outline plan. Most of the cities that are run by municipalities have valid outline plans, but these date back to the British Mandate before the creation of the state of Israel and are long outdated. Because so much time has elapsed since the plans were drawn up, and because a great part of the West Bank was defined by the British as an “agricultural area” or “nature reserve,” the land allocated for building has long since been exhausted. In addition, the plans declare 1000 square meters as the basic, indivisible unit for a house, thereby preventing division of the land into smaller portions and severely limiting even the options for in-fill construction and development.

Fixing the spatial configuration as that of the late 1960s and early 1970s limited Palestinian living space to extant places, essentially prohibiting additional development. This was accomplished by denying building permits, thereby laying a legal foundation for destruction and for the arbitrary use of force. This limiting, both in theory and in practice, divided the Palestinian space, that is, the built areas, from the space of potential Israeli development—that is, all the rest.

Palestinian expansion was limited also by reserving widespread areas for military purposes, enacting aberrant building restrictions near main roads, and prohibiting the construction of residential buildings near settlements and military bases. In addition, many areas were declared nature reserves in which construction and agricultural activities were prohibited. Thus, Israel succeeded in prohibiting building in nearly 70 percent of the West Bank.

In the early 1990s, the Central Planning Bureau of the Civil Administration prepared Special Partial Outline Plans for some four hundred villages in the West Bank. These plans were meant to replace the detailed plans required by Jordanian law. Instead of being a means of development, however, these new plans were actually limitation plans, formed as they were by taking aerial photographs of each village, drawing a line around the built areas, and prohibiting construction...
beyond that line. According to these plans, construction in the villages was to be in-fill, that is, vertical construction in available areas within the line and a gradual increase of population density.

Using outline plans as a means of limiting Palestinian construction and as a tool for increasing construction in the settlements was very common in East Jerusalem, too, despite institutional and legal differences between this area and the rest of the West Bank. Upon the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, and contrary to what happened in the rest of the West Bank, all the Jordanian outline plans were canceled, creating a planning vacuum that was filled gradually only in later years. During the first ten years of Israeli annexation, only ad hoc building permits were given, and these only in extremely limited areas of the town.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Jerusalem municipality decided to prepare outline plans for all the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, most of which were completed, and some of which are still in the process of preparation and approval. The most significant characteristic of these plans is the huge amount of land, roughly 40 percent, labeled as “open landscape,” upon which construction is prohibited. According to the plans approved by the end of 1999, only 11 percent of East Jerusalem land, excluding the expropriated land, was available for Palestinian construction. In keeping with the other demarcation plans of the West Bank, construction is allowed mainly in the existing built areas.

Today, authority for planning and building in Area C, about 60 percent of the West Bank, is exclusively in Israeli hands. Palestinian applications to the Civil Administration for building permits on their own private lands that fall outside the demarcation boundaries have been rejected in most cases. The arguments for the rejection are based upon the demarcation plans (in which the land is beyond the plans’ boundaries), as well as upon the British Mandate’s outline plans (in which the land is defined as an agricultural area or as a nature reserve). The legal counselor of the Civil Administration, Colonel Shlomo Politis, has admitted that “in practice...there are no building permits for Palestinians.”

In some parts of the West Bank, especially in the western hills, the boundaries of Areas A and B overlap almost completely with the boundaries of the built Palestinian areas, which serve as the boundaries of the demarcation plans. Most of the available land is therefore in Area C, where the planning authorities are Israeli. As this illustrates, transferring to the Palestinian Authority the mandate for planning and building in Areas A and B is meaningless in many cases.

The planning vacuum was filled by Israel. Planning policy for the West Bank is guided by two main bodies that coordinate their efforts. The first is the government, acting through various ministries, and the second is the Jewish Agency, acting through the Settlement Department of the Zionist Organization. The 1980
Drobless Plan, the master plan of the Jewish Agency for settlement in the OPT, defined its goals as “reducing the spread of uncontrolled Arab settlement.” This is an application to planning of the view that Palestinian space must be restricted to existing homes and villages and that all growth is an uncontrolled invasion into Jewish space. Thus, the demarcation of Palestinian space and the creation of the tools that made possible Israeli domination of the remainder of the space have resulted in a topological inversion. The Palestinian villages were no longer part of the continuous space of the West Bank, but rather became isolated islands in an open frontier reserved exclusively for Israelis.

The main tool Israel used to acquire Palestinian land was declaring it “state land.” This method is based on the Ottoman Land Law of 1858. According to this law, the sovereign can seize ownerless land, defined as land that is not private property, that has been cultivated for less than ten successive years, that has not been cultivated for at least three years, or that is rocky land so far away that “the loudest voice made by a man in the nearest settled area would not be heard there.” As noted above, the registration procedures for more than 70 percent of the West Bank’s land had not been completed by the time of the order that froze registration, making this land easy prey. It must be noted that Israel had significantly increased the burden of proof concerning land cultivation. In addition, the actual marking of the land on maps was very inaccurate. The primary marking was made on aerial photographs, which have a distortion effect that increases as one moves from the center of the photograph to the perimeter. Apparently, more than 30 percent of the lands declared as state land should not have been so declared, even according to the strict criteria set by Israel.

Here we must emphasize the inversion of the burden of proof. A Palestinian wishing to appeal against his land’s seizure must pass through the Appeals Committee. The main principle according to which the committee works is that the burden of proof lies on the person claiming that the land is not state land. According to the Order Regarding Government Property (Judea and Samaria) of 1967, “If the Custodian has confirmed, in a written declaration bearing his signature, that a given property is government property, that property shall be considered government property for so long as the contrary has not been proven.” The first obstacle facing Palestinians wishing to object to such labeling of their lands was that, in many cases, they did not even know about the procedure. Many Palestinian landowners discovered that their lands had been declared as state land only when construction of a settlement began. In most cases, the actual building started months and sometimes years after the declaration, and therefore they could not appeal to the committee, since appeals are accepted only within forty-five days of the declaration. In addition, an appeal is costly, because the appellant must pay an appeals
fee, a certified surveyor for a precise mapping of the land, and a lawyer to draw up the affidavit and present the case to the Appeals Committee.

Even if the appellant manages to fulfill all requirements and to convince committee members of his ownership of the land in question, there are still cases in which the committee will reject the appeal. This is because sometimes the deliberations take place after the custodian has already signed an authorization for one of the bodies engaged in settlement and after preparatory work for a settlement has already begun. To prevent the reversal of such a situation, section 5 of Order No. 59 Regarding Government Property includes the following provision: “No transaction undertaken in good faith by the Custodian and another person regarding any property that the Custodian believed, at the time of the transaction, to be government property shall be nullified, and it shall continue to be valid even if it is proven that the property was not at that time government property.”

**TAKING CONTROL OF THE CONTINUOUS SPACE**

Geographer Elisha Efrat argues that the settlements did not create a critical demographic mass, and that their geographic dispersal made them weak and vulnerable. “It is hard to say that after a few decades of creeping civil occupation, there is now Jewish domination of the territories,” he claims. Efrat’s attitude, derived from the classic geographic view, misses the complexity of the spatial expansion process described here. True, the number of settlers at mid-2007 was 267,500, or around 10 percent of the West Bank’s population, and the constructed areas of settlement were only 1.7 percent of the West Bank’s land. Indeed, by these measures, the settlers are clearly inferior numerically. But these measures ignore highly important factors of space arrangement and usage regulations: the location of the settlements, their municipal area, their shape and form of development, the roads connecting them, and the military defense practices in the settlements and on the roads. These are the factors that describe the real scale of Israeli domination of the OPT.

**THE LOCATION OF THE SETTLEMENTS** The spread of the settlements was very calculated. The settlers of Gush Emunim, the flagship movement of religious-ideological settlement in the Occupied Territories, understood well that their “control of a region is a function not only of the size of the population residing there, but also of the size of the area in which this population exercises its impression and influence.” The map of the settlements shows how they spread throughout the land, often intentionally in the heart of Arab population centers. Many of the settlements were built very close to Palestinian settlements, blocking further Palestinian urban development. In some cases, the settlement was purposely built in a
location that, due to topographic circumstances, would be the natural direction for expansion of the Palestinian settlement.\textsuperscript{47}

The proximity of the settlements to main roads was of major importance. Road 60 is the main north-south artery in the West Bank, connecting the six main Palestinian cities. Spreading the settlements along this axis was meant to enable Israeli control over the main road while blocking possible Palestinian construction that would have linked Palestinian settlements on both sides of the road. As the master settlement plan for Judea and Samaria states, “Jewish settlement along this road will create a mental barrier with regard to the mountain ridge and may also limit the uncontrolled expansion of Arab settlement.”\textsuperscript{48} In most cases, the settlements are isolated and control relatively short segments of the road. In a few cases, however, Israel created a block of settlements that dominate a significant area of Road 60. One example is the settlement block of Shilo, Eli, and Ma’ale Levona, whose municipal boundaries cover some 1,925 acres around the road.

The settlement of Ma’ale Adumim exemplifies the importance of settlements’ location. Its municipal area is only 0.8 percent of the total land of the West Bank, but its location near the west-east road from Jerusalem to Jericho cuts the West Bank horizontally into two parts that are almost totally separated.

The municipal area With regard to Jewish settlements, the manner of demarcation is the inverse of that applied to Palestinian settlements. Whereas for Palestinian settlements the municipal area is de facto never more than the built area, the municipal boundaries for Jewish settlements can be dozens of times the size of the built area.\textsuperscript{49} The inversion is most salient in the Arvot Hayarden Regional Council (along the Jordan valley), where the municipal boundaries were defined as “all the Jordan Valley excluding the Palestinian settlements.” Here the entire continuous space has become Israeli, excluding only the already built Palestinian areas, thereby preventing any future Palestinian development.

Two important concepts are the “area of the community,” that is, the municipal boundaries of a specific settlement, and the “municipal area,” which is the area under the jurisdiction of a regional council that oversees several settlements. The areas within the municipal area’s boundaries include all the lands that Israel has laid claim to over the years. Therefore, the boundaries of most of the Jewish local authorities in the West Bank are curved and include noncontinuous patches of land. The municipal areas of the regional councils contain huge tracts of empty space that are not part of the “area of community” of a specific settlement. The built Jewish area in the West Bank is 1.7 percent of the total land, while the community areas are four times that size. An additional 35.1 percent (nearly 500,000 acres) has been put under the jurisdiction of the regional councils. Thus, the
settlements directly control 41.9 percent of the West Bank.\textsuperscript{38} The municipal areas were significantly increased in the mid-1990s, the period of the Oslo Accords, and as stated by an official report, “the municipal boundaries were broadened without any connection to the urban needs of the existing settlements.”\textsuperscript{51}

**The shape and form of development** As stated above, the municipal boundaries of most of the regional councils in the OPT are winding and, at times, include noncontiguous tracts of land. At first glance, these boundaries seem totally unreasonable and indeed, they do not meet any standard of classic geography-based planning. Let us take Itamar as an example. This settlement, inhabited by 540 people, has an area of the community of more than 1,750 acres, or fourteen times the built area, of hilly, winding, narrow, and long tracts of land, surrounding “islands” that are not part of its municipal area.

It is even harder to comprehend the form of construction within that area. Instead of erecting new buildings adjacent to the existing built area, more and more outposts have been built (six so far) at the edges of the settlement boundaries. Although the last “official” settlement, Modi’in Illit, was established according to an Israeli governmental decision in 1996, since the mid-1990s, more than one hundred illegal outposts have been erected all around the West Bank and in Gaza Strip before the evacuation. Although these outposts are indeed considered
“illegal,” most of them receive a full service from the Israeli authorities: defense by means of soldiers, weapons and fences; electricity and telephones; paved roads; budgets for education and religious services, and more. Building outposts thus necessitates paving more roads through difficult terrain, additional security, and so on. Broadening one’s view from the settlement itself to its Palestinian surroundings makes clear the reason for such an odd form of expansion. Itamar directly blocks the growth of three Palestinian villages: Beit Furik, Awarta, and Yanun. Preventing Palestinian contiguity is the only reason for such a development.

Another example can be seen in the city of Ariel. Its municipal boundaries stretch 11 kilometers from east to west, and its maximum breadth is 2.5 kilometers. Here, again, we can see an intentional blocking of Palestinian continuity, because the settlement was stretched out as long as possible by means of building from the outside in, that is, starting at the edges and only then building the central area. The length of Ariel’s built area is 5 kilometers, but its width is only 700 meters. From a planning perspective, this is an unreasonable spread.

The unreasonableness is even more glaring in light of the fact that adjacent to where the first of the houses were built, especially to the south, there are extensive available lands that could have served to widen the settlement. Construction in outlying areas indicates that the Israeli planning authorities were not concerned with urban planning, but rather acted to create a buffer, as long as possible, separating the Palestinian villages on both sides of the Cross-Samaria Road and disrupting their territorial continuity.

**ROADS** “The roads in Judea and Samaria have always been notable for their close connection to the topography, the conditions of the agricultural land, and the distribution of rural and urban Arab areas.” The settlement roads totally differed from this pattern from their inception. Every settlement built in the OPT entailed construction of a road leading to it, even when this involved breaking through difficult, rocky terrain or dealing with steep slopes. Ten kilometers of road were needed to connect the settlements of Kadim and Ganim to the Jenin bypass road, fourteen kilometers were paved for 300 people living in Shim’a, and more than thirty kilometers of road were paved between Teko’a and the Dead Sea in order to connect to 550 settlers in Ma’ale Amos and Mitzpe Shalem. These roads required land that was obtained through widespread confiscation of Palestinian lands.

In addition, the roads adhered to the logic of erecting barriers in the heart of Palestinian population centers. Contrary to the common purpose of roads—connecting people in different locations—the Israeli roads in the West Bank were meant to do the exact opposite to the Palestinians. Some of these roads were planned as physical boundaries limiting the urban development of Palestinian settlements. These roads prevent the natural coalescence of Palestinian settlements in
map 6 Growth of the built area in Ariel. The last illustration is based on a plan from 1985, which so far has not materialized. [Source: B’Tselem, “Land Grab” (see note 4)]
areas over which Israel wants to maintain its control for military or civil purposes. Amira Hass wrote in January 2003:

A person can drive all over the West Bank without knowing not only the names of the villages and the towns whose lands were taken for the building of Jewish settlements and neighborhoods, but also the very fact of their existence. The names of most of them do not appear on the road signs.... A Jew driving on the little-traveled roads of the West Bank might think that there are no more Arabs; they do not drive on the wide roads he uses....

Whoever planned the settlements, both big and small, 20 years ago knew that it was imperative to prevent any attacks on them and their inhabitants by the “natives,” primarily achieved through building roads that would isolate every Palestinian village and town, distancing them from one another and from the main roads. This was done to such an extent that a mound of earth became sufficient for blocking access from the village to the road.... Israeli decision makers... knew how to plan a dividing web of roads that would become the main weapon against the Palestinians.

Citing security as an excuse, since the outbreak of the second intifada, Israel has prevented the Palestinians from using a major part of West Bank roads. A B’Tselem report divided the restricted roads into three types: those on which travel by Palestinians is completely prohibited, partially prohibited, or restricted. The completely prohibited roads are further divided into roads with a military manned checkpoint that allows Jews to pass, but prohibits Palestinian passage (defined as a “sterile road”) and roads that are blocked with physical barriers preventing access. In some cases, even crossing the road by car is prohibited. Consequently, Palestinians are limited in their ability to use even nonprohibited roads. In such cases, a Palestinian traveling on a permitted road who reaches an intersection with a prohibited road must exit the vehicle, cross the prohibited road on foot, and take another vehicle for the rest of the journey. A B’Tselem survey shows seventeen roads and road segments in the West Bank that are completely prohibited to Palestinian vehicular movement. Their total length is 120 kilometers.

The partially prohibited roads include those on which only Palestinians holding a “Special Movement Permit for Internal Checkpoints in Judea and Samaria” may drive. This category also includes roads on which driving is permitted only for Palestinians with the special permit or who live (as their ID cards testify) in villages or towns that are otherwise inaccessible. There are ten roads or segments in this category with a total length exceeding 245 kilometers.

The restricted-use category includes roads that are accessible only through a manned checkpoint because all other access roads have been blocked by physical barriers. Generally speaking, Palestinians do not have to show a movement...
permit in order to pass through these checkpoints. Nevertheless, Palestinians must undergo certain inspections. At some of these checkpoints, the small number of soldiers relative to the amount of traffic results in long waits. As a result, many drivers avoid using these roads. In addition, police enforce traffic laws rigorously in Palestinian areas and impose many fines. From time to time, the IDF imposes additional restrictions, such as allowing only public-transportation or commercial vehicles access to the road. Fourteen roads and road segments in the West Bank fall into this category. Their total length is 365 kilometers. Map 7 shows how these prohibited and restricted-use roads are distributed over the West Bank.

DEFENSE PRACTICES “Our basic assumption always is that wherever Jews are, the army must ensure their well-being,” declared Ron Schechner, assistant to the defense minister. Since there are Jews everywhere in the OPT—in the settlements, at outposts and on the roads—the army must employ defensive practices at any point where Jews live or pass.
Initially, Palestinians were restricted from entering the settlements themselves. This restriction was not published as an official order, but it was clear that a Palestinian had no business within a settlement, with the exception of Palestinian laborers employed in construction, cleaning, and so on. In 1996, the entire municipal area of the settlements was declared a closed military zone. The order states, naturally, that “the declaration’s orders do not apply to Israelis.” In a later phase, the military declared sterile “special security zones” around the settlements and around the outposts, as well. The special security zone includes a paved “security road” and a barbed-wire fence encompassing the settlement at a distance of 400 meters from the perimeter of the built area. In many places, however, the fences were put up farther than 400 meters from the perimeter. The spatial defense framework was upgraded again in January 2003, when the Central Command brigadier general ordered that “the boundaries of any settlement’s security envelope extend to the most outlying houses of the neighboring Arab villages.”

The term “defense” is misleading. The IDF’s conception of defense has always been active and offensive. “Going outside the fence” was the basic practice for defending a fence from the time of the pre-IDF organizations of the 1930s. The real meaning of the term “security zone” is a sterile, Palestinian-free zone. In many of these places, this translates into a shoot-to-kill policy against anyone who enters. It is important to note that these areas are not declared, signposted, or marked in any way, on a map or on the ground. No wonder, then, that Palestinians prefer to stay far from whatever might be a “security zone.” When that zone extends to the houses of the neighboring Palestinian village, the only safe space for inhabitants lies within the village boundaries themselves. Since these offensive-defense practices are also imposed on roads used by Jews, Palestinians avoid approaching the roads, even on foot, as much as possible.

To the “defensive practices” we must add actions of the settlers. These, in keeping with the military rationale, but in a less restrained manner, move “defense” outside settlements and roads and into the shrinking Palestinian space. Thus, a complementary mechanism is created: “security measures” declared by the army are used by the settlers to enlarge the area they control; this, in turn, begets an enlarging of the area affected by security measures, and so forth. According to one of the settlers, “There are officers who expect us, as they even told us themselves, to enter nearby villages and go wild. I can understand them; it is hard for them to act with their arms and legs tied, and in many cases the politicians indeed fetter them.”

In many parts of the West Bank, settlers sow terror and fear in their surroundings, thus preventing Palestinians from approaching their own lands, roads, and olive groves. Many Palestinians are afraid of getting near areas where they may encounter settlers. In some areas, mainly around Nablus, in southern Mount
Hebron, and in the city of Hebron, such violent behavior by the settlers has become routine, and many Palestinians are abandoning their lands and limiting or changing their daily routes.64

The topological inversion is thus complete. The lines that connect the dots have become too dangerous to cross, either on foot or by car, and thus are delineated as isolated islands.65 This situation has been perpetuated, both politically and graphically, by dividing the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C. Area C, which is under full Israeli control, constitutes a continuous 60 percent of the West Bank’s territory. Within it are no fewer than 190 islands of Areas A and B.66 The roads and settled Jewish points determined this map on the clear assumption that “whatever is not Palestinian will now be Israeli.” In many cases, the boundaries of areas under Palestinian rule are congruent with the built areas and always are at a great distance (the “defense area”) from Jewish settlements and roads.

The settlements were not built with the intention of reducing Palestinian movement, but rather to limit the expansion of built areas and to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity, just as the railroad lines were not laid in South Africa in order to divide the space and to play a role in the Boer War. But in both cases, the original intent is irrelevant. From the moment a division of the space was needed, the settlements and the roads formed an excellent basis for barriers and separations. The fences and the checkpoints, which are relatively new, are the embodiment of the potential for closure and limitation that existed in the organization of space from the beginning. All that was needed was a redefinition of movement regulations, coupled with enforcement by means of trenches and mounds of earth. According to Olivier Razac, “The perfection of a tool of power is not measured so much by its technical refinement as by its economic adaptation. The instruments which serve authority best are those which expend the smallest amount of energy possible to produce the effects of control or domination.”67

THE REGULATION OF SPACE

As we have just seen, spatial analysis is a powerful tool for examining the development, application, and consequences of movement-disruption technology proceeded in the OPT. It can illuminate a number of other topics related to the use of that technology in the regulation of space there, topics whose importance usually has been reduced or ignored in other modes of analysis and that merit deeper critical scrutiny. These topics are the outposts, the “Seam Zone,” the various disengagement plans, and the separation of Palestinian movement from Israeli movement.68
OUTPOSTS

In early 2008 there were 122 “official” settlements in the OPT, inhabited, as of mid-2007, by 267,500 settlers. The last settlement built with permission of the government, Modi’in Illit, established in 1996, is the second-most populated city in the West Bank. As of 2004, its population was 27,300. In addition to “official” settlements, more than 100 outposts have been established in the OPT since the 1990s. Their total population is no more than several thousand. Comparing the city of Modi’in Illit to the outposts emphasizes the difference between considering the size of a population and considering its location and distribution.

While the population of Modi’in Illit is five to six times that of all the outposts combined, a map shows the essential difference in their spatial claims. Modi’in Illit, located close to the Green Line, has a sufficiently large mass of inhabitants to bring about a change in the route of the Separation Wall so as to include the settlement on the Israeli side, swallowing up large parts of the land of the Palestinian village of Bil’in. Without disregarding the harm caused to Bil’in, we can say that this harm is mainly local and that its effect is more similar to that depicted by the conservative spatial description of the conflict. That is, it does not prevent the existence of Palestinian space, but rather limits and reduces it. The outposts, on the other hand, in spite of their tiny size, at times even unmanned, fulfill their objective of taking over the space. Just as the train stations, despite their being no more than uninhabited passage points between places, played a significant role in the British domination of South Africa, so the main importance of the outposts lies in the lines stretched to them and in the defense practices with regard to the points and lines.

The settlement Itamar again provides an excellent example (see Map 5). The winding, space-blocking municipal area of the settlement was not enough. Six tiny outposts were spread out on a line eight kilometers long. A road was paved and security was established between the points, defining the abstract municipal areas de facto. Sometimes these additions even provide an excuse for enlarging the municipal areas, as in the case of the municipal area of the settlement Shim’a, which was enlarged in 2005 so as to include the Sansana outpost located more than an aerial distance of five kilometers away.

THE “SEAM ZONE”

The “Seam Zone” is the Israeli-named region between the Separation Wall and the Green Line, in which Israeli domination and Palestinian exclusion reach their maximal point. The first article in the order creating the Seam Zone states that “no one may enter the Seam Zone or stay in it” and that “anyone in the Seam Zone must leave it immediately.” The next article allows all other “kinds of people” into the zone, with the exception of its Palestinian inhabitants.
In keeping with this draconian regulation of space, every stay in it requires a permit. The trapped villagers must have a “permanent resident permit,” which must be renewed every three months, in order to continue living in their own houses. Noninhabitants wishing to enter the Seam Zone must request a special permit from the District Coordination Office (DCO). There are a dozen categories of people who may request a permit: agricultural workers, teachers, irrigation technicians, and others. In general, the permit gives its holder the right to stay within the closed zone only during the day; sleeping in the zone requires separate approval, marked on the back of the permit. Also, the permit is valid only at the specific entrance gate named on it.

A “spatial table” is thus constituted in the Seam Zone. Instead of arranging information, data, and people’s files in columns and rows on a piece of paper or in office drawers, the table here is created on the ground. Each item is put in its specific place according to the rational justification of the narrow categories set by Israel. Movement, allowed only at one named gate and only during its specific hours of operation, is also bound to specified patterns. The other aspect of the table is its ability to exclude and eliminate. The moment an item fails to fit into its prescribed location, it is considered dispensable and is discarded.

Unique to the Seam Zone is the physico-geographical existence of this table. The imposition of bureaucratic documents onto a concrete territory makes the classification much more violent than it is ordinarily. It is a sophisticated method that prepares the ground (or at least produces the potential) for a gradual “bureaucratic combing action” by means of which the land will be emptied of its inhabitants by a reduction of the number of permits and the eligibility for them. The spatial imposition of the table allows not only the removal of a person’s papers from a drawer, but also the removal of the individual from the land. A situation will be created that is similar to that of the concentration camps of the Boer War. The remaining inhabitants will stay in villages that are actually isolated pens, encircled by barbed wire or walls, cut off from their lands and from any possible space for expansion.

“DISENGAGEMENTS”

The ground withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the dismantling of the settlements there, known as “the disengagement plan,” was marketed to the Israelis, as well as to the world, as the first step toward the end of the occupation. In fact, all that happened was a change in the mode of control. True, at this moment, Israel is no longer settled in the Gaza Strip, but it still controls it effectively. First, the passages between the Gaza Strip and Israel are working on a very irregular basis, a situation that creates an acute scarcity of basic goods, such as flour, sugar, and
construction materials. At the same time, the export of goods and the entry of workers to Israel are prohibited. As of December 2005, 65 percent of the Gaza Strip’s inhabitants earned less than $2.10 per day. According to OCHA’s data, Gaza is on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe.

The aerial and marine spaces of the Gaza Strip are exclusively controlled by Israel. Small unmanned aircraft patrol the skies constantly, relaying data and targets for liquidation. IDF combat planes assassinate “wanted” men and produce sonic booms in the middle of the night to frighten the populace. Artillery units shell the periphery of the cities and systematically destroy the infrastructure of the roads in the northern Gaza Strip, to the extent of severing the town of Beit Hanoun from the rest of the strip. There are even threats of bombing inhabited neighborhoods (after warning residents that to avoid harm they are advised to leave), in response to Qassam rockets fired at Israel. In April 2006, the IDF reduced the “safety range” for artillery bombing from 300 meters to 100 meters from built areas. One hundred meters is the known error for an artillery shell of the kind used in Gaza. In other words, the IDF is shelling with clear knowledge that civilians will be hit. The destruction in northern Gaza Strip neighborhoods is great, and several civilians have already been killed in their homes.

All future disengagement plans for the West Bank mention continuing all military activities, liquidations, and raids “if necessary.” In fact, “disengagement” gives Israel an opportunity to increase the severity of military practices used against Palestinian inhabitants. James Ron distinguishes between two spatial patterns: the “frontier,” defined as a peripheral region unincorporated into a powerful state’s legal zone of influence and, as such, more prone to acts of lawless nationalist violence, and the “ghetto,” defined as a repository of unwanted and marginalized populations but that is nonetheless included within the dominant state’s legal sphere of influence, with inhabitants classified as quasi-members of the polity. Ghetto populations are more likely to be policed than forcefully deported. The space of the OPT is gradually being transformed from a ghetto into a frontier. This is the true meaning of the “Lebanonization” that security authorities talk about in Israel. This is the shift of the status of the Occupied Territories from a space policed and governed rigidly to a space of warlike methods in which almost everything is allowed in order to allow the ruling power to “restore order.” The Gaza Strip has passed into the last phase before becoming a total frontier, according to Ron. This stage is marked by effective control coupled with a renunciation of responsibility, alienation, and elimination. This is the apparent path in store for areas from which Israel will disengage in the future, especially, it appears, the most populated areas of the West Bank, located between the Separation Wall and the Jordan Valley.
“SEPAREATION”

Concurrent with increasingly limited possibilities of movement in the heart of the West Bank, other, seemingly opposite processes are taking place in the periphery. Here I refer mainly to the “passages” in the Separation Wall and the plans for segregated roads for Jews and Palestinians in the West Bank. The passages, according to spokespeople of the control array, exhibit a conspicuous change in the army’s attitude toward checkpoints. The change is manifested first of all in their names. These sites are designated as passages, and not as barriers to prohibit passage. The defense minister’s adviser on matters of the Palestinian “fabric of life,” Baruch Spiegel, claimed that this change would be expressed in the fact that the passages would operate on a principle of being “usually open,” as opposed to checkpoints, which operate on the basic assumption of being “usually closed.” Also, these passages would have fixed passage regulations, “something which has never existed.” The passages are even defined as a humanitarian issue, receiving $50 million of American financing as “aid for humanitarian needs.”

The passages, in keeping with this approach, have been privatized and are operated by private security companies on the assumption that these can ensure better “customer service” to the Palestinians and that competition between the companies will bring about an “improvement in service.” The aim of privatization is to “change the management culture of the checkpoints.” The company indeed emphasized service and even set maximal time spans for the passage of Palestinians in the various categories. Passage will be by means of a biometric “smart card,” available for purchase at the passage itself (and valid for one to three months). A Palestinian would not see a soldier or other official until the final phase, when the photograph on the card is compared with the individual who presents it.

Segregating the road system is also presented as a humanitarian solution to the harsh situation of the Palestinians. According to the plan, code named by the military Everything Flows, a continuous Palestinian space parallel to that of the Israelis will be made possible by means of interchanges, bridges, and underpasses. As of January 2006, twenty-seven underpasses and overpasses had been built along the Jewish-only main roads. An additional nineteen are being planned or under construction. In addition, two new Palestinian road systems are planned. The first road, called “East Villages Road,” will allow Palestinian movement from Hebron to Bethlehem east of Gush Etzion, continuing to Ramallah through an underpass below the Jericho-Jerusalem main road. From Ramallah to the northern cities, mainly Tulkarem, the connection will be the “Western Villages Road,” passing west of the Beit-El–Tapuah main road. The total length of the new roadways
is planned to be 140 kilometers (out of 2,000 kilometers of roads in the West Bank), spread over thirty-four roads.

But all of these nice words conceal a very different reality and are no more than euphemisms. The day after the inauguration of the Qalandia checkpoint as a “border passage,” Ha’aretz declared: “The significance of opening this passage is mainly to tighten checks on Palestinians and to conform to the policy that these passages signify the future border between Israel and the territories.” Daniela Mansbach shows how the privatization of the passages worsened their “service” to the Palestinians. One of the important issues is the prohibition on Machsom-Watch and other humanitarian organizations members from entering the passage. The architecture of the passage allows the Palestinians to be checked one by one, in a “sterile” zone, thus avoiding the critical gaze of the activists, leaving the arbitrary behavior of the soldiers unchecked.

The same is true for the Heraclitian Everything Flows plan. Just as the spatial uncertainty described above does not signify freedom, but rather a technology of control, Everything Flows means channeling the flow in a way that makes supervision and control easier. Palestinian movement is channeled into alternative side roads on which a barrier can be opened or closed for regulation. Iron gates are installed at the entrance to most of the underpasses and overpasses, a permanent reminder of the potential for closure.

As Gilles Deleuze once noted, “Guattari has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position—licit or illicit—and effects a universal modulation.” Pedestrian space is harder to regulate than that of highways and railroads. When movement is prohibited on all roads, bypass routes spring up, making movement less predictable for the ruler. Diverting the flow onto roads declared to be “usually open” will help prevent the formation of bypasses, will avoid rhizomization, and will ultimately increase control. Like the city under the surveillance of Guattari’s computer, the planned space in the OPT will allow relatively unhindered Palestinian movement. The point, however, is that with the same ease as in Guattari’s example, the biometric card can be rejected or the tunnel can be locked without explanation and without any option of argument or appeal. Arbitrariness will not be reduced, but rather will be refined, in that there will be no need for mechanisms of justification and no room left for bypass options.
CONCLUSION: EVERYDAY RESISTANCE

Resistance is inherent in movement. As Michel de Certeau noted, “the crossing, drifting away, or improvisation of walking privilege, transform or abandon spatial elements” because “the walker transforms each spatial signifier into something else.” Thus, “on the one hand he actualizes only a few of the possibilities fixed by the constructed order (he goes only here and not there),” while “on the other he increases the number of possibilities (for example, by creating shortcuts and detours) and prohibitions (for example, he forbids himself to take paths generally considered accessible or even obligatory).” The resistance to the spatial state of affairs that allows continuity of life in the OPT is of two types: physical and communicative. Creating new bypasses is an example of physical resistance. Actually, since most Palestinian-restricted roads originated as bypass roads (that is, allowing settlers to bypass Arab population centers), the new roads are bypass roads bypassing bypass roads. Every checkpoint and every prohibited road generates new bypasses.

Local Palestinian councils renovate and widen internal roads that, due to lack of alternatives, become main roads. In a few places, such as the Hebron and Tulka-rem areas, the local councils paved new roads between villages after their access to main roads was cut. Thus, new roads connect Palestinian villages, roads that are not obligated to the Israeli spatial design and thus subvert the attempt to divide the land into cells and to manipulate movement toward the checkpoints.

Sometimes the physical resistance occurs in the most oppressive location, the checkpoint itself. As Rema Hammami describes it:

Checkpoint workers [porters carrying materials, goods, and even people through the no-driving zone of the checkpoints] constantly subverted physical boundaries: at night they stealthily pushed concrete blocks a few more inches apart to make way for horse carriages, or trampled the edges of newly-made dirt barriers so that porter carts could get to the other side. And through both necessity and ingenuity, they reclaimed the space of the checkpoint from being purely a site of oppression and brutality into the one where livelihood, social life and even sociability could be recovered.

Communication also furthers resistance. Communication networks, informing people about checkpoints and blockages, have developed over the years. Though the Israeli authorities never give notice of movement restrictions, the local radio and television channels do the job. Just as in other places, the daily weather forecast advises people on what to wear, a news segment informs Palestinians about the day’s conditions of movement and blockages. Drivers have developed a sign language to inform each other of surprise checkpoints or the presence of military
forces on the road. Taxi drivers use their radio networks and mobile phones to warn each other of military forces they have encountered and to channel whoever they can onto alternative routes.

Currently, the lives of Palestinians can be summarized as a double-faced mode of action: steadfastness and smuggling. Steadfastness, sumud in Arabic, is an old practice that is the main means of resistance to the occupation, antedating and complementing violent resistance. It has been expressed by building homes in the absence of a permit, knowing full well that they are under constant threat of demolition; by cultivating lands despite the uncertainty and the frequent possibility of confiscation; by reviving the memory of villages destroyed in 1948 and keeping the keys to destroyed houses; but mainly by refusing to emigrate, in spite of the difficulty of living under the occupation. Today, however, sumud is expressed mainly by maintaining a routine in spite of the checkpoints.

Concurrently, there are constant attempts to smuggle. In the face of spatial constraints aimed at minimizing movement, Palestinians aim to cross the lines to get to work, to study, to receive medical treatment, to visit relatives, and so on. Palestinians try to smuggle goods, a work force, at times explosives, but always, first and foremost, themselves.

The Palestinian situation is thus integrated into the global rationale of barriers and smuggling. In Israel/Palestine, one group can move freely, while the other is constrained. The walls, like those built these days elsewhere on the periphery of the rich world, are meant to be semipermeable. The wall erected along the U.S.–Mexico border is intended to limit movement only from the south. These walls were designed to stop the smuggling of drugs, goods, and people, and to fix the flow of capital in the desired direction.

The difference lies in the fact that in the OPT, there is also an inner division of the land. This is different from a more or less distinct line separating “here” from “there,” with passage allowed in only one direction, as is the situation with regard to the Separation Wall. In the West Bank, there are innumerable boundaries, fluid and changing. Crossing them is prohibited, but they are not defined as “here” and “there,” “inside” and “outside.” The movement regime in the OPT produces a state of affairs in which nearly every movement involves a transgression, and almost all Palestinians are therefore “traffic violators.”

Daily movement, in spite of hardships and the a priori “traffic violations,” gives the space new significance and loads it with Palestinian use values. The struggle for space, or rather for its use, is carried out through small daily activities: bypassing checkpoints, risk taking, and generally insisting on using the space. In other words, in the OPT, smuggling is steadfastness.
NOTES

2 See Kevin Lynch’s research on cognitive maps, for example in The Image of the City (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1960).
4 This is the sum of the settlements’ municipal area. See the report by B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, authored by Yehezkel Lein, “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank,” (May 2002), available online http://www.btselem.org/Download/200205_Land_Grab_Eng.pdf (last accessed July 14, 2008).
5 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), part III.
6 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “West Bank Closure Count and Analysis” (January 2006), available on-line at http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/docs/UN/OCHA/OCHApt_ClosureAnalysis2006_En.pdf (last accessed July 14, 2008). The maps and the spatial analysis that follow are based on these data. The most updated data at time of publishing are those of September 2008. According to OCHA there were at that date 533 unmanned blocks and 93 manned checkpoints.
8 Meron Rapoport, “Ghost City,” Ha’aretz, November 18, 2005.
9 See below page 213.
12 A-Tufah checkpoint, which separated Han Yunes from the Al-Mawasi area in the Gaza Strip, was closed at the end of March 2002 for fifty consecutive days. The occupation authorities did not announce anything at any point about the estimated closure period. See the B’Tselem report by Shlomi Swisa, “Al-Mawasi, Gaza Strip: Impossible Life in an Isolated Enclave” (March 2003), available on-line at http://www.btselem.org/Download/200303_AlMwassy_Eng.pdf (last accessed July 15, 2008).
13 Hägerstrand, Innovation Diffusion as a Spatial Process.
14 Ibid.
15 “Place,” according to Edward Relph, is a location in space that has something special, that is, it is a location containing human significance exceeding its designated functional role, while a “placeless place” is the cold, alienated, and uniform location. The classic examples of a placeless place are McDonald’s branches and shopping malls. Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion, 1976).


The Separation Wall with its passages, is an aberration of this logic, as will be discussed later.

See Adi Ophir and Ariella Azoulay, “The Order of Violence,” in this volume.

See Neve Gordon, “From Colonization to Separation: Exploring the Structure of Israel’s Occupation,” in this volume.

The army has defined certain areas as “special security zones,” which really are death zones. Anyone entering these areas, which are unmarked and whose existence has not been announced in any way, puts his or her life at risk.


On the way in which the American use of barbed wire to divide space mortally injured the population of Native Americans, see Olivier Razac, *Barbed Wire: A Political History* (New York: The New Press, 2002). Nevertheless, this injury was a byproduct of limiting agricultural plots, whereas in the Boer War, the primary purpose was to manage and dominate people.

In the “Seam Zone” enclaves and in East Jerusalem, inhabitants must produce valid proofs in order to confirm their residency in the restricted area. Failing to do so for any reason (for example, being in the neighboring village at the census time, or the unilateral movement of the “border” by Israeli forces) turns the person into an “illegal resident” in his or her own home. See for example, Akiva Eldar, “Illegal Residents in Their Own Homes,” *Ha’aretz*, September 14, 2004, and Meron Rapoport, “There are No People in This Photograph,” *Ha’aretz*, January 21, 2005. See also the discussion about the Seam Zone below.

Order Regarding the Regulation of Land and Water (Judea and Samaria) (No. 291), 1968.

B’Tselem, “Land Grab.”


B’Tselem, “Land Grab.”

*Ibid.* The limitations on construction are not a new method, but rather one that was widely used in Arab villages and towns within “Israel proper,” that is, west of the Green Line. The municipal boundaries marked by the Ministry of Interior reduced the average municipal area by 64 percent in comparison with the “village lands” area of the British Mandate. Therefore, while the Arab population constitutes about 18 percent of Israel’s total population, the municipal areas of their settlements make up only 2.5 percent of Israel’s land. Following the fixing of boundaries, the constructed area within Arab villages and towns is sixteen times that of 1948. Planners for Planning Rights (Bimkom), “Widening Municipal Areas


37 B’Tselem, “Land Grab.”


39 The method started following the High Court of Justice decision in the Elon Moreh case, rejecting the security argument as a basis for the seizure of land to establish the settlement. The petitioners submit affidavits of former senior military officials that question the security need in building a settlement in the heart of a densely populated area. In addition, the settlers themselves submit an affidavit that avoids the security pretext and claim they have a complete and unconditional right to settle everywhere in the West Bank. Following the court’s decision, Israel had to seek for new ways of seizing Palestinian land on which to build settlements.


41 Order Regarding Government Property (Judea and Samaria), section 2c, in B’Tselem, “Land Grab.”

42 Since 1983, the heads of villages or neighborhoods, the mukhtars, have been the only source of information for the populace. Since then, the custodian has stopped attaching to the order a map showing the declared land borders. See Raja Shehade, Occupier’s Law, Israel and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988), p. 30.

43 Order Regarding Government Property (Judea and Samaria), section 5.

44 Efrat, Geography of Occupation, p. 56.

45 Excluding East Jerusalem, in which about 180,000 settlers lived at that time.


47 B’Tselem, “Land Grab.”


49 One example is the 300-inhabitant settlement Shim’a, on a main road in the south of the West Bank. The built area of the settlement is quite limited, just 66 acres, including the outpost to the south of it, but its municipal boundaries are 2,650 acres—forty times the built area.

50 B’Tselem, “Land Grab.”


52 Efrat, Geography of Occupation, p. 149.

53 Ibid.

55 Lein, “Forbidden Roads.”
56 Which are about 0.14 percent of West Bank Palestinians. *Ibid.*
58 Order Regarding Security (Judea and Samaria) (No. 378), 1970, Declaration of the Closure of an Area (Israeli Communities).
60 Eldar and Zertal, *Lords of the Land,* p. 422.
61 Which is not a safe place, either. Many Palestinians have been killed in their homes, schools, yards, and so on. The common excuse cited by the IDF spokesperson is that they were hurt by a “stray bullet” fired in an incident nearby in which shooting was “legitimate.”
62 Not necessarily as a result of fear for their lives, but also because of the fear of being caught by a military jeep and having to undergo questioning, humiliation, and even beatings. Therefore, although there is no law that prohibits Palestinians from walking along the roads, most of them avoid it out of fear. Interview with *Ha’aretz* reporter in the OPT Gideon Levy, March 22, 2006.
65 In some cases, there is extensive fencing along main roads of the West Bank, physically preventing pedestrian and vehicular passage.
66 One should not confuse the 101 “land cells” previously mentioned with the 190 “islands” of Areas A and B within Area C. While the latter are quite stable, being, at least officially, part of reciprocal negotiations, the former are the effects of tentative and changing de facto limits on Palestinian movement as imposed by Israel.
68 The outposts are often seen as a problem to Israel’s relations with the United States, since the Israeli government is said to be committed to the evacuation of all the outposts built after March 2001, or as a symbol of the lawlessness on part of the young generation of settlers, the “youth hill.” But they are rarely understood as a problem in itself, due to the harsh effects they have on the Palestinian environment and daily life. The same goes for the disengagement plan, which is often presented as “the beginning of the end of the occupation,” or for the plans for the separation of movement.
69 Talia Sasson’s *Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts* distinguishes between two kinds of outposts—those established before and after March 2001, the time when Ariel Sharon became prime minister. The opinion notes that there are 753 families in the first type and 600 individuals in the second.
70 On the case of Modi’in Illit, see also Gadi Algazi, “Matrix in Bil’in,” in this volume.
71 It should be noted that the Israeli High Court of Justice ordered the dismantlement of 1.7 kilometers of the separation barrier near Modi’in Illit and the return of more than one thousand dunams to residents of the village of Bil’in. The justices held that the route was not based on security reasons and was planned so as to include future neighborhoods in Modi’in.
Illit. HCJ 8414/05, Yassin vs. The State of Israel. Since January 2005, the villagers of Bil‘in, together with Israeli leftist activists, had waged a continuous nonviolent struggle against the separation barrier. On the Court’s decision see Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross, and Keren Michaeli, “The Illegality of the Occupation Regime,” in this volume.

72 “The security concept according to which the IDF will provide defense in any place where an Israeli lives has had a particularly sad outcome. Every settler who wishes to build his house in a given place, even without permission, without authority, and against the law, is defended by the army. The result of these acts is that the IDF’s deployment in the area is determined at the end of the day not by the military commander, but by the settlers.” Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts, p. 342.

73 In these outposts, the houses are built consciously at a great distance from each other. “Thus an outpost inhabited by only a few families succeeds in spreading itself over dozens and sometimes hundreds of acres.” Nadav Shragai, “Consciously We Have Already Won,’ Say the Inhabitants of Hill 725,” Ha’aretz, May 31, 2006.

74 A road connecting the easternmost outpost to the Gitit settlement in the Jordan Valley was paved, creating a Jewish-controlled line stretching all the way from Nablus to the Jordan Valley.

75 Order Regarding Defense Regulations (Judea and Samaria) (No. 378), 1970, Declaration Regarding Closure of Area No. 52/03 (Seam Area).

76 See, for example, the B’Tselem report by Yehezkel Lein, “Nu’man, East Jerusalem: Life under the Threat of Expulsion” (September 2003), available on-line at http://www.btselem.org/Download/200309_Numan_East_Jerusalem_Eng.doc (last accessed July 18, 2008).

77 From the beginning of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (mid-August 2005) to the time of writing these lines (January 2008), Karni checkpoint—the only active transit point for goods moving in and out of Gaza—has operated only part of the time and never to its full capacity. Since Hamas won the elections and later took control over Gaza, the checkpoint has been closed most of the time. For 2007 data, see Palestinian Trade Center (Pal-trade), Gaza Terminals Movement Monitoring: Monthly Report (January 10, 2008), available on-line at http://www.paltrade.org/cms/images/enpublications/gaza_terminals_Report_december%202007.pdf (last accessed July 18, 2008).


80 Ha’aretz, December 18, 2005.


83 Ibid., p. xii.

84 Thirty-four Wall passages are planned in addition to seventy to seventy-five agricultural gates, meant to enable villagers to work their lands on the “Israeli” side of the barrier.
“Checkpoint,” in Hebrew, is machsom, which means “barrier.”

Interview with Baruch Spiegel, February 17, 2006.


Interview with Baruch Spiegel, February 17, 2006.

Below are the planned passage times for Palestinian pedestrians:

a. Security check for a pedestrian without luggage—11 to 13 seconds.
b. Security check for a pedestrian with luggage/special populations—20 to 24 seconds.
c. Checking of permits for a Palestinian holding a “smart card” and passing through a manned post, including biometric identification—13 to 17 seconds.

Quoted from the passages contract.

So that Israel can avoid accusations of apartheid, Palestinians will be formally permitted to drive on Israeli roads, but their doing so will involve many checkpoints. The security system therefore expects them to prefer the smooth driving available on Palestinian roads. Amira Hass, “IDF Paves Roads for the Palestinians: Will Drive on Different Levels Than the Israelis,” Ha’aretz, March 23, 2006.


De Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, p. 98.

Hass, “IDF Paves Roads for the Palestinians.”


Ibid., p. 18.