Colonial conquests and the politics of normalization: The case of the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus

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Abstract
The space of exception has been extensively discussed as a location in which governing technologies are deployed through the suspension and manipulation of the norm. The scholarship on the subject has underscored the ways in which various localities can be encamped, which alludes to the dynamic in which spaces of exception can be shaped through the application of various means of sovereign violence that produces new and unpredictable norms. Building on this literature, the article analyzes the ways in which the exception is intentionally used in order to spatially construct the norm. Two case studies are discussed: Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights and the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus. The article's main aim is to show how the state of emergency, which provided the justification for deploying exceptional means—occupation and subsequent colonization—was domesticated. By domestication I mean a situation whereby the state of emergency is not fully negated, but rather rearticulated and redeployed in order to reshape the space and transform it so that it is concomitantly both threatening and normal. I go on to show, however, how despite the processes of spatial normalization the state of exception always resurfaces.

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This article examines how occupying forces deploy exceptional means to reconstruct contested territories so as to normalize and in thus way fortify their presence. Analyzing two case studies—the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights and the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus—I show that the objective of the normalization process has in each case been different. Israel normalized its presence in the Golan in order to incorporate this region into its own territory, while Turkey has been normalizing its presence in Northern Cyprus in order to craft it as Turkish without fully integrating it into its own body politic. However, and despite these differences, a similar rationale has in both cases led the core states—Israel and Turkey—to employ a twofold normalization strategy during the conquest and subsequent occupation.

On the one hand, the core states accentuated the geostrategic risks (real or constructed) embodied in the territories captured and presented them as constituting a threat that could be dealt with only through the imposition of a state of emergency and the deployment of exceptional means (e.g., ethnic cleansing, widespread destruction). On the other hand, and simultaneously, the core states strove to transform these contested spaces and reproduce them as normal in order to render them non-threatening.

In other words, the core states present the spaces they had occupied as both an exception (a threat that needs to be controlled and managed) and simultaneously as normal. Examining how the strategies employed by the occupying states are informed by this tension, I show that the incongruity cannot be fully managed. The fact that these territories are colonized and are therefore constituted as spaces of exception is ultimately re-exposed.

Following a brief literature review and after justifying the comparison between the two cases, I analyze the impact of ethnic cleansing, destruction and reconstruction on how the occupied spaces were reproduced following the military conquests. I maintain that the practices used during the occupation constituted the space as a form of encampment that is bent on shaping each territory as a space of exception. I examine the strategies deployed to normalize the colonized spaces, emphasizing the important role of constituting the threat as external, while showing how various practices, such as tourism, have been deployed to produce a sense of normalcy. These normalization efforts should be conceived as a domestication strategy aimed at mitigating the spatial ramifications of transforming the territory into an encampment. By way of conclusion, the conceptual and spatial codependency of exception

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and norm within the framework of contemporary colonial conquests is revisited.

Spaces of exception, encampment and domestication

The state of exception has engendered considerable interest among geographers and critical theorists. Originally employed by Carl Schmitt in his critique of liberal regimes (1988), it has been discussed extensively both as a theoretical framework and as a paradigm for empirical research. Most of the scholarly literature concerned with this subject also invokes Giorgio Agamben’s (1995) analysis of the concentration camp as a point of departure. Deploying the concept of homo sacer (sacred man or the accursed man), Agamben claimed that upon entering the camp a person’s life can be taken without committing homicide. But, following Michel Foucault (1984), he argued that the biopolitics of the camp are oriented toward preservation of the inmate’s life on the brink of death (Agamben, 1995: 28–29). Whether a Nazi extermination facility, a Soviet Gulag or a humanitarian relief center for refugees, the camp is a space wherein Schmitt’s separation between norm and exception enters a zone of in-distinction as law and violence are no longer discernable from one another (Agamben, 2000: 40.1; Diken & Laustsen, 2005; Elk, 2006).

The scholarship on the space of exception has underscored the ways in which various localities can be encamped, which alludes to the dynamic in which spaces are shaped into an Agambenian camp through the application of various means of sovereign violence. In other words, encampment is the process through which a given space becomes a space of exception through different practices such as bordering (Amoore, 2006; Epstein, 2007; Sparke, 2006), systematic annihilation (Gregory, 2004), neglect (Shewly, 2013), or by being heir to a broader conflict (Boano & Martén, 2013). Encamped spaces can be formed as interstate frontiers (Hagmann & Korf, 2012), borderlands (Jones, 2009a) and enclaves (Jones, 2009b; Shewly, 2013) or urban localities (Schinkel & Van den Berg, 2011). In this sense we can understand the space of exception, not as a concrete location but as an ever-changing site which materializes through an “unlocalizable process of transformation” (Belcher, Martin, Secor, Simon, & Wilson, 2008: 599).

Current literature on encampment processes, criticizes the way in which the space of exception has been perceived and presented as a site where sovereign force is total and no resistance is possible (Jones, 2012), and accordingly points to the various conceptualizations of political agency that can be formed within spaces of exception (Ramadan, 2012). As Derek Gregory suggests in his examination of the military internment compound at Guantanamo Bay (2006), the space of exception is characterized by political subjectivity that may be (productively) shaped as well as repressed.1

The underlying theoretical claim in this literature is that the exception can produce new and unpredictable norms. Stuart Elden (2007), for instance, shows how paramilitary training camps can be reshaped into sites of resistance that subvert conceptualizations of territorial sovereignty and integrity. Another notable example concerns Palestinian refugee camps, which have languished in a state of temporariness for over 60 years and have been a frequent target for the exertion of extrajudicial violence (Ramadan, 2009a). These camps, however, also serve as sites for the forging national identity (Hanafi, 2008) and collective memory (Collins, 2011; Ramadan, 2009b; 2012), and bear the potential to foster embattled inhabitants’ forms of autonomous governance beyond the suspension of the sovereign (Szanto, 2012). Similarly, an encamped urban sphere can become a space of defiance and subversion where norms are challenged and social and political protests unleashed (Ramadan, 2013).

Thus, encampment does not necessarily entail merely the suspension of the norm, since at times it can end up producing in unexpected and unintentional ways novel and even transgressive norms. As Benedikt Korf (2006) shows the practices used in the production of a space of exception can be (and, at times, are) applied to facilitate the realization of a particular utopian vision. Thus, spaces of exception may be reshaped as purified ideal places in accordance with the aims, intentions, and visions of those able to wield sovereign power (Giaccaria & Minca, 2011).

Spatial encampments have also been a focal point of research that does not necessarily engage with the conceptual framework of the state of exception. There is a developing body of literature that gauges the convoluted ways in which various colonial sites have undergone some form of normalization (Shigematsu & Camacho, 2010). One germane example pertains to the scholarly work analyzing the way the United States formed various sites in parts of the Pacific and Asia (Gillum, 2007), such as Guam (Herman, 2008), Pearl Harbor (Osorio, 2010), Bikini Atoll (Davis, 2005) and the Clark Special Economic Zone in the Philippines (González, 2007).

Such works examine the economic, social, and cultural effects as well as colonial legacies of America’s different encampments by investigating issues such as gender relations, ecology, architecture, memory, and tourism, and reviewing what Lutz (2006) calls the topography of U.S. power and how it produces various forms of militarized landscapes.2

According to Lutz (2006: 595), since contemporary colonial and imperial projects constantly work to disguise themselves there is a need to closely scrutinize how these projects are produced – cases, which Michael Lujan Bevacqua argues, represent a form of “colonial banality that continues to evade even the sharpest critical eyes” (Bevacqua, 2010: 33).

Thus, the dynamics through which the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus were shaped as domesticated encampments are not unique. Similar processes can be identified in other colonial settings in North America, the Pacific, the Balkans or the Middle East. The analysis of the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus domestication process contributes to our general understanding of how similar spaces of exception which were shaped as normal sites are constructed and deconstructed.

More specifically, building on the insights of the body of literature that discusses how contested colonial sites are normalized, the aim of this article is to examine how the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus can improve our understanding of the processes in which exceptional encampments are normalized. Concentrating on the co-existence (rather than replacement) of exception and norm, in the following pages I analyze the way in which the exception is intentionally used in order to spatially construct the norm through a process of domestication. Domestication denotes a situation whereby the state of emergency which provided the main reasoning for the occupation and subsequent sovereign control is not negated, but rather rearticulated and redeployed in order to reshape the space and transform it so that it is concomitantly both threatening and normal.

I also show how in both the Golan and Northern Cyprus two distinct practices—ethnic cleansing and spatial demolition—became part of the overall process in which the occupied territory was encamped and later domesticated so as to constitute the contested space as normal. Consequently, two interconnected processes are examined here. I begin by describing how the state of exception was produced and employed to garner legitimation and support and then show that it was used spatially to reproduce the contested space in order to domesticate it. The duality of the practices used to shape space in order to rationalize the ongoing presence of the occupying state and reconcile apparent incongruities as well as the tensions and contradictions that
ultimately re-expose the state of exception is the main interest of this article.

The case studies

The two case studies are notably distinct in regard to their historical trajectory, social context and geographical setting — and not surprisingly have never been dealt with together or compared. There is an abundant literature dealing with Turkey and Northern Cyprus ranging from analytical chronologies of the occupation to studies of the inherent problems of the Cypriot state, which fore-shadowed the 1974 Turkish invasion. Some investigations into the framework of the state of exception also discuss the way in which it produces rather than represses political agency (Bryant & Hatay, 2011; Constantinou, 2008). There are also comparative examinations that have been utilized to assess the Northern Cypriot status as an unrecognized state (Isachenko, 2012; Ronnen, 2010), as well as ethnographic introspections on the convoluted ways in which it has been constructed as a polity (Navaro-Yashin, 2003; 2012; Papadakis, 2005).

Scholarly work on the Golan tends to be less critical. Most research has focused on its geostrategic advantages (Shaley, 1995), military history (Mayzel, 2001; Zisser, 2002), historical development as a contested region (Efrat, 2009; Muslih, 1999) and Israel’s effort to colonize it (Davis, 1983; Harris, 1980; Kipnis, 2009). Critical investigation of the normalization of the Golan remains strikingly underdeveloped, and tends to regard the occupation of the territory as a mere “side effect” or epiphenomenon of the June 1967 war (Gorenberg, 2006; Oren, 2002; Segev, 2007).

Notwithstanding the differences between the case studies, two common denominators enable a fruitful comparison. First, both territories were occupied by military force and subsequently colonized by a core state. Each space was connected to the occupying territories were occupied by military force and subsequently colonized in the aftermath of the 1948 war, the Syrian-Israeli armistice (July 1949) placed the Golan Heights outside Israel’s recognized sovereign territory, officially demarcating it as part of Syria (Biger, 2001: 135–187).

Despite the armistice agreement, ensuing border skirmishes revolved around three core issues: sovereignty over several disputed enclaves; disputed water resources; and alleged Syrian assistance to Palestinian combatants attempting to infiltrate Israel. Both Israel and Syria used military force to advance their interests bringing casualties, damage, and anxiety on both sides (Muslih, 1999: 4–20, 23–45). Significantly, ongoing clashes resulted in an intensified militarization of the area which Israel almost always referred to as the “Syrian plateau”.

In reality, apart from limited incursions into Israel and artillery fire on the latter’s settlements, Syria restricted its warfare to vehement propaganda broadcasts from Damascus (Zisser, 2002: 186). Nonetheless, the border clashes were conceived in Israel as a threat and served as one of the catalysts for the Six-Day War of June 1967 (Oren, 2002: 42–49). There was substantial public pressure in Israel, as well as strong demands from the military, that the Syrian plateau be captured. The invasion finally began on June 8th and within two days, 1250 square km of the plateau were occupied by the Israeli military (Oren, 2002: 261, 300–302). Map 1.

Cyprus was important within the Turkish national security discourse for three major reasons. First, the island had been under Ottoman rule from 1571 till 1878, when it was transferred to British authority. Though Turkey abrogated any claims to sovereignty over the island in 1923, Cyprus continued to occupy an important place in Turkey’s national narrative as a territory ceded by the Ottoman Empire (Uzer, 2011: 124). Second, the island’s proximity to the shores of Anatolia rendered it a potential strategic threat due to the demand of a majority of Cypriots for unification with Greece, Turkey’s traditional rival (Bilgin, 2007; 752). Third, the wellbeing of the Turkish Cypriot minority was considered a national concern in Turkey (Nevzat, 2005).

After Cyprus gained independence in 1960, Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied with the degree of political power given to the island’s Turkish minority and became involved in the internal affairs as radical left the 1930s, inter-communal relations rapidly deteriorated (Salem, 1992: 120) and in December 1963, violent clashes quickly spiraled into open civil war. By August, 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots had been killed (Patrick, 1976: 53). Most of the 100,000 Turkish Cypriots were moved to 42 territorial enclaves covering approximately 1.6 percent of the island’s territory (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1997: 501–502).

In practical terms, relocating into enclaves meant that Turkish Cypriots would be excluded from state institutions and dwell under a state of siege. While this state of emergency also became a moment of opportunity to practice autonomous self-government and to fashion a more distinct Turkish Cypriot identity (Bryant & Hatay, 2011), this embattled independence was paradoxically predicated on dependence upon Turkey, which provided Turkish Cypriots annually with 25 million dollars (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1997: 502); delivered relief aid to 56,000 Turkish Cypriots (Borowiec, 2000: 65); and provided military training and support (Dodd, 2010: 67). This relationship framed Turkey as an external agency intermittently intervening through supervision and occasional force. Concurrently, as hostilities on the island had eased considerably the Greek Cypriot political leadership was becoming disenchanted with the idea of unification with Greece, particularly since the coup by a military junta there in 1967. Displeased with the Greek Cypriots’ newly found antipathy, Athens staged a military coup in Cyprus on July 15th 1974. The Greek junta appointed Nikos Sampson, a notorious Greek Cypriot militia fighter — who in the 1960s openly propagated a plan of ethnic cleansing against the Turkish minority — as president and he immediately proclaimed that a full unification with Greece was imminent (Hitchens, 1997).

Together with Greece and Britain, Turkey had been granted guarantor rights allowing it to use militarily means if Cyprus’ constitution were compromised. Since the 1960s, Turkish public sentiment had encouraged armed intervention in Cyprus (Bahchelli, 1992: 68), bolstered by demands of the Turkish military — which had by that time already forcibly removed two elected governments in Ankara in May 1960 and March 1971 (Adamson, 2001). Turkey was also experiencing severe internal unrest as radical left movements and extreme right militias violently clashed in the streets throughout period under discussion (Nye, 1977). Hence, the state of emergency in Cyprus correlated with internal emergencies in Turkey, and although the crisis of 1974 was largely confined to
Greek Cypriot areas, Turkey invaded the island on July 20th (Adamson, 2001: 278). The military intervention in Cyprus was presented as an attempt to prevent a state of emergency for Turkish Cypriots, under the pretext of Turkey’s role as guarantor. Within a month, Turkey had occupied a third of Cyprus, literally creating a new state on the island. Map 2.

Notably, in both the Israeli and Turkish cases, areas distinctively external to the state’s sovereign territory had come to represent a space whose occupation was vital to thwart danger and prevent an emergency. As one popular Hebrew song referred to it, the conquest of the Syrian plateau was a victory over the “mountain that turned into a monster” (Kipnis, 2009). Similarly, as news of the invasion spread, the Turkish public reacted with delight for the operation “had brought a sense of national unity to the country, which cut across political, economic, and social lines” (Adamson, 2001: 289–90).
Thus, more than anything else, the occupation was understood to be part of an expansion strategy propelled by the perception (mostly constructed) of a concrete menace. This also meant that subsequent actions of control and appropriation in the newly occupied territory would have to be rationalized as necessary in order to quell the potential resurgence of an emergency situation. Consequently, both occupied areas underwent a process of encampment which was based on two related tactics: population removal and spatial devastation.

Encampment

Since Israel considered the Syrian plateau a strategic location to be pacified at all costs, it decided to reshape the area, first by expelling the indigenous population and preventing their return (Harris, 1978; Ram, 2014), and later by destroying their built environment. The Syrian plateau was thereby emptied of its indigenous residents through the application of sovereign violence including expulsion. According to a UN report compiled following the war, the Israeli military used scare tactics, such as shooting and bombing in the vicinity of villages in order to hasten the departure of civilians fleeing hostilities (Davis, 1983; Harris, 1978; 1980; Murphy & Gannon, 2008).

Those caught attempting to return to their villages were brought before a military tribunal and deported (IDFA, 1967a; 1968). Such deportations were not based upon Israeli civilian law but rather emergency regulations that bestowed extrajudicial powers upon the military (Fogelman, 2010). The strategy was fully executed. In 1966, the local population had been 147,613, with an additional 15,000 Palestinian refugees of the 1948 war (Abu Fakhr, 2000: 5–36). Two months after the occupation, an Israeli census enumerated 6404 residents in the area occupied by Israel (IDFA, 1967b; ISA, 1967a).

This population depletion was exceptional compared with other territories Israel had occupied during the war in which less than 25 percent of the population in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Sinai had been expelled. The sheer scope of the Syrian population depletion was crucial for the normalization process that Israel initiated after the war (Harris, 1978: 312–315). Israel’s efforts to normalize its control over the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza Strip eventually failed precisely due to its inherent inability to govern large populations under a prolonged state of occupation and colonization (Gordon, 2008). In the Syrian plateau, by contrast, Israel hardly needed to govern a local population.

The population removal was accompanied with another practice oriented toward the Golan’s built environment which also contributed to the Golan as an encamped space. The Israeli military systematically demolished villages, farms, and houses. Of the 139 agricultural villages and 61 individual farms registered prior to the war, only seven villages were listed in official Israeli records by August 1967 (IDFA, 1967b). Security considerations were invoked in order to justify the destruction of abandoned villages as vital to prevent their structures from serving as hideouts for terrorists (Shai, 2006: 101), thus relating the need to perform the act of destruction to the broader risk emanating from Syrian retaliation by military raids or infiltrators. Thus the overall demolition was based on the designation of the Syrian Plateau as a territory which posed a distinct threat.

Along similar lines, Northern Cyprus could be normalized as a Turkish polity mainly because about 160,000 Greek Cypriots were removed from the northern part of the island by various acts of violence including displacement, systematic rape and random shooting into civilian populations (ECHR, 1978). After the war subsided, approximately 20,000 Greek Cypriots (of 180,000) remained in territories which had been occupied by the Turkish military (Gürel & Özersay, 2006). They were enclosed in schools, churches and hotels, or were placed under curfew within their own
Map 1. Source: University of Texas Libraries.
villages (ECHR, 1978, 139). Not unlike the occupation of the Syrian plateau, the encampment of Cyprus was simultaneously directed towards the population and its built environment. The Turkish military engaged in massive destruction and damage of icons, murals and other sanctified objects, as well as wide scale looting and pillaging of churches, hotels and museums (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1997: 511).

Systematized and unrestricted destruction of homes, theft of possessions and arson, exceeding any plausible military necessity, are common encampment practices (Campbell, Monk, & Graham, 2007; Graham, 2005; Ramadan, 2009) and were performed in both cases described here. Similarly and in the context of the overall encampment process of the Golan and Northern Cyprus, the destruction of space, together with the removal of the population, also created the conditions for re-reproducing the space as normal and ostensibly uncontested. In other words, the specifics of these particular encampments, which were employed and justified on the basis of the prior designation of each territory as a site that poses a threat, also enabled to spatially reshape it in order to normalize the occupation.

Domestication

After the Golan’s occupation, officials from Israel’s Ministry of Agriculture and the Jewish Agency explained that “the needs of [Israeli] society and security compel a razing to the ground of this place”. Existing structures were deemed unsuitable for a “modern Jewish population” (Harris, 1978: 64; ISA, 1968a; Shai, 2006: 176). Hence social well-being was achievable only through the complete destruction of the threatening space.

In the weeks after the war, several teams of Israeli experts were dispatched to the plateau in order to evaluate its potential. Civil engineers, rural planners, veterinarians, agronomists, agricultural advisors, hydrologists, and land preservation and drainage engineers toured the area, gathering information to enable maximal utilization of the territory (ISA, 1967b; 1967c). Archaeologists and civilian planners were divided into teams and compiled a list of abandoned villages designated for preservation. The criteria for preservation were defined as a site’s “archaeological, historical, and touristic values” (ISA, 1967d; 1968b).

There was a distinct colonial undertone in this discursive shift. The Golan remained an enemy territory but it also became a site that should be reshaped in order to be more suitable for modern forms of habitation. This shift — from the conceptualization of the area as a conflict zone to a civilian region in need of modernization — served to defuse the overt political and military relevance of Israel’s actions and spurred reconstruction of the territory into a localizable frontier region to be incorporated into the state. As one Israeli newspaper proudly announced to its readers in August 1968: “The Syrian Plateau [sic] has become the Golan Heights” (Landau, 1968).

Likewise, Turkey also sent various experts to evaluate the potential of Northern Cyprus to support several economic enterprises, and invested in irrigation, afforestation and agricultural schemes (İnav, 2010). Under Turkey’s supervision, Northern Cyprus was fashioned as a distinct governable polity through the construction of road works, water utilities, and various other infrastructure projects (Moravidi, 1993a). Turkey also sent archeologists to examine sites considered symbolically important (Jansen, 2005). The domestication of Northern Cyprus was thus carried out by different state bodies but with results similar to those in Israel — space was reshaped so it could be governed. Thus, the widespread ethnic cleansing and demolitions created the necessary conditions for domestication.

The Turkish domestication process in Northern Cyprus adopted features of an acculturation project aimed in this case at transforming the occupied Cypriot space into a Turkish colony. One particularly visible practice was the conversion of 59 churches,
chapels and monasteries into mosques (Ioannides, 1991: 179). Turkey also arranged for about 70 imams to be sent to Cyprus and preside over religious services (Moravidi, 1993b: 269). The decision to convert churches was paradoxical, the modern Turkish state rejected religiosity as the principal component of Turkish identity. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot population was distinctly non-religious (Hatay & Nevzat, 2009). Yet when juxtaposed to the displacement of Greek Cypriots, it became an effective form of signification of the occupied territory as Turkish.

The second practice used in order to craft Northern Cyprus as Turkish was the extensive renaming of settlements. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot villages were given monikers that carried Turkish names with more “authentic” elements (Navaro-Yashin, 2010: 127–145). The renaming campaign incorporated both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot villages so they could become more “authentically” Turkish, which highlighted the growing differences between local Turkish Cypriots and the occupying force. It was conducted in cooperation with the Turkish military and this stressed yet again the ways in which the domestication process was based on the same agents that had propagated the conquest and occupation (Navaro-Yashin, 2006, 2010: 127–143).

Achile Mbembe has argued that a state of exception has a tendency to become the norm [in colonial settings]. A colonial occupation is a matter of seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over a physical geographical area — of writing a new set of social and spatial relations on the ground. His contention is that colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. At the same time the territory is construed not as enemy land but as a vacant, unspoiled land that can be explored and eventually exploited (Mbembe, 2003: 25). In both the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus the encampment process was domesticated by converging two distinct strategies. On the one hand, the implementation of an encampment process entailed the application of violence aimed at cleansing the space of its original population to create the necessary conditions for reshaping the space. On the other hand, “cleansing the space” by physical demolition served as the necessary condition for domestication and was carried out initially by governmental practices such as exploration, assessment, analysis, and quantification. This dual dynamic of encampment of space and domestication of the state of emergency literally laid the ground for a new formation, producing in the Israeli case the Golan Heights and in the Turkish one, Northern Cyprus as distinct political units.

The context of each occupation led to striking differences between the domestication processes and the difficulties they encountered. Turkey was disinclined to assume formal authority over the territory it occupied: its invasion was justified as intervention in favor of the local Turkish Cypriot population. Northern Cyprus was refashioned as a state apparatus and in 1983 unilaterally declared its own independence (Dodd, 1993a; 1993b). At the same time, Turkey maintained direct authority over the administration and as a result on the entire space of the Turkish Cypriot polity.6

Israel, on the other hand, argued that when the Syrian plateau was occupied there existed an “absence ... of even the slightest sign of governmental or legal arrangements” (Levi, 1982: 104). The assertion that the Golan had been “lawless” served to conceal the very dynamic that had brought about its transformation into a space with no trace of rules. Nevertheless, the claim regarding the lack of norms, regulation and any legal documentation enabled Israel to justify the application of its laws almost instantly after it was occupied (Gordon, 2008a, 2008b: 4–5).7

Another notable difference between Israel and Turkey was the difficulties each state encountered when attempting to resettle the space. The Golan was presented as a strategic stronghold and its colonization was primarily justified by security concerns, rather than a Jewish return to an ancient homeland, as had been in the case of the West Bank. The settlements were widely dispersed throughout the territory, in keeping with military logic. Predictions of 50,000 Jewish settlers by 1979 were over optimistic; there are currently only 20,000 Jews on the Golan, compared with over 500,000 now living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Harris, 1980: 59–105; Gordon & Cohen, 2012; Kipnis, 2009).

Turkey also invested considerable efforts to promote the colonization of the territory it had occupied. In 1975, the state initiated the resettlement of peasants from regions around the Black Sea, Central Anatolia and southeastern Turkey into Northern Cyprus. They were entrusted with taking care of abandoned property and confiscated land but were not granted the property rights (Hatay, 2005, 2007: 11; Hitchens, 1997: 106; Ioannides, 1991: 5). The denial of property deeds, together with the harsh, arid climate, led many settlers to return to Turkey with no more than 15,000 remaining in Cyprus (Hatay, 2005).

Alternative manifestations of Turkish colonization were in the form of cheap labor migration. More than 130,000 workers throughout the 1990s and early 2000s relocated to Northern Cyprus, and about 70,000 stayed as Turkish nationals while almost 60,000 naturalized as Turkish Cypriot citizens (Hatay, 2007). However, concerted efforts to colonize the territory triggered widespread antagonism among Turkish Cypriots towards the Turkish settlers, immigrants and soldiers, whose behavior was regarded as a threat to local cultural and social identity (Hatay, 2009; Lacher & Kaymak, 2005; Loizides, 2011; Navaro-Yashin, 2006).

One witnesses that each colonization attempt brought forth different difficulties that were related to the overall efforts to domesticate an area also considered to be a space external to the territory of the occupying state. In a sense, the efforts to domesticate the spaces served to re-politicize and re-securitize the discourse about these contested spaces. In the case of the Golan Heights, it was bent on integrating the occupied area into Israel and in the case of Northern Cyprus to craft it as a Turkish Territory. In both however, the rationality remained similar, to domesticate the encampment. The effort was mainly concentrated on curtailing the ascribed threat that each territory ostensibly posed. At the same time, this threat had to be preserved in order to justify the occupation. This situation created an inherent tension that became particularly evident through the spatial effects of the encampment process and the ways in which the state of exception constantly resurfaces.

The encampment resurfaces

As described above, the movement of settlers into the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus encountered various difficulties. However, Israel and Turkey carried out a significantly more successful form of normalization by construing the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus as tourist destinations for the citizens of each occupying state.

Importantly, enough, the role of tourism in normalization process of contested and colonized spaces is not unique. As Vernadette Gonzalez shows (2013) tourism is often used in order to normalize colonial encampments that are occupied by military force. Tourism, she claims, can help to justify militarism, while the latter becomes a platform through which tourism is sustained.

Indeed, tourism also played a vital role in the domestication process of Northern Cyprus and the Golan Heights from the
initial moments of the occupation. Immediately following the occupation responsibility for managing most of Northern Cyprus’s tourist industry was transferred to Turkish Cypriots, including 50 percent of all entertainment facilities, 82 percent of all accommodations, and 96 percent of new hotels under construction (Alipour & Kilic, 2005: 83). Nevertheless, the lack of an organized planning strategy and the international embargo imposed on the north seriously obstructed the ability to develop a tourist industry which could compete with its successful Greek Cypriot counterpart. Instead, Northern Cyprus became popular as a destination for visitors from Turkey (Martin, 1993: 323).

Much like other cases of domesticated encampments (Davis, 2005), the wholesale ethnic cleansing of the 1970s enabled the Turkish Cypriot authorities to brand the territory as a space unspoiled by human development (Lockhart, 1994: 370). In 1974, 70,000 mostly Turkish tourists visited Northern Cyprus, swelling to nearly 300,000 in 1990 (Olgun, 1993b: 318; 323). Currently, visitors from Turkey make up about 80 percent of all tourist arrivals (Alipour & Kilic, 2005; Hatay, 2007). Importantly, Northern Cyprus was never officially designated by Turkey as a foreign destination, thereby allowing its citizens to skirt state limitations prohibiting more than one annual trip abroad (Lockhart, 1994: 380), thereby creating the impression that Northern Cyprus is part of the national territory of the Turkish state.

Rebecca Stein argues that military conquests and tourism operate in similar ways because both entail encounters with “strange” landscapes and people (2008: 647). Accordingly, tourism was used to make Northern Cyprus familiar to the citizenry in the core state, which is crucial for the normalization process. Yet, like other former encampments (Teaiwa, 1994) the construction of the area as a tourist hub was paradoxical. On the one hand, tourism became an important practice that enabled normalization of the occupation by transforming the encamped space into a leisure site rather than a warzone. On the other hand, this transformation cannot completely cover up the physical evidence of the military encampment.

One example of how the military encampment resurfaces can be found in Famagusta, Northern Cyprus’s second largest urban center, located on the eastern coast. Tourists who visit the city often go to the nearby “Palm Beach” hotel. This recently renovated hotel and casino complex stands at the edge of town on the seashore. At a certain point, the pleasant walk along Famagusta’s Palm Beach’s shoreline is abruptly curtailed by a physical barrier clearly marked with “No Entry” signs. A quick look around reveals an eerie landscape that contrasts starkly with the placid beach. Towering over the bathers in the clear turquoise water are large, crumbling, deserted bunkers and live minefields. One could argue that the domestication dynamic thoroughly effort to domesticate the encampment process is particularly noticeable as the only accessible beach, for both tourists and locals, is located directly outside Varosha. The rest of Famagusta’s shoreline is under control of the Turkish military, which has rendered most of it inaccessible for security reasons (Kurum, 2012). Consequently, visitors to Famagusta are confronted with reality that is produced by the encampment and its continuing domestication.

Much like Turkey, Israel has invested significant efforts into reshaping the Golan Heights as a tourist hub. Tourism was directly linked to the spatial encampment and domestication a mainly by using natural attractions such as Mount Hermon. The main reason for occupying this mountain was its geo-strategic importance as the highest observation point in the area. However, the military and several governmental ministries created a joint governmental agency allowing private entrepreneurs to convert the mountain into a tourist site, entailing the demolition of the main Syrian village on the mountain’s slopes and the construction of a ski resort (Ram, 2014).

Indeed, Mount Hermon together with the rest of the Golan, became an attractive location for Israeli tourists. The number of visitors to the Golan increased from 150,000 in 1968 to 500,000 during the 1970s, reaching approximately 1.5 million in 2005 (Avni & Petersburg, 2007). Visitors are encouraged to spend a weekend in an area so they can “feel like being in Europe while remaining in Israel” (Maariv, 2001).

One of the Golan’s most popular sites is Tel Bental (Mount Bental). Covered with snow from January through March, this inactive volcano provides a landscape relatively foreign to Israel’s Middle Eastern climate. A short drive up its winding road one finds oneself on a barren hilltop with a spectacular view of mountainous terrain, green meadows and secluded settlements neatly built yet scattered (Fig. 2).

However, looking more closely at Bental, this pastoral landscape reveals significant militaristic attributes. To the north stand the battlefields of the 1973 October war with ruined fortifications, deserted bunkers and live minefields. To the east, and not unlike Famagusta’s Varosha, lies the ghost town of Kuneitra, formerly a Syrian town, today located in a no-man’s land buffer zone. To the west, is Tel Avital, Bental’s geological twin, now a formidable army outpost. Bental itself represents the hybrid nature of this region, for at its peak stands a Syrian outpost remodeled as an Israeli tourist attraction, merging the seemingly opposing elements of battle and leisure, exception and norm. People can play war by freely roaming through its dugouts or by waging playful snowball “battles”. For defense, one can also hide behind human scale images of soldiers posed in fighting positions which provide a constant sense of a state of war (Fig. 3).

One could argue that the domestication dynamic thorough which the Golan is normalized, has rendered the Bental as a place which Rachel Woodward (2013: 43) defines as post-military landscapes: site without a military function in the present, but where the imprint of former military actions remain too pervasive to enable the erasure of their military origins. However it seems that the spatial contours of the Bental and the Golan Heights, as well as Varosha and Northern Cyprus, attests to a different situation which correlates with other colonial sites that have been encamped and domesticated (Teaiwa, 1994).

In each case, space is rendered ordinary, an integral part of the everyday landscape of the state that incorporates it. Yet, the exception does not totally disappear, reminding the visitor of the space’s “abnormal nature”. This reminder is part of the way in which the occupation is justified and actually becomes part of the tourist attraction. Thus, the state of emergency which provided the rationalization for a military occupation that was
turned into a colonial conquest and executed through spatial encampment is maintained. In other words, the state of exception that produced the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus constantly resurfaces, preventing both from becoming normal.

Conclusion

In her discussion on imperial and colonial forms of dominance, Catherine Lutz explains that rather than a single coherent and accomplished enterprise, colonial conquests should be understood as a set of conflicting and only partially achieved projects (Lutz, 2006: 594). The Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus corroborate her insight not only because these territories are sites in which normalization is an everlasting project that cannot be completed, but also because both territories testify to the ways in which the effort to render encamped spaces as ordinary is continuously interrupted by a contrasting need to maintain the spatial attributes of the encampment.

We saw that the condition of possibility for the occupation of the Golan Heights and Northern Cyprus was to present the territories as posing an external threat to the core state’s territory (which provided the pretexts of war for the military conquests) and that in order to deal with the threat the core states subsequently transformed the occupied area into an encampment. It is clear that spatial encampments can come in many forms. Their shape depends on their function and ultimate goals, while their materialization hinges on the practices which create them. In the cases at hand, and similar to other colonial settings, such as Guam or the Bikini Atoll, the act of encampment was based on extensive population removal and the destruction of indigenous spaces. Also the domestication processes which aimed at achieving different goals—in the Israeli case the objective was to incorporate the Golan into the state, while in the Turkish one the goal was to craft Northern Cyprus as a viable political proxy—operated in a similar way. They mitigated the exceptional means that were deployed in order to produce the normality of the space. In other words, they strove to transform the space that had been occupied because it posed an ostensible threat, as non-threatening.

However as Lutz has argued and as the two case studies show, encamped spaces can be normalized but cannot become normal. One example to the inherent inability of these contested spaces to be perceived as normal relates to their function as tourist attractions, while maintaining their status as a possibly active warzones. The duality of each site as a tourist site and a battleground reminds the visitors that the area is not just a simple weekend resort but also a potential battle.

Conflict of interest

There is no conflict of interest.

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Endnotes

1 Indeed, Guantanamo Bay has come to represent the quintessential model of the space of exception, especially as it presents the various obscurities arising from the relation between normal and exception. Simon Reid-Henry, for example, stresses the historical continuity in which Guantanamo Bay operates as a space of exception, elucidating its internal organizational balance between areas where the law is suspended and others where it is strictly abided (Reid-Henry, 2007). Nasser Hussain and Claudia Aradau have convincingly demonstrated the operation of normative law within Guantanamo Bay’s ostensible ambit of suspension, as well as the alteration of normative state jurisprudence to coincide with practices inside the camp (Aradau, 2007; Hussain, 2007).

2 For a discussion on the various forms of militarized landscapes see Woodward (2005). To one notable example on the ways in which structural violence is subsumed in the construction of imperial conquest and militarized landscape see Loyd, (2009).

3 The Turkish military pressed to invade Cyprus twice, in 1964 and 1967 (O’Malley & Craig, 2002: 128); yet a full scale incursion was thwarted by American pressure and reluctant civilian politicians in Turkey (Adamson, 2001: 286; Bolukbasi, 1993; 504). Yet by 1974 the United States and Britain believed that the partition of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece would serve their cold war interests (Fouskas, 2005; Mallinson, 2007).

4 Importantly, the use of violence was not limited to the Turkish military. Turkish Cypriots residing in the south were likewise incarcerated and fell victim to the unrestrained violence of Greek Cypriot forces. Thus, as Costas Constantinou (2008) suggests, Cyprus was caught in several states of exception that operated in tandem, reciprocating one another. Eventually, the mutual violence exerted on both sides of the island led to a population exchange agreement, signed on August 1975 (Hakkı, 2011: 80). By 1978, the number of Greek Cypriots living under Turkish rule had fallen from 20,000 to 500. Concurrently, 40,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south amassed in the north and joined the 71,000 Turkish Cypriots in the territory under Turkish control (Özerşay & Gürel, 2006: 3; Hatay, 2005: 14).

5 Spatial destruction of encamped spaces also literally lays the ground for the domestication efforts. One example is Guam, where the destruction of 80 percent from the island’s built environment during the Second World War, was followed by overall restructuring of the area’s spatial attributes (Herman, 2008: 638). Another example is the Bikini Atoll which was almost laid to waste due to American nuclear testing and then restructured through various schemes such as afforestation and resettlement (Davis, 2005).

6 Turkish Cypriot security forces, formed as a regular standing army and police force, were placed under the direct authority of the Turkish military commander.
The director of the central bank is appointed by Turkey and is typically a Turkish citizen. The Turkish Lira was chosen as the official currency and is fixed with the same parity in Europe (Frankfurt, 1993c). A special committee was established within the Turkish embassy and charged with channeling funds from Turkey to local public projects with a budget amounting to US$3.07 billion between 1974 and 2004 (Sonnan, 2007). The financial stream also helped inflate the Turkish Cypriot public budget, which (Haller, 1993) comprises about 22% of the total workforce. One interesting complaint regarding Turkey’s intervention was heard from Turkish Cypriots who were trained in Turkey as civil servants that the program built for their professionalization was getting “more and more Turkish in style” (Dodd, 1993: 176).

In 1981 Israel formally announced the application of civil law over the Golan Heights; it was more a declarative act that corroborated the actual application of the law from the initial moment of the occupation (Rosental, 1969; Yishai, 1985).

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