Introduction: State rule and indigenous resistance among Al Naqab Bedouin Arabs

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Throughout the Middle East, the indigenous desert-dwelling Bedouins have formed an integral component of Arab society. As the Arab world went through the colonial and formally “post-colonial” eras, no community was so dramatically affected as that of the Bedouins. This was particularly true of the Bedouin-Arab community in Al Naqab. In addition to the changes brought about by global processes of “modernization,” this community was greatly affected by the European-based Zionist movement to settle Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent transformation of the indigenous Palestinian-Arab population into a minority in a Western/European-oriented Jewish state.

Al Naqab Bedouins are among the indigenous Palestinian Arabs who remained in Israel after 1948 and who are today a part of the Palestinian minority in Israel. They have inhabited Al Naqab Desert from early periods (Maddrell, 1990) and were traditionally organized into nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes that lived by raising sheep and engaging in seasonal agriculture.

Historical background

Prior to 1948, estimates of the Bedouin-Arab population in Al Naqab ranged from 65,000 to 90,000 (Falah, 1989; Maddrell, 1990). They were engaged in animal husbandry and seasonal agriculture and cultivated over two million dunams (494,200 acres) of land, primarily in the northern Naqab (Falah, 1989; Marx, 1967). Approximately 90 percent of them earned their living from a mixture of agriculture and pastoralism; the rest subsisted solely on raising livestock (Falah, 1985, 1989).1

During the course and aftermath of the 1948 war, the vast majority of Al Naqab Bedouin Arabs were expelled and became refugees in the surrounding Arab countries/territories (e.g., the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Egypt); thus, by 1952, only about 11,000 remained in Al Naqab (Falah, 1989; Marx, 1967). The Israeli authorities took control of most of the land there, so the Bedouin Arabs lost the freedom to move around with their herds and cultivate their lands. Twelve of the 19 tribes were removed from their lands, and the whole population was confined to a specially designated Restricted Area in the northeastern Naqab, representing only...
ten percent of the territory they had controlled before 1948. Furthermore, the Israeli authorities imposed military government on the areas of the country that had large indigenous concentrations. The regulations of the military government typified traditional imperialist attitudes for dealing with the native population of a colony. They gave the authorities extensive and extremely rigorous powers, and their enforcement resulted in the nearly complete loss of individual freedoms and property rights. They impinged upon virtually every aspect of life, from control over freedom of speech, movement, means of transportation and freedom of the press to the expropriation of property (Jiryis, 1976).

Using these expanded powers, the Israeli authorities closed most of the land in Al Naqab to the Bedouin Arabs and forbid them from migrating seasonally with their herds and cultivating their lands (Lustick, 1980). Furthermore, the military regulations imposed upon the Bedouins isolated them from the Arab population in other parts of Israel and required them to obtain special permits to leave their designated sections of the Restricted Area to access jobs, education, markets, health care services and the like (Marx, 1967). These restrictions represented a form of forced sedentarization, which virtually ended their traditional way of life.

During the tenure of the military government, the authorities also took great care to prevent the migration of the Bedouin Arabs out of the Restricted Area. Bedouin men who were given permits to work in the Jewish sector were not allowed to bring their families with them, thus ensuring their return to the Restricted Area. Even within the Restricted Area, a Bedouin of one tribe could not visit the area of another tribe without the permission of the military governor (Marx, 1967). The Israeli authority’s record during this period was one of intimidation and violence, in which collective punishment against Al Naqab Bedouin Arabs was common. Falah (1985) documented several massacres, as well as several cases of expulsion of Bedouins after the establishment of the state. Jiryis maintained that “More than any other group, Al Naqab Bedouin Arabs suffered the full and unrestrained harshness of military rule” (1976:122). As one Bedouin sheikh stated:

...the land expropriation and the forced expulsions without compensation or the right to return... brought the Bedouin to a situation which [was] difficult both psychologically and materially, and to a lack of security unlike anything they had previously known (cited in Lustick, 1980:13).

Subsequent to their transfer to the Restricted Area, Al Naqab Bedouin Arabs were largely neglected by the planning authorities for 20 years. No residential, agricultural or economic development plans were prepared for this region. As a result, over the course of these 20 years, dozens of Bedouin Arab villages were formed. The seven tribes that originally lived in the Restricted Area settled on their own lands, while those who had been transferred to the Restricted Area by the government settled in the areas in which they had been placed. These settlements were characterized by tin shacks, cabins or tents because no permanent building
activity (e.g., stone or concrete structures) was allowed in the Restricted Area (Yiftachel, 2003, 2006). These “spontaneous” (from the perspective of state planning authorities) villages were denied recognition by the government and, as a consequence, were also denied basic infrastructure and services, such as electricity, running water and roads (Abu-Saad, 2000; Marx, 2000; Yiftachel, 2003, 2006).

Confiscation and Judaization of the land

The Judaization of the land in Palestine has its roots in pre-1948 Zionist settlement methods that attempted to create contiguous chains of segregated Jewish localities, particularly in areas with an Arab majority, such as the Galilee and the northeastern Naqab (Yiftachel, 1999). Settlement in these regions was considered one of the valued achievements of Zionist activity. As Al Naqab represented nearly 60 percent of the country’s total land mass, the northern portion of which (some 2,560,000 dunams or 640,000 acres) consisted of good soil suitable for irrigation, it was central to the Zionist settlement project. As David Ben Gurion once wrote:

Negev land is reserved for Jewish citizens, whenever and wherever they want…. We must expel Arabs and take their places … and if we have to use force, then we have force at our disposal, not in order to dispossess the Arabs of Al Naqab, and transfer them, but in order to guarantee our own right to settle in those places (in a letter to his son, Amos, October 5, 1937, cited in UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2003:5).

After the establishment of the state, the Israeli government continued to engage in massive efforts to Judaize the land. In some respects the entire country became a frontier, and the glorification associated with settling the frontier assisted in the construction of a unified national Jewish identity, as well as in the actual conquest of the physical space in which that identity could be territorially constructed. These frontier regions were often internal places within the state, with predominantly Palestinian populations, over which the government attempted to assert its hegemony (Yiftachel, 1999). Al Naqab continued to be a major Zionist frontier icon, the Jewish settlement of which was passionately called for by Zionist leaders.

The Judaization of the land entailed its de-Arabization, and thus the relationship between the Bedouin Arabs and their land was almost entirely expunged from Zionism’s “official story.” Following the war of 1948, David Ben Gurion appointed a committee whose job was to provide “Hebrew names to all places, mountains, valleys, springs etc., in the Negev.” In a letter addressed to the members of the committee, Ben Gurion wrote:
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We have to remove the Arabic names for political reasons; as much as we do not recognize the political ownership of the Arabs over the land we also do not recognize their spiritual ownership [of the land] and their names (State Archives; Prewar Archive, C/2613, cited in Benvenisti, 1997:8–9).

Moreover, as Shamir stated:

A host of historians, geographers, reporters, engineers, policymakers, and educators emphasize the rootless character of Bedouin life and describe the Bedouin as lacking the fundamental and constructive bond with the soil that marks the transition of humans in nature to humans in society (hence, for example, the distinction between “planned” and “spontaneous” settlements). One aspect of this official story emphasizes the emptiness of Al Naqab, while another aspect discovers the Bedouin nomads as part of nature. Both aspects ultimately converge into a single trajectory: an empty space that awaits Jewish liberation, and a nomadic culture that awaits civilization (1996:236).

The desert was empty only because the Zionist colonizers chose not to see its indigenous inhabitants, in the same way that British colonizers chose not to see Australia’s indigenous population and could thus declare it to be terrus nullius (an empty land, not owned by anyone) (Yengoyan, 2001). Similar to other colonial projects, the next task was to physically and materially empty the territory of the indigenous communities by removing them from their lands, removing any trace of their presence and way of life, and removing all possibilities of their return to their land and former livelihood. This Zionist version of history, which insisted that Al Naqab was empty and uninhabited, was instrumental to facilitating the enactment of numerous laws and regulations of land confiscation. Once confiscated, the land was given a new identity through the renaming of its places and the building of new Jewish towns and agricultural villages (moshavim) and cooperatives (kibbutzim) (Abu-Saad, 2005, 2008; Falah, 1989; Shamir, 1996; Yiftachel, 2006).

The most dangerous aspect of the land expropriation following the initial wave of expulsion is that it was (and continues to be) done through legal channels and is therefore an “acceptable” and “modern” way of cleansing the space in Al Naqab. In 1950, the Transfer of Property Law made the government custodian over the property of “absentee owners.” Then, in 1953 under the Land Acquisition Law, which was modeled after the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 and did not officially recognize Bedouin landholdings, the State of Israel expropriated 93 percent of Al Naqab land (Arab Association for Human Rights, 2004; Yiftachel, 2003). It is important to note that it was only after the creation of the state that the old Ottoman land categories became a powerful and effective means of expropriating land. No compensation was offered for these confiscated lands, as the land was required for “positive development needs.”
The classification of Naqab Bedouin-Arab lands as “state lands” gave their confiscation an unprecedented permanence due to the unique pattern of land ownership in Israel. The Israel Land Authority (ILA) administers state lands in Israel jointly with the Jewish National Fund (JNF), an international nongovernmental organization representing the interests of the Jewish people worldwide, rather than the interests of all citizens of the State of Israel. Nevertheless, the JNF has been given quasi-governmental powers with regard to land administration in Israel (Abu-Saad, 2000; Yiftachel, 2003, 2006).

When military rule over Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel was ended in 1966, some Naqab Bedouins attempted to reclaim or return to their lands. According to Falah (1989), the Bedouins used the following four arguments as proof of their ownership of the land: (1) they had worked and cultivated the lands for a long period and were in possession of official tax as well as traditional documents; (2) the Turkish government purchased approximately 2,000 dunams from the ‘Azazmah tribe in 1900 to build the town of Beer Sheva, thereby proving Bedouin claims to the land; (3) the Israeli authorities recognized the purchasing claims of individual Jews in Al Naqab before 1948; and (4) the Israeli authorities do recognize Bedouin land ownership, but only when the Bedouins agree to sell the land to the state.

Due to the policies of “Judaizing the land,” the Bedouin Arabs’ attempts to win recognition for their historical land rights through the Israeli justice system have been unsuccessful. The court offers no protection for their lands. For example, in 1974, when the Al-Hawashleh family challenged the confiscation of 36,000 dunams (9,000 acres) of their land in order to establish the Jewish town of Dimona, the court ruled that this land belonged to the state. Furthermore, the court accepted both arguments made by the state: firstly, that the Bedouins as nomads had no attachment to the lands and so could not possibly own them; and, secondly, that these were state lands that the Bedouins had invaded (Al-Hawashleh, 1974).

Another major land confiscation occurred in 1980. Due to the ever-increasing military needs of Israel, the Israeli Army insisted on establishing new airfields and military bases in Al Naqab to replace those which were closed in the Sinai after the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt. The Law of Requisition of Lands conveniently authorized the expropriation of 82,000 dunams in the Restricted Area. The compensation offered for these lands was much less than that given to the Jewish settlers who were removed from the Sinai during the same period. In addition, the above stated land law denied the Bedouins the right of appeal in the court system (Abu-Saad, 2005, 2008; Shamir, 1996).

Sixty years have passed since Israel’s establishment, but there has been little or no change in its land policies, despite its lack of success in completely removing the Palestinian presence from the land. According to official government policy, the Bedouins residing on and using their traditional lands are invaders and criminals, as was clearly and openly stated by Avigdor Lieberman (himself an immigrant from the former Soviet Union) while he was the Israeli Minister of Infrastructure in 2002:
We must stop [the Bedouins’] illegal invasion of state land by all means possible. The Bedouin have no regard for our laws; in the process we are losing the last resources of state lands. One of my main missions is to return the power of the [Israel] Land Authority in dealing with the non-Jewish threat to our lands (cited in Cook, 2002:2).

The attitude Lieberman expresses, which reflects the public discourse, is that Al Naqab Bedouins have no rights to “state lands,” despite their status as Israeli citizens, because “state lands” are in actuality “Jewish lands,” and the Bedouins are reduced to the illegitimate and dehumanized status of “the non-Jewish threat.” After more than half a century as citizens of Israel, they remain illegal invaders and a threat to the vision of Zionism.

Despite the government’s unrelenting Judaization/de-Arabization land policies, the Bedouins continue to resist the confiscation of their land, and the tension involving Bedouin-Arab land ownership remains a central issue. Ninety five percent of their land claims have not been settled, covering approximately 800,000 dunams (Mena, 1996). Half of these lands are in areas settled by Jews. The compromises reached so far between Naqab Bedouin Arabs and the state account for only 30,000 dunams. This low figure reflects not only the slow pace of the Israeli legal system, but also the ongoing Bedouin-Arab resistance to the next stage in the evolution of state policies, which attempted to link the settlement of land disputes to their relocation and urbanization (Abu-Saad, 2008; Yiftachel, 2003, 2006).

The impact of the land confiscation upon the Bedouin Arabs in Al Naqab cannot be overstated, and its detrimental effects are ongoing. The total loss of land deprived the entire Bedouin-Arab population of their means of production, physical resources and economic autonomy. They were denied the resources to retain their traditional means of subsistence (herding and agriculture), except under tightly controlled conditions directed toward coopting selected Bedouin Arabs rather than restoring their means of production and economic autonomy. The government land confiscations severely impoverished the Bedouin community, and the effects of this deprivation have perpetuated their state of impoverishment up to the present (Abu-Saad, 2005, 2008).

**Forced urbanization**

In the late 1960s, the Israeli government formulated a program for the resettlement of the Naqab Bedouin-Arab population into planned, urban-style towns. The core rationale for the program of urban settlements was based upon the ideological nature of spatial planning in Israel (Falah, 1989; Gradus and Stern, 1985; Kimmerling, 1982; Marx, 2000). Dispersion of the Jewish population throughout the land continued to be one of Israel’s major national planning goals. Furthermore, the
Bedouins’ widely dispersed settlement and extensive land use even within the Restricted Area, not to mention their land ownership claims, represented an obstacle to the ongoing Zionist conquest and cultivation of “frontier” desert areas (Gradus and Stern, 1985; Marx, 2000; Yiftachel, 2003, 2006). Thus, the governmental plan to remove the Bedouin Arabs from the land and settle them in higher density towns was designed to further decrease the extent of their claim on the land and to stem their “spontaneous” settlement activities (Abu-Saad, 2008; Falah, 1989; Law-Yone, 2003; Marx, 2000; Shamir, 1996; Yiftachel, 2003, 2006).

On another level, by the 1960s, the rapidly developing Israeli economy required growing numbers of workers (Marx, 2000). As such, the unskilled Bedouin-Arab workforce, who would no longer have the land resources to maintain their traditional livelihood in urban-style towns, could participate as low-wage workers in the industrial and economic development of the Jewish towns in Al Naqab. As Moshe Dayan stated during his term as the Minister of Agriculture in 1963:

We should transform the Bedouins into an urban proletariat—in industry, services, construction and agriculture. Eighty eight percent of the Israeli population are not farmers; let the Bedouins be like them. Indeed, this will be a radical move, which means that the Bedouin would not live on his land with his herds, but would become an urban person who comes home in the afternoon and puts his slippers on. His children would be accustomed to a father who wears trousers, does not carry a shabaria [the traditional Bedouin knife] and does not search for head lice in public. The children would go to school with their hair properly combed. This would be a revolution, but it may be fixed within two generations. Without coercion but with governmental direction ... this phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear (Haaretz interview, July 31, 1963 [Hebrew]).

The government-expressed rationale for this policy has been multifaceted and often cast in the benevolent light of desiring to “modernize” the Bedouins and enable more efficient provision of services. This rationale is belied by the fact that an explicitly urban and highly concentrated settlement model was selected that represented the complete destruction of the Bedouins’ traditional lifestyle. If the goals of the government were in actuality only to modernize and provide the Bedouins with services more efficiently, both aims could have been achieved by planning agricultural villages or cooperatives with a land base (such as the Jewish moshavim and kibbutzim) for them. This would have coincided with Bedouin demands for their own development and would not have required the complete alienation from their land and traditional lifestyle that urbanization entailed (Abu-Saad and Lithwick, 2000; Abu-Saad, Lithwick and Abu-Saad, 2004).

There were, in fact, strong cultural factors that made urban settlements unattractive to the indigenous Bedouin Arabs. As Law-Yone explained:

...
Hierarchies of space based on tribal social structure were replaced by repetitive lots of uniform size, shape, and orientation. Gradations of proximity, enclosure, and openness of the desert were replaced by the spatial logic of European urban form. New and strange definitions of private and public spheres were grafted onto a society that had its norms, which were no longer considered valid (2003:181).

In 1968, the Housing Ministry launched the first town, Tel-Sheva, by building 49 small houses (70 square meters) on 400 square-meter lots each (Lewando-Hundt, 1979). Each Bedouin family was to receive a renewable 49-year lease for the lot; at the same time, they were expected to sign away all claims to land owned in the past. The houses were built in a linear pattern, extending out on both sides of a central commercial area, consisting of a few shops, a school and a clinic (Gradus and Stern, 1985; Marx, 2000). The small houses were unsuitable for large families with an average number of 8–9 children, and the high density of the town itself stood in conflict with the Bedouins’ traditionally widely dispersed settlements. From the Israeli government’s perspective, the high density advanced the Zionist aim of reduced indigenous land requirements/control, as well as the economic goal of more cost-efficient service provision. These considerations took priority over concerns about how gravely the high-density urban model disrupted the Bedouins’ traditional way of life, socially, culturally and economically (Abu-Saad, 2005).

The predominant Bedouin response was refusal to move to Tel-Sheva. Due to the failure of this initiative, the Israeli government planners who initiated a second settlement, Rahat, in the early 1970s, made a limited effort to take some Bedouin lifestyle and cultural factors into account, while still maintaining an urban model and advancing the Zionist aims of reducing the amount of land occupied by the Bedouins. In Rahat, Bedouin tribes were placed in different sections of the town according to their traditional relations, territorial distribution and willingness to move. Each street and lane was identified with an extended family, and its households were concentrated on adjacent lots (Falah, 1983, 1985; Gradus and Stern, 1985; Marx, 2000; Stern and Gradus, 1979). Furthermore, instead of providing small lots with small two-room houses, as was done in Tel-Sheva, the Ministry of Housing allowed people to purchase/lease a “large” vacant lot (800 square meters) for each household within an extended family. The Bedouins were then free to build their houses according to their own budgetary resources and household and social needs. The planning model used in Rahat was extended to new neighborhoods that were added to Tel-Sheva, as well as to the additional five planned Bedouin towns that were established during the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 1).
Table 1. Year of establishment and population of Bedouin government-planned towns in Al Naqab, December 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Population in 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rahat</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>42,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel-Sheva</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A’rara Banegev</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>12,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ksayifa</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hura</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laqiya</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segev-Shalom</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics (2008); Marx (2000).

Over time, the Bedouin-Arab families that had been rendered landless by the removal from their traditional lands and relocation to the Restricted Area, as well as those who had been landless before 1948 or were affected by a new wave of displacements in the 1980s, moved to the planned urban settlements. For the Bedouins without land, moving to the towns was preferable to their ambiguous, temporary status on lands classified as “state land” or, according to Bedouin law, land belonging to another family/tribe (Abu-Saad, 2001; Marx, 2000). This process has moved slowly, for as Marx explains:

While the planning model adopted in Rahat and replicated in subsequent towns succeeded in reducing some of the socio-cultural barriers related to allocation of space that had caused the first model to fail, it did not address the employment needs of the population. With no local industry, local employment was non-existent beyond small grocery shops and work for the local government councils. The planned Bedouin towns never became more than dormitory communities with large numbers of men leaving very early in the morning for their places of employment and returning late at night. A survey commissioned by the Rahat Municipality in 1997 found that of the 66% of men over 18 who were employed, fully 64% worked outside Rahat in construction, trucking, industry, agriculture and services (2000:113).

Furthermore, aside from the provision of basic services (water, electricity, telephone hook-up, schools and clinics), the towns lacked essential urban characteristics. In his 2002 Report, the State Comptroller reported that none of the Bedouin towns had a completed sewage system, even though the settlements had
been in existence for many years and thousands of families had already paid for this essential system. In four of the seven towns (Hura, Laqiya, Tel-Sheva and Arara Banegev), the sewage system was not operational at all. In the words of the Comptroller:

Reasonably paced implementation of development and infrastructure in the Bedouin towns has not been carried out for many years. The settlements were populated with minimal infrastructure, and subsequently the level of resources invested for establishing and completing the infrastructure was insufficient, particularly with regard to sewage systems, streets and sidewalks. As a result of the many years of neglect in investment in the infrastructure, the settlements are suffering from great negligence. Moreover, there is a severe shortage in the domain of public institutions (e.g., recreational facilities, community centers, libraries, etc.), as well as public parks, sports fields, etc. (Israel State Comptroller, 2002:109).

Unlike their neighboring urban settlements in the Jewish sector, they also lacked intra- and inter-city public transportation services, banks, post offices, public libraries, public parking lots, recreational and cultural centers and the like (with the exception of the largest town, Rahat, of nearly 42,000 inhabitants, which has only one bank) (Abu-Saad, 2003, 2008; Lithwick, 2000; Swirski and Hasson, 2006).

Government-planned Bedouin towns: Perpetuating dependence and underdevelopment

The seven Bedouin towns in Al Naqab are among the youngest government-established towns in Israel, with the local governing body of the oldest (Rahat) established in 1980 and of the youngest (Hura and Laqiya) in 1990. All of their local councils were headed by non-resident Jewish mayors appointed by the Interior Ministry for many years, because the Bedouins were not considered capable of governing themselves in their new urban context. It is the standard procedure of the Interior Ministry to appoint a council ostensibly of professionals for an initial period (e.g., until the next local council elections, scheduled nationally every four years) in all newly established towns in order to facilitate their initial development. One of the first appointed mayors to head the Bedouin town of Laqiya previously worked for the military administration over Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, making one wonder just what type of “professional” skills the Interior Ministry deemed were essential to establishing and developing a Bedouin town. Furthermore, the “initial period” of an appointed council in the case of the Bedouin towns stretched on for over ten years in all cases, until the Bedouin inhabitants of the towns themselves challenged it in the Israeli High Court, and the High Court ordered the Interior
Ministry to allow the Bedouin towns to hold local elections. The first elections for local authorities in Rahat and Tel-Sheva were held in 1988 and 1992, respectively, while elections in the remaining five Bedouin local authorities were held in 2000, again only after the involvement of the High Court (Abu-Saad, 2005, 2008).

Despite the formal apparatus of locally elected government, it is not possible to talk about self-governance or autonomy in the Bedouin towns for a number of reasons. First, their access to and control over land is so circumscribed that they barely have enough land to meet the needs of their local population growth by replicating the same high-density urban model; they cannot begin to consider any other development or land use options. This further underlines the fact that the government rationale for urbanizing the Bedouins had more to do with the land than “modernizing” the population. As Swirski and Hasson (2006) explain:

The Bedouin urban localities are characterized by small areas of jurisdiction…. Although the population of these localities constitutes 16% of the total population of the Beer Sheva subdistrict, their area of jurisdiction (60 sq. km.) makes up just 0.5% of the area of the subdistrict, which covers 12,945 sq. km. …

These facts are particularly striking when Bedouin localities are compared with Jewish ones: Dimona, whose population is smaller than Rahat’s (33,700 and 34,100 residents, respectively, in 2003) has an area of jurisdiction of 30.6 sq. km.—3.5 times that of Rahat (8.85 sq. km.). Omer, whose population is around half of that of its Bedouin neighbor, Tel-Sheva, has an area of jurisdiction which is 2.7 times that of Tel-Sheva (Adalah, 2004:7, cited in Swirski and Hasson, 2006:58).

Second, the budgets of the government-planned towns are the lowest in the entire country (Lithwick, 2000; Razin, 2000; Swirski and Hasson, 2006). One of the main reasons for this is that the low socioeconomic status of the Bedouins living in the towns, together with the lack of local economic activities, translates into a very low income from property and local business taxes. Extra budgetary support from the government, despite often-voiced official concern for improving the conditions and attractiveness of the towns, has not been sufficient to alter the fact that the Bedouin towns’ budgets remain the lowest in the country. Furthermore, governmental authorities have done nothing to address the clear need for large-scale investment in educational and economic infrastructures or to generate local places of employment, even though a detailed development plan for the seven towns, created through a joint Bedouin-university initiative, was submitted to the government (Abu-Saad and Lithwick, 2000). Such investment would generate a higher level of self-funding and could thus be translated into greater capacity for independent indigenous development, but the national government’s lack of support for any such
initiatives suggests it prefers the status quo of urbanized Bedouins who remain impoverished and dependent.

Education, health and social welfare services in the Bedouin towns are supplied by and controlled through national government channels, and as with other governmental provision, receive minimal and often insufficient funding given the scope of the needs (Abu-Saad, 2008; Abu-Saad et al., 2004; Golan-Agnon, 2006; Jabareen, 2006; Swirski and Hasson, 2006). Many small (and even competing) non-governmental organizations dealing with a wide array of issues have sprouted up in the Bedouin towns in the past few decades. However, the fact that, in most cases, both their organizational missions and their funding sources are determined by members of the Israeli majority, has tended to cripple their ability to develop indigenous models of service provision and support in the urban context, or to begin confronting issues of decolonization (Abu-Saad, 2008; Swirski and Hasson, 2006).

At the same time that the governmental urbanization policy was actively being pursued in order to “modernize” the Bedouins so that they could be integrated into the Israeli labor market and society, the government-planned Bedouin towns were being excluded from the broader development plans for the region. In several key regional plans, both for Al Naqab and for the Beer Sheva metropolitan area, (including the 1972 District Plan, the 1991 “Negev Front” strategy, the 1995 Beer Sheva Metropolitan Development Plan and the 1998 renewed District Plan), the areas of Bedouin towns and unrecognized villages were either left blank, as if they were non-existent, or designated for public uses such as sewage plants, recreational forests or industrial zones (Abu-Saad, 2008; Yiftachel, 2003, 2006). Important new infrastructure developments, such as the new Trans-Israel Highway, recently improved rail facilities and even inter-city bus services have taken virtually no account of the Bedouin-Arab towns and their needs.

While the urbanization of the Bedouins suited the policy goal of reducing the Naqab Bedouins’ de facto use of and control over land resources, it is clear that no real attempt has been made by the state to integrate the new Bedouin towns into the national infrastructure in a viable and meaningful sense (Abu-Saad et al., 2004). Neither were they given sufficient resources for independent development, because Israeli government policy toward the indigenous Palestinian minority has consistently aimed at maintaining their dependence upon the Jewish economic and power structures in order to maximize the state’s control over them (Lustick, 1980). As such, the towns of the Israeli government planned for the Bedouins bear less resemblance to urban centers of economic, educational, service and social activity than they do to the typical colonial model of reservations, only with urban-style density, built to ensure that the land is reserved for someone else.
Governmental dismantling of traditional villages

Four decades after the initiation of the urban resettlement program, the total Naqab Bedouin population numbers approximately 200,000, making up 25 percent of the regional population, but only about half of the Bedouins live in the government-planned towns. The numbers of those refusing to move to the government-planned towns has grown to nearly 100,000 people, constituting Israel’s most marginal and deprived community (Abu-Saad, 2000; Shamir, 1996; Yiftachel, 2003, 2006).

Due to Bedouin resistance to the urbanization program, the Israeli government has placed numerous pressures on the inhabitants of unrecognized localities in an effort to coerce them to move to the government-planned towns (Abu-Saad, 2005, 2008; Statistical Yearbook of the Negev Bedouin, 1999; Swirski and Hasson, 2006; Yiftachel, 2003, 2006). The unrecognized villages and hamlets are denied services such as paved roads, public transportation, electricity, running water, garbage disposal, telephone service, community health facilities and, in many cases, schools. The residents of the unrecognized villages are acutely aware of the discrimination in the government’s policies toward them. As a resident of the unrecognized village of Tarabin al Sana (located next to the Jewish town of Omer) stated:

Look how we live. We live like animals in the mud. Then walk through that gate into Omer and see how nicely they live there. Our kids have to get up at 6:15 to be bussed to school in one of the recognized townships. Next door the kids of Omer walk out the door at 7:50 a.m. to be at the local school at 8:00 a.m. But they still want to get rid of us. Why can’t we become residents of Omer? I’m an Israeli citizen, I have been living in this village all my life, this is my home, why can’t I keep living here? (Human Rights Watch, 2008:22).

Bedouins in the unrecognized villages are also denied licenses for building any sort of permanent housing. All forms of housing (except for tents) are considered illegal and are subject to heavy fines and demolition proceedings (Abu-Saad, 2005; Falah, 1989; Maddrell, 1990; Shamir, 1996; Yiftachel 2003, 2006). From 1992 to 1998, a total of 1,298 buildings were demolished and 869,850 NIS (approximately $220,000) in fines were paid, due to the “illegal” status of these buildings (Statistical Yearbook of the Negev Bedouin, 1999). This phenomenon is ongoing, with demolition of hundreds of houses over the past few years (Arab Association for Human Rights, 2004; Ginsburg, 2003).

Over the past year, government house demolition activities have escalated, and in a new development, entire villages have been destroyed. For example, on June 25, 2007, all dwellings in the village of Um al-Hiran were demolished, leaving 150 people without homes. In addition, all of their possessions were confiscated, including medicine, children’s books and school materials, and food. The village,
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Twail Abu Jarwal, which had around 100 residents, was demolished in 2006. The villagers responded by rebuilding their homes, and government forces have since destroyed their village another sixteen times (RCUV, 2008).

The unrecognized villages are denied their own representative authorities and have no official local councils. The effect is that they are denied two clear rights: a local authority to provide them with basic services and the right to elect local representatives.2 The majority of residents of the unrecognized villages live in areas devoid of any municipal authority. Even those who do live in an area under a municipal authority—such as those villages within the jurisdiction of Jewish regional councils, like Bnei Shimon and Ramat Hanegev—do not receive services from these bodies or vote in their elections. Rather, the residents of the unrecognized villages are governed by a number of administrative structures and units set up especially for the Bedouin Arabs. These include most notably the Bedouin Advancement Authority, the Bedouin Education Authority and the Green Patrol (for more details, see Swirski’s article in this volume).

Community resistance

In 1997, the Bedouin Arabs who lived in the unrecognized villages formed their own regional council as a grassroots community movement, which drew up and submitted its own plans for regional development to the Ministry of the Interior. The Interior Ministry did not accept the proposed plan of the Council of Unrecognized Villages for more appropriate, rural settlement models and has remained intent upon going ahead with the same unsuccessful urban model with only superficial improvements, but it faces serious and organized resistance from the Bedouin community. The first level of resistance is that people are refusing en masse to move to the planned towns, despite the many coercive measures used against them. In addition, they are expanding their dwellings to meet the needs of their natural population growth, as well as building small business and other community structures (e.g., mosques, soccer fields). Many have begun building more permanent structures (e.g., cinderblock and stone houses, rather than tin shanties), and their response to house demolitions is to rebuild rather than to relocate. Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail in the following section, the government has drawn up plans for “recognizing” and developing some of the unrecognized villages, but as it has become clear that the government still intends to resettle their inhabitants in high-density urban style around government-constructed service centers, people are refusing to cooperate with the plans and insisting upon an agricultural-based development model.

As a second level of resistance, various local Bedouin community organizations, along with nationwide organizations representing the indigenous Palestinian minority, have begun launching proactive legal action. They have been
finding cracks in the Israeli legal structure that can be used to oppose the discriminatory practices driven by Judaization policies which contradict the tenets of law and governmental responsibilities to its citizens (Yiftachel, 2006). For example, during the 1990s, the government’s responsibility to provide compulsory education to all children ages 3–16 was used in successful appeals to the Israeli High Court to obtain permission to build preschools and supply electricity (generator-powered only) to elementary schools in the unrecognized villages. At the same time, the High Court denied appeals to build high schools in the unrecognized villages. In addition, a lawsuit brought against the Ministry of Health to have public maternal and child health care clinics was successful and resulted in the opening of such clinics in a small number of the unrecognized villages (for further details, see http://www.adalah.org/eng/legaladvocacyoverview.php). More recently, the High Court ruled that the planners of the new regional Beer Sheva Metropolitan Plan must make an official commitment to include Bedouin concerns, opinions and representation in the planning process (though in the Bedouin community, there is quite a bit of skepticism about how this will actually be done and what will actually be done, since their request for agricultural villages was denied and they were told they had to “be more realistic”). In addition, the decision to expand the municipal boundaries of the Jewish town of Omer by annexing the land owned and occupied by Bedouins in several adjoining unrecognized villages was challenged in the High Court, with the result that the expansion was nearly totally cancelled (Yiftachel, 2006). Since 2000, however, there have also been a number of failed efforts to use the legal route, with, for example, the denial of appeals to provide a point for obtaining drinking water to an unrecognized village and to provide electricity to cancer patients and others with life-threatening illnesses in unrecognized villages (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

The third level of resistance to develop was the formation of an alliance of local Bedouin community and Jewish-Arab non-governmental organizations called The United Forum for Equality and Growth. This alliance coordinates a range of self-help and NGO programs for community empowerment, education and legal representation (Abu-Saad, 2005; Yiftachel, 2006).

In light of the Naqab Bedouins’ continued resistance to the government’s urbanization policies, the role of Green Patrol and other paramilitary measures are gaining increasing importance in the governmental effort to de-Arabize the land of Al Naqab (Cook, 2003; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2003; see also Swirski and Gottlieb in this volume). These measures, which are being intensified under the most current (Sharon and Olmert) governments, perhaps foreshadow a fallback to the days immediately before and after the 1948 war when military measures were used to “empty” the land for Jewish settlement.
The scope of the special issue

This introduction provides an overview of the conflict; the development policies and their socioeconomic and political consequences; the community initiatives and resistance; and the future uncertainty that are further explored in this special issue of studies in policy, resistance and development in Naqab Bedouin-Arab society. The first group of articles deals with how the issues of space, government policy and community resistance are actualized and intertwined. The second group locates Naqab Bedouin-Arab society in the broader contexts of Israeli society and the globalized human community, as they explore economic, educational and media issues.

In the first article, “Transparent citizens: Israel government policy toward the Negev Bedouins,” Shlomo Swirski examines how the State of Israel still regards the Bedouins as transparent citizens, refusing to recognize their rights to the lands they inhabit and insisting on dealing with them through the intermediation of state agencies established for the express purpose of keeping them under control, while at the same time setting them apart from the rest of Israeli citizenship. Swirski discusses the major milestones in the formation of state policy concerning Bedouin lands and the main specialized agencies created to control the Bedouin community. He concludes that, as Israel approaches the end of its sixth decade, the day when it will be possible to say that Al Naqab Bedouins are citizens just like other Israeli citizens is still a long way off. The Bedouins were and continue to be a “problem” in search of a “solution.”

Nora Gottlieb, in her article, “Reconstruction: The voices of Bedouin-Arab women on the demolition of their homes in the unrecognized villages of the Negev,” explores the government policies of forcefully altering Bedouin space via house demolitions through the eyes of Bedouin women who are impacted by these policies. Gottlieb investigates how house demolitions in the unrecognized villages violate Bedouin women’s basic rights and impact their well-being from a human and health rights perspective. She also discusses the meaning of home life under the threat of a pending demolition order, the act of the demolition and its aftermath, the physical and emotional trauma, and the resources Bedouin women bring to resistance and reconstruction. Gottlieb argues that house demolitions in the unrecognized villages have unique and especially severe implications for women, which are related to gender roles and the division of space and labor in the Bedouin-Arab communities. The State of Israel ignores the human and female-specific aspects of its house demolition policy. It thus actively violates the most fundamental rights of an especially vulnerable group, to whom it promises special protection and support. Bedouin-Arab women are very aware of the larger political context; thus, in their eyes, the destruction of their homes translates into the destruction of their belonging and reinforces a deep sense of alienation from state and society.
The article, “Renaming space and reshaping identities: The case of the Bedouin town of Hura in Israel,” by Arnon Ben-Israel and Avinoam Meir, takes a more classic Israeli Jewish academic approach to studying the Bedouins, defining and exploring the issue of naming space in the government-planned town of Hura and interpreting the implications of this process for Bedouin identities. The authors explore several layers of spatiality in the government-planned Bedouin town of Hura and illuminate the process of constructing spatial meanings and representations. They claim that Bedouins in Hura prefer two basic arenas of associations for naming places in their new spatial context. The first arena, which dominates institutional and residential spaces, is Islamic. The second arena, which dominates economic-business spaces, is business oriented in a Western-capitalist adaptation to the Israeli context. Ben-Israel and Meir rely primarily upon the writings of mainstream Israeli “scholars of the Bedouins” and other Western academics for framing and interpreting the results of their exploration of these Bedouin naming processes. They conclude that, after a long period of non-naming in the new government-planned space, these recent and ambivalent naming trends might suggest that positive bonds to local space have been developed among some residents of Hura.

In “Between memory and resistance, an identity shaped by space: The case of the Negev Bedouins,” Safa Abu-Rabia illuminates the issues of space, memory, naming and identity from a Bedouin perspective and, in a sense, answers the fundamental questions that proceed, and that are left unasked, in Ben-Israel’s and Meir’s article. She explores the connections to the spaces that were taken away and how the maintenance of those connections is a means of resistance both to the reshaping of their space and to the authorities’ remaking of their identities. The governmental relocation of the Bedouins transformed their identity into that of expellees and strangers living outside their native space; however, over the years, they have developed practices that return them to their original space, reviving it through the search for relics of the life from which they were removed. As such, their old space has become a basis for memory, while their new space has become an arena for resistance, expressing their protest against and rejection of the present lifestyle that has been imposed upon them. Furthermore, Abu-Rabia asserts that the Bedouin exile identity is expressed through a constructed sense of alienation toward the place in which they are currently compelled to live, coexisting with a cultivated sense of emotional and physical belonging to their tribal lands, which they consider their real home.

The second group of articles begins with Suleiman Abu-Bader’s and Daniel Gottlieb’s paper, “Education, employment and poverty among Bedouin Arabs in southern Israel,” and explores how these factors position them vis-à-vis Israeli society at large. Abu-Bader and Gottlieb examine the relationships between educational attainment, employment and poverty among the Bedouin Arabs in the government-planned towns and the unrecognized villages of Al Naqab. Furthermore, they discuss the Bedouin Arabs’ economic status compared to the rest of the Arab minority in Israel, as well as the effects of recent developments in
educational attainment on employment opportunities in the Bedouin towns. The authors demonstrate how the lack of basic infrastructure is responsible for the low level of education, the lack of employment opportunities and the higher poverty rate among Al Naqab Bedouin Arabs. They argue that the vicious cycle of poverty will be perpetuated, unless the Israeli government takes a number of serious measures to break it, such as improving the access to infrastructures, attracting private investment to the Naqab Bedouin sector, improving the quality of education, and reducing job discrimination, especially in the public sector, for Bedouin-Arab university graduates.

The importance of the right to quality education is reinforced and placed in an international context by Norma Tarrow in her article, “Human rights and education: The case of the Negev Bedouins.” Tarrow examines the relationship between demographic, socioeconomic and political factors, on the one hand, and the universal human right to education, on the other hand, in the context of Al Naqab Bedouins. In light of Israel’s responsibilities as signatory to various international agreements, it is obligated to provide equal rights to its citizens, including the right to education. In exploring the fulfillment of this obligation to Al Naqab Bedouin Arabs, Tarrow examines educational objectives, budget, staffing, dropouts and the role of non-governmental organizations dedicated to ensuring the right to education and education about human rights.

Mustafa Kabha, in his article, “The Hebrew online media’s treatment of Arab citizens in the Negev,” investigates how the Hebrew online media represents the Bedouin-Arab population of Al Naqab. He argues that the Bedouins suffer from double discrimination in the media due, on the one hand, to their exclusion from media coverage in general and, on the other hand, to the inflammatory stereotypes presented to Israeli media consumers when they are covered in the media. He shows how positive or even neutral media attention is rarely given the Arab population of Al Naqab; instead, the media coverage focuses on cases involving the disruption of public order, criminal activity or fatal traffic accidents. Kabha analyzes the content of several online articles relating to the Arab population of Al Naqab and examines the responses of those who read these reports.

The first Open Spaces essay in this special issue, by Mazin Abu-Mahfouz, is entitled “The odyssey of the Abu-Mahfouz tribe: From Al-Naqab to exile.” In this piece, Abu-Mahfouz gives an account of the historical development of the Abu-Mahfouz tribe from the seventh century and its roots in Al Nagab in southern Palestine. He relates the odyssey of his family and tribe after going into exile beyond the borders of the Israeli state formed in 1948. His story provides insights into how they have preserved their social order, identities and memories in exile, and how, similar to what Abu-Rabia found among Bedouin exiles who remained in Al Naqab, they have maintained a strong sense of emotional and physical belonging to their tribal lands in Al Naqab.

Amara’s piece, “The Goldberg Committee: Legal and extra-legal means of solving the Naqab Bedouin case,” reflects upon the Israeli government’s recent
attempt to resolve the land conflict through the formation of the Goldberg Committee. Amara argues that the government should establish independent and impartial specialized institutions with a comprehensive and integrated mandate that can address Bedouin-Arab claims by providing remedies for ownership, security of tenure, resettlement, compensation and development. He also calls for these institutions to acknowledge the Bedouin-Arabs’ historical and cultural ties to the land, and to foster their participation, consultation and representation through transparent processes.

Oren Yiftachel’s epilogue to the special issue succinctly summarizes the main approaches that have been taken to study the Bedouins in Al Naqab and proposes developing a colonial scholarly paradigm. Yiftachel highlights three perspectives within the “colonial” paradigm with great potential for advancing the future study and understanding of Bedouin-Arab society in Al Naqab: settler society, indigeneity and “gray space.”

Thus, this special issue brings together the writings of many scholars, who cover a broad range of fields. They offer a variety of perspectives on critical historical and current issues facing Bedouin-Arab society in Al Naqab, as well as promising directions for future research.

NOTES

1 In the 1931 Census of Palestine, 89.3% (42,868 persons) of the Bedouins of Al Naqab were recorded as living from agriculture and 10.7% (5,113 persons) were recorded as occupied solely in raising livestock. See Falah (1985).

2 The Decree for Local Councils includes two key provisions. First, it is the council’s task to offer municipal services according to the needs of the residents. According to the Local Council Law, one of the tasks of a local authority is to establish and maintain services, enterprises and institutions that, to its knowledge, offer benefits to the public. Second, according to Article 3 of the Local Council Law, those who have the right to be elected are those who at the determining day, and for six months previously, have maintained their place of residence in this area.

3 See, for example, the writings of Emmanuel Marx, Gideon Kressel, Avinoam Meir and Joseph Ben-David.

REFERENCES

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