

**POLARIZATION, FOREIGN
MILITARY INTERVENTION, AND
CIVIL CONFLICT**

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Polarization, Foreign Military Intervention, and Civil Conflict*

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Abstract

In a behavioral model of civil conflict foreign military intervention alters the resources available to warring groups and their probability of winning. Such a model highlights the importance of distributional measures along with the modifying effect of the intervention for conflict incidence. The paper confirms empirically the finding in the literature that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil war, but it also finds evidence that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with civil conflict in the presence of foreign military intervention of non-humanitarian and non-neutral nature. Such external interventions exacerbate religious polarization leading to high-intensity conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region, but not in the rest of the world. These results suggest that unlike in the rest of the world where civil conflicts are mostly about a public prize linked to ethnic polarization, in MENA they are mostly about a sectarian-related public prize. The results are robust to allowing different definitions of conflict, model specifications, data time spans and to controlling for other types of foreign military interventions.

JEL classification: D74, D31

Keywords: Conflict, polarization, foreign military intervention, Middle East and North Africa.

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I. Introduction

Civil wars and other types of political violence have grave consequences for human development and global poverty reduction efforts. They disrupt economic activity and investments and destroy human lives and infrastructure, so their effect is usually felt long after peace is restored. The literature on armed insurgencies argues that countries at risk for civil wars tend to be poor (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), politically unstable (Hegre et al., 2001), abundant in lootable resources and unskilled labor (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and ethnically polarized (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012). Except for Yemen, the countries in the Middle East and North Africa do not fit this profile. Following independence, most Arab countries made substantial socio-economic progress. Nearly all of them achieved middle-income status, reduced extreme poverty, kept vertical economic inequality at moderate levels, and improved access to education and health (Devarajan and Ianchovichina, 2017). Horizontal inequality was moderate as reflected by ethnic and religious polarization levels that were on average below those observed in other regions (Table 1). Following the tumultuous 1950s and part of the 1960s, most of the Arab states remained politically stable between the late 1960s to the early 2000s. Yet, during the same period (from 1965 to 2004), the average incidence of conflict by country in the MENA region far exceeded the corresponding incidence in the rest of the developing world; it was one and a half times higher than the incidence of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, twice the incidence in Asia, and more than three times the incidence in Latin America and Caribbean (Table 1). The high incidence of civil conflict in these mostly middle-income countries poses a puzzle, the so-called paradox of “political violence in middle-income countries” (Ianchovichina, 2017). This paper

explores one potential explanation for this puzzle: the role of non-humanitarian and non-neutral, foreign military interventions.¹

Table 1 Averages of some major indicators (per country per period)

	<i>External Intervention Int_nh (1)</i>	<i>Conflict Incidence PRIOCW (2)</i>	<i>Religious Polarization RELPOL (3)</i>	<i>Ethnic Polarization ETHPOL (4)</i>	(1)/(3) ¹ (5)	(1)/(4) ² (6)	(2)/(3) (7)	(2)/(4) (8)
MENA	.370	.267	.470	.525	0.79	0.70	0.57	0.51
SAFRICA	.166	.179	.701	.537	0.24	0.31	0.26	0.33
ASIAE	.095	.136	.507	.458	0.19	0.21	0.27	0.30
LAAM	.084	.086	.404	.646	0.21	0.13	0.21	0.13

Data sources: IMI data (Pearson and Baumann, 1993) for external military interventions of non-neutral and non-humanitarian type, *Int_nh*, in (1); PRIO for conflict incidence, *PRIOCW*, in (2); L'Etat des religions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook for religious polarization, *RELPOL*, in (3); WCE for ethnic polarization, *ETHPOL*, in (4). Note: MENA stands for Middle East and North Africa; SAFRICA is Sub-Saharan Africa; ASIAE is East Asia; and LAAM is Latin America. Columns (5) and (6) display numbers for the incidence of external intervention per unit of religious and ethnic polarization, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) display numbers for the incidence of civil conflicts per unit of religious and ethnic polarization, respectively.

Previous studies of civil war incidence have emphasized different explanatory factors, but virtually all have related civil war to domestic factors and processes. Theoretical studies of internal conflict have focused on grievance-motivated rebellions (Gurr, 1970), the factors creating opportunities for collective action in mobilization (Tilly, 1978), and the role of rents from conflict in promoting support for violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Many studies have explored the hotly contested link between ethnic and religious diversity and social conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not find a link between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict, but others insist that ethnic cleavages may increase the risk of conflict (Ellingsen, 2000; Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) and the duration of civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 2004).² Arguing that there is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, and more conflict, in societies where a large ethnic minority lives side by

¹ Other explanations for this puzzle, referring specifically to the period after the Arab Spring, are discussed in detail in Ianchovichina (2017).

² Collier et al. (1999) argue that the duration of civil wars is positively, though non-monotonically related to the level of ethnic fractionalization of the warring society. The implication is that polarized societies would generate longer civil wars because the cost of coordinating a rebellion for a long enough period could be prohibitively high in very diverse societies.

side with an ethnic majority, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that ethnic polarization,³ not ethnic fractionalization,⁴ is a significant explanatory variable for the incidence of civil war. They conclude that ethnic polarization has a robust and significant explanatory power on civil wars in the presence of other indices of fractionalization and polarization, while the statistical significance of religious polarization depends on the particular specification. Esteban and Ray (2011) formalize theoretically the link between distributional measures and conflict incidence and test these links empirically in Esteban et al. (2012). Assuming no external intervention, they find that all three indices of ethnic distribution – polarization, fractionalization, and the Gini-Greenberg index – are significant correlates of conflict.⁵

This literature has largely overlooked the role of transnational factors on conflict incidence (Regan 2010), despite the importance given to these factors in popular accounts of civil wars (McNulty, 1999). The research on interventions has focused on three areas: (i) the effect of foreign intervention on civil war duration; (ii) foreign intervention's effect on civil war resolution; and (iii) foreign intervention's effect on peace keeping. Quantitative studies in the first strand of the literature, reviewed in detail by Regan (2010), produces strong evidence that external interventions tend to lengthen civil conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000), irrespective of whether they are in the form of direct military involvement, military aid, economic assistance or sanctions, or whether they are designed to be neutral or to favor the government or the opposition (Regan 2000, 2002). Several explanations of this effect have been put forward, with the most popular explanation linked to expected utility (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Regan, 2002). Foreign intervention provides the

³ Polarization measures capture the distance of the group distribution from the bipolar one where the population is split in half into two large groups.

⁴ Fractionalization measures capture the extent of diversity in a country or society.

⁵ This result holds under the assumption that the resources committed by the warring groups come only from individual efforts within countries and that each warring group's probability of winning equals their population share (Esteban and Ray, 2011).

resources necessary for one or both sides to carry out insurgency, which lowers the opportunity cost of participating in the war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), potentially making rival groups optimistic about the likelihood of a military victory and creating commitment problems.⁶ The latter could arise because the intervention may reduce incentives for the side that benefits from outside assistance to credibly commit to the terms of a peace deal or to reach such a deal because of the greater number of veto players, especially in the case of multiple interventions on different sides of the warring groups (Cunningham, 2004). The second body of this literature finds evidence for the positive effect of foreign interventions that occur once a peace treaty has been signed on the successful resolution of these wars (Walter, 2002; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Fortna, 2002; and Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Zartman (1989) argues that foreign intervention can create a ‘hurting’ stalemate during which both sides calibrate their expected utility and realize that they must negotiate an end to the war sooner rather than later. Foreign intervention can also help overcome information failures that prevent warring factions from reaching a settlement and shortening the duration of the war (Zartman, 1989, 1995; Brown, 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Doyle, Johnston and Orr, 1997) and help solve commitment (Brown, 1996) and implementation problems (Hampson, 1996). The presence of third-party guarantees reassures combatants that the treaty is credible and alleviates their safety concerns, making post-treaty demobilization possible and credible (Walter, 1994, 1997, and 2002). The third strand of the literature finds that external intervention reduces the risks of war recurrence once a peace deal is reached and implemented (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2002). However, only neutral (UN) and multidimensional⁷ peacekeeping operations have a positive effect on peace maintenance, according to Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Other types of outside interventions,

⁶ Fearon (2004) and Salehyan (2004) make similar arguments.

⁷ Multidimensional operations include involvement in economic reconstruction, institutional reform and election oversight.

including monitoring and observer missions, economic reconstruction/institutional reform, and peace enforcement, appear to have no effect on either the duration of the post-war peace or democratization.


Few studies in the literature explore the question of how foreign interventions influence the incidence of civil wars and the results of these studies are mixed. Albornoz and Hauk (2014) find that interventions by global superpowers such as the U.S. are a sizable driver of domestic conflict, with the risk of civil war increasing under Republican governments and decreasing with the U.S. presidential approval ratings. Cetinyan (2002) finds that external support does not affect civil war incidence, but it influences the terms of settlement in the event conflict occurs. Gershenson (2002) also looks at this issue but in terms of sanctions, not direct military intervention. He finds that strong sanctions can compel the state to engage rebel demands whereas weak sanctions against the state can weaken the rebel's position. Gleditsch (2007) examines how transnational contagion from neighboring states affects the risk of conflict in a country and concludes that regional factors strongly influence the risk of civil conflict.

This paper explores the effect of foreign military intervention on the incidence and intensity of civil war. Our hypothesis is that non-neutral and non-humanitarian external intervention increases the risk of high-intensity conflict that results in many casualties. The question of how different types of outside military interventions affect the intensity of war is distinctly different from the questions explored in the existing literature on intervention which focus on war duration effects⁸ and not on the causal link between intervention, war incidence and its scale, or how costly a war is in terms of human casualties. This issue is particularly relevant in the context of the increased incidence of high-intensity conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab

⁸ Lengthy wars are not necessarily costly in terms of casualties.

Spring; the post-Arab Spring civil wars have led to many casualties and massive destruction (Ianchovichina, 2016). The paper focuses on non-neutral and non-humanitarian external interventions because we expect that this particular type of intervention has the potential to disturb the status quo in a country by increasing the incentives of different groups to raise resources for fighting and thus altering the groups' probability of winning. We also believe that this type of intervention has the highest potential to increase the intensity of fighting and the associated casualties as external support decreases the rebels' dependence on local support and therefore their incentives to protect the local population.

Figure 1 Distribution of Military Intervention Frequency by Type and Region



Data source: IMI data (Pearson and Baumann, 1993).

The global International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset, which provides information on events involving foreign military deployment in countries around the world, indicates that there are large differences in the incidence of external military interventions by type and region. Since 1965 the incidence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian interventions has been highest on average in MENA and lowest in Latin America (Figure 1). In Sub-Saharan Africa – the region with the

second highest incidence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian interventions – the average prevalence of foreign military interventions was less than half of that observed in MENA. By contrast, neutral and humanitarian interventions appear evenly distributed across regions. Appendix Table 1 provides a complete list of military interventions that have been classified as non-neutral and non-humanitarian in the IMI database and that have been implemented around the world following the end of World War II.

The data suggest that nearly all MENA countries have been the target of military interventions, but the case of Lebanon – a multi-sectarian state – stands out. It illustrates the dynamics between external interventions, the onset of the Lebanese civil war and its intensification. Prior to the war, interventions occurred because following the ‘Black September’ 1970,⁹ the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was pushed out of Jordan and established presence in Lebanon, disturbing the balance among different sects in the country. After 1970 interventions occurred in Lebanon in support of the Shia minority, which was pushed out of Southern Lebanon into the urban peripheries of Beirut.¹⁰ These interventions, occurring in the context of shifting population weights, led to increases in sectarian polarization and a struggle for political power, which resulted in a split into pro-Nasser Sunni Muslim camp and pro-Western Christian camp. Eventually, a confrontation erupted between the Lebanese Forces (LF)¹¹ and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and sectarian violence escalated, leading to further interventions in a vicious cycle that grew into a large-scale conflict.

⁹ During the ‘Black September’ conflict, the Jordanian Armed Forces fought with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and forced it to relocate from Jordan to Lebanon.

¹⁰ The ruling Alawite minority in Syria viewed the Shia minority in Lebanon as a counterweight against the Sunni majority of Syria and the Palestinians.

¹¹ The LF included the Maronite Christians and the LNM represented a coalition between Druze, Shia, Arab Nationalists, Socialists, Communists and Sunni Militias. The LNM had the support of the PLO.

The paper incorporates foreign intervention in a model a la Esteban and Ray (2011). In the model external intervention affects the probability of winning of warring groups¹² and the resources available to them and therefore modifies the horizontal distributional measures. External interventions modify the effect of the distributional measures on the risk of conflict as they alter the balance of power among potential warring groups and therefore the incentives of groups to raise war-related resources. In other words, the revised model tells us that the equilibrium level of conflict depends on the distributional measures of inequality, fractionalization and polarization, modified to reflect the effect of military intervention. The theoretical specification does not indicate the direction and strength of the modifying effect— depending on the type of intervention and the presence of other interventions, it may increase or decrease the risk of conflict or it may have no effect on it.

The theory informs the format of the empirical model, which allows us to estimate empirically the direction and strength of the intervention and its modifying effect. We rely on the global International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset for data on different types of external military interventions, the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset for civil wars, and the databases on ethnic and religious fractionalization used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Our findings are consistent with the results in the literature (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012) that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil wars. In addition, we find robust evidence that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with civil conflict in the presence of non-humanitarian and non-neutral foreign military interventions. Such external interventions exacerbate religious polarization leading to high-

¹² The extent to which probabilities shift remains unknown to opponents due to asymmetric information and incentives to dissemble, creating conditions for violence (Fearon 1995).

intensity conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region, but not in the rest of the world. We find no such effect in the case of neutral and humanitarian military interventions.

The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. Section II presents the theoretical model. Section III discusses the empirical model and data and Section IV presents the main econometric results. We discuss endogeneity issues and robustness checks in Section V and present a summary of findings and concluding remarks in Section VI.

II. Theory

We explore the equilibrium level of conflict attained in a behavioral model in which warring groups choose the amount of resources to commit to a conflict. In the model warring groups can receive external military assistance. This help may be extended for political, economic, or any other reasons and may come in the form of direct military assistance, i.e. a foreign army fighting on behalf of the warring group, or other assistance that alters the groups' chances of winning.¹³ The model developed by Esteban and Ray (2011) defines the link between conflict and measures of inequality and polarization along non-economic identity markers such as ethnicity or religion.¹⁴ These divisions enable groups interested in stoking conflict to channel antagonisms into organized action. This paper argues that external military interventions may deepen perceptions of horizontal divisions and may alter the behavioral incentives of the warring groups to raise war-related resources. Leaving such influences outside the analysis may therefore overestimate the importance of distributional factors as reasons for civil wars. This paper does not study the motives

¹³ External assistance at one point can also give warring factions the assurance of support at a later time. However, the extent to which intervention alters the probability of winning remains unknown to opponents due to asymmetric information and incentives to dissemble (Fearon 1995).

¹⁴ Polarization may occur along other identity markers such as political ideas, racial, and/or social views.

behind intervention¹⁵ and do not represent explicitly the preferences of the intervening external parties;¹⁶ instead we consider the incentives of the domestic warring factions in the presence of exogenous interventions and in particular, how foreign support may affect warring factions' efforts to raise resources and change their probability of winning.

We consider a country with a population of N individuals belonging to m warring groups. In each group i , there are N_i individuals and $N = \sum N_i$, for $i=1, \dots, m$. We assume these groups fight over a budget whose per capita value is normalized to unity and that a fraction of it, λ , is available to produce public goods. The winning group enjoys both a public prize,¹⁷ whose value is given by λ , and a private prize, which is given as the remaining fraction of the budget and can be privately divided among the members of the winning group once it gets control over the resources.¹⁸ Using the private good as numeraire, u_{ij} is the public goods payoff to a member of group i if a single unit per capita of the optimal mix for group j is produced. Then, the per capita payoff to members of the warring group i is $\lambda u_{ii} + \frac{(1-\lambda)}{n_i}$, if in case group i wins the war and λu_{ij} in case some other group is the winner. We assume that $u_{ii} > u_{ij}$ for all i, j with $i \neq j$. This payoff difference defines the "distance" across groups: $d_{ij} = u_{ii} - u_{ij}$.

Individuals in each group commit resources r to influence the conflict's outcome. These resources include time, effort, risk, and finance. The income equivalent cost to such expenditure is $c(r)$ where c is assumed to be increasing, smooth, and strictly convex, with $c'(0)=0$. If $r_i(k)$ is the contribution of resources by member k of group i , then $R_i = \sum r_i(k)$ is the total of all resources

¹⁵ Foreign interventions may occur for a variety of reasons, some of which may be linked to aspirations for greater economic, political, and ideological influence in a given country.

¹⁶ The papers focuses on equilibrium conflict, not equilibrium intervention.

¹⁷ The public prize can be enjoyed by all members of the winning group regardless of its population size and includes political power, control over policy, ability to impose cultural and religious values, among other benefits.

¹⁸ The private payoff, with a per capita value μ , could be in the form of administrative or political positions, specific tax breaks, and bias in access to resources, among others.

committed by group i . The total of all societal resources devoted to the war is $R = \sum R_i$, for $i = 1, \dots, m$ and assuming that $R > 0$, the probability of winning is given by $p_i = R_i/R$. The more resources group i commits to the conflict the higher its chances of success. If an external force provides resources to faction i , then group i 's probability of winning will be higher than that suggested by the domestic resources available to this group.

The overall expected payoff to an individual k in group i is given by the following expression: $\pi_i(k) = \sum_{j=1}^m p_j \lambda u_{ij} + p_i \frac{(1-\lambda)}{n_i} - c(r_i(k))$,¹⁹ where $n_i = N_i/N$ is the population share of group i . Individuals choose resources r so as to maximize a mix of their own payoff and the group's payoffs:

$$U_i(k) \equiv (1 - \alpha)\pi_i(k) + \alpha \sum_{l \in i} \pi_i(l), \quad (1)$$

where α is altruism and is a nonnegative number. If $\alpha = 0$, individual k maximizes individual payoff, but if $\alpha = 1$ then k acts so as to maximize the group's payoffs.²⁰ Assuming that $r_j(l) > 0$ for some l that belongs to j and not i , the solution to the choice of $r_i(k)$ is completely given by the interior first-order condition:

$$\frac{\sigma_i}{R} \sum_{j=1}^m p_j \Delta_{ij} = c'(r_i(k)), \quad (2)$$

where $\sigma_i \equiv (1 - \alpha) + \alpha N_i$ and $\Delta_{ij} \equiv \lambda d_{ij} + \frac{1-\lambda}{n_i}$ for all $j \neq i$ and $\Delta_{ii} \equiv 0$. According to this condition, the marginal cost of raising funds to fight equals the marginal benefit of fighting for any member of group i . Esteban and Ray (2011) show that a unique equilibrium exists and that in an equilibrium, according to condition (2) every individual k of group i makes the same contribution.

¹⁹ Since the private good is given in per capita terms, to divide it equally among the winning members of group i , the private good must be scaled up by N .

²⁰ Under some circumstances, discussed in Esteban and Ray (2011), α may exceed 1.

If we denote the ratio of the win probabilities to the population shares as $\gamma_i = p_i/n_i$ and the per capita resources spent on conflict as $\rho = R/N$, and assume that $c(\cdot)$ is a quadratic function,²¹ when we substitute for p_i and r_i in equilibrium condition (2) using the fact that in equilibrium all $r_i(k) = R_i/N_i$, and sum over all i , condition (2) is transformed into the following expression:

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^m \gamma_j n_i n_j \frac{\sigma_i \Delta_{ij}}{N}. \quad (3)$$

There may be a substantial difference between the probability of winning ($p_i = R_i/R$) and the population shares (n_i) of a warring group i due to foreign military intervention. Therefore, we do not follow Esteban and Ray (2005) who assume that $p_i = n_i$,²² implying that the behavioral correction factor γ equals 1. Since we do not assume that the probability of winning p_i equals the population shares n_i , we allow γ_i to differ from 1. The intervention may change the relative sizes of warring groups, and therefore moderate the effect of polarization. It may also promote greater resource mobilization and risk taking thus incentivizing warring groups to engage in high-intensity and prolonged confrontations with each. In short, allowing γ_i to differ from 1 and opening the possibility that $\gamma_i \neq \gamma_j$ for $i \neq j$, enables us to investigate how external military interventions may affect the probability of civil conflict.

We substitute for σ_i and Δ_{ij} in condition (3) and obtain the following expression:

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ i \neq j}}^m \gamma_j n_j n_i \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)}{N} + \alpha n_i \right] \left[\frac{(1-\lambda)}{n_i} + \lambda d_{ij} \right]. \quad (4)$$

After substituting for γ_i and re-arranging, condition (4) can be rewritten as:

²¹ Given the assumption of quadratic cost function $c(\rho) = 0.5\rho^2$, it can be shown that $c'(\gamma\rho) = \gamma c'(\rho)$.

²² In other words, Esteban and Ray (2005) assume that there is no deviation of the win probability from the population share.

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\lambda)(m-1)}{N} \right] + \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)\lambda}{N} \right] G^e + \alpha \{ \lambda P^e + (1-\lambda) F^e \}, \quad (5)$$

where G^e is the Gini index modified to reflect the presence of intervention through the behavioral factor parameter γ :

$$G^e = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^m n_i n_j \gamma_j d_{ij}.$$

The polarization measure, P^e , is also modified by the intervention as follows:

$$P^e = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^m n_i^2 n_j \gamma_j d_{ij}.$$

The fractionalization index F is the Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index

$$F = \sum_{i=1}^m n_i (1 - n_i) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^m n_i n_j$$

and its modified version F^e is given as:

$$F^e = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{\substack{j=1 \\ j \neq i}}^m n_i n_j \gamma_j.$$

The equilibrium per capita conflict condition in the presence of external intervention depends on the modified horizontal distributional measures G^e , P^e , and F^e .²³ This leads us to the following proposition.

²³ With the intervention the probability of group i winning the war is not necessarily equal to the population shares (n_i).

Proposition: Equilibrium per capita conflict²⁴ in a country is determined by the three distributional measures: the Gini index, the fractionalization index, and the polarization index, modified by the influence of external military intervention as given in equilibrium condition (5).

Proof: The discussion after (3) outlines the steps needed to prove that equilibrium condition (4) can be transformed into (5). If there is no external intervention ($\gamma_j=1$ for all j) condition (5) reduces to the condition (18) in Esteban and Ray (2011). Since irrespective of whether conflict is over private or public goods, external intervention affects the probability of winning of the warring groups and the resources they raise, altering their effective population sizes, it also moderates the effect of the distributional measures on conflict in a country. As in most cases the distance between groups $d_{ij} = u_{ii} - u_{ij}$ is nonmonetary, it is challenging to arrive at a reasonable estimate of d_{ij} . For this reason, we adopt the approach in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and assume that the distances between any pair of distinct groups are the same, with $d_{ij} = 1$ for all $i \neq j$ and $d_{ii} = 0$. This assumption allows us to simplify condition (5) and use the distributional measures of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) in the empirical parts of this paper. The simplified condition is:

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\lambda)(m-1)}{N} \right] + \alpha(\lambda P^e + (1-\lambda)F) + \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)\lambda}{N} \right] F^e. \quad (6)$$

In this case, the equilibrium per capita conflict is determined by a combination of only two distributional measures of polarization (P) and fractionalization (F), and the influence of the intervention on these two types of distributional measures.

²⁴ Equilibrium per capita conflict proxies for the equilibrium per capita resources spent on fighting on average in a country.

If the country is populous (i.e. N is large), as in the baseline case in Esteban and Ray (2011), condition (6) transforms into:

$$\rho c'(\rho) = \alpha(\lambda P^e + (1 - \lambda)F). \quad (7)$$

This condition suggests that equilibrium per capita conflict in the large country case depends on the extent of fractionalization and polarization and external intervention has an effect on equilibrium conflict only through its effect on horizontal polarization. If conflict is mostly over a public prize ($\lambda = 1$), the equilibrium per capita conflict depends only on the polarization measure and the extent to which the intervention polarizes the society. This is consistent with the nature of the public prize, which is linked to the characteristics of the horizontal groups and the individual payoff from it, which is undiluted by one's own group size. The public prize includes the seizure of political power, the setting of norms, the abolition of certain rights or privileges, the establishment of a religious state, the repression of a language and other public aspects that may lead to contention among horizontal group. If conflict is mostly over a private prize ($\lambda = 0$), the equilibrium per capita conflict depends only on the degree of fractionalization and not on polarization and/or external intervention. This is because the private prize is about access to resources (oil or specific material benefits obtained from special positions of power) and the individual payoff of this type of prize is diluted by the group size. In the general case, it is difficult to discern the effect of external intervention on civil conflict incidence without empirical testing, so next we test empirically the association between external military intervention and conflict prevalence.

III. Empirical investigation: model and data

We utilize a logit model for the incidence of civil wars:

$$P(\text{PRIOCW}_{it} = 1) = \alpha + X_{1it-1}\beta_1 + X_{2it-1}\beta_2 + \text{Int}_{it} \gamma + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (8)$$

in which the independent variables, X_{1it-1} and X_{2it-1} , are the relevant distributional and control variables, respectively; and ε_{it} is the error term. The distributional factors and some of the control variables are time invariant; the rest are set at their values in period $t-1$. The binary explanatory variable, Int_{it} , is 1 if there has been an external military intervention in at least one of the four years preceding period t ($t-1 \leq s < t$) and 0 otherwise. We describe the data for each of these sets of variables next.

We study 137 countries over 1960-2005 and divide the sample into five-year periods so we have a total of 946 observations.²⁵ For comparison purposes, we first conduct the analysis for the period 1960-1999, considered by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), but then we estimate the model and test the robustness of the results over the full period up to 2005. We use the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset for civil wars to construct the endogenous binary variable of civil war incidence, PRIOCW , which is set at 1 if a civil war occurred in a country i in period t and zero otherwise. In the baseline results we focus on intermediate armed conflict (PRIOCW , categories 3 and 4), defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory, where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in a minimum of 1,000 deaths over the course of the civil war. In the robustness checks, we also consider low-level conflict (PRIO25) associated with at least 25 deaths,

²⁵ The number of observations in a specific empirical model depends on the independent variables included in it, as different variables have different missing observations. In the baseline model, the maximum number of observations is 946.

and large scale civil wars (PRIO1000) associated with at least 1,000 per year and per incompatibility (see details in appendix). In the baseline, we consider non-humanitarian and non-neutral military interventions that are likely to be implemented before a civil conflict intensifies and therefore alter the balance of power and the winning probabilities of potential warring groups as discussed in the theory section of this paper.

As in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), the distributional variables are ethnic polarization (*ETHPOL*), ethnic fractionalization (*ETHFRAC*), religious polarization (*RELPOL*), and religious fractionalization (*RELFAC*). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that the indices of polarization and fractionalization differ, independent of the data source used in their calculations. We choose the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE) to obtain the ethno-diversity measure, favoring it to the other two sources: the Encyclopedia Britannica (EB), and the ANM (1964). We do so because according to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) the most accurate description of ethnic diversity is the one in the WCE. It contains details for each country on the most diverse classification level, which may coincide with an ethnolinguistic family or subfamilies. There are also several sources of data on religious diversity. We adopt the *L'Etat des religions dans le monde* (ET) data, which are based on a combination of national data sources and the WCE, and provide information on the proportions of followers of Animist and Syncretic cults. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) consider this to be an important factor for the calculation of indices of religious heterogeneity. Since the data used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban et al. (2012) do not contain information on the distributional variables for Lebanon, we construct the indexes of religious and ethnic polarization and fractionalization based on data from Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year 2001.

The group of control variables includes explanatory variables found to influence the incidence of conflict in earlier empirical studies by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and Collier and Hoeffler (2002). Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that GDP per capita is a proxy for the state's overall financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities. Rebels can expect a higher probability of success in a low-income society with weak state institutions. In addition, a low level of GDP per capita reduces the opportunity cost of engaging in a civil war. The log of real GDP per capita (LGDPC) is set at its value in the previous period in order to reduce the potential endogeneity problem between conflict and the level of real economic activity.²⁶ The log of the population (LPOP) is also included in the set of control variables and is set at its value in the previous period.²⁷ Since the usual definitions of civil war always set a threshold in the number of deaths, we control by population as a scale factor. The size of the population can also be considered an additional proxy for the benefits of a rebellion as it measures potential labor income taxation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Fearon and Laitin (2003) also indicate that a large population implies difficulties in controlling what goes on at the local level and increases the number of potential rebels that can be recruited by the insurgents. Mountains (*MOUNTAINS*) are included as well since this terrain can provide safe haven for rebels. Long distances from the center of the state's power also favor the incidence of civil wars, especially if there is a natural barrier between them, like a sea or other countries, so we include the noncontiguous state (*NONCONT*) variable in the set of control variables. As pointed out by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) the existence of natural resources provides an opportunity for rebellion since these resources can be used to finance the war and increase the payoff if victory is achieved. We measure this dependence using the share of primary commodity exports of GDP (*PRMEXP*) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002;

²⁶ As in Motalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) we do not use annual data and GDP growth as an explanatory variable due to strong concerns about the potential endogeneity problem between economic growth and conflict.

²⁷ See appendix for data sources for each variable.

Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Finally, in line with the literature we consider the effect of democracy, measured with the level of democracy using the Polity IV dataset score for general openness of the political institutions, transformed into a dummy variable that takes value 1, if the score is greater or equal to 4, and 0 otherwise.

As military interventions for humanitarian and peacekeeping purposes are implemented once civil wars have intensified, we focus only on non-humanitarian and non-neutral military interventions, which may occur before an armed conflict begins and are likely to alter the balance of power and the winning probabilities of potential warring groups leading to armed conflict or the intensification of an existing one, as discussed in the theory section of this paper. We use the dataset of International Military Intervention (IMI)²⁸ to define the intervention variable *Int_nh_{it}*. This data set records interventions that are purposeful, are the result of conscious decisions of national leaders, and involve “the movement of regular troops or forces of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (Pearson and Baumann, 1993). The data set excludes interventions that involve paramilitaries, government backed militias, private security forces, and other military units that are not part of the regular military of the state. The IMI dataset contains a total of 1243 cases of military interventions which meet these criteria for the period 1946-2005; they have been further classified as neutral, supportive of government or rebels, humanitarian, and other types.²⁹ This enables us to define external military intervention as a binary variable, *Int_nh*, which takes the value 1 if there has been at least one intervention in the target country during the four years preceding the current period and the intervention was not neutral and


²⁸ The IMI project was established in the late 1960s by Frederic S. Pearson and Robert A. Baumann. Under their guidance, 667 cases of international military interventions spanning the years 1946 to 1988 were coded. Emizet N. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering expanded the IMI collection to 2005. Many studies have been done using the IMI data set, among others are Peksen (2012), Koga (2011), Sullivan and Koch (2009), Pearson et al. (2006), and Pickering and Kisangani (2006).

²⁹ For the full list of variables consult the International Military Intervention, 1989-2005 notebook at <http://www.researchconnections.org/ICPSR/studies/21282>.

was not for humanitarian matters. In total, there were 178 intervention years of this kind during the period 1946-2005. The complete list of non-humanitarian and non-neutral military interventions by year, intervening country and target country is shown in Appendix Table 1.

Different regions have relatively similar levels of religious and ethnic polarization, but substantially different frequency of civil conflict and external military interventions, as shown in Table 1. In the context of moderate levels of religious and ethnic polarization, the MENA region stands out with the highest incidence of civil conflict and foreign military intervention of the non-humanitarian and non-neutral type. Figure 2, which is based on the data of Table 1, shows that countries with high incidence of civil conflict are places with higher than average levels of religious polarization (RELPOL) and external military intervention.

Figure 2 External Intervention and Civil Conflict Incidence (per Country per Period) at Different Levels of Religious Polarization



IV. Regression Results

We first replicated the major results of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in columns (1), (2), and (4) of Table 2. These results point to the significance of ethnic polarization, not fractionalization, as a determinant of conflict. In their specification, which omits the foreign military intervention variable, religious polarization and fractionalization are not significant predictors of conflict. In other words, their results suggest that civil conflict is driven mostly by ethnic strife over public prizes.

A. *External Intervention and Polarization*

When we include the non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention variable (*Int_nh*), along with the indices of polarization and fractionalization, we find that both the intervention variable and the ethnic polarization index are statistically significant and have the expected positive signs (see columns (3) and (5) of Table 2). This result suggests that, conditional on a given degree of polarization, this type of external military intervention is associated with an increase in the incidence of civil war.^{30,31}

Expression (6) for the equilibrium per capita conflict in the theory section links the incidence of civil war to the distributional measures modified by the presence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention. It suggests that the intervention is associated with conflict through its effects on the distributional measures. In the large country case, given by expression (7),³² this effect comes through the influence of the intervention on the polarization

³⁰ The sample used to estimate regression models (3), (5), (6), and (7) includes observations for Lebanon. Similar results are obtained without Lebanon in the data sample. Results without Lebanon are available upon request from the authors.

³¹ We recognize that there may be reverse causality between intervention and conflict so we interpret the effect on the intervention variable as a conditional association, rather than a causal relationship.

³² The large country case is also the baseline case in Esteban and Ray (2011).

measure. We reflect this by including an interaction term between the external military intervention variable and each of the polarization measures. The results, presented in columns (6) and (7) of Table 2, as well as those presented in columns (6) and (7) of Table 3 for the sample extended up to 2005,³³ suggest that ethnic polarization is a significant determinant of conflict incidence and that foreign intervention exacerbates the relationship between religious polarization and conflict. In other words, religious polarization combined with external military intervention is significantly and positively associated with civil war.

Table 2 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-1999)

	(1) ¹	(2) ²	(3)	(4) ³	(5)	(6)	(7)
LGPPC	-0.28	-0.42*	-0.34	-0.38	-0.28	-0.36	-0.36
LPOP	0.34**	0.40**	0.38**	0.44***	0.39***	0.40***	0.40***
PRIMEXP	-0.90	-1.07	-1.71	-0.86	-1.77	-1.53	-1.49
MOUNTAINS	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
NONCONT	0.08	0.28	0.35	0.48	0.47	0.41	0.42
DEMOCRACY	0.07	0.03	0.11	-0.04	0.08	0.14	0.14
ETHFRAC	1.19*	0.17	0.12	0.04	-0.08	-0.35	-0.39
ETHPOL		2.28**	2.60***	2.11***	2.38**	2.59***	2.76**
RELFAC				-4.45	-2.12	-1.89	-1.98
RELPOL				3.28	1.92	1.32	1.36
Int_nh			1.52***		1.53***	0.44	0.82
Int_nh × RELPOL						1.86	1.89*
Int_nh × ETHPOL							-0.71
Intercept	-5.82**	-6.29**	-7.00***	-7.54**	-7.71***	-7.15**	-7.23**
N	850	850	859	850	859	859	859
McFadden's R ²	0.101	0.123	0.169	0.135	0.176	0.182	0.183
McFadden's Adjusted R ²	0.079	0.098	0.142	0.104	0.142	0.146	0.144

¹ Refers to column 1 in Table 1 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).

² Refers to column 3 in Table 1 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).

³ Refers to column 8 in Table 1 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).

³³ We include data up to 2005 by adding one period to the sample employed in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). We have also added observations for Lebanon, which are not present in their sample. Similar results are obtained with and without Lebanon in the data sample. Results without Lebanon are available upon request from the authors.

Table 3 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-2005)

	(1) ¹	(2) ²	(3)	(4) ³	(5)	(6)	(7)
LGDPPC	-0.37*	-0.52**	-0.44*	-0.45*	-0.38	-0.46	-0.46
LPOP	0.37**	0.42**	0.39**	0.46***	0.39***	0.42**	0.42***
PRIMEXP	0.34	0.31	-0.29	0.25	-0.44	-0.11	-0.08
MOUNTAINS	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
NONCONT	0.35	0.60	0.63	0.75	0.74	0.68	0.68
DEMOCRACY	0.00	0.02	0.12	-0.05	0.08	0.14	0.14
ETHFRAC	1.10*	-0.06	0.01	-0.03	-0.06	-0.30	-0.33
ETHPOL		2.34**	2.47**	2.13**	2.24**	2.42**	2.55**
RELFAC				-4.52	-2.56	-2.32	-2.35
RELPOL				3.18*	2.04	1.37	1.38
Int_nh			1.32***		1.33***	0.02	0.32
Int_nh× RELPOL						2.16*	2.19**
Int_nh× ETHPOL							-0.56
Intercept	-5.74**	-6.10**	-6.41**	-7.23**	-7.12***	-6.63***	-6.69***
N	937	937	946	937	946	946	946
McFadden's R ²	0.116	0.138	0.174	0.150	0.179	0.188	0.189
McFadden's Adjusted R ²	0.097	0.117	0.150	0.124	0.151	0.157	0.155

¹ Column (1) shows results for the specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (1) of Table 1 in their paper, with the dataset extended to 2005.

² Column (2) shows results for the specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (3) of Table 1 in their paper, with the dataset extended to 2005.

³ Column (4) shows results for the specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (8) of Table 1 in their paper, with the dataset extended to 2005.

B. The MENA Effect

This section investigates the robustness of the results to the inclusion of regional dummies. This way we address the relationship between geographical heterogeneity and civil conflict. In Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) all countries not located in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America are included in the reference (base) region. The MENA countries therefore are included in the reference region along with all developed countries and the rest of the world. The inclusion of the MENA countries with the base group poses a problem given the substantially higher incidence of civil wars and foreign military interventions in MENA compared with the rest of the world (Table 1). In line with the fact that conflict incidence is higher in MENA than in the rest of the world regions, the coefficient on the MENA dummy is large, positive, and significant, while all other regional dummies remain statistically insignificant (see column (2) of Table 4). Furthermore, the inclusion of MENA reduces the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on

the ethnic polarization (ETHPOL) variable; it becomes significant only at the 10% level. As expected, the association between non-neutral and non-humanitarian foreign military intervention variable, *Int_nh*, and civil conflict is positive and significant in the 3rd regression model, shown in column (3) of Table 4. The addition of the interactions of the intervention variable with each of the two polarization indices (RELPOL and ETHPOL) in column (4) of Table 4 suggests that the intervention exacerbates the effect of religious polarization on conflict incidence, but it does not have a similar effect on ethnic polarization.

We explore the channels through which the MENA regional effect translates into higher incidence of civil conflict with the help of alternative specifications of the regression models in columns (5) through (8) of Table 4. In columns (5) and (6) we show results from the regression model with interactions between the regional dummies and the religious and ethnic polarization indices, respectively. In both cases, the MENA dummy loses its significance, the magnitude of its coefficient goes down significantly, and only the interactions of RELPOL with the MENA and the intervention dummy, respectively, remain significant.

Given the different degrees of religious polarization and the incidence of external military interventions across geographic regions, we include a triple interaction term in model (7) that allows us to capture the region-specific dimension of the moderating effect of external intervention on religious polarization. The results show that none of the three variables is significant by itself but the coefficients of the tri-interaction term for MENA is positive, large and highly significant. The interaction terms between the religious polarization and MENA variables and those between the intervention and religious polarization variables are no longer significant too. The final specification in Table 4, shown in column (8), is our preferred specification. It is closest to the specification in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (1), with the difference

that we have included the tri-variable interaction between the military intervention dummy, the religious polarization variable, and the MENA dummy.³⁴ The results with this specification indicate that the index of ethnic polarization is a significant explanatory variable for the incidence of civil war and, in the case of MENA, religious polarization combined with external military intervention is significantly associated with conflict. Similar results are obtained with the sample extended to 2005 (Table 5). The result that ethnic polarization is a significant explanatory variable for war incidence is weakened when the sample is extended and the model proposed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) is used and this distributional variable ceases to be significant in the specification with MENA dummy. However, this variable becomes significant at the 5% level in our preferred specification (8).

The magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term and can be of opposite sign (Ai and Norton 2003). We therefore plot in Figure 3 the predicted probability of intense civil conflict as a function of RELPOL, allowing for shifts in this curve by the two binary variables: Int_nh and MENA, and in figure 4, the marginal effect of Int_nh, differentiating between MENA (MENA=1) and non-MENA (MENA=0) regions. The predicted probability of civil conflict with external intervention in MENA is higher than that in non-MENA countries for any level of RELPOL greater than 0.33 and in both cases the predicted probabilities significantly differ from zero at the 5% significance level (Figure 3). Foreign military interventions of non-neutral and non-humanitarian type increase substantially the predicted probability of these types of conflict in MENA at much lower levels of RELPOL than in the non-MENA case, where substantial differences emerge at the highest levels of RELPOL (Figure 3). In the case of MENA, the marginal effect of external intervention is statistically significant when

³⁴ All interaction terms and dummy variables that were insignificant in specification (7) have been dropped from specification (8).

RELPOL ranges between 0.32 and 0.59 while in the non-MENA cases, RELPOL needs to be higher, above 0.6 for external intervention to have a statistically significant effect on conflict incidence (Figure 3). At the averages for RELPOL in the data, the estimated marginal effect of intervention in the case of MENA is about 0.25 compared to 0.07 in the non-MENA case.

Table 4 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) in the Presence of Regional Dummies (1965-1999)

	(1) ¹	(2) ²	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LGDPPC	-0.41*	-0.41	-0.35	-0.40	-0.60*	-0.60*	-0.46	-0.50**
LPOP	0.38***	0.45***	0.46***	0.46***	0.54***	0.50***	0.49***	0.39**
PRIMEXP	-1.15	-2.19	-2.54	-2.55	-2.67	-2.61	-2.81	-2.22
MOUNTAINS	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
NONCONT	0.09	0.44	0.52	0.42	0.45	0.33	0.39	0.48
DEMOCRACY	0.09	0.62	0.56	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.72	0.38
ETHFRAC	0.26	0.63	0.41	0.12	0.01	0.21	0.08	0.05
ETHPOL	2.35***	1.96*	2.49**	2.21*	2.64**	2.18**	2.44**	2.59**
RELFAC				-2.81	-1.29	-1.89	-2.37	
RELPOL				1.91	-0.88	-0.31	1.30	
Int_nh			1.28***	-0.02	0.31	0.16	0.25	
MENA	Excluded	2.44**	2.09**	2.22**	0.31	0.74	1.75*	
SAFRICA	Included	1.03	1.03	0.81	0.11	-0.59	0.90	
LAAM	Included	0.49	0.51	0.40	-0.19	-2.45	0.40	
ASIAE	Included	1.00	0.90	1.27	1.18	1.84	1.57*	
Int_nh*RELPOL				2.50***	2.04*	2.11**	1.69	1.04
Int_nh*ETHPOL				-0.37	-0.59	-0.41	-0.82	
RELPOL*MENA					5.55**	5.17*		
RELPOL*SAFRICA					1.84	1.69		
RELPOL*LAAM					1.89	0.78		
RELPOL*ASIAE					0.49	0.54		
ETHPOL*MENA						-0.61		
ETHPOL*SAFRICA						0.98		
ETHPOL*LAAM						3.72		
ETHPOL*ASIAE						-1.22		
Int_nh*RELPOL*MENA							3.53*	5.43***
Int_nh*RELPOL*AFRICA							0.71*	1.04
Int_nh*RELPOL*LAAM							1.00	
Int_nh*RELPOL*ASIAE							-3.08	
Intercept	-6.07**	-8.40**	-9.35**	-8.06**	-8.06*	-7.23*	-8.70**	-6.14**
N	846	859	859	859	859	859	859	859
McFadden's R ²	0.127	0.169	0.203	0.240	0.240	0.245	0.237	0.208
McFadden's Adjusted R ²	0.093	0.133	0.165	0.179	0.179	0.173	0.176	0.175

¹ Column (1) here is column (2) in Table (5) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), who do not have a dummy variable for MENA and include the MENA countries into the reference group.


² Column (2) here is column (2) in Table (5) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), with the addition of MENA dummy to the regression.

Table 5 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) in the Presence of Regional Dummies (1965-2005)

	(1) ¹	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LGDPCC	-0.45*	-0.53*	-0.45	-0.52*	-0.65**	-0.66**	-0.65**	-0.56**
LPOP	0.37**	0.44***	0.44***	0.47***	0.53***	0.51***	0.50***	0.37**
PRIMEXP	0.11	-1.47	-1.74	-1.46	-1.63	-1.64	-1.64	-1.05
MOUNTAINS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.01
NONCONT	0.41	0.87	0.90	0.77	0.77	0.68	0.65	0.74
DEMOCRACY	0.10	0.60	0.60	0.71	0.69	0.68	0.65	0.32
ETHFRAC	0.22	0.38	0.30	-0.04	-0.07	0.01	0.03	0.19
ETHPOL	2.05*	1.78	2.00*	2.36	2.56**	2.69	2.64	2.21**
RELFRAC	-4.73	-3.93	-3.77	-3.85	-2.49	-2.70	-2.77	
RELPOL	3.47	3.09	2.93	2.25	0.37	0.46	0.57	
Int_nh			1.08***	-0.32	-0.07	-0.14	-0.31	
MENA	Excluded	2.49**	2.27**	2.37**	0.98	1.71	1.74	
SAFRICA	Included	0.73	0.83	0.89	0.84	0.60	0.63	
LAAM	Included	0.17	0.20	0.24	-0.06	-1.89	-1.89	
ASIAE	Included	1.27*	1.24	1.54**	1.85	2.46	2.46	
Int_nh* RELPOL				2.95***	2.58**	2.58**	2.74***	1.47***
Int_nh* ETHPOL				-0.76	-0.92	-0.80	-1.00	
RELPOL*MENA					3.91	3.92	3.06	
RELPOL*SAFRICA					0.70	0.80	0.72	
RELPOL*LAAM					1.15	0.44	0.42	
RELPOL*ASIAE					-0.40	-0.16	-0.36	
ETHPOL*MENA						-1.28	-1.21	
ETHPOL*SAFRICA						0.08	0.12	
ETHPOL*LAAM						2.84	2.85	
ETHPOL*ASIAE						-1.32	-1.232	
Int_nh*RELPOL*MENA							2.05**	4.33***
Intercept	-5.81*	-7.61**	-8.39**	-8.12**	-7.98**	-7.46**	-7.42**	-5.35**
N	946	946	946	946	946	946	946	946
McFadden's R ²	0.154	0.198	0.224	0.238	0.250	0.254	0.257	0.210
McFadden's Adjusted R ²	0.120	0.162	0.184	0.195	0.198	0.192	0.193	0.185


¹ Column (1) shows results for the specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (2) of Table 5 in their paper, with the dataset extended to 2005.

Figure 3 Predicted Conflict Incidence




Note: This graph is based on the results for the coefficients in specification (7) of Table (5) and the variables set at their means.

Figure 4 Marginal Effect of Non-neutral and Non-humanitarian Intervention by Region



Note: This graph is based on the results for the coefficients in specification (7) of Table (5) and the variables set at their means.

Figure 5 Differences in the Predictive Margins of Non-neutral and Non-humanitarian Intervention by Region



Note: This graph is based on the results for the coefficients in specification (7) of Table (5) and the variables set at their means.

Figure 4 displays the difference between the marginal effects of external intervention in MENA and non-MENA countries along with their 95% confidence intervals. The predictive difference between the marginal effects of external intervention on the incidence of civil conflict in MENA and non-MENA regions is statistically significant at the 5% level only when RELPOL varies between 0.32 and 0.53 (Figure 5). Since the average level of RELPOL in MENA is 0.47 and falls in this range, we conclude that the marginal effect of external intervention is much stronger in MENA than in other developing regions. In other words, external intervention of non-neutral and non-humanitarian type worsens polarization along religious lines in MENA, a result which suggests that conflict in the region has been associated with a public prize linked to sectarian norms.

C. Robustness checks

The literature makes a distinction between military and non-military foreign interventions (e.g., interventions through diplomacy and trade sanctions), but most studies do not distinguish between different types of external military interventions. This paper focuses on non-neutral and non-humanitarian foreign military interventions (Int_nh), but in this section we turn our attention to another type of foreign military intervention – an intervention that is neutral, i.e. designed not to favor one warring group over another, and that is done for humanitarian reasons. Our hypothesis is that neutral and humanitarian military interventions (NH) are not significantly associated with conflict. We test this hypothesis by including in our model (8) both types of interventions: Int_nh and NH.

Table 6 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-1999)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LGDPCC	-0.272	-0.351	-0.355	-0.296	-0.376	-0.380
LPOP	0.397***	.0418***	0.419***	0.453***	0.477***	0.477***
PRIMEXP	-1.707	-1.423	-1.380	-2.678	-2.476	-2.428
MOUNTAINS	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	0.004	0.003	0.003
NONCONT	0.430	0.355	0.364	0.546	0.372	0.369
DEMOCRACY	0.094	0.159	0.152	0.568	0.687	0.683
ETHFRAC	-0.054	-0.329	-0.345	0.366	0.123	0.125
ETHPOL	2.450**	2.672***	2.909***	2.120**	2.243**	2.378**
RELFAC	-2.095	-1.877	-2.055	-2.821	-2.736	-2.854*
RELPOL	1.851	1.208	1.290	2.410	1.733*	1.797
Int_nh	1.473***	0.349	0.770	1.240***	-0.222	0.011
Int_nh × RELPOL		1.918*	1.943*		2.428**	2.433**
Int_nh × ETHPOL			-0.755			-0.416
NH	1.011**	0.741	1.176	0.944*	0.078	0.389
NH × RELPOL		0.510	0.510		1.404	1.366
NH × ETHPOL			-0.792			-0.519
MENA				2.117**	2.220**	2.200**
ASIA				1.033	1.271	1.260
AFRICA				0.855	0.875	0.854
LAAM				0.348	0.378	0.356
Intercept	-8.030***	-7.497***	-7.618***	-9.758***	-9.246**	-9.275**
N	859	859	859	859	859	859
McFadden's R ²	0.184	0.191	0.192	0.219	0.231	0.231
McFadden's Adjusted R ²	0.148	0.150	0.145	0.172	0.178	0.173

The results presented in Table 6 indicate that the inclusion of neutral and humanitarian external military interventions (NH) preserves our findings of significant and positive association between non-neutral and non-humanitarian interventions and conflict. Only in specifications (1) and (4) in Table 6, NH is positively and significantly associated with the incidence of civil war. However, in all other specifications (columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) of Table 6), which feature the interaction of intervention with the polarization measures, neutral and humanitarian external intervention variable is not significant and neither are its interactions with religious and ethnic polarization. This result implies that only non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention modifies RELPOL and only this type of intervention is associated with conflict regardless of the presence of efforts to intervene in a neutral way for humanitarian purposes. Finally, we also test and confirm the robustness of the results to changes in the conflict intensity and the single-equation logit model specifications (Table 7).

Table 7 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars: Comparing Alternative Definitions of Civil War (1965-2005)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent Variable	PRIO25	PRIO25	PRIO25	PRIO25	PRIO1000	PRIO1000	PRIO1000	PRIO1000
LGPPC	-0.65***	-0.50***	-0.73***	-0.54***	-0.59***	-0.39**	-0.63***	-0.47***
LPOP	0.33**	0.20**	0.35**	0.21**	0.15	0.04	0.17	0.06
PRIMEXP	-0.35	-0.33	0.02	-0.18	-1.23	-1.67*	-0.83	-1.15
MOUNTAINS	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
NONCONT	0.99**	0.75*	0.97**	0.76**	0.93	0.85*	0.88	0.79
DEMOCRACY	0.30	0.24	0.33	0.24	-0.10	-0.03	-0.06	0.02
ETHFRAC	0.23	0.09	0.10	0.04	0.78	0.84	0.38	0.65
ETHPOL	1.83**	1.41**	2.27***	1.82**	2.16*	1.58**	3.34**	2.86**
RELFAC			-0.16	-0.58			1.20	1.03
RELPOL			-0.48	-0.02			-1.06	-1.08
Int_nh	1.14***	1.29***	1.10	1.61*	0.90***	0.69*	1.38	1.72
Dependent variable lag		2.72***		2.71***		3.05***		3.07***
Int_nh* RELPOL			1.70**	1.17			1.93*	1.57
Int_nh* ETHPOL			-1.73	-1.90			-2.93*	-3.64**
Int_nh*	3.05***	1.23	3.29***	1.52*	2.93***	2.48***	2.82***	2.57***
RELPOLxMENA								
Intercept	-3.20	-2.77*	-2.78	-2.57*	-2.36	-2.14	-2.69	-2.48
N	946	863	946	863	946	863	946	863
McFadden's R ²	0.196	0.381	0.204	0.385	0.180	0.379	0.195	0.391
McFadden's Adjusted R ²	0.175	0.357	0.175	0.353	0.146	0.339	0.147	0.337

V. Endogeneity issues

The possible mutual relationship between the dependent variable and two of the explanatory variables raises the issue of endogeneity bias. The real per capita GDP and the external military intervention are two potentially endogenous variables. The risk of conflict is higher in poor countries but civil conflict also affects real per capita incomes due to damage to infrastructure, loss of labor, skills and productivity, causing erosion in per capita incomes over time. Similarly, conflict can lead to external intervention, but it is also possible that external intervention may lead to conflict. The endogeneity bias is likely to be particularly strong in cases of prolonged and high-intensity civil conflicts because even if civil conflict onset preceded intervention, the intervention may create conditions that intensify and prolong the conflict. This section discusses how we deal with this issue and presents some robustness checks.

Aware of the possible endogeneity with respect to per capita income, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) use periods of five years for civil wars and the GDP per capita in the beginning of the period. We adopt their approach of dealing with this source of endogeneity bias.³⁵ In this section, we develop a strategy for addressing the endogeneity with respect to external military intervention of the non-neutral and non-humanitarian type.

We estimate a version of equation (8) in which we include not only the intervention, Int_nh , but also its interaction with religious polarization, $RELPOL$:

³⁵ Another way to deal with the endogeneity is by adding the lagged value of the dependent variable to the set of the right-hand side variables. Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) added the lagged incidence of war to the list of explanatory variables to lessen the effect of endogeneity. The use of the lagged dependent variable can be effective, however, only in the absence of serial correlations in the errors of the estimated equation.

$$P(PRIOCW_{it} = 1) = \Phi(X_{1it-1}, X_{2it-1}, Int_nh_{is}, Int_nh_{is} \times RELPOL). \quad (8.1)$$

First, we test for endogeneity of the intervention variable and its interaction with RELPOL separately in the cases of MENA and non-MENA countries. As the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test statistic shows, we cannot reject the exogeneity null of these two variables in the case of non-MENA countries even at the 10% significance level. However, we reject the null in the case of MENA countries at the 1% significance level. Therefore, we use a linear probability model (LPM) to estimate equation (8.1),³⁶ while in the case of MENA we employ a two-stage linear probability model (TSLPM). The choice of TSLPM rather than a two-stage logit model is based on the conclusion of Angrist and Kruger (2001) that a linear regression in the first stage generates consistent second-stage estimates in case of an endogenous dummy variable. Moreover, using nonlinear models such as probit or logit to generate fitted values in the first stage for use in the second-stage does not generate consistent estimates unless the nonlinear model happens to be exactly right.

In the first stage, we estimate simultaneously the system of equations (9.1) and (9.2):

$$P(Int_nh_{it} = 1) = F_1(X_{1it}, X_{2it}, X_{3it}, X_{3it} \times RELPOL) \quad (9.1)$$

$$Int_nh_{it} \times RELPOL = F_2(X_{1it}, X_{2it}, X_{3it}, X_{3it} \times RELPOL) . \quad (9.2)$$

This system represents a reduced-form specification for the intervention and interaction variables and includes a vector of instruments, X_{3it} . We consider as potential instruments for intervention the number of bordering countries to country i (BORD) and the total length of the border of country i in kilometers (TOTBORD). This choice of variables is motivated by Gleditsch (2007) who finds

³⁶ We obtain similar results with the logit.

that transnational linkages and attributes of neighboring countries can exert a substantial impact on the risk of conflict. He argues that a country is at a substantially higher risk of civil conflict if it has many transborder groups on its territory or if it is located next to a country in conflict or an authoritarian country. During the period of estimation most MENA countries were authoritarian or fragile and many of them hosted transborder groups, including some located in conflict countries, so the likelihood of non-neutral and non-humanitarian external intervention in a specific country is expected to be linked with the number of bordering countries or alternatively with the length of its border. The F test for excluded instruments confirms the strength of both instruments (BORD and TOTBORD). Since intervention interacts with religious polarization in equation (8.1), we also include as an instrument in equations (9.1) and (9.2) the interaction of the instrument with RELPOL. In the case of MENA, the use of BORD as an instrument interacted with RELPOL results in a predicted value of $Int_nh \times RELPOL$ whose coefficient is significant only at the 6% significance level. Therefore, we use the alternative instrument, TOTBORD, along with its interaction with RELPOL, which leads to a significant coefficient on the predicted value of $Int_nh \times RELPOL$ at the 1% significance level. The Stock-Wright test for the joint significance of all excluded instruments confirms that we can reject the null that the coefficients on all our instruments are zeros. In addition, the Hansen J test of over-identification confirms the null of absence of correlation between TOTBORD and its interaction with RELPOL and the errors in the incidence-of-civil-conflict equation (8.1). These results convey a good evidence of the strength and suitability of our instruments. In the second stage, we estimate the incidence-of-civil-conflict equation (8.1), using the estimates of intervention and its interaction with RELPOL from the first stage. In the 2nd stage the dependent variable is high-intensity conflict (PRIO1000) because of our hypothesis that intervention leads to this type of conflict. Our estimates are efficient for homoscedasticity and robust to heteroscedasticity.

Table 8 displays the LPM estimation results for the non-MENA panel in column 2 and the TSLPM estimation results for the MENA countries in columns 3-5.³⁷ The coefficient of Int_nh in column (2) is negative and significant, while the coefficient of the interaction term Int_nh x RELPOL is positive and highly significant. However, the total effect of Int_nh on conflict is insignificantly different from zero.³⁸ ETHPOL is highly significant and positive, and the effects of other traditional variables are in line with those obtained in Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012).

The results from the first-stage estimation for the MENA panel suggest that the interaction of TOTBORD with RELPOL is a significant determinant of external intervention. This result is in line with the notion that the longer the border of a country in the Middle East the higher the probability of having a transborder ethnic or sectarian group and therefore the higher the probability of external interventions enabled by the presence of a cross-border group. The effect of primary exports on intervention is highly significant and positive in the first-stage estimation, suggesting that in this oil-rich region, external interventions are also driven by a private prize linked to oil resources. The effect of MOUNTAINS is significant and negative as expected because the presence of mountains makes it harder to intervene with boots on the ground. In the second-stage conflict-incidence equation, ETHPOL is an insignificant factor in explaining civil conflict in MENA. The coefficient of the interaction term between predicted intervention and RELPOL is highly significant and positive, which confirms that intervention exacerbates religious polarization and leads to high intensity conflict. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that non-neutral and non-humanitarian intervention is a determinant of civil conflict in MENA. Moreover, it appears that the effects of some of the other exogenous variables (e.g., PRIMEXP and LGDPC) on the

³⁷ We apply the STATA option of variance clustering at the country level.

³⁸ The total effect is that of the external intervention and its interaction with RELPOL and is measured at means of the variables.

incidence of civil conflicts are indirect, occurring either through the intervention variable or its interaction with RELPOL. These results suggest that unlike in non-MENA, where conflicts are mostly about a public prize linked to ethnic polarization, in MENA they are mostly about a public prize linked to sectarian polarization.

Table 8. Two-Stages Linear Probability Model Panel 1965-2005

Dep. Variable	LPM		TSLPM	
	Non-MENA Panel		MENA Panel	
	Eq. (8.1) (2)	1st stage Eq. (9.1) (3)	1st stage Eq. (9.2) (4)	2nd stage Eq. (8.1) (5)
	PRIO1000	Int_nh	Int_nh x RELPOL	PRIO1000
LGDP	-0.054***	-0.26	-0.03	0.029
LPOP	0.023***	-0.09	-0.08**	-0.012
PRIMEXP	0.048	1.18***	0.05	-0.21
DEMOCRACY	0.016	0.09	-0.11	-0.27**
MOUNTAINS	0.001	0.01	0.002***	0.005**
NONCONT	0.084**			
ETHPOL	0.182***	-0.18	0.08	-0.031
RELPOL	-0.055	-2.82	-1.69	-0.064
TOTBORD		-0.000	-0.000	
TOTBORD*RELPOL		0.0003**	0.0003***	
LAAM	0.022			
SAFRICA	0.020			
ASIAE	-0.017			
LGDPxRELPOL		0.18	-0.03	
PRIMEXPxRELPOL		-1.34*	0.30	
DEMOCRACYxRELPOL		0.51	0.59*	
MOUNTAINS*RELPOL		-0.04***	-0.03***	
LPOPxRELPOL		0.11	0.12	
Int_nh	-0.141**			-0.125
Int_nh*RELPOL	0.424***			1.044***
Constant	0.008	1.94	1.40***	0.010
N	824	122	122	122
Centered R ²				0.181
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity χ^2 test	0.597	4.505***		
F test of excluded instruments		11.03***(15% bias)	23.76***(5% bias)	
Stock-Wright test for the joint significance of all excluded instruments				33.48***
Hansen J test				5.361

Notes: ***(15% bias) and ***(5% bias) indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instrument at the 1% significance level, using Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, allowing respectively for 15% and 5% bias of maximal TSLP relative to the LPM estimator.

VI. Conclusions

This paper develops the theory behind the link between polarization, foreign military intervention, and civil conflict. Specifically, in a behavioral model of civil conflict external military interventions alter the resources available to warring groups and their probability of winning. In this case, equilibrium level of conflict depends on the distributional measures, modified by the effect of external intervention. It can be shown that in relatively populous countries, the equilibrium level of conflict depends on the level of polarization modified by the intervention, in the case of conflict over a public prize linked to horizontal divisions, and on the level of fractionalization, in the case of conflict over a private prize.

We test the model empirically and find that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil conflict and that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with conflict in the presence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military interventions. Such external interventions exacerbate religious polarization leading to high-intensity conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region, but not in the rest of the world. The results are robust to allowing for different definitions of conflict, model specifications, and data time span and to controlling for neutral and humanitarian external interventions, which are not significantly associated with conflict.

It appears that the weak explanatory power of religious polarization on the incidence of civil war found in earlier studies is due to the fact that these studies do not consider the regional heterogeneity and the moderating effect of external military intervention on polarization. These results have important policy implications. They identify non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention as a possible channel for increased risk of high-intensity civil conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, they suggest that unlike in the rest of the world

where civil conflicts are mostly about a public prize linked to ethnic divisions, in MENA they are mostly about a sectarian-related public prize. Future work should explore the specific mechanisms through which external military interventions of the non-neutral and non-humanitarian type affect polarization, the formation of horizontal groups contending a prize, and the measurement of overlapping polarization along multiple lines of division. The reliance on the IMI dataset restricted the focus of the analysis to non-humanitarian and non-neutral external military interventions that involve the deployment of troops. Future work should look at other types of non-humanitarian and non-neutral types of interventions, including the transfer of funds and other types of support to rebel groups or to governments involved in disputes with rebels.

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Appendix

Definitions of variables and data sources

PRIO25: “Armed conflict” from PRIO: a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility. We consider only types 3 and 4 from the database; these refer to internal armed conflict. If a country has experienced a PRIO25 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1.

PRIOCW: “Intermediate armed conflict” from PRIO: includes all PRIO25 conflicts that result in a minimum of 1,000 deaths over the course of the conflict. We consider only types 3 and 4 (internal armed conflict). If a country has experienced a PRIO25 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1.

PRIO1000: “War” from PRIO: same definition as PRIO25 with a threshold of battle related deaths of at least 1,000 per year and per incompatibility. We consider only types 3 and 4 (internal armed conflict). If a country has experienced a PRIO1000 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1.

F: Fractionalization, defined as $F = \sum_{i=1}^m n_i(1 - n_i)$, where n_i is the population share of group i and

m is the number of groups. Data on group shares has been obtained from Fearon (2003b) and the Ethnologue project (<http://www.ethnologue.com>).

DEMOC: Institutionalized democracy. Data source is Polity IV (2011). Democracy ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). As in MRQ, DEMOC takes a value equal to 1 if the score is higher than or equal to 4 and 0 otherwise.

ETHFRAC: Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization calculated using the data of the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE).

ETHPOL: Index of ethnolinguistic polarization calculated using the data of the WCE.

LGDPCC: Log of real GDP per capita corresponding to the first year of each five-year period. See Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for data sources. In our update of the two data sets we used the same sources. In the case of Lebanon, GDP per capita data in PPP prices after 1993.

LPOP: Log of population (in millions) in the first year of each five-year period. See Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for data sources. In our update of the two data sets we used the same sources. In the case of Lebanon, population data for the whole period of investigation come from WDI.

MOUNTAINS: Percent mountainous terrain. The data source is Fearon and Laitin (2003b), who use the coding of geographer A. J. Gerard N. Population, in millions. Source: Maddison (2011).

NONCONT: Noncontiguous states, referring to countries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated from the land area containing the capital city either by land or by 100 kilometers of water. Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003b).

PRIMEXP: Proportion of primary commodity exports of GDP. Primary commodity exports. Source: Collier and Hoeffler (2001).

RELFRAF: Index of religious fractionalization. Source: L'Etat des religions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook.

RELPOL: Index of religious polarization. Source: L'Etat des religions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook.

MENA= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a MENA country and 0 otherwise.

SAFRICA= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a Sub-Saharan country and 0 otherwise.

ASIAE= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is an East Asian country and 0 otherwise.

LAAM= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a Latin American country and 0 otherwise.

Reference group = European and other developed countries.

$X*Y$ = is the interaction of variables X and Y.

Int_nh: A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there has been at least one intervention that was not neutral and not humanitarian in nature in the target country during the four years preceding the current year.

NH: A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there has been at least one neutral and humanitarian intervention in the target country during the four years preceding the current year.

Appendix Table 1: Non-neutral, non-humanitarian external military interventions, 1945-2005				
Intervener	Target	Start Year	End Year	Description and sources
PAKISTAN	AFGHANISTAN	1949	1949	Tribal Disp.--Disp. 82/NYT
PAKISTAN	AFGHANISTAN	1989	1996	Pakistan military supports Mujahadeen rebels (RIA, Reuters, UPI)
RUSIA	AFGHANISTAN	1991	1995	Russia attacks rebel bases in Afghanistan (Bercovitch, AP, AFP, UPI)
USA	AFGHANISTAN	1998	1998	US uses cruise missiles to attack suspected terrorist facilities (Xinh, IP, DP)
PAKISTAN	AFGHANISTAN	1998	1998	Pakistani air raids intended to aid Taliban government in Afghanistan (TASS)
MOROCCO	ALGERIA	1963	1964	Border-NYT/Kees/Hasna/Butterw
MOROCCO	ALGERIA	1984	1984	Border Incurs--NYT
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	ANGOLA	1975	1976	Ang-Kapln/KInghof/LeoG/ACR/NYT
SOUTH AFRICA	ANGOLA	1976	1979	Anti-SWAPO/Pro-UNITA-LT/NYT
SOUTH AFRICA	ANGOLA	1980	1988	Anti-SWAPO-LTimes/NYT/ARB
SOUTH AFRICA	ANGOLA	1989	1989	S. Africa aids Unita opposition in Angola (GM, Xinh)
NSAs	ANGOLA	1995	1997	UN (UNAVEM III) in Angola to restore peace and reconciliation (UN website)
NSAs	ANGOLA	1997	1999	UN (MONUA) in Angola took over for UNAVEM III mission to restore peace and reconciliation
SOUTH AFRICA	ANGOLA	2000	2002	Namibia pursues rebels into Angola (FT)
QATAR	BAHRAIN	1986	1986	Disputed Islands-Disp87/NYT
CUBA	BAHAMAS	1980	1980	Bahama Fish Zone--NYT/Jessup
USA	BAHAMAS	1980	1980	Bahama Fish Zone--NYT/Jessup
INDIA	BANGLADESH	1991	1991	Indian border guards exchange fire with BDR (Reuters,Xinh)
MYANMAR	BANGLADESH	1991	1991	Myanmar (Burmese guards) attack Bangladeshi camp (Reuter,CT)
MYANMAR	BANGLADESH	1994	1994	Burmese troops lay landmines inside Bangladesh territory (Reuters)
MYANMAR	BANGLADESH	2001	2001	Myanmar exchanges gunfire with Bangladeshi troops (Worldsource)
ZIMBABWE	BOTSWANA	1975	1980	Disrupt Opponents--ARB/NYT
ZIMBABWE	BOTSWANA	1983	1983	Hot Pursuit Rebels-ARB
FRANCE	CAMERON	1960	1960	Anti-Rebel--NYT/LeVine
NIGERIA	CAMERON	1993	2006	Nigeria occupies part of Cameroon in territorial dispute (AFP, African Security Review)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	CAMERON	2001	2001	Central African Republic dismantles border customs post and occupies a small area of Cameroon (FT)
FRANCE	COTE D'IVOIRE	1966	1966	Anti-Guin/Ghan-ARB/AR
ANGOLA	COTE D'IVOIRE	2002		Angolan troops support Ivory Coast government by protecting airport and the President (AFP)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1979	1979	Student Rebel.--ACR
RNSAs	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	2001	2002	COMESSA peacekeeping mission following aborted coup in Central African Republic (BBC, AP, AFP)
CHAD	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	2002	2002	Chadian troops cross into Central African Republic and attack troops and destroy radio station (All Africa, AFP)
RNSAs	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	2002		CEMAC sends peacekeeping force to Central African Republic (AllAfrica, AFP, FT)
FRANCE	CHAD	1960	1965	Admin. North--Pittman
FRANCE	CHAD	1977	1977	Transport Chad Troops-NYT
LIBYA	CHAD	1979	1981	Invasion-Pittman/USDS-GIST
NIGERIA	CHAD	1983	1983	Island Clash-ARB/Disputes 87
USA	CHAD	1983	1983	Trans. Zairians--ARB

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	CHAD	1983	1984	Support Habre--ARB
FRANCE	CHAD	1983	1984	Support Habre--ARB
LIBYA	CHAD	1983	1987	Support Goukhouni--ARB
FRANCE	CHAD	1986	1987	Oppose Libyans--ARB/NYT
FRANCE	CHAD	1990	1990	France sends limited reinforcement to Chad to aid in repelling Libyan invasion (Reuter, UPI, WT, Xinh, LM)
FRANCE	CHAD	1991	1992	French intervenes in Chad to protect French nationals (WP, FT, CSM, LM)
SUDAN	CHAD	2004	2004	Sudanese conflict leads to bombing into Chad (DP, AFP)
ARGENTINA	CHILI	1958	1958	Beagle Ch.--NYT
ARGENTINA	CHILI	1982	1982	Beagle Ch.--Disputes 82
FRANCE	CHINA	1946	1946	Take Admin.--Viet Backgrnd
FRANCE	CHINA	1950	1950	Korean War--NYT
TAIWAN	CHINA	1950	1950	Tai. Str. Bomb Cities-Keesings
PORTUGAL	CHINA	1952	1952	Border Clash--NYT
TAIWAN	CHINA	1954	1955	Taiwan Str.-Disp82/Stolper
TAIWAN	CHINA	1958	1979	Taiwan Str. Counter-Shell/NYT
INDIA	CHINA	1962	1962	Forward Ind. Posts-Maxwell
INDIA	CHINA	1965	1969	Disp. Territory--NYT/Keesings
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	CHINA	1974	1974	Paracels-Wash Post/Disp82
VIETNAM	CHINA	1981	1981	Border Clash--WSJ/NYT
VIETNAM	CHINA	1984	1985	Border Clash--NYT
VIETNAM	CHINA	1987	1987	Border Clashes--Disputes 87
FRANCE	COMOROS	1989	1989	France sends troops and naval vessels to take control of Comoros security (FT, WP, NYT, LM)
FRANCE	COMOROS	1995	1995	France intervenes to reverse coup in Comoros (DP, AP, LM)
NICARAGUA	COSTA RICA	1948	1948	C.R. Civ. War--FoF/NYT
NICARAGUA	COSTA RICA	1978	1979	Sandan. Revol-- Newsw/LTimes
NICARAGUA	COSTA RICA	1983	1985	Contra War-NYT/Jessup/FoF/Kees
PORTUGAL	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1964	1964	Anti-Ang.Rebel-ARB
UGANDA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1965	1965	Anti-Tshombe Reb-AR/NYT/FoF
ETHIOPIA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1967	1967	Assist Anti-rebel-ARB/AR
CUBA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1976	1976	Bomb Town--ARB
EGYPT	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1977	1977	Shaba I--NYT/ACR/Keesings
FRANCE	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1977	1977	Shaba I-ARB/NYT/Keesings
MOROCCO	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1977	1977	Shaba I--NYT/ARB
SENEGAL	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1977	1977	Shaba I--Nsweek

UGANDA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1977	1977	Shaba I--ARB/LTimes
RWANDA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1996	1998	Rwandan troops enter Zaire after cross border firing to assist Tutsi rebels (AFP, Reuters, LAT)
UGANDA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1996	1998	Uganda troops cross into Zaire to attack rebel bases (Herald, Reuters)
BURUNDI	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1996		Zaire accuses Burundi, whose troops are aiding Tutsi rebels (NYT)
ANGOLA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1997	2002	Angola intervenes in Congo in support of rebel leader Laurent Kabila (AP)
RWANDA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1998	2002	Rwanda sends troops to support DRC government opposition groups (AP, Xinh)
UGANDA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1998	2003	Uganda sends troops to DRC to support groups opposed to Kabila (AP, Xinh, DP)
CHAD	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1998	1999	Chad intervenes in DRC in support of Kabila (DP, AP)
SUDAN	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1998	1999	Sudan sends troops to DRC in support of Kabila (AP, AFP)
RNSAs	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	1998	2002	SADC (Namibia,Zimbabwe,Angola) aid Kabila in Congo against rebels (AFP, Xinh)
RWANDA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	2004	2004	Rwanda pursues rebels in DRC (Econ., FT, Xinh)
RWANDA	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	2004		Rwanda pursues rebels in DRC (Econ., FT, Xinh)
PERU	ECUADOR	1951	1951	Old Border Dispute-NYT/FoF
PERU	ECUADOR	1984	1984	Border Dispute--NYT
PERU	ECUADOR	1995	1995	Peru carries out air raids against Ecuador in border conflict (IPS, DP, AFP)
ISRAEL	EGYPT	1950	1950	Gaza Raids--Khouri/NYT
ISRAEL	EGYPT	1954	1956	Gaza/Raids-Khri/NYT/FoF/Jssp
FRANCE	EGYPT	1956	1956	Suez-Khouri/FoF/Ks/Flick-Pwll
UKG	EGYPT	1956	1956	Suez-Khr/FoF/Ks/F-P/Lld/Dpy
ISRAEL	EGYPT	1956	1957	Suez-Khouri/FoF/Kees/Dupuy
ISRAEL	EGYPT	1958	1958	Huleh--NYT/LTimes/Fof
IRAQ	EGYPT	1959	1959	Mosul Rebel-FoF/LT/NYT/Butterw
ISRAEL	EGYPT	1960	1960	Syr DMZ-NYT/vHrn/Khri-MEJ/FoF
ISRAEL	EGYPT	1967	1967	Six Day War-Khouri/Moore/Kees.
RUSSIA	EGYPT	1967	1967	Deterrence--Khouri/Kaplan
ALGERIA	EGYPT	1967	1967	Pre-War/Israel--Jessup
SUDAN	EGYPT	1967	1972	Post67-Jessup/NYT/OBI/Ks/FoF
ISRAEL	EGYPT	1969	1970	War Attrition--Khouri/Jessup
ALGERIA	EGYPT	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
IRAQ	EGYPT	1973	1973	1973 War--Aker
KUWAIT	EGYPT	1973	1973	1973 War--Aker

LIBYA	EGYPT	1973	1973	1973 War--Aker
MOROCCO	EGYPT	1973	1973	1973 War--Aker/Whetten
NORTH KOREA	EGYPT	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
SUDAN	EGYPT	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
TUNISIA	EGYPT	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
ISRAEL	EGYPT	1973	1974	1973 War--Whetten/Jessup
LIBYA	EGYPT	1977	1977	Lib-Egy Raids--NYT
SOMALIA	ETHIOPIA	1964	1964	Som Irredentism-NYT/Keesings
YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	ETHIOPIA	1977	1978	Somal War/Drivers-Kapln-Legum
SOMALIA	ETHIOPIA	1977	1978	Invade Ogaden-Jessup/NYT/ACR
ERITREA	ETHIOPIA	1998	2001	Eritrean planes bomb Ethiopia and cross into Ethiopian territory (CH, AP, KNS)
SENEGAL	GAMBIA	1971	1971	Retal./Smuggling--ARB
SENEGAL	GAMBIA	1980	1980	Anti-Libyan--ACR/NYT
SENEGAL	GAMBIA	1981	1988	Restore Gov/Confed-NYT/ACR/ARB
RUSSIA	GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	1953	1953	E. Ger. Riots--NYT/Butterworth
RUSSIA	GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	1961	1961	Berlin--Kaplan
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	GERMANY	1985	1985	Warn plane--NYT/Facts on File
SENEGAL	GUINEANEA-BISSAU	1990	1990	Senegal engages in border clash with Guinea-Bissau over disputed territory (BBC, Xinh, LM)
GUINEA	GUINEANEA-BISSAU	1998	1999	Guinea aids the government of Guinea-Bissau to contain a military rebellion (AP, AFP)
SENEGAL	GUINEANEA-BISSAU	1998	1999	Senegal aids Guinea-Bissau's government to help contain a military rebellion (AP, AFP)
YUGOSLAVIA	GREECE	1948	1948	Balkans--Facts on File/NYT
BULGARIA	GREECE	1952	1952	Bul-Gr Is.-NYT/Keesings
TURKEY	GREECE	2002	2002	Turkish jets cross into Greek airspace (AP)
USA	GUATIMALA	1987	1987	Insurgency--NYT/FoF
BELIZE	GUATIMALA	1995	1995	Belize border guards attack Guatemala village (DP, UPI, AFP)
BELIZE	GUATIMALA	2001	2001	Belize troops enter Guatemala in territorial dispute (FT, AP)
BELIZE	GUATIMALA	2002	2002	Belize soldiers cross border and arrest Guatemalans (AP)
PORTUGAL	GUINEA	1970	1970	Guin-B.-NYT/ACR/LTms/AR
VENEZUELA	GUYANA	1970	1970	Border Disp-Disp82/FoF/NYT
SURINAME	GUYANA	2000	2000	Suriname gunboats and aircraft move into Guyana in a territorial dispute over oil rights (AP)
CUBA	HAITI	1959	1959	Raiding Party--FoF/NYT
USA	HAITI	2004	2004	US aids in restoring order in Haiti (AP, AFP)
CANADA	HAITI	2004	2004	Canada aids in restoring order to Haiti (AP, Barrier)
CHILI	HAITI	2004	2004	Chili aids in restoring order to Haiti (AFP, Xinh, AP)
FRANCE	HAITI	2004	2004	France aids in restoring order in Haiti (AFP, UPI)
NICARAGUA	HONDURAS	1957	1957	Border Dispute--NYT
EL SALVADOR	HONDURAS	1976	1976	Border Flareup--Disp.82
NICARAGUA	HONDURAS	1980	1981	Contra War--Keesings
EL SALVADOR	HONDURAS	1981	1982	Insurgency--Disp82/NYT
NICARAGUA	HONDURAS	1984	1985	Contra War--NYT
NICARAGUA	HONDURAS	1986	1988	Contra War--NYT
USA	HONDURAS	1986	1988	Contra War--NYT

USA	HONDURAS	1988	1988	Contra War--NYT
EL SALVADOR	HONDURAS	1989	1989	El Salvador air attack against Honduran rebels (UPI, IPS, Xinh)
NICARAGUA	HONDURAS	1991	1991	Nicaraguan forces exchange fire with Honduran troops (UPI)
NICARAGUA	HONDURAS	2000	2000	Nicaraguan patrol boat fires on Honduran naval vessel in disputed waters (AFP, Xinh)
RUSSIA	HUNGARY	1956	1958	Hung.Rev.--Donelan/Grieve
UKG	ICELAND	1958	1959	Iceland Fishing--FoF
CHINA	INDIA	1962	1962	Ch-In Border-NYT/Dsp82/Mxwl/Ks
PAKISTAN	INDIA	1965	1965	Rann of K.--NYT/MEPD/FoF/Kees
CHINA	INDIA	1965	1969	Disp. Territory--NYT/Keesings
PAKISTAN	INDIA	1965	1966	Kashmir-Dsp82/MEPD/Ks/EncyWar
PAKISTAN	INDIA	1971	1971	Chase rebels--NYT
PAKISTAN	INDIA	1971	1972	Bangla D.-Jackson/Butter./MEPD
CHINA	INDIA	1975	1975	Border Clash--NYT
CHINA	INDIA	1979	1979	Border Dispute--Keesings/NYT
CHINA	INDIA	1981	1985	Island Dispute--Disputes82
PAKISTAN	INDIA	1990	1990	Pakistan exchanges cross-border firing with India in Kashmir region (FT, Indep, GM)
BANGLADESH	INDIA	1991	1991	Bangladeshi Rifles (BDR) crosses border to return fire on Indian border guards (Reuters, Xinh)
PAKISTAN	INDIA	1991	1991	Pakistani troops enter Indian zone of Kashmir (UPI, AFP)
PAKISTAN	INDIA	1999	1999	Pakistani soldiers infiltrate Indian controlled area of Kashmir region, known as the Kargil War (DP, Global Sec.)
BANGLADESH	INDIA	2001	2001	Bangladeshi soldiers occupy homes in India (AP, Xinh, AFP)
RUSIA	IRAN	1946	1946	Azerbaijan-Butterw/Heravi/Kapl
IRAQ	IRAN	1966	1966	Kurdish War--NYT/FoF
IRAQ	IRAN	1972	1974	Shatt-NYT/Abdulghani/Keesings
IRAQ	IRAN	1979	1979	Kurdish War--NYT/Keesings
IRAQ	IRAN	1980	1988	GulfWar-D82/87/Faf/GIST/S-K/Gs
UKG	IRAQ	1946	1947	Iran Strike-NYT/Btrw/Ks/Fof
SYRIA	IRAQ	1963	1963	Kurdish War-O'Ballance/NYT
ISRAEL	IRAQ	1967	1967	Six Day War-Khoury/Moore/Kees.
IRAN	IRAQ	1969	1969	River Shipping-Jessp/FoF
IRAN	IRAQ	1972	1974	Shatt/Kurd-NYT/Abdlgni/MEPD/Ks
RUSIA	IRAQ	1973	1975	Kurdish War--Kaplan
IRAN	IRAQ	1980	1982	Shell and Retal.--NYT/Jessup
ISRAEL	IRAQ	1981	1981	Destroy Reactor--Faf/NYT/Perl
IRAN	IRAQ	1982	1988	Gulf-Disp82/87/Faf/Jesp/GIST
TURKEY	IRAQ	1983	1987	Kurd Rebel-NYT/Faf/FoF/WashP
FRANCE	IRAQ	1991	1991	France moves troops into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Desert Sheild Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle, LM)
UKG	IRAQ	1991	1991	Britain moves into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (Des. Shield Factbook, USA, Gulf War Chronicle)
USA	IRAQ	1991	1991	US moves troops into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
IRAN	IRAQ	1993	1993	Iranian forces attack Kurdish rebel bases in Iraq (AFP, Xinh)
IRAN	IRAQ	1994	1994	Iran attacks rebel bases in Northern Iraq (AFP)
USA	IRAQ	2003		US topples Iraqi government (DP, AFX, CNN)
SYRIA	ISRAEL	1951	1951	Huleh Drainage--NYT
SYRIA	ISRAEL	1954	1955	Gal. Attacks-Khoury/NYT/FoF
SYRIA	ISRAEL	1957	1958	Huleh Drainage--NYT/LTimes
EGYPT	ISRAEL	1958	1958	Huleh--NYT/LTimes/FoF

EGYPT	ISRAEL	1960	1960	Syr DMZ-NYT/vHrn/Khri-MEJ/FoF
SYRIA	ISRAEL	1962	1962	Shelling--Khour/NTY
SYRIA	ISRAEL	1964	1967	Water/Fatah/Galilee-Khour/NTY
EGYPT	ISRAEL	1967	1967	Subs Shell Coast--Jessup
IRAQ	ISRAEL	1967	1967	Six Day War--Safran
IRAQ	ISRAEL	1968	1968	W.Bank Shell--Keesings
JORDAN	ISRAEL	1968	1968	W.Bank Shell--Keesings
EGYPT	ISRAEL	1969	1970	War of Attrition--Khour
EGYPT	ISRAEL	1969	1969	Syr. Border/DMZ--NYT
SYRIA	ISRAEL	1970	1970	Golan Clashes--Jessup/FoF
EGYPT	ISRAEL	1973	1974	1973War-Monroe-Hockley/Whetten
SYRIA	ISRAEL	1973	1974	1973War-Butterw/Whet/Jessup
IRAQ	ISRAEL	1991	1991	Iraqi Scud attack against Israel (WP,PAL)
LIBYA	ITALY	1986	1986	Attack US Base--FAf/NTY
ISRAEL	JORDAN	1948	1949	Pales. War--NYT/Jessup
UKG	JORDAN	1948	1957	Pal.War-Khour/Keesngs/NTY/FoF
ISRAEL	JORDAN	1950	1988	Occup. Territ.--NYT/FoF/Khour
ISRAEL	JORDAN	1951	1951	Border Clashes-FoF/LTimes
ISRAEL	JORDAN	1953	1954	Retal Raids-Khour/Jessup/NTY
ISRAEL	JORDAN	1956	1956	Fedayeen Retal.-Khour/Jessup
SYRIA	JORDAN	1956	1957	Suez Wartime--NYT
SYRIA	JORDAN	1957	1957	Nasserism--NYT
UKG	JORDAN	1957	1957	Nasserism--Jessup
IRAQ	JORDAN	1957	1958	Nasserism/Leb.-NYT/Butterw
SAUDI ARABIA	JORDAN	1957		Nasserism--NYT
USA	JORDAN	1958	1958	Air Cover UK--Butterw
UKG	JORDAN	1958	1958	Iraqi Rev.--Butterw
ISRAEL	JORDAN	1965	1966	Retal. Fatah--Khour
ISRAEL	JORDAN	1967	1968	Six Day War-Khour/Jessup
IRAQ	JORDAN	1967	1970	Pre-War/Israel--Jessup/NTY
SAUDI ARABIA	JORDAN	1967		1967 War Deter-Keesings
ISRAEL	JORDAN	1968	1970	Raids/Shell-NYT/Jessup/Kees
USA	JAPAN	1953	1953	Attack USSR planes--NYT/Kees.
UGANDA	KENYA	1976	1976	Cattle Raid--ARB/NTY
UKG	KENYA	1982		Anti-Poaching--NYT
UGANDA	KENYA	1987	1988	Border Cross-NYT/LTms/FAf/ARB
UGANDA	KENYA	1989	1989	Ugandan air attack on Kenyan Village (AP, Bercovitch)
SAUDI ARABIA	KUWAIT	1961	1961	Iraqi Threat--Butterw/Zacher
UKG	KUWAIT	1961	1961	Anti-Iraq-Jessup/Butterw/NTY
SAUDI ARABIA	KUWAIT	1973		Deter Iraq-Butterworth/Jessup
IRAQ	KUWAIT	1975	1977	Border Disp.--Butterw/NTY
IRAN	KUWAIT	1980	1988	Gulf War-WSJ/CQ
IRAQ	KUWAIT	1990	1990	Iraq invades Kuwait and establishes a provisional government (AP,UP, BBC)
BAHRAIN	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Bahrain troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
BANGLADESH	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Bangladesh troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Czechoslovakia troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
EGYPT	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Egyptian troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)

FRANCE	KUWAIT	1990	1991	France troops, air, navy part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook, LM)
HONDURAS	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Honduras troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
MOROCCO	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Morocco troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
NIGER	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Niger provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
OMAN	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Oman provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
PAKISTAN	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Pakistan provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
QATAR	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Qatar provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
ROMANIA	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Romania provides medical team and NBC experts as part of the Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
SAUDI ARABIA	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Saudi Arabia aids in Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
SENEGAL	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Senegal provides troops for Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
SYRIA	KUWAIT	1990	1991	Syrian troops in Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
UAE	KUWAIT	1990	1991	UAE troops in Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
UKG	KUWAIT	1990	1991	UK troops, air, naval support for Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle)
USA	KUWAIT	1990	1991	US restores Kuwaiti government in Desert Storm (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle)
AFGHANISTAN	KUWAIT	1991	1991	Afghanistan troops aid Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
NETHERLANDS	KUWAIT	1991	1991	Netherlands provides air defense batteries as part of coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
SIERRA LEONE	KUWAIT	1991	1991	Sierra Leone provides medical team and troops for coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
FRANCE	KUWAIT	1994	1994	French send frigate to aid force in defending Kuwait (UPI)
BAHRAIN	KUWAIT	1994	1994	Bahrain sends naval and air force to defend Kuwait (UPI, Xinh)
OMAN	KUWAIT	1994	1994	Oman sends naval forces to defend Kuwait (UPI, Xinh)
UKG	KUWAIT	1994	1994	UK bolster US forces opposing Iraq border buildup (Reuters, APF)
USA	KUWAIT	1994	1994	US build up in Kuwait to respond to Iraqi border build-up (UPI, AP)
UAE	KUWAIT	1994	1994	UAE sends troops and 6 mirages to defend Kuwait (UPI, AFP)
USA	KUWAIT	1996	1996	US buildup of troops in Kuwait after Iraq's provocation (SDUT, Reuters)
SYRIA	LEBANON	1963	1963	Border Clashes--NYT/FoF
ISRAEL	LEBANON	1965	1965	Fatah--Khouri/NYT

ISRAEL	LEBANON	1969	1973	Retal. Raids--NYT/Jessup
SYRIA	LEBANON	1973	1973	Isr-Syr Dogfight in L.-NYT
ISRAEL	LEBANON	1974	1982	PLO-Jsp/FAf/MPD/Pgny/Ks/FoF
SYRIA	LEBANON	1976	1988	Leb Civ War-Jessup/NYT/Pogany
ISRAEL	LEBANON	1982	1985	Leb Civ War-NYT/FAf/MEPD/FoF
ISRAEL	LEBANON	1982	1988	Southern Zone--NYT
SYRIA	LEBANON	1976	1988	Leb Civ War-Jessup/NYT/Pogany
FRANCE, ITALY, UK, USA	LEBANON	1982	1984	Leb. Civil War--Jessup/FAf
SOUTH AFRICA	LESOTHO	1982	1982	ANC--ARB/SLPD
RNSAs	LESOTHO	1998	1999	SADC peacekeepers in Lesotho (AFP, DP, BBC)
FRANCE	LIBYA	1957	1957	Alg. Rebels--NYT
UKG	LIBYA	1958	1958	Nasserism/Iraq--NYT/FoF
EGYPT	LIBYA	1977	1977	Lib-Egy Raids--NYT
PAKISTAN	LIBYA	1977		Air Force Troops--NYT
USA	LIBYA	1986	1986	Anti-Lib. Bombing--FAf/NYT
MOROCCO	MAURITANIA	1977	1979	Anti-Polisario-ACR/MacF
MOROCCO	MAURITANIA	1981	1981	Hot Pursuit--NYT
SENEGAL	MAURITANIA	1989	1990	Senegal aids nationals in Mauritania after territorial dispute (UPI,Xinhua,BBC, LM)
THAILAND	MALI	1969	1976	Joint Counter-Ins.--Jessup
THAITILAND	MALI	1977	1981	Joint C-Insur--NYT/Kees./FoF
UKG	MAURITIUS	1968	1968	Ethnic Violence--NYT/Keesings
GUATIMALA	MEXICO	1982	1983	Refugee Camps-Kees./NYT/FoF
BURKINA FASO	MALI	1985	1985	Border-Disp87/FAf/NYT/SLPD
RUSIA	MONGOLIA	1966	1988	Deter PRC--Kaplan/NYT
FRANCE	MOROCCO	1956	1961	Post-Indep/Alg-NYT/FoF/C-H/Ks
FRANCE	MOROCCO	1962	1962	Unauth. Airraid--NYT
ALGERITREAA	MOROCCO	1963	1964	Border-NYT/FoF/Ks/Hasna/Btrw
FRANCE	MOROCCO	1976	1978	Anti-Polisario-NYT/ACR
SPAIN	MOROCCO	2002	2002	Spanish forces evict Moroccans from disputed island (AP)
CHINA	MYANMAR	1951	1953	Border Sanctuaries--NYT
CHINA	MYANMAR	1955	1956	Disputed Territ.--Zacher/NYT
CHINA	MYANMAR	1969	1974	Anti-Nat./Guer.--WashP/FoF
THAITILAND	MYANMAR	1997	1997	Thailand shelling in Burma to prevent border crossings (AP)
THAILAND	MYANMAR	1999	1999	Thailand fires on Burmese ships territorial dispute on Andaman sea (Bernama, Xinh)
ZIMBABWE	MOZAMBIABIQUE	1976	1979	Zim. Revol (Moz)-NYT/ARB/Kees
SOUTH AFRICA	MOZAMBIABIQUE	1981	1981	Raid ANC--ARB/NYT/FAf/AR/ACR
SOUTH AFRICA	MOZAMBIABIQUE	1983	1983	Raid ANC--ARB/NYT/SLPD/AR/ACR
SOUTH AFRICA	MOZAMBIABIQUE	1984	1985	Transport Rebels--NYT
SOUTH AFRICA	MOZAMBIABIQUE	1987	1987	Anti-ANC Raid--SLPD/NYT
ANGOLA	NAMIBIA	1999	1999	Namibia allows Angola to attack UNITA within Namibia, end date approx (AP)
CHINA	NEPAL	1960	1961	Nepal Border--NYT/Keesings
HONDURAS	NICARAGUA	1980	1981	Border/Contras--Kees./NYT
COSTA RICA	NICARAGUA	1984	1984	Retal Firing--NYT
HONDURAS	NICARAGUA	1985	1985	Down Copter--FoF
HONDURAS	NICARAGUA	1986	1988	Contra War--NYT
HONDURAS	NICARAGUA	1991	1991	Honduras fires on Nicaraguan patrol boat (UPI)
CAMERON	NIGERIA	1998	1998	Cameroon attacks Nigeria using helicopter mounted machine guns in territorial dispute (AP, AFP)
CHAD	NIGER	1993	1993	Chad forces pursue rebels into Niger (BBC, LM)

UKG	OMAN	1952	1972	Buraimi Oasis-Butterw/NYT/D82
UKG	OMAN	1957	1959	Dhofar Reb.-NYT/MEPD/Keesngs
UKG	OMAN	1966	1977	Dfr-Jsp/MPD/Tnd/Ptsn/Ks/NT/FoF
RUSIA	OMAN	1973	1973	Transport S.Yem--Kaplan
YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	OMAN	1973	1976	Dhofar Rebel.-Kaplan/Keesings
IRAN	OMAN	1973	1979	Dhofar-Jessp/NYT/Keesings/FoF
JORDAN	OMAN	1975	1975	Dhofar-Petrsn/Butterw/Halliday
YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	OMAN	1981	1982	Post-Dhofar-Bidwill/Disp87/MEJ
INDIA	PAKISTAN	1948	1949	Kashmir--NYT
INDIA	PAKISTAN	1965	1965	Kashmir-Disp.82/MEPD/Kees
INDIA	PAKISTAN	1965	1966	Rann of K.--NYT/MEPD/FoF/Kees
INDIA	PAKISTAN	1965	1966	Ind-Pak War-Disp82/MEPD/Kees
AFGHANISTAN	PAKISTAN	1979	1979	Fire on Refugees--Ltms/DTel
AFGHANISTAN	PAKISTAN	1980	1980	Afgh. Insurg.-Jessup/NYT
RUSSIA	PAKISTAN	1980	1982	Afgh. War--NYT
RUSSIA	PAKISTAN	1983	1988	Afgh War-CSM/Keesings
AFGHANISTAN	PAKISTAN	1983	1988	Afgh. Insurg.--WSJ/Keesings
INDIA	PAKISTAN	1984	1987	Kshmr Glacier-Disp.87/Keesings
AFGHANISTAN	PAKISTAN	1989	1990	Afghanistan fires Scuds and RPGs into Pakistan (BC, Xinh, Reuters)
INDIA	PAKISTAN	1990	1990	India initiates firing into Pakistan after mobilizing troops in disputed territory (Globe,PLC,WP,FT)
INDIA	PAKISTAN	1998	1998	Indian troops fire on Pakistani troops along Kashmir border (AP)
USA	PAKISTAN	2004	2004	US pursues Taliban insurgents into Pakistan (AFP)
COLOMBIA	PANAMA	1959	1959	Exile Rebel.--NYT
USA	PANAMA	1959	1959	Exile Rebel.--NYT
USA	PANAMA	1988	1988	Noriega Dispute--NYT
USA	PANAMA	1989	1990	US removes Panamanian government (WP, NYT)
ECUADOR	PERU	1953	1953	Insp. Border Markers--NYT
ECUADOR	PERU	1978	1978	Border Dispute--NYT
ECUADOR	PERU	1981	1981	Border Dispute--NYT/Disputes82
ECUADOR	PERU	1995	1995	Ecuador bombs Peru over border dispute (AFP, DP)
ECUADOR	PERU	1997	1997	Ecuadorean soldiers plant mines in Peru (AFP, Xinh)
ECUADOR	PERU	1998	1998	Ecuador troops cross border into Peru (AP, AFP)
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	PHILIPPINES	1974	1974	Spratly Is.--NYT
USA	PHILIPPINES	1989	1989	US aids Philippine government after coup attempt (AP, UPI, Xinh)
CHINA	PHILIPPINES	1998	1999	China adds structures and troops to reef in waters disputed with Philippines (AP, AFP)
MALI	PHILIPPINES	1999	1999	Malaysian navy takes disputed Sprately shoal from Philippines (AP)
RUSSIA	POLAND	1956	1956	After Poz.Riots--Fejto/Butter
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	PORTUGAL	1975	1975	Pro-FNLA-Hallett/Legum/LeoG
SOUTH AFRICA	PORTUGAL	1975	1975	Occupy-Legum/AR/ARB/Hallett
INDONESIA	PORTUGAL	1975	1976	E.Timor-Zacher/Disp.82
SAUDI ARABIA	QATAR	1992	1992	Saudi Arabia forces attack Qatar military post (AP,TS)
CHINA	SOUTH KOREA	1950	1953	Korean War--Lukacs
NORTH KOREA	SOUTH KOREA	1992	1992	N.Korea crosses into DMZ in S.Korea (WP, NYT)
NORTH KOREA	SOUTH KOREA	1999	1999	N. Korea engages in naval battle with heavy shelling against S. Korea over crab fishing rights (SFC, Kyodo)

BELGIUM	RWANDA	1990	1990	Belgium troops aid Rwandan government from rebel attack (UP, AP, LM)
FRANCE	RWANDA	1990	1990	France defends Rwandan government from rebel attack (CT, WP, NYT, LM)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	RWANDA	1990	1991	Zaire sends troops to aid government of Rwanda (AP, UPI, LM)
FRANCE	RWANDA	1993	1993	French troops sent to Rwanda to reinforce existing troops and protect and evacuate French nationals (AP, Indep, UP, LM)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	RWANDA	1996	1996	Zaire shells across border into Rwanda (Reuters)
HONDURAS	EL SALVADOR	1969	1971	Football War--Butter/Disp/NYT
HONDURAS	EL SALVADOR	1976	1976	Border Flareup--Disp.82
HONDURAS	EL SALVADOR	1982	1983	Insurgency--Disp82/NYT
EGYPT	SAUDI ARABIA	1962	1967	Yemen War-NYT/Btrw/Ks/Bdb/Wn
YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	SAUDI ARABIA	1969	1970	S.Y.War & Territ-NYT/Jessp/FoF
PAKISTAN	SAUDI ARABIA	1981	1988	Protect Royal Family--NYT
ARGENTINA	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	ARG provides a destroyer to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
AUSTRALIA	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	AUL provides frigates & supply ship to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Coalition)
BAHRAIN	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	BAH provides troops to SAU through Gulf Council (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
BELGIUM	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	BEL provides aircraft & ships for SAU in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
BANGLADESH	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	BNG provides troops for SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
CANADA	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	CAN provides combat aircraft & ships to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook)
CZECH REPUBLIC	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	CZR provides a chem. defense & hospital units to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
DENMARK	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Denmark provides 1 warship to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
EGYPT	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Egypt provides ground and paratroops and combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
FRANCE	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	France provides troops and Legion, 32 combat aircraft, and large carrier group to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle, LM)
GREECE	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Greece provides 1 frigate to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook)
ITALY	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Italy provides 8 combat aircraft, 2 frig, 1 supply ship to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
KUWAIT	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Kuwait provides troops through the Gulf Council and 25-30 combat aircraft (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
MOROCCO	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Morocco provides ground and mechanized infantry troops for Op. Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook, LM)

NEW ZEALAND	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	New Zealand contributes a hospital team and one medical transport aircraft for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
NIGER	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Niger provides infantry troops in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
NETHERLANDS	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Netherlands give 18 combat aircraft and 2 frig and 1 supply ship for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook)
OMAN	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Oman contributes troops through gulf council in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook)
PORTUGAL	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Portugal provides supply ship for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
QATAR	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Qatar provides troops as a gulf council member in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
RUSSIA	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Soviet Union provides guarded missile destroyer, anti-sub warfare ship, 2 supply ships for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
SENEGAL	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Senegal provides 500 troops for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
SPAIN	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Spain provides one ship for Operation Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
SYRIA	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Syria in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
UAE	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	UAE in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Des. Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
UKG	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	Britain provides troops, aircraft, & naval fleet to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chron., Shield Factbook)
USA	SAUDI ARABIA	1990	1991	US in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (US Today, Des. Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle)
YEMEN	SAUDI ARABIA	1994	1995	Yemen clashes with Saudi Arabia over ill-defined demarcation line (UPI, AFP, Reuters)
IRAQ	SAUDI ARABIA	2001	2001	Iraqi troops fire on Saudi troops in cross border raid (AP, AFP)
PORTUGAL	SENEGAL	1961	1973	Guin-B Rev-AHBk/ACR/ARB/NYT/AC
MAURITANIA	SENEGAL	1989	1990	Mauritania aids and evacuates nationals in Senegal after territorial dispute (UPI, Xinhua, BBC, LM)
GUINEA-BISSAU	SENEGAL	1990	1990	Guinea-Bissau engages in border clash with Senegal over disputed territory (BBC, Xinh, LM)
GUINEA	SIERRA LEONE	2000	2001	Guinea launches artillery attacks against Sierra Leone (AP, AllAfrica, AFP)
PNG	SOL	1992	1992	Papua-New Guinea pursue rebels in Solomon Islands (AP, Reuter, Xinh)
PNG	SOL	1993	1993	Papua New Guinea troops attack village in Solomon Islands (Xinh, UP)
ETHIOPIA	SOMALIA	1964	1964	Border Clashes-AD/ARB/NYT/Kees
ETHIOPIA	SOMALIA	1977	1978	Attack Base/Planes--NYT
ETHIOPIA	SOMALIA	1982	1985	Border Insurg.--NYT/Jessup/Ltms
ETHIOPIA	SOMALIA	1999	2001	Heavy Ethiopian artillery shelling into Somalia (AFP, Xinh)
FRANCE	SPAIN	1958	1958	Defend Sp.Sah/Maur.-NYT
MAURITANIA	SPAIN	1975	1976	Annex/Anti-Polis.-NYT/ARB/ACR
MOROCCO	SPAIN	1975	1976	Annex/Polisr-NYT/ARB/FoF/Kees
ALGERIA	SPAIN	1976	1976	Pro-Polisario--NYT/FoF
MOROCCO	SPAIN	2002	2002	Moroccan soldiers camp on island disputed with Spain (AP, FT)

RUSSIA	SUDAN	1970	1971	Sud.Civ. War-Kaplan/Wai
EGYPT	SUDAN	1970	1972	Sud Civ War-Epirle/NYT/Ks/Time
USA	SUDAN	1984	1984	Transport Egy.--AR/ACR
EGYPT	SUDAN	1984	1985	Anti-Libya--AR/ACR
LIBYA	SUDAN	1986	1986	Sud Civ War-WSJ/NYT/Ks/ACR
UGANDA	SUDAN	1997	1997	Ugandan soldiers cross into Sudan in pursuit of rebels (AFP)
ERITREA	SUDAN	1997	1997	Eritrea attacks rebels in Sudan (AFP)
ETHIOPIA	SUDAN	1997	1997	Ethiopia bombards Sudan and captures POWs (BBC, AFP)
USA	SUDAN	1998	1998	US carries out air strikes against suspected terrorist facilities in Sudan (TNS, PI)
ERITREA	SUDAN	1998	1998	Eritrea bombards Sudanese town in border clash (AP, Xinh)
SOUTH AFRICA	SWAZILAND	1985	1986	Raids-ANC/Renamo-SLPD/NYT
FRANCE	SYRIA	1946	1946	General Strike--NYT/Jessup
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1948	1949	Pales. War--NYT
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1951	1951	Huleh Drainage--NYT
IRAQ	SYRIA	1951	1958	Deter Isr.--Keesings/LTms
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1954	1955	Retal Raid-Khouri/NYT/FoF
EGYPT	SYRIA	1957	1958	Tur-Syr-FoF/Ks/Ptran/MPD/NYT
EGYPT	SYRIA	1958	1961	UAR Merger-NYT/Jessup
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1962	1962	Attack Villages-Khouri/NYT
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1964	1967	Water/Fatah/Galilee-Khouri/NYT
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1967	1967	Six Day War-Khouri/Moore/Kees.
IRAQ	SYRIA	1969	1970	Arab Command-NYT/FoF/Ks/Jessup
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1970	1970	Golan Clashes--Jessup/Fof
JORDAN	SYRIA	1971	1971	PLO Conflict--NYT/Keesings
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1972	1973	Anti-Guer/Golan-Jessp/NYT/Kees
RUSSIA	SYRIA	1973	1973	Transport Mor. Troops--Kaplan
IRAQ	SYRIA	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
JORDAN	SYRIA	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
KUWAIT	SYRIA	1973	1973	1973 War--Whetten
MOROCCO	SYRIA	1973	1973	1973 War-Whetten/Kaplan
ISRAEL	SYRIA	1973	1974	1973 War--Monroe-Hockley
SAUDI ARABIA	SYRIA	1973	1976	1973 War-Whetten/NYT/Kees/FoF
RUSSIA	SYRIA	1983	1988	SAM Missiles--FoF/Kees/NYT
ISRAEL	SYRIA	2003	2003	Israeli air raid on Syria (Int'l Herald, FT, AP)
CHINA	TAIWAN	1950	1958	Taiwan Str.-Jessup/NYT/Kees
CHINA	TAIWAN	1954	1955	Tai. Str./Islands-Disp82/Kees
CHINA	TAIWAN	1958	1978	Tai.Str./Qmoy-Disp82/Keesings
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	TAIWAN	1974	1974	Spratly Is.--NYT
PORTUGAL	TANZANIA	1966	1967	Incursions--ARB
UGANDA	TANZANIA	1972	1972	Bomb/Rebel Incurs--ARB
PORTUGAL	TANZANIA	1972	1973	Attack Frelimo-ARB/ACR/LTms/AR
BURUNDI	TANZANIA	1973	1973	Border Raids--ACR/ARB/NYT
UGANDA	TANZANIA	1978	1978	Incurs/Annex-NYT/ARB/ACR/A/H/S
LIBYA	TANZANIA	1979	1979	Ug. War Bombing-NYT
BURUNDI	TANZANIA	1995	1996	Burundi pursues Hutu rebels into Tanzania (IPS, AFP, Xinh)
FRANCE	THAILAND	1946	1946	Lao Rebel-Adams/Champassak
MYANMAR	THAILAND	1953	1953	KMT Suppression--NYT
AUSTRALIA	THAILAND	1962	1962	Border Deterrence--NYT
NEW ZEALAND	THAILAND	1962	1962	Border Deterrence--NYT
UKG	THAILAND	1962	1962	Border Deterrence--NYT
USA	THAILAND	1962	1962	Deter Lao Crossing--FoF

USA	THAILAND	1966	1976	Counter-Insurg.--NYT
MALI	THAILAND	1969	1976	Joint Counter-Ins--Jessup/NYT
LAOS	THAILAND	1975	1978	River/Border--NYT/Keesings
CAMBODIA	THAILAND	1976	1978	Border Attacks--Keesings/NYT
MALI	THAILAND	1977	1981	Joint C-Insur--NYT/Kees./FoF
CAMBODIA	THAILAND	1980	1980	Counter-Insurg.--Keesings
VIETNAM	THAILAND	1980	1987	Counter-Insurg--WSJ/FoF/NYT
LAOS	THAILAND	1980	1982	Mekong Disp-Disp 87/Keesings
LAOS	THAILAND	1985	1988	Border Disp.--NYT/Disputes 87
MYANMAR	THAILAND	1992	1993	Myanmar troops seize Karen rebel camp and maintain presence in Thai territory (NYT, Xinh)
MYANMAR	THAILAND	1999	1999	Myanmar fires on Thai ship in territorial dispute on Andaman sea (Bernama, Xinh)
MYANMAR	THAILAND	2005	2005	Burmese troops cross into Thailand (BBC)
FRANCE	TUNISIA	1956	1960	Alg/Guer-NYT/Jessp/Butterw/Ks
FRANCE	TUNISIA	1961	1962	Alg/Bzrte-Jesp/Ks/NYT/Btrw/AfD
USA	TURKEY	1957	1957	Syr-Tur Disp-NYT/FoF
IRAQ	TURKEY	1962	1962	Kurdish Reb.-Kees/FoF/NYT
IRAQ	TURKEY	1965	1965	Kurdish War--NYT
IRAQ	TURKEY	1974	1974	Kurdish Reb.--FoF
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	UGANDA	1965	1965	Anti-Tshombe Reb-AR/NYT/FoF
SUDAN	UGANDA	1965	1971	Pursue Rebels-Butterworth/ARB
LIBYA	UGANDA	1972	1972	Support Amin--ARB/Jessup
LIBYA	UGANDA	1979	1979	Oppose Tanz.--NYT/A/H
KENYA	UGANDA	1989	1989	Kenyan troops fire into Uganda (BBC, Bercovitch)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	UGANDA	1996	1996	Zaire engages in cross border raids against Uganda (AP)
SUDAN	UGANDA	1998	1998	Sudanese air raid in Uganda (AFP)
BELGIUM	UKG	1946	1949	Join German Occup.--NYT
DENMARK	UKG	1946	1949	Join German Occup.--NYT
NORWAY	UKG	1947	1949	Join German Occup.--NYT
INDONESIA	UKG	1963	1963	Sarawak Raids--James & Small
EGYPT	UKG	1963	1964	Yem War/Aden-NYT/MEJ/Ks/Bdb/Wn
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	UKG	1963	1964	Border War-NYT/Jessp/MEJ/Ks
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	UKG	1965	1965	Border Firing--NYT
IRAN	UKG	1971	1971	Occupy Gulf Is.--Disp.82
ARGENTINA	UKG	1976	1976	Chase UK Ship-FoF/LTimes/R&E
ARGENTINA	UKG	1982	1982	Falklands--Disputes 82
COLOMBIA	VENEZUELA	1987	1987	Coastal Dispute--NYT
UKG	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1954	1954	UK-Aden--NYT
UKG	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1958	1959	UK-Aden--NYT/Keesings
EGYPT	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1962	1967	Yem War/Butterw/Badeeb/Wenner
UKG	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1963	1965	Retal Aden-Yem-NYT/Jesp/MEJ/Ks
UKG	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1966	1966	Aden/Attack Village--MEJ
RUSIA	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1967	1968	Yem. Civil War-Kaplan
SYRIA	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1968	1968	Yem Repl. Soviets--Kaplan

YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1968	1970	Yem. Civil War--NYT/Jessup
YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1972	1972	Rebels-Jesp/NYT/Btrw/FoF/Kees
YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1979	1979	Yem Invas-NYT/Jessp/Ec/Kees
SAUDI ARABIA	YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	1980	1980	Border & N-S Merger-NYT/Disp87
SAUDI ARABIA	YEMEN	1994	1995	Saudi Arabia clashes over southern provinces being claimed by Yemen (UPI, AFP, Reuters)
ERITREA	YEMEN	1995	1998	Eritrea captures Hanish island after conflict with Yemen (AFP)
SAUDI ARABIA	YEMEN	1998	1998	Saudi Arabia occupies Yemeni territory in dispute (AP, AFP)
SAUDI ARABIA	YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	1969	1970	S.Y.War & Territ-NYT/Jessp/Fof
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	1972	1972	Rebel Disp.-Jesp/FoF/Keesings
OMAN	YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	1972	1975	Dhofar Rebel.-Jesp/Keesings
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC	1979	1979	Yem Invas-NYT/Jessp/Keesings
CUBA	YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC		1976	Dhofar Reb.-Peterson/Keesings
UKG	ZAMBIA	1965	1966	Protect from Rhod-- FoF/NYT
PORTUGAL	ZAMBIA	1966	1972	Ang/MozRebel-Ptman/NYT/ARB/ACR
SOUTH AFRICA	ZAMBIA	1976	1980	Invade W. Zam.-SLPD/ARB
ZIMBABWE	ZAMBIA	1977	1980	Anti-Rebel-NYT/ACR/ARB/AR/Kees
SOUTH AFRICA	ZAMBIA	1981	1982	Anti-SWAPO--ACR
SOUTH AFRICA	ZAMBIA	1986	1986	Bomb Lusaka-SLPD/NYT/FoF/ARB
SOUTH AFRICA	ZAMBIA	1987	1987	Anti-ANC/Zam.-NYT/FAf
ANGOLA	ZAMBIA	2000	2000	Angolan troops fire on Zambian troops patrolling and violate Zambian airspace in pursuit of rebels (Allafrica, BBC)
SOUTH AFRICA	ZIMBABWE	1985	1985	Raid ANC--SLPD
SOUTH AFRICA	ZIMBABWE	1986	1986	Punitive Raid--NYT