## CREDIBLE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPULSORY SCHOOLING BY LINKING WELFARE PAYMENTS TO SCHOOL ATTENDANCE: LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIA'S NORTHERN TERRITORY

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# Credible Enforcement of Compulsory Schooling by Linking Welfare Payments to School Attendance: Lessons from Australia's Northern Territory

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We apply a difference-in-difference analysis to demonstrate the importance of credibility for enforcing compulsory schooling by linking welfare assistance to school attendance. The unique circumstances of Australia's School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM) led Indigenous parents of truant children in the Northern Territory initially to believe that continued truancy jeopardized their welfare income. Consequently, SEAM had a substantial, immediate impact on participation rates in standardized tests. However, as administrators rarely withheld welfare payments from truant families the credibility of the threat was undermined and most of the initial improvement in participation dissipated.

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#### **I. Introduction**

Regular school attendance is a key element in breaking the intergenerational chain of poverty, yet children growing up in deprived circumstances are those most likely to be absent from school. Some developing countries have addressed this issue by offering conditional cash transfers (CCTs) to low-income parents as an inducement to send their children to school regularly (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005). However, there is little scope for such interventions in industrialized, democratic countries with compulsory schooling laws where offering parents money for complying with the law, though potentially effective, is inherently unpopular when funded from tax revenues, and too expensive to fund routinely from private sources.<sup>1</sup>

This has led some jurisdictions in the United States to experiment with the alternative approach of "negative CCTs": addressing truancy among families on welfare by conditioning continued support on improved school attendance. However, this is inherently difficult to implement, as withholding welfare payments from these truly needy families is likely to cause further harm to their children. Such policies implicitly assume that the threat of withholding payments will be sufficient to deter truancy, but if targeted families realize that welfare administrators will resist following through, they will respond accordingly and ignore the threat. A review of such programs by Campbell and Wright (2005) found that indeed caseworkers often found valid reasons for parents' non-compliance, and in other cases, targeted families were unaware of the risk of losing their welfare support. Consequently, Campbell and Wright (2005) concluded that such policies do not generally succeed in raising school attendance unless accompanied by an

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Levitt et al. (2012) and Cook et al. (2014) report on successful field experiments with CCTs in Chicago, funded from non-government sources.

increase in case management resources that directly address the problems these families face.

This raises the question, what would be the effect of a credible threat to withhold welfare payments on school attendance? The unique experience of Australia's School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM), initiated in 2009 sheds new light on this question. Targeted at Indigenous parents of truant children in the Northern Territory (NT), its threat to withhold welfare payments from these parents if their children failed to meet school attendance requirements was set against the backdrop of the Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER). This broader intervention, generally directed at the territory's Indigenous population, came in response to allegations of child abuse in their communities, and involved a military presence ("Operation Outreach") and temporary suspension of Australia's Racial Discrimination Act (Broome, 2010, Chapter 14). While formally separate from the NTER, SEAM gained credibility from the heightened anxiety and uncertainty the NTER generated, and from the living memory of yet severer measures directed by past Australian governments at Aboriginal families.<sup>2</sup>

In the absence of direct data on attendance, we estimate the impact of SEAM on school attendance indirectly through its impact on student participation in Australia's National Assessment Program—Language Arts and Numeracy (NAPLAN). Initiated in 2008, a year before SEAM, NAPLAN annually administers standardized tests in numeracy, reading, spelling, grammar and writing to all Australian students in grades 3, 5, 7 and 9. We apply a difference-in-difference analysis of participation rates in the Northern Territory numeracy and reading tests,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Prominent among these is the forced removal of Indigenous children from their families by Australian Federal and State government agencies, which began around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and continued until the mid-1970s. In 2008, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd issued a formal recognition and apology for what the Australian Government called "The Stolen Generations" (Australian Human Rights Commission, 1997).

comparing their variation over time among the Indigenous students in the Northern Territory, to their variation over time among the Indigenous students in Australia's other states and territories. Specifically, we focus on the difference between 2008, the year before SEAM, and subsequent years to 2012.<sup>3</sup>

Previewing our main results, we find that in 2009, the first year in which SEAM was implemented, test participation increased dramatically among Indigenous children in the Northern Territory, rising by 16-20 percentage points compared to 2008 pre-SEAM levels, where no similar increase appeared among the Indigenous student population in Australia's other states and territories. Moreover, this sharp rise in participation rates did not lead to a decline in pass rates for the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory, indicating that the observed increase in test participation does indeed reflect an increase in school attendance.<sup>4</sup> We interpret these findings as demonstrating how a credible threat to link welfare payments to school attendance can substantially raise participation rates.

However, while SEAM motivated many Indigenous parents in the Northern Territory to send their children to school, those who failed to meet school attendance requirements were not punished: suspension of welfare payments from these parents was not carried out in a single case (DEEWR, 2011), and as this became known, participation rates fell off. The following year, 2010, saw an erosion of about half the gains achieved in 2009, and they continued to fall to 2012, the last year in our study, though remaining throughout significantly above the baseline level of 2008.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Our analysis relies solely on publicly available data, aggregated by state/territory and community (Indigenous/non-Indigenous). Individual-level data would allow a more detailed analysis, and shed further light on the issues at hand but are not publicly available. Earlier observations that would allow us to make these comparisons before 2008 do not exist.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> It also indicates that students induced by SEAM to participate in NAPLAN were of similar academic ability to those who participated in NAPLAN before SEAM.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> We cannot rule out the possibility that the subsequent decline in participation rates did not reflect a similar decline in attendance, but this seems less likely than the assumption that the two went hand in hand.

This demonstrates both the importance of credibility for implementing policies linking welfare payments to school attendance over time and the difficulty of sustaining their credibility. SEAM created a window of opportunity in 2009, in which large numbers of parents were induced to start sending their truant children to school—an opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of schooling to these parents. However, the difficulty of following through on the threat of withholding welfare payments eroded their credibility over time, leading most parents of previously truant children to revert to their earlier behavior. The sustained effect of policies such as SEAM depends on parents changing how they perceive formal education, and finding enough value in the schooling available to their children to continue sending them to school when the threat is past. This may require changes in the schools themselves and better local employment opportunities.<sup>6</sup>

The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background data on the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory; Section 3 describes the NTER and SEAM initiatives; Section 4 presents descriptive statistics on the impact of SEAM on participation rates and changes in average performance in the Northern Territory; Section 5 presents the results of our regression analysis; and Section 6 concludes.

#### 2. Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory

The number of Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory—53,000 in 2006, 56,000 in the 2011 census—is not the largest among Australia's states and territories, but their share of the total population in the territory is by far the largest,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Altman, Buchanan and Biddle's (2006) analysis of the Indigenous economy of the Northern Territory suggests that Indigenous parents did not find their traditional activities well served by conventional education, and saw few opportunities for their children in the Australian labor market. We expand on this in Section 2.

27%, and they own roughly half its land. Indigenous Australians generally exhibit markedly weaker aggregate indicators of well-being compared to non-Indigenous Australians; and this gap is yet wider in the Northern Territory, where a large share of the Indigenous population lives in very remote areas and maintains a separate, traditional way of life.

Differences in life expectancy illustrate these gaps. In 2006, life expectancy at birth was 78.7 for all non-Indigenous Australian men; 75.7 for non-Indigenous men in the Northern Territory; 67.2 years for all Indigenous Australian men; and 61.5 years for Indigenous men in the Northern Territory (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009, Table 1.1).<sup>7</sup> Differences in aggregate labor market outcomes are similarly arresting. In 2011, 76% of non-Indigenous Australians participated in the labor force, and 72% were employed, while only 57% of Indigenous Australians participated in the workforce and only 48% were employed. Among Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory, these rates are even lower: 44% participated in the workforce and 38% were employed (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012, Table 1); and even these low rates could not have been maintained without the support of the Community Development Employment Project (CDEP), a targeted work-for-welfare scheme (Hunter and Gray, 2012).<sup>8</sup>

Altman, Buchanan and Biddle (2006) describe Indigenous employment in Australia as divided among three sectors: the private or market sector; the public sector (predominately CDEP); and the customary or informal sector, which includes activities such as hunting, fishing and gathering, production of art and crafts, and land, habitat and species management participation. Though ignored by official statistics, employment in the customary or informal sector is especially

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The numbers for women are about four years higher with similar inter-group differences.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The government's efforts notwithstanding, Altman, Biddle and Hunter (2008) judge that "labour force participation rates would take over a century to converge if the trends for the period 1971-2006 were to persist." Similar gaps characterize health outcomes, employment, family and community violence, incarceration and freedom from poverty (Stephens, 2010; Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2011).

large in remote Indigenous communities, which account for a disproportionately large fraction of the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory. This increases the opportunity cost of conventional schooling while lowering its expected incremental returns for Indigenous families in remote areas.

Differences in education achievement between Indigenous Australians and the Australian population at large and in the Northern Territory exhibit a similar pattern to those observed in life expectancy and the labor market. The National Assessment Program for Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) results for 2008—its first year of operation, before SEAM was implemented—give the percentage of non-Indigenous Australian students in grade 3 achieving the national minimum standard as 93.5 in reading and 96.0 in numeracy.<sup>9</sup> The corresponding rates for Indigenous Australians were 68.3 in reading and 78.6 in numeracy; for Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory and 52.4; and for Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory in Very Remote locations, 14.3 and 35.0. The percentage of non-Indigenous Australian students in grade 7 achieving the national minimum was 95.4 in reading and 96.4 in numeracy. The corresponding rates for all Indigenous Australians were 71.9 in reading and 78.6 in numeracy; for Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory, 32.4 and 50.2; and for Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory, 32.4 and 50.2; and for Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory, 32.4 and 50.2; and for Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory in Very Remote locations, 13.7 and 34.9.

We conclude this section with data drawn from the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey (NATSISS) for 2008, presented in Table 1, that illustrates the distinct cultural identity and socio-economic circumstances of Indigenous Australians living in the Northern Territory. It shows that compared to other large Indigenous populations in Western Australia, Queensland, New South Wales and South Australia, Indigenous Australians in the Northern Territory have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> See http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html. (National Assessment Program, 2014).

stronger ties to traditional Indigenous culture and ways of life, and are less likely to report that they or a relative had been forcibly removed from their natural families. In some respects—psychological distress, disability, employment rates they are similar to other Indigenous Australians, but they have less formal schooling and less access to money income, and hence are less socially mobile within Australian society at large.

	Northern Territory	Western Australia	Queensland	New South Wales	South Australia
Speak Indigenous language	62.6	22.6	19.1	3.2	25.9
Identify with tribal group	85.4	62.3	64.2	51.7	72.7
Live on homelands	40.5	29.5	16.7	29.6	17.9
Involved in cultural events	81.3	70.0	65.2	55.1	65.0
Have crisis support	85.2	90.1	84.6	92.0	90.8
Removed from natural family	4.8	11.0	7.2	7.7	11.9

TABLE 1. SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION BY STATE/TERRITORY (% SHARE OF THE LOCAL INDIGENOUS POPULATION)

Source: National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey (NATSISS), 2008.

#### **3.** The perception of SEAM within the context of the NTER

The impact of the School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM) on participation in schooling, on which we focus in this paper, can only be understood against the backdrop of the controversial Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) initiated after Parliament's approval in August 2007. SEAM was not a part of the NTER, but it was the operational context of the NTER that lent SEAM much of its initial credibility. The conservative, Liberal-National Coalition government led by John Howard implemented the NTER in 2007, during the lead-up to the federal election of that year, in response to allegations of widespread child neglect and sexual abuse in Indigenous communities set out in the report of a special Board of Inquiry entitled *Little Children are Sacred* (Wild and Anderson, 2007). The initial action involved an increased presence of police and military units in the Northern Territory.<sup>10</sup> It imposed government control of Indigenous communities for a five-year period, and introduced a range of measures aimed at addressing the abuse of children and women, as well as narrowing the gaps in economic opportunity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.

In addition to the added deployment of police and military units, the Intervention included a set of racially targeted measures, which required temporary suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act: restrictions on alcohol and pornography, new limitations on Native land rights, and a sequestering of 50 percent of all welfare payments for basic needs. The Australian Defense Force presence ended in October 2008 but the Intervention continued until August 2012 (Altman and Russell, 2012). It enjoyed a strong bi-partisan mandate, with the continued support of subsequent Labor governments, but many Indigenous leaders spoke out publicly against it, labeling it "authoritarian" and "paternalistic."<sup>11</sup>

SEAM was announced in June 2008, and its implementation began at the start of the following Australian school year, in March 2009. Administered by the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), it aimed to raise the low school attendance rates among Indigenous Australians in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The Australian Defence Force (ADF) began "Operation Outreach" on 27 June 2007, deploying approximately 600 ADF personnel, about 400 of them soldiers (http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/global/opoutreach/index.htm). This manner of intervention would not have been constitutionally possible in an Australian state (rather than a territory).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Broome (2010) describes this public response, noting in particular an open letter against the Intervention signed by sixty Aboriginal community and church organizations, and published in *The Age*, a leading newspaper. However, some Indigenous leaders, notably women such as Professor Marcia Langston, expressed support for the NTER, viewing it as necessary for protecting the rights of Indigenous women and children in view of the failure of the Northern Territory government to address these issues effectively. <u>http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-02-08/trapped-in-the-aboriginal-reality-show/1036918</u>. The NTER has since been replaced by the Stronger Futures Policy.

the Northern Territory by conditioning income support payments on school attendance, with the ultimate goal of narrowing the economic gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, and interrupting the intergenerational transmission of poverty.

In its first year, SEAM formally targeted only a small number of parents receiving Centrelink (welfare) payments, and with children in one of fourteen schools in six trial areas, comprising 989 parents and 1658 children, a small fraction of the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory (Table 2).

Location	Total Population	Indigenous population	Parents in SEAM	Children in SEAM
Katherine Township	9,208	2,365	354	611
Katherine Town Camps	-	-	111	191
Hermannsburg	623	537	87	125
Wallace Rockhole	68	63	15	21
Tiwi Islands	2,579	2,267	203	336
Wadeye	2,112	1,927	219	374
Total			989	1,658

TABLE 2—TARGET POPULATIONS IN SEAM SITES, 2009

*Note:* Target numbers are from Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (2011). Population statistics are from the 2011 Australian Census. There are no publicly available census data on the population of Katherine Town Camps, an exclusively Indigenous community located near Katherine Township.

However, SEAM was widely perceived as having a much broader scope. Government reports published by the Department of Employment, Education and Workplace Relations (DEEWR, 2011) indicated a high degree of awareness of the SEAM program among Indigenous parents in the Northern Territory, while observing that "parents and communities had limited understanding of the details of SEAM, and this was compounded by misinformation." The report cited common misconceptions among parents and community members, noting they incorrectly believed that:

- SEAM was directed in general at Indigenous children in remote areas.
- All child-carers (including grandmothers and aunts) would have their payments suspended if they were caring for a truant child.
- Indigenous families subject to SEAM included wage-earning families and families participating in CDEP.
- Non-compliance with SEAM would trigger immediate suspension of payments (where a compliance period was actually required).

These misconceptions fueled SEAM's effectiveness not only among its target population *but among the entire Indigenous population of the Northern Territory*.

In effect, however, none of the parents within the formal scope of the program in 2009 had their payments suspended for failure to comply with SEAM (DEEWR, 2011). Of the 989 parents in this group, 918 (1604 children) were sent enrolment notification letters, which requested that they provide their child's school enrolment details to Centrelink within 14 days. Of these, the DEEWR evaluation report notes, 170 parents (286 children) were non-compliant; and of these, 56 parents (84 children) were sent enrolment warning notices, the final step before having their benefits suspended. The majority complied but eleven chose to move out of the target area; effectively this was the most severe sanction for non-compliance in 2009. The strong threats implicit in the information campaign that accompanied the initial implementation in 2009, while highly credible and effective at the time, were actually not carried out.

#### 4. The impact of SEAM on educational outcomes: Descriptive statistics

We use publicly available, aggregated data on NAPLAN participation rates to estimate the impact of SEAM on school attendance among Indigenous children in the Northern Territory. Table 3 presents comparative summary statistics on NAPLAN participation rates in two knowledge domains, reading and numeracy, averaged over four grade levels, 3, 5, 7, and 9, in five successive years: from 2008, the year before SEAM was implemented to 2012. The participation rate is the share of students participating in the NAPLAN test as a percentage of the total number of students in the year level; students exempted from the test by the school are counted as having participated.<sup>12</sup> The pattern of change in participation rates is clearly similar for both knowledge domains.

		Reading			Numeracy	
	All non- Indigenous	All Indigenous	Indigenous in NT	All non- Indigenous	All Indigenous	Indigenous in NT
2008	96	87	67	96	86	68
2009	96	89	86	96	88	85
2010	96	87	76	95	87	75
2011	96	87	77	95	86	76
2012	95	86	74	95	85	72

TABLE 3—NAPLAN PARTICIPATION RATES BY KNOWLEDGE DOMAIN AND POPULATION GROUP, AVERAGED OVER GRADE LEVELS, %

*Source:* The 2008-2012 NAPLAN National Reports, <u>http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html</u>. Entries are averages over grades 3, 5, 7 and 9. Detailed participation rates, by knowledge domain, grade level, year and state/territory, are presented in the Appendix.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Non-participating students are students classified as absent, or withdrawn by the parents.

The data illustrate both the immediate impact, in 2009, of the perceived threat of SEAM on education outcomes in the Northern Territory, and how this effect dissipated in subsequent years, as the threat of withholding welfare payments proved hollow. The sharp increase in 2009—of 19 percentage points in reading and 17 in numeracy—was without parallel for Australia as a whole or for the general Indigenous population, and nearly erased in a single year the difference between the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory and the general Indigenous population of Australia. In subsequent years, as it became increasingly clear that the threat of withholding welfare payments would not be carried out, participation rates steadily declined—by ten percentage points in 2010—so that by 2012 less than a third of the initial gains remained.

		Reading			Numeracy	
	All non- Indigenous	All Indigenous	Indigenous in NT	All non- Indigenous	All Indigenous	Indigenous in NT
2008	95	70	33	97	77	48
2009	96	73	36	97	77	45
2010	96	73	39	97	76	43
2011	96	75	39	97	79	49
2012	96	73	36	96	75	43

TABLE 4—NAPLAN PASS RATES, BY KNOWLEDGE DOMAIN AND POPULATION GROUP, AVERAGED OVER GRADE LEVELS, %

*Source:* The 2008-2012 NAPLAN National Reports, <u>http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html</u>. Entries are averages over grades 3, 5, 7 and 9.

Surprisingly, the sharp rise in participation rates in 2009 did not trigger a concomitant decline in pass rates, as Table 4 shows. The pass rate in reading actually rose by three percentage points, mirroring a similar rise in the general Indigenous population, while the pass rate in numeracy fell by the same measure.

Subsequent years saw yet further gains in reading pass rates, and fluctuating changes in numeracy. In this regard, those induced by SEAM to participate in NAPLAN had a similar distribution of outcomes to the student population participating in NAPLAN before SEAM.

Figures 1 and 2 compare the changing levels of participation in NAPLAN reading and numeracy tests among Indigenous students across Australia's eight states and territories for each grade level over time. (The underlying data are in the appendix.) In both knowledge domains, the percentage of Indigenous students participating in NAPLAN in the Northern Territory, indicated by the black line, follows a markedly different pattern from that of Indigenous students in Australia's other states and territories, indicated by gray lines. In 2008, prior to the implementation of SEAM, participation in NAPLAN among Indigenous students in the Northern Territory was the lowest in Australia—for all four grade levels in both reading and numeracy. The subsequent spike in participation in 2009, visually obvious in Figures 1 and 2 for all grade levels, disproportionately raises the Northern Territory Indigenous participation share so that it is no longer the lowest of all states and territories in any grade. However, this increase falls off immediately, and in each subsequent year the Northern Territory's Indigenous participation share is again the lowest of all states and territories in all four grade levels, in both reading and numeracy. Nonetheless, in all grade levels, NAPLAN participation rates in 2012 are noticeably higher than in 2008.



FIGURE 1. INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION IN NAPLAN READING TESTS BY YEAR, GRADE AND STATE/TERRITORY

Source: NAPLAN National Reports. http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports/national-reports.html.



FIGURE 2. INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION IN NAPLAN NUMERACY TESTS BY YEAR, GRADE AND STATE/TERRITORY *Source:* NAPLAN National Reports. <u>http://www.nap.edu.au/results-and-reports.html</u>.

#### 5. The impact of SEAM on educational outcomes: Regression analysis

In this section, we apply regression analysis to the annual state-level NAPLAN data for 2008-2012 presented graphically in Figures 1 and 2, to provide further statistical evidence of the dynamic patterns indicated above. We use a differencein-difference approach to estimate average annual effects of SEAM on participation rates among the Indigenous students in the Northern Territory, comparing them to the corresponding effects among the Indigenous students in other Australian states and territories over the five years, pooling all four grade levels and both knowledge domains in one regression. We assume that the population of Indigenous students in the Northern Territory was "untreated" by SEAM in 2008, the year prior to implementation; then fully treated in 2009, the first year of implementation, by the credible, generally believed, threat that parents who did not send their children to school jeopardized their continued welfare support; and then partially or ineffectively treated in 2010, 2011 and 2012, when the threat lost its credibility. The Indigenous students in other states and territories are the comparison group; we assume this group is untreated by SEAM in all years, grade levels, and knowledge domains.

Our assumption of full treatment in 2009 is based on the evidence from government reports presented in Section 3, indicating that extensive misinformation led the general Indigenous population of the Northern Territory to feel threatened by SEAM, though it was formally directed at only a small fraction. In the context of our analysis, this is a conservative assumption. If it is an overstatement—i.e., if not all child-carers believed that their welfare payments would be reduced if they did not send the children in their care to school—then our estimated effects are biased downward and the actual initial effect of SEAM on participation was stronger than our estimates indicate.

Our basic difference-in-difference specification is thus:

$$Y_{idgt} = \alpha + \beta_r I_r + \sum_{g=3,5,7} \gamma_g I_g + \sum_{t=2009}^{2012} \delta_t I_t + \eta I_{NT} + \sum_{t=2009}^{2012} \kappa_t I_t I_{NT} + v_{idgt}$$

where  $Y_{idgt}$  is the participation rate for the Indigenous population in state/territory *i*, in knowledge domain *d* (numeracy or reading) and grade *g* (3, 5, 7 or 9), in year *t* (2008, ..., 2012). Here,  $I_r$  is an indicator for the reading domain (numeracy is the omitted category) and  $\beta_r$  is a fixed effect for reading.  $I_g$  is an indicator for grade level (grade 9 is the omitted category) and  $\gamma_g$  are grade level effects for g = 3, 5, 7.  $I_t$  is an indicator for year *t* (2008 is the omitted category) and  $\delta_t$  are year effects for years t = 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.  $I_{NT}$  is an indicator for the Northern Territory and  $\eta$  is the Northern Territory fixed effect. The coefficients  $\kappa_i$  are the difference-indifference effects for years  $t = 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, I_{NT}$  is an indicator for the last term,  $v_{idgt}$ , is an error term, which we assume to be independent across states, but possibly correlated across grade levels and domains within a state.

Our interest focuses on  $\kappa_t$  as it varies over time. It estimates the difference in the difference in participation rates between the base year and year t between the Northern Territory Indigenous population and the Indigenous populations in other states and territories, averaged over all grade levels and knowledge domains. We expect a large, statistically significant, positive value for  $K_{t=2009}$ , the coefficient associated with the interaction between the year 2009 and NT indicators, and smaller effects for subsequent years,  $K_t$  for  $t \in \{2010, 2011, 2012\}$ , as the threat becomes less credible.

Table 5 presents the results from a linear model with weights equal to the number of Indigenous students in each grade, domain, state, year. As we allow that observations across grade levels and domains within a state may be correlated, we apply Cameron et al.'s (2008) wild cluster bootstrap procedure clustered at the state level to estimate the standard errors of the coefficients. We find that the average participation rate of the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory in 2008 is almost 22 percentage points lower than the average rate for Indigenous students in other states and territories, highlighting the relative disadvantage of the Indigenous population in the Northern Territory; this accords with the differences outlined in Section 2. For all Indigenous students in Australia, participation rates in grades 3, 5 and 7 are significantly higher than in grade 9, indicating a substantial degree of general truancy in grade 9—still in compulsory schooling—among the general Indigenous population. We also find participation rates declining slightly over time after 2008 among all Indigenous children, mirroring a similar trend in the general population of Australia; and we find a small but statistically significant 1% difference in participation rates between numeracy and reading.

	Coefficient	95% Confidence Interval	<i>p</i> -value
Intercept	0.803	[0.745,0.861]	< 0.001
Northern Territory (NT)	-0.218	[-0.262,-0.174]	< 0.001
T=2009	-0.003	[-0.027,0.021]	0.883
T=2010	-0.006	[-0.032,0.020]	0.746
T=2011	-0.013	[-0.036,0.011]	0.436
T=2012	-0.023	[-0.056,0.011]	0.135
Grade 3	0.112	[0.087,0.138]	< 0.001
Grade 5	0.117	[0.091,0.144]	< 0.001
Grade 7	0.096	[0.080,0.113]	< 0.001
Reading	0.010	[0.007,0.013]	< 0.001
NT in 2009	0.183	[0.158,0.208]	< 0.001
NT in 2010	0.092	[0.066,0.117]	< 0.001
NT in 2011	0.102	[0.077,0.123]	< 0.001
NT in 2012	0.083	[0.048,0.118]	< 0.001

TABLE 5— REGRESSION OF INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION RATES

*Note.* Linear model fit with weights for total Indigenous students in each grade, domain, state and year pooled over all eight states and territories; N = 320;  $R^2 = 0.726$ . P-values and confidence intervals from bootstrapped t-statistics (2000 replications) using Cameron et al.'s (2008) wild cluster bootstrap procedure clustered at the state level using the clusterSEs package in R (Esarey, 2015).

The difference-in-difference coefficients, which indicate the impact of SEAM on Indigenous participation in the Northern Territory as it varies over time, appear in the bottom four rows of Table 5, below the dotted line. We find, as hypothesized, a highly significant increase of 18.3 percentage points in 2009, which then declines by half in 2010, followed by a slight rise in 2011, and again a fall in 2012 to a level 8.4 percentage points above 2008 participation rates. All the difference-indifference estimates are significantly greater than the base year, 2008, with the point estimate for 2009 significantly different from all the other years. The estimates for 2010, 2011 and 2012 are not statistically different from each other. The slight rise in 2011 presumably echoes the strong effect registered in 2009, as students tested in 2011 in grades 5, 7 and 9 were the same students tested in 2009, in grades 3, 5 and 7.<sup>13</sup>

#### 6. Conclusion

Australia's School Enrolment and Attendance through Welfare Reform Measure (SEAM), implemented in 2009 against the backdrop of the Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER), aimed to raise school attendance rates among Indigenous children in the Northern Territory by threatening to withhold welfare payments from parents who failed to send their children to school regularly. The formal target population was narrowly defined but the circumstances in which SEAM was implemented—the police and military presence, the temporary suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act, and the troubled history of race relations in Australia—all contributed to creating a climate in which the entire Indigenous community of the Northern Territory came to believe in 2009, the first

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>We also estimated an unweighted regression with very similar results. The interaction coefficients for 2009-2012 were respectively 0.197, 0.100, 0.115 and 0.084, with slightly larger 95% confidence intervals ranging in size from .07 to .09.

year SEAM was implemented, that truancy immediately jeopardized a family's continued welfare support. However, as administrators rarely withheld welfare payments from truant families the credibility of the threat was undermined in subsequent years. The implementation of SEAM thus provides a unique opportunity to study the role of credibility in enforcing compulsory schooling by linking welfare payments to school attendance.

We use participation rates in NAPLAN reading and numeracy tests in grades 3, 5, 7 and 9 as a proxy for school attendance, and compare variation in participation rates over time among the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory to their variation among the Indigenous populations of Australia's other states and territories. Graphic analysis indicates a dramatic increase in participation rates in 2009 and a subsequent erosion of this increase, across all four grades and both knowledge domains, beyond corresponding changes in participation among the Indigenous populations of Australia's other states and both knowledge domains, beyond corresponding changes in participation among the Indigenous populations of Australia's other states and territories.

Estimating a difference-in-difference regression, we find that in 2009, the first year in which SEAM was implemented, test participation in the Northern Territory increased by 18.3 percentage points, beyond the average change in participation rates among the Indigenous populations of Australia's other states and territories, averaged over our four grade levels and two knowledge domains. Using Cameron et al.'s (2008) wild cluster bootstrap procedure to allow for clustering at the state level, we obtain a 95% confidence interval for this initial increase of 15.8 to 20.8 percentage points. Moreover, this rise in participation rates did not reduce pass rates, suggesting that the increase in participation rates we observe reflects a similar increase in school attendance.

However, these gains were not sustained. As it became widely apparent that the threat of withholding welfare payments would not be carried out except possibly in a handful of cases, participation rates among the Indigenous population of the Northern Territory fell significantly. Our difference-in-difference estimation indicates that more than half the gain dissipated in 2010, and by 2012 participation rates were only 8.3 percentage points above pre-SEAM levels, much reduced though still a statistically significant increase.

These findings demonstrate that a credible threat to link welfare payments to school attendance can be highly effective in the short run. At the same time, it highlights the difficulty of following through on such a threat, even in the unusual context of the NTER, and shows how this loss of credibility adversely affects subsequent participation. Once the threat proved hollow, over half of the initial gains were lost, indicating that many of the parents induced to send their children to school by the perceived threat of losing welfare payments did not come to appreciate the value of the schooling their children received. This suggests that even credible efforts to enforce compulsory schooling by linking welfare payments to attendance will not be effective in the longer term unless accompanied by measures that enhance the perceived value of schooling in the target population.

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# Appendix

		J	Reading				Ν	Jumerac	у	
State/Territory	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Northern Territory	0.71	0.89	0.79	0.81	0.78	0.72	0.86	0.78	0.79	0.75
Western Australia	0.85	0.86	0.87	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.83	0.86	0.84	0.83
Queensland	0.95	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.94	0.92	0.93	0.92	0.90
New South Wales	0.94	0.94	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.92	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.93
Victoria	0.90	0.90	0.85	0.88	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.85	0.87	0.88
South Australia	0.96	0.82	0.83	0.81	0.84	0.97	0.83	0.82	0.81	0.85
Tasmania	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.94	0.95
Australian Capital Territory	0.90	0.94	0.92	0.87	0.86	0.88	0.92	0.92	0.86	0.87

## TABLE A1: GRADE 3 PARTICIPATION RATES

## TABLE A2: GRADE 5 PARTICIPATION RATES

			Reading				Numeracy           2009         2010         2011         2           2         0.90         0.79         0.80           4         0.86         0.86         0.84           4         0.93         0.93         0.92           2         0.94         0.93         0.94           9         0.89         0.88         0.89			
State/Territory	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Northern Territory	0.71	0.92	0.81	0.81	0.80	0.72	0.90	0.79	0.80	0.76
Western Australia	0.84	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.85
Queensland	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.90	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.89
New South Wales	0.93	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.92	0.94	0.93	0.94	0.93
Victoria	0.90	0.91	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.88	0.89	0.88
South Australia	0.97	0.87	0.87	0.85	0.88	0.97	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.87
Tasmania	0.97	0.95	0.96	0.97	0.96	0.95	0.94	0.96	0.95	0.96
Australian Capital Territory	0.91	0.89	0.89	0.93	0.89	0.92	0.90	0.90	0.93	0.89

	Reading					Numeracy				
State/Territory	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Northern Territory	0.63	0.87	0.77	0.76	0.74	0.65	0.87	0.81	0.75	0.71
Western Australia	0.86	0.85	0.85	0.83	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.82	0.84
Queensland	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.92	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.92	0.90
New South Wales	0.89	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.90	0.88
Victoria	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.88	0.86	0.87	0.86	0.83	0.85	0.85
South Australia	0.96	0.87	0.86	0.88	0.86	0.94	0.87	0.84	0.87	0.83
Tasmania	0.93	0.89	0.94	0.89	0.93	0.94	0.88	0.93	0.89	0.91
Australian Capital Territory	0.81	0.79	0.85	0.85	0.84	0.83	0.74	0.87	0.86	0.83

TABLE A3: GRADE 7 PARTICIPATION RATES

 TABLE A4: GRADE 9 PARTICIPATION RATES

	Reading				Numeracy					
State/Territory	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Northern Territory	0.62	0.75	0.66	0.69	0.66	0.61	0.75	0.64	0.68	0.65
Western Australia	0.71	0.72	0.74	0.70	0.71	0.72	0.71	0.74	0.69	0.70
Queensland	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.81	0.86	0.85	0.86	0.83	0.81
New South Wales	0.80	0.84	0.82	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.82	0.81	0.80	0.77
Victoria	0.78	0.75	0.71	0.71	0.77	0.79	0.77	0.73	0.69	0.75
South Australia	0.90	0.71	0.68	0.71	0.69	0.89	0.70	0.65	0.73	0.68
Tasmania	0.82	0.83	0.85	0.81	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.87	0.81	0.84
Australian Capital Territory	0.69	0.76	0.77	0.69	0.80	0.73	0.77	0.77	0.73	0.78