revolt'. It contains no material of place, horizon or history; it is 'engaged poetry' rather than 'nationalist engaged poetry':

Not like slaves brought to heel were we dragged to the fight,
In strange lands our life's blood to squander,
And if we must die our people to free,
We are willing our lives to surrender.
made it, from its beginning to this day, a poetry which demands Peace and which exults Peace, with all the political conclusions which are derived from this cry and are generally expressed with humor and by understatement.

It can be easily surmised that amongst all the factors that prepared the political climate for a change in Israel, or strengthened it, Amichai's poetry played a truly significant role.

On the Poem 'Unknown Soldiers', 1929–1932

Yaira Ginossar

Avraham Stern, 'Yair', is totally identified with his poem 'Unknown Soldiers' which he wrote in 1932. The poem became famous both in Eretz-Israel and throughout the Jewish world. Yair's life, especially his last seven years, merged with the chronicles of Zionism. Since he had a special status as a remarkable figure therein, his biography (1907–1942) as part of that history's continuum is better known than his life story as a poet.

In this article, the author traces Yair's literary sources and influences which have not been previously recognized. She points out that in his childhood and adolescence Yair was a pupil of comprehensive Russian culture which he absorbed at home and he also imbibed revolutionary culture during his stay in Russia (1915–1921). The author claims that his early poetic origins were anchored in Russian poetry and not in Polish poetry. Thus his literary origins make him, upon his arrival in Eretz-Israel in 1926, a 'typical' poet, contemporary with his generation.

Yair's Hebrew literary origins were not from 'home' but from the Department of Hebrew Literature of the then new Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where he studied from 1928 to 1933. Prior to that he had only known Bialik's poetry translated into Russian. His choice to write in Biblical Hebrew rather than use the Talmudic vocabulary, and his preference for the nationalist genre, matched the models of Hebrew literature which were taught at the Hebrew University at that time and which combined national poetry and Biblical language. But his poetical choices combined opposites such as futuristic poetry and classical material.

In 1932 Yair wrote and published 'Unknown Soldiers'. It is clear that the poem was written in direct consequence to the 1929 Riots. It is a poem of 'existential
that can be compared with that of Amichai's in its political significance and influence. Both of these aspects were right from the start subversive and anti-establishment and in contrast to the accepted national ideologies. This political significance and influence became an integral part of the emerging political and ideological consensus and thus reshaped it.

Amichai's poetry does not represent explicit positions or political values. Its political influence is derived from its being a comprehensive poetic system within a specific historical context, in which it was composed and read, and in its reference to this historical context.

Five aspects of Amichai's poetry can be described as being responsible, separately and in combination, for its possible political influence:
1. A close and intimate attachment to the real and spiritual world of many of its generation and time.
2. A formation of a new world view and ideology different from the ones formerly accepted in Hebrew literature.
3. The compositional design, rhetoric and unique poetic forms of this poetry awakened in the readers basically new, skeptical and rebellious reflections.
4. Although he presented radical and critical positions concerning the accepted norms, Amichai maintained a reserved, moderate and cautious tone in presenting his positions. Instead of awakening ardent objections, he thus encouraged thought and agreement.
5. The popularity of Amichai's poetry.

The influence based on the above mentioned factors did not have a direct political bearing but it enabled the marking of a defined ideological domain by which one can explain and justify political aims and activities. On the one hand, this poetry places crucial value upon the individual's life and happiness, and all values and all political deeds are considered and judged accordingly. On the other hand, this poetry is sober and realistic and doubts any ideology, religious or secular theology, as well as all other systems that pretend to solve the existential problems of the individual human being.

Enforced by these two complimentary directions, Amichai's poetry presents its readers with a suspicious attitude towards ideological and 'theological' justifications. This is apparent, in particular, in Amichai's conclusive attitude to War that is the crucial negative experience in his poetry. Amichai raises the demand to prevent, with all possible efforts, this terrible materialization of ideology and politics.

Placing the individual's human life as the highest value of his poetry, and the consequent demystification of national and collective values of all kinds, has
The satire attacks its victims for a series of character defects that cover a broad spectrum. Agnon employs universalistic moral criteria in an intensive manner and uses them to judge his characters and to utterly condemn them. But the satiric mechanism, which proceeds by defining an objective yardstick of behavior and then judges a certain sector of human activity according to it, appears to mix two different criteria here. The first, which is more apparent, uncovers the faults of Jewish society in Galicia, especially of its Zionist activists, in the light of universal norms of any time and place. But 'With Our Young and Our Old' was written also from a viewpoint of a political Zionist position that radically negated the Diaspora and embraced a vision in which Diaspora life was the main source of the deformation and degeneration of Jewish existence. As a satire it is a systematic attack on the more moderate Zionist stance which developed around this time in East-European Zionism. This Zionist position recognized the national importance of 'working for the present' in the Diaspora and rejected the future-oriented claim, and saw the importance of carrying on a national Jewish existence in the Diaspora during a transitional period that might be quite long. This hope for an existence as a national minority with full civil rights was at the time, in the first years after the war, perceived as a real threat to the mainstream Zionist ideology that rejected the Diaspora out of hand.

Agnon as a satirical writer fought a battle from a specific, political and particularistic point of view. The perspective of the power struggles in which he was involved forces us to observe closely the manner in which he reacts to and takes on those against whom he is pitted. Behind a facade of a universalistic satire there is a complicated political attack on the 'minority discourse' that had risen then in the Jewish national arena. Some of the literary mechanisms of 'With Our Young and Our Old' become clearer when we place this text in the context of a satirical discourse in 1920 against specific models of power and of the concrete repercussions of the question of minority rights in Galicia at the beginning of the century.

On the Political Significance of Yehuda Amichai's Poetry

Boaz Arpali

In this article, the author presents the claim that amongst the bodies of poetry that have been created in Israel since its establishment there is no other poetic body
and could have led to a political desert. The price which the Kibbutz leadership paid for victory was too high. On the Israeli political scene the Sneh crisis symbolized the end of the left-wing option.

S.Y. Agnon's 'Book of the State' as a Response to the Jewish Nation-State

Michael Keren

This article focuses on S.Y. Agnon's attitude towards Ben-Gurion's conception of the state. Based on an analysis of Agnon's fictional 'Book of the State', as well as on his correspondence with Ben-Gurion, it is claimed that while Agnon expressed great affection towards the sovereign State of Israel as an organ assuring its citizens' physical security, he rejected Ben-Gurion's 'Political Messianism', i.e. the Prime Minister's attempt to attribute the state with norms and symbols exceeding its basic function of security.

Nationalist Satire and its Victims: Politics of Majority and Minority in S.Y. Agnon's 'With Our Young and Our Old'

Hannah Hever

Agnon first published his satirical story 'With Our Young and Our Old' in Hatkufa (1920). It was a grand narrative project, into which Agnon incorporated a broad spectrum of everyday life of the Jews of Galicia at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. At the heart of the story are the events surrounding the general elections to the parliament of the Austro-Hungarian empire, which took place in Galicia in 1907. The Zionist groups in Galicia, among others, presented candidates who stood in these elections. The story unfolds the tale of a pogrom that took place in Pitcheritz near Chevosh. The pogrom against the Jews is presented in the satire as a moment of crisis for the Zionists of Galicia, testing the depth of their national faith and the level of their commitment.
The Kibbutz Leadership Opposite the Left in the 'Sneh Crisis'

Eli Tzur

For a period of three months, between November 1952 and January 1953, the Israeli political world watched an internal crisis taking place within Mapam, the United Workers' Party in Eretz-Israel. This show-down became known as the 'Sneh Crisis'. This crisis was the climax of a drawn out process in which the veteran Kibbutz institution, which had founded the party, attempted to recapture the Mapam leadership. Mapam, established in January 1948 by the merger of Achdut Ha'Avoda-Poalei Zion party and the workers' Hashomer Hatzair party, was the third biggest party in Israel and was located on the far left of the Zionist spectrum.

The Sneh crisis centered around the question of whether Mapam was just a satellite of the Communist Movement or whether it was a nationalist-socialist movement which cooperated with the Soviet camp. The crisis took place simultaneously on three levels – the structural/constitutional level, the social level and the educational/ideological one. The left wing of Mapam wished to adopt the organizational structure of the Communist Party, and to fully support the Soviet foreign policy while adopting entire sections of the Bolshevik ideology. The veteran leadership opposed a withdrawal from the traditional Zionist primate and from the collective Kibbutz ideology. The veteran Kibbutz leadership indeed won this battle at the price of losing the active section of the party and harming the important party components in both the Kibbutz and the city. Nevertheless, the leadership of the two Kibbutz movements were ready to pay the full price to wipe out the left. This willingness stemmed from the trauma which both movement's leaderships had undergone, one which had taught them that the left posed such a danger that it was better to destroy it in its infancy, even at the price of getting rid of those innocent of any deviation. They were also influenced by the world atmosphere during the 1950s which viewed reality as a global struggle, in which one must use all tools at one's disposal in order to survive. This was the McCarthy era, and the era of the show trials in Eastern Europe. If there were differences between the two movements' activity patterns, they stemmed partly from their nature – the one being a continuation of a youth movement, and the other a collection of individuals whose identity stemmed from the nature of its leadership. Today, it is clear that the postulates of the left were erroneous ones.
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commemorating family members of the deceased who perished during the Holocaust, synagogue plaques or entire synagogues dedicated in memory of Holocaust victims. This article shows how an analysis of these and other commemorative forms can teach us much about the nature and dynamics of society in Israel.

The Political Struggle Over the Establishment of a Central Medical Center in the Negev

Shifra Shvarts

The development of the Israeli health care system is characterized by long lasting political struggles. One of the early conflicts was a result of the initiative of the Labor Federation and its health organization, Kupat-Holim, to establish a medical center in the southern region of the state, in the Negev. The issue of who should be the provider of health services for the population of the Negev became the main basis of a dispute between David Ben-Gurion and the Israeli Ministry of Health and Kupat-Holim. The Israeli Government wished to nationalize all health services in the country, including Kupat-Holim. But Kupat-Holim wished to stay independent and opposed the nationalization policy. Building a central hospital in the Negev would enlarge the influence and the organizational power of Kupat-Holim and would help it to remain an independent health organization. The conflict between the government and a locally-rooted socialist organization based on mutual aid and stressing self reliance was focused on the argument about building a central hospital for the Negev populace. In addition, this contention between the government and Kupat-Holim brought the latter to recognize its own organizational power to determine the health policy.

This paper describes this first struggle which affected the crystallization of the social and health policy in Israel during the early years of the state.
Commemorating the Holocaust by Communities and Individuals in the State of Israel

Judith Tydor Baumel

Holocaust commemoration by communities and individuals in the State of Israel reflects an interesting admixture of cultures – the dominant official culture, the popular-national culture and the culture of European immigrants who came to Israel both before and after the Holocaust. This is evident in several spheres. Holocaust commemoration by Landsmanschaften — societies of Jews from the same European city or town — is expressed by Yizkor books and by the tombstone-monuments which these groups erected in Israeli cemeteries. A good number of them erected the monuments over graves containing ashes from extermination camps which their members had brought to Israel, either legally or clandestinely.

Cities, towns, kibbutzim and moshavim in Israel have also erected local Holocaust memorials — many in the form of monuments located in or near the local cemetery. Furthermore, other methods of commemoration include groves planted in memory of Holocaust victims, inscriptions on tombstones
This paper is focused on trying to check the characteristics and relations between the Jewish institutions and the Arab community in Haifa against the background of the apparent difficulties and constraints on the state level in general, and in Haifa as a mixed city in particular. Three aspects will be the substance of the discussion: 1. Consolidation of the cooperation between the Haifa Municipal Administration and the Arab community. 2. Election of municipal representatives. 3. Organization and education.

The first programs to integrate the Arab population within the urban system were put forward even before the Arab countries' invasion into Israel. Security reasoning dictated the base of every program, and accordingly this was reflected in the events of the city. But while the State leaders had been worried as to how to handle the Arab population, in Haifa a relative moderate view had consolidated principally as a historic process in the city, in the meaning of the relations between Jews and Arabs. The orientation to this course was first given by the Committee for Arab Affairs, and later by the Minorities Office branch in Haifa that strove to make everyday life as comfortable as possible for the Arab minority. The leadership of the Municipality, being of mixed color, fulfilled its function till 1950 without any disruption between the Arab and the Jewish delegates. Consequently, many positive implications were seen in the role played by the Municipality acting for the restoration of the Arab minority, for example, the importance that was attached to the build up of the Arab educational system.

'Remember Us'
Maoz Azaryahu

The construction of war memorials in Israel was part of the process of mythologizing the War of Independence. The monuments which were erected narrated the tale of heroic sacrifice and victory and were instrumental in integrating these into the Israeli landscape. At the same time, the various commemoration projects evinced diverse interests that were legitimized by the Zionist consensus concerning the meaning of the war and its objectives.

This article is dedicated to a detailed analysis of the Huleikat Memorial, inaugurated in 1952, that commemorated the 54th Battalion of the Givati Brigade in the Israeli War of Independence. The significance of this monument
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The Labor Settlement Movements Following the Transition from Yishuv to State

Yishai Geva

This article examines the changes that occurred in the development of the Labor Settlement Movements (the collective name referring to the movements of the Moshavim and the Kibbutzim) in the transition time from the Yishuv period to the State of Israel. The major issue is the absorption of thousands of immigrants in the agricultural sector of the newly born state. The basic assumption is that the degree of preparedness on the part of the settlement movements to absorb the newcomers on the one hand, and the absorption patterns created for that purpose on the other, determined the internal development of the various movements as well as their importance in the framework of the Israeli society and state. In order to understand this process the effect of historical factors on the judgments and actions of the decision makers are examined, as well as the effects of the circumstances which prevailed in 1948–1950. The last part of the article points out the connection between the way the new comers were absorbed in the agricultural sector in the early years of the state and the major characteristics of the settlement movements in Israel.

Administrative Actions to Integrate the Arab Minority into the Haifa Urban Community 1948–1950

Tamir Goren

Until the outbreak of the war between Israel and the Arab countries the Haganah succeeded in gaining meaningful military achievements. Taking control of the mixed cities of Tiberias, Haifa and Sefad in less than a month, brought about, for the first time, a new reality in the urban fabric of those cities. The main changes soon showed up in the physical and demographic modifications that derived mostly as a result of the flight of the Arab population and by the acts of the ruling administration. In contrast to the events in Haifa, in Tiberias and Sefad no Arab population remained and in fact these became Jewish cities. Thus, their definition as mixed towns is appropriate just up to the end of the Mandate era.
format. In the framework of the new format the regional units were granted wide planning and execution authority. The new format enabled a closer contact between the agricultural settlers and the settling institutions, thus preventing alienation and numerous errors. In its elemental structure the new layout served as a model for additional regional formations that were later improved by the planning wing of the Prime Minister's Office. These became known as the 'regional-village-corporation'.

Physical Planning of the Northern Negev During Israel's Second Decade

Elisha Efrat

Physical planning of the Northern Negev was carried out in the late 1950s and during the 1960s in order to regulate the urban development of the area in coordination with national and regional considerations and governmental policy; And to describe and determine the then current and future uses and to specify the underlying concepts.

In the physical planning of the region a number of fundamental goals and principles were constantly kept in mind: To achieve the maximum population density in all parts of the Negev; to consolidate the urban aspects of the new towns founded in the past; to promote the economic utilization of the natural resources; to expand the cultivated area wherever possible; to establish communications arteries to connect all parts of the Northern Negev with the rest of the country; to develop the frontier regions and to preserve the natural landscape and antiquity sites for restoration and rehabilitation.

The principal planning of the Northern Negev is demonstrated herewith in five domains: The division into planning units to provide a spatial distribution into homogenous parts as regards planning and development needs; the dispersal of urban and rural population towards 1985; the functional economic division of existing and future urban settlements; the existing and proposed communications including roads, railways, airports and harbors and sites for landscape, recreation and tourism development.
The Negev Enterprise – A New Concept of Developing and Settling the Negev 1949–1951

Chanina Porat

The Negev Enterprise, under the auspices of the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency, started dealing with the settlement and development of the Northern and Western Negev at the beginning of the winter of 1948. The office was put in charge of twenty-eight settlements. These had emerged from the War of Independence in difficult economic and social states. But within several years, aided by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Settlement Movements, the Negev Enterprise established and fostered a total of forty-six agricultural settlements.

During 1949, the Negev Enterprise crystallized its principles pertaining to the settlement of the Negev and endeavored to adjust the nature of the settlements in the area to the urgent needs facing the young state – settling the borders and the abandoned lands, the rapid production of fresh food, the dispersal of the population and the need to employ the new immigrants.

During 1950, the efforts of the Negev Enterprise were directed at planning and aiding the establishment of a new water pipe-line to the Negev, by means of 'Mekorot' Water Company. Thus, as of 1950, millions of cubic meters of water flowed to the settlements, enabling the execution of a daring agricultural plan of planting fruit trees and extensive plots of vegetables. The urgent needs of the state to provide employment to new immigrants prompted the heads of the Enterprise to plan grain-growing villages, almond-growing villages, shepherd groups and mining camps – all being innovative forms of agricultural settlements, providing homes and jobs in the Negev area.

The security problem in the Negev became acute in 1951. Representatives of the Negev Enterprise collaborated with the army in crystallizing plans for the deployment of agricultural settlements along the cease-fire borders with Egypt and Jordan. The Enterprise leaders demanded that the sites of the farm units would not be determined merely by the military-strategic plans, but would also take into consideration the size of the plot offered for cultivation in the area, the nature of the settling nuclear group and the ability of 'Mekorot' to provide the settlements with water.

The Negev Enterprise symbolized the functional change taking place in the settlement frameworks – a transition from a centralized alignment to a regional
and cultural tradition. Already in 1915, D. Ben-Gurion in his appeal to join 
Hehalutz recalled the decisive part played by the frontiersmen in laying the 
foundations of American civilization. L.D. Brandeis, who equated Zionism with 
Americanism, also compared the halutzim to the pioneers.

In the Zionist Youth Movements too, the attitudes ranged from the elevation of halutziut, meaning Aliya to a kibbutz, as the only acceptable movement aim, to its use as an educational method designed to contribute, like other cultural elements of 'Jewish Palestine', to continued religio-ethnic Jewish existence in America.

In 1935, the halutzic youth movement pattern was adopted by the Young Poale Zion Alliance for its younger members and within five years this pattern had become dominant, so that in 1940 the movement name Habonim as well as its ideas and educational methods were approved to designate the organization as a whole. But concurrently the meaning of halutziut for its members was the subject of a debate which continued well into the 1950s. This debate, its main protagonists, and the points of view expressed, are the subjects of this paper.

Among the first to attempt an original approach towards American Jewish youth was Enzo Sereni, who served as an emissary (shaliah) in 1936–1937. His idea of halutziut as a meaningful alternative to those spiritually dissatisfied with life in America found one significant convert: Ben Halpern, who served as secretary of Hehalutz and whose halutz ideology, as influenced by Sereni, is shown to lie at the root of his concept of American Jewish existence. After Sereni, Ben-Tzion Appelbaum (Ilan) tried to prepare members for kibbutz life, especially in the light of the failure of many American halutzim to adjust. As part of this preparation he also attempted to substitute the socialist-Zionist ideology of the movement with the 'revolutionary constructivism' as developed by Berl Katzenelson. But at the same time a trend in the opposite direction arose in Habonim, proposing Halutzic realization of the movement's aims in America. The debate continued throughout the 1940s and came to an end in the early 1950s, largely as a result of changing circumstances in America and Israel.
Jewish problem was a national one and assumed that it must be solved by the establishment of a Jewish Statehood. At first, the establishment of a Jewish-Belorussian Republic was considered. Later, as of 1923, all efforts were channeled towards the establishment of a compact Jewish settlement in regions that were adjacent to each other and close to the Sea of Azov, as a basis for the Soviet Jewish Republic.

The article discusses the various memorandums and particularly that of Abraham Bragin and Gregory Broido. The author points out the positive attitude of the Yevsektsiya as to the solution and to its efforts to be involved in promoting the subject within the framework of the Komzet (The Committee for Agricultural Resettlement of the Jewish Working People). In this connection, Esther Frumkin's positive attitude is also discussed, including its theoretical aspects.

Efforts for compact settlement failed, first and foremost, because the various republics refused the demands to relinquish their lands for the sake of the enterprise. This shows that the lands of different republics had clear national parameters and could not be transferred from one authority to another according to the principle that land belongs to whosoever works it. The national parameter of acquired lands was inherent with the New Economic Policy, an issue that the planners could not eventually evade.

**Halutzic Theses and Antitheses in North America:**
**Enzo Sereni, Ben Halpern and Others**

Yehuda Riemer

The *Hehalutz* organization originated in North America and in fact was founded there three times: in 1905, 1915 and 1933. American *halutzim* have played a modest, but not insignificant part in the realization of the *halutz* ideal by establishing or joining pioneering settlements, beginning in Mandatory Palestine and continuing in the State of Israel. But no less meaningful were the interpretations given to the term as a result of the unique dynamics of American Jewish life, as well as the interaction between American Jewry and what was then known as 'Labor Palestine'.

Similarly to Judaism and Zionism, the concept of *Halutziat* underwent a process of Americanization, i.e. attempts to integrate it into the American ethic
From a 'Low Profile' Policy to a 'Steamroller Strategy' – The Kennedy Administration and the Israeli Nuclear Build Up 1962–1963

Zaki Shalom

When the Israeli nuclear build up in the Dimona reactor was first revealed in December 1960, the Kennedy Administration had not yet officially taken over. During the first months of 1961, it was still making its first, very cautious, steps in the foreign policy arena. Thus, although the struggle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons was first on its agenda, the Administration could hardly undertake far-reaching measures in this regard. This fact, coupled with other considerations, led the Kennedy Administration to carry out a 'low profile' and moderate policy towards Israel's nuclear build up.

In 1962, and more so in 1963, the Kennedy Administration seemed to have estimated that unless drastic measures were taken to control the development of the Israeli nuclear build up, an irreversible nuclear reality might develop in the Middle East within a relatively short period of time. As a result, the Kennedy Administration embarked upon an unprecedented campaign, accompanied by vigorous threats, to ensure ongoing regular inspections of the Dimona reactor by American scientists. This demand seemed to the Israeli leadership to be counter to Israel's most vital security interests.

An analysis of the efforts of the Israeli leadership, headed by Ben-Gurion until June 1963, and later on by Levy Eshkol, to avoid major damage to the development of Israel's nuclear option on the one hand, and to prevent a dangerous rupture with the US, on the other hand, is the crux of this article.

Problems of Agricultural Resettlement and Territorialization of the Jews in Soviet Russia in the 1920s

Matityahu Minc

The author claims that from its beginning, the issue of transferring Jews to work the land in the 1920s in Soviet Russia, and their agricultural resettlement, clearly had a national-political aspect. The Soviet leadership understood that the
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Middle East in the later 1950s and 1960s. Only the fresh challenge Gamal Abdul Nasser put to this status quo in May 1967 brought about the final and absolute collapse of the armistice regime which had defined Arab–Israeli relations through almost two decades.

The Position of the Arab States Towards the Question of Palestine 1947–1949

Ilan Pappe

This article analyses the position of the Arab states towards the question of Palestine during 1947–1949. The article points to the disarray and the disunity which were prevalent in the Arab camp on the eve of the 1948 War. Warlike rhetoric was not matched by any serious preparations for the military confrontation in Palestine. Similar impotence was displayed towards the crucial debates in the UN on the future of post-mandatory Palestine. The Arab delegations failed to present a united front in the Assembly and exert pressure, which they could have exerted, to modify Resolution 181 which was conceived by them as hostile and unacceptable.

The article concentrates on the diplomatic battle during and after the war of 1948. It examines the Arab League’s position vis a vis the UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, in the summer of 1948. Bernadotte was willing to rectify the UN partition resolution according to the situation of the forces on the ground at the end of the first lull in the fighting. He also suggested the repatriation of the refugees and the internationalization of Jerusalem. While these three components, as a basis for a solution in post-mandatory Palestine, were rejected by most of the Arab countries in the summer of 1948, they were accepted a year later at the Lausanne Conference. Arab willingness to negotiate over these issues was not reciprocated by the Israeli government, hence it is difficult to assess the essence of the shift in the Arab position.

The article also points to the unique position adopted by the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan in this episode and stresses its ambivalent attitude towards both Israel and the pan-Arab stance on the one hand, and its hostile attitude towards the Palestinian cause, on the other.
colleagues of the ruling elite, considered the new status quo which the armistice agreements formulated as the best deal Israel and the Zionist movement could realistically achieve. This status quo was considered by them a better bargain than even a full peace treaty, since the achievement of Peace would require concessions which Israel refused to make, such as giving up its control of the Negev or a massive return of Palestinian refugees.

Despite the Israeli political elite's overall acceptance of the new territorial deployment of the state during 1955 and 1956, even Ben-Gurion seriously considered the enforcement of changes in Israel's frontiers by an armed initiative. The October 1956 Sinai Campaign was clearly launched with the intention to change the borders between Israel and Egypt. This aberration in Israel's basic policy must be explained less by emotional or ideological motives (which in any case were connected more with the Jordanian controlled West Bank and primarily with Jerusalem, areas which were not part of the aims of that campaign) than by rational calculations of the prevailing security conditions. A more elaborate definition of the term status quo must be used in this case.

When Israel accepted the armistice agreements as the final verdict of the 1948 War it had assumed that they meant more than just a temporary truce in the fighting. Israel interpreted the Arab undertaking as an inhibited mandate given to Israel to develop its life and absorb its immigrants without any limitations or threats, throughout the territories under its effective control. This interpretation was not accepted by the Arabs and the escalation of violent confrontations and other acts of belligerency during 1951-1955, and the growing threats of a 'second round' led the Israeli security establishment to conclude that the armistice agreements may have after all been a bad bargain. Under conditions of belligerency, the Israeli strategists concluded that the territorial situation was too dangerous and Israel had become too vulnerable as a result. The insistence of the Arabs to stick to their position as 'belligerents' under the classic interpretation of the terms of armistices should be taken advantage of in order to improve Israel's frontiers.

The Sinai Campaign failed in its territorial ambitions, but achieved a return to the armistice agreements with greater Arab compliance with the Israeli interpretation of their meaning and detailed terms. It gave Israel a respite of another ten years in which it managed to develop its economic and military strength, which eventually made the striking victory in the Six Days War possible. This enabled Ben-Gurion to return to his erstwhile strict adherence to the post-1948 status quo, despite the dramatic changes which occurred in the
supposed to outmaneuver the Iraqi army out of Samaria (Nablus–Jenin–Tulkarm) by diplomatic means. Israel would then sign a peace agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and let it annex the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, providing Jordan with an access to the Mediterranean Sea via land arrangements to the Gaza Strip.

Following Ben-Gurion's directions, the IDF initiated 'Operation Horev' in the last week of December 1948. Nitzana and Abu-Ageila were taken by the Israeli Southern Front Forces. From Abu-Ageila on the Egyptian side of the international border, the IDF threatened the vital strategic bases in the Egyptian rear in Sinai. Israel expected the Egyptians to dilute their forces in the Gaza Strip by diverting some of them to the vicinity of El-Arish. After four-five days, the IDF's main effort was supposed to attack and conquer the weakened Gaza Strip, or at least cut it off totally from Sinai. This expected plan was not fulfilled. On 31 December, President Truman, on behalf of the US and Britain, delivered the Israeli Government with a strict demand to immediately evacuate all the Israeli military forces from Sinai. Ben-Gurion conceded and the IDF completed its evacuation on the morning of 2 January 1949. Another Israeli attempt to cut off the Gaza Strip from Sinai did not succeed. Ben-Gurion accepted the fait accompli that Gaza would remain under Egyptian occupational rule. Thus, Ben-Gurion's comprehensive strategic and political concept as to how to end Israel's War of Independence did not materialize completely.

Status Quo – Before or After?
Commentary Notes on Israel's Defense Policy 1949–1958

Mordechai Bar-On

The original dream of all Zionists has been to establish sovereignty over the entire land of Biblical Palestine. The Zionist movement accepted the partition of the land only after many bitter internecine controversies and by a rather narrow majority decision. Partition became a military, political and legal reality upon the termination of the 1948 War when four armistice agreements were concluded between the recently founded State of Israel and its neighboring Arab states.

A number of minority parties on the right and left of the ruling Labor party continued to aspire to further territorial expansion. But Ben-Gurion, and his
matter of convenience which both sides used in order to further their wishes? It is very difficult to answer this question. However, it seems that Cunningham did see Abdullah as a personal friend while it is difficult to say the reverse was true. Cunningham was ready to assist Abdullah to further his aims as long as they did not contravene British interests and his own principles.

This essay tries to illustrate the mutual relations between these two different men.

D. Ben-Gurion's Policy and Strategy at the End of Israel's War of Independence

Meir Pail

Until the end of April 1948, the Zionist strategy adhered to the policy expressed in UN Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947. Just before the invasion of the Arab armies, on 15 May 1948, while the guerrilla war of the Israelis against the Palestinians and the foreign Arab volunteers reached its peak, Ben-Gurion confirmed the following four military operational offensives to be carried out by the Haganah, intended to expand Jewish territorial holdings, beyond that which had been allotted to the Jewish State by the UN Partition Plan:

1. To encircle and occupy Jaffa (25 April).
2. To occupy Western Galilee (11 May).
3. To take control of the main road to Jerusalem (12 May).
4. To attempt to take Ramla (14 May).

The first and second missions were accomplished before the Arab armies' invasion started. The third and fourth missions were completed only two months later by the Haganah, which had by now become the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), after the Jordanian army temporarily succeeded in cutting off the main road to Jerusalem.

During October 1948, the IDF succeeded in breaking the Egyptian besiegement of the Negev; to occupy Be'er-Sheva; to widen the corridor to Jerusalem, and to drive out from the entire Galilee all the Lebanese and Arab 'Salvation' army forces. Following these strategic achievements, Ben-Gurion developed his final strategic concept for terminating the war: The IDF was to occupy the whole Negev and drive out the Egyptian army completely out of the borders of the Holy-Land. Simultaneously, King Abdullah of Jordan was
destroyed the Jewish infrastructure in Eretz-Israel, except in the Galilee. It was obvious that no revolt within the Roman Empire had a chance of succeeding.

When Prof. Harkabi discussed current issues he criticized various attitudes concerning the solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He rejected the stand which called for a withdrawal without a peace treaty. He also criticized the notion of defendable borders. As he saw it there were various degrees of defensibility of borders according to the ever-changing military technology.

Regarding issues of Jewish tradition, Prof. Harkabi admitted that he was an agnostic Jew. He did not believe a man could possibly know the will of God. Of all the Jewish writings he preferred those of the sages – the Talmud and the Mishna – over the Bible. He loathed the Kabbalah and on this he was in consent with the late Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz, though he did not agree with him on some other major issues.

The Mutual Relations between High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cunningham, and King Abdullah 1945–1948

Haim Levenberg

Abdullah was Britain's devoted supporter not only because Britain had established and sustained his kingdom, but also because he regarded Britain as the only power which might support him in his hopes for a Greater Syria. Ever since the Peel Commission had recommended the partition of Palestine in 1937, Abdullah regarded the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine as a major step towards his plan. No wonder then, that Abdullah was eager to begin at once his cooperation with Cunningham – the new High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, hoping to gain his confidence and support.

Since Cunningham regarded Abdullah as 'one of our few loyal friends in the Middle East', it was only natural that personal relations developed between the two men. Mutual meetings and visits helped them to get to know one another. It seems that the 'chemistry' established during 1946 between the two personalities developed through 1947 – so much so, that Abdullah referred to Cunningham as 'my bosom friend' (sadiqi al-hamim), while the High Commissioner announced to the Secretary of State that '... I see Abdullah still on terms of personal friendship and could no doubt help to further H.M.G.'s wishes ...'.

Was it really a true friendship between the two different personalities or just a
ABSTRACTS

Interview with Prof. Y. Harkabi *

Interviewed by Pinhas Ginossar and Zaki Shalom

Since the late Prof. Harkabi was deeply involved with Israel's security problems, in various capacities, over an extended period, this topic was one of the first to be raised in the interview. Concerning the Israeli Military Intelligence, Prof. Harkabi observed that in its initial stages it was based on total improvisation. Its staff members had no sufficient military training or experience. They had to contend with a miscellany of security issues that the fledgling state had to confront, starting with the Fidaiyyun activities right up to the imminent threat of an all out attack by the Arab countries. According to Prof. Harkabi, during the 1950s there was no chance that the Arab world could accept the existence of Israel, even if Israel had adopted a more flexible policy than the one that it did. Prof. Harkabi rejected all the speculations regarding this issue raised by politicians and historians. This view changed in the 1970s. By then the Arabs had learned, rather slowly, a lesson in history. Albeit, their basic attitude of regarding Israel as a terrible injustice did not change, but two factors caused them to accept Israel as a reality. The first – the understanding that they could not clash with international recognition of Israel's legitimacy and the second was Israel's strength.

Prof. Harkabi believed that Jewish settling in Judea and Samaria was a colossal error. This could not withstand the 'feasibility test' as he had written Menachem Begin already in 1977. It was immoral mostly because it was unrealistic and thus irresponsible. The irresponsible political behavior of a leader only inflicts unnecessary suffering upon his people. Prof. Harkabi's example for such unrealistic behavior was Bar-Kokhva's rebellion which had

* The interview with Prof. Harkabi took place in Jerusalem in January 1994, a few months before his death. Dr. Ginossar took upon himself to edit the discussion. We thank Prof. Harkabi's son, Mr. Dan Harkabi, for reviewing the text and permitting us to publish it.