This article discusses the collective concept of the Jews in the modern era, i.e. their transition from being a religious nation to their being a people defined by several aspects - civil, lingual-cultural and religious. The term Klal Israel (All Israel) thus represents the ideological aspiration as well as the political interest to maintain a Jewish unity on a global base.

In the first part, the article examines the modern attitude to Klal Israel on two levels: historiography and politics. It analyzes the view of the historians who wrote the history of the Jewish people in the modern era. It also examines modern political ideologies of Jews - secular as well as religious - in which the issue of Klal Israel was central. The second part of the article discusses the validity of these views of the historians examined above and the validity of the various ideologies in terms of the concept of Klal Israel. It deals with the question whether these historical and ideological conceptions, facing far-reaching changes in the Jewish society since the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, can still indicate or promote the continuation of Klal Israel.

In the third part, the article examines the different possibilities of forming a Jewish common denominator on a multi-cultural and worldwide basis in view of these changes. Here we find the distinction between Jewish visions that are only partial in terms of their contents and the public they address, on the one hand, and Zionism on the other. From its beginning, Zionism promoted in its practice both the idea and the ethos of Klal Israel, and it is now the only Jewish vision that can still promote this idea. Under current conditions, those parts of the Jewish people who wish to uphold the framework of Klal Israel, because they have faith in it and because of their political interests, must accept the Zionist ethos as a minimal common denominator of a multi-cultural and dispersed nation.
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Israel’s Role in Structuring Modern Jewish Identities

Ruth Gavison

The paper argues that Israel’s unique features as the only place with a Jewish majority and a Jewish-Hebrew public culture, have pervasive and diverse effects on the structuring of contemporary Jewish identities in Israel and abroad. Israel’s laws define ‘Jewishness’ for purposes of Return, registration and personal status. These issues have created an ongoing debate concerning religious pluralism, which has hurt the legitimacy of all state authorities as welcoming variety of Jewish perceptions. Israel should find ways to serve as an inclusive force and not as a sectarian one, while respecting the need of orthodox Jews to be able to identify those who meet their own standards of Jewish membership. Israel’s public culture provides an amazing support for Jewish culture of all kinds, but it is of special importance to non-religious Jews, who gain a natural way of maintaining Jewish identity without fear of assimilation. At the same time, the very naturalness of maintaining this Jewish identity may lead to its vulnerability. These strengths and weaknesses of Israel should be attended to, so that those in Israel and abroad who wish to strengthen and deepen the Jewish components of their identities could benefit from the former and avoid the latter.

The Reconstruction of Herzl’s Image in Israeli Collective Memory: From Formative Radicalism to an Adapting Fringe

Daniel Gutwein

In the last century, Herzl’s image has been repeatedly reconstructed in the Zionist and Israeli collective memory. This article examines the way Shlomo Avineri, one of Israel’s leading political scientists and Zionist thinkers, has done so in two different texts which appeared in 1980 and 1998, respectively.

There is a striking difference between Herzl’s image in the two texts. In 1980, Avineri followed the accepted version in historical research and depicted Herzl as a well-known journalist, whose Zionist ideas crystallized while he was in Paris. There he gradually came to view Antisemitism as the result of modern politics, and not as a remnant of the pre-modern traditional order, as it had appeared to him in Vienna. In 1998, in contrast, Avineri portrayed Herzl as a hardly important journalist,
whose Zionist ideas were formed in Vienna under the impression of Austrian Antisemitism and its implications for the Jews in its non-German provinces. These provinces, mainly Galicia, also served as a bridge between Herzl and the nascent Jewish nationalism in Eastern Europe that informed his Zionism. In 1998, Avineri marginalized Herzl personally, geographically, ideologically and politically. However, he did not point either to the change that had taken place in his own views, or to its reasons.

Examination of the arguments put forward by Avineri to sustain the marginalization of Herzl in 1998 prove to be self-contradicting, chronologically problematic, conflicting with well-established historical data, and putting forward a questionable presentation of current historiography. While the tranformation in Avineri’s views can not be explained by developments in historical research, it appears, however, as an adaptation to the changes in Israeli politics and public discourse.

In 1980, in the wake of the fall of the Labor Government, Avineri, as one of its ideological speakers, tried to posit Labor Zionism as the real follower of Herzl. This was meant to give the Labor party a ‘national’ legitimization in its contest with the Right. Two decades later, the Labor party was marginalized in Israeli politics and lost its hegemony. Accordingly, Avineri marginalized Herzl as a national symbol to facilitate a dialogue with other marginalized groups in Israeli society. The marginalization of Herzl further served to combat the assault launched by the Post-Zionists, who portray Zionism as an oppressive colonial force. Marginalizing Herzl undermines the hegemonic nature of Zionism and legitimizes it as just another ‘Other’.

### Anatomy of Jabotinsky’s Critique of Socialism
#### Part II: Critique of the Socialist Change in the World and in Eretz Israel*

Reuven Shoshani

This article contains the second and final part of the effort to delineate Zeev Jabotinsky’s entire critical approach towards Socialism, both in theory and in practice. The crux of the article is an examination of two issues, each of which has a different geo-political status and scope.

The first issue is the aspiration for a universal socialist change. According to

\* Part I is to be published separately in our forthcoming volume on Jabotinsky.
Jabotinsky (1880-1940), this in the long run will have nothing to support it for it has no moral legitimacy. This is derived from the conclusions reached when considering the nature and the extent of the strategic efficiency of the means, the agent, whereby normative socialism intends to make the revolutionary change, namely, the international proletariat. Analysis of the agent shows that its weaknesses and limitations are of structural characteristics. Much to the detriment of its Socialist followers this trait expropriates its revolutionary sting and the justification of its revolutionary intentions and goals. At this point, the author of this paper names four reasons why according to Jabotinsky, international socialism is doomed to fail: One - it cannot withstand the test of international solidarity when confronted by immigration and racial differentiation. Two - the inevitable development of modern economics will necessarily enforce itself upon the proletariat. Thereby, it will significantly weaken its ability and political power to bring about specific social changes. Three - in total contrast to its anticipated political and social human emancipation, the political victory of international socialism will only beget a brutal and arbitrary dictatorship. Four - due to its improved and enhanced political, social and economic conditions, the international proletariat will in fact lose its moral basis in its struggles to attain the goals of distinct social classes. Consequently, Jabotinsky, at times explicitly and at other times implyingly, calls the Jewish proletariat in Eastern Europe and Eretz Israel to give up the false spell of a socialist vision, as well as the inclination towards the international working class, in favor of forging a nationalist-Zionist solidarity and to advance its particular aims.

The second issue discussed in this paper is the socialist change that the workers’ movement in Eretz Israel sought to make in the social fabric of the Yishuv. In Jabotinsky’s assessment, no effort could be more deplorable since objectively it placed obstacles in the path of the Zionist enterprise. For Jabotinsky, it was axiomatic that for the Zionist goals to be achieved, convenient conditions for the growth and prosperity of the Yishuv’s bourgeoisie had to prevail. Therefore, the socialist aspect of the ideological synthesis advocated by the labor movement, combining, in the opinion of the Zionist-Revisionist leader, labor union militancy on the one hand, and the disbursement of national capital resources for cooperative settlement on the other, must necessarily pull the rug from under the feet of private property, and consequently cut off the branch that served as the basis for the Zionist build-up. A total and unavoidable failure would therefore be the fate of the Zionist accomplishment, should the Zionist Left shape its character and chart the course of its development.

An additional obstacle which could bring the Zionist enterprise to an end were the inherent ideological attitudes of the special framework of ‘Constructive
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Socialism’. The most important and notable of them was the ‘petit bourgeois’ mentality - ascribing the highest priority to preserving, improving and obtaining material acquisitions. As such, and it seemed to be a chronic disease, it could only mean enslavement to a sectarian and provincial outlook, just as it should copy the image of its own progenitor, both by reasoning that ultimately leads to ‘political minimalism’ and nourishes processes of deterioration and decline of the momentum of the national vision. Since the social and political management of the labor movement - which directly or indirectly commanded an enormous collection of material possessions - was infected ‘organically’, in Jabotinsky’s opinion with the ‘petit bourgeois’ mentality, its claims to serve as the spearhead of the Zionist movement (and/or establish for itself exclusive hegemony), and had no justification theoretically, functionally or ethically from a Zionist perspective.

Therefore, according to Jabotinsky, the quest for a socialist change in the world, not only had dubious moral bases but also relied on extremely flimsy support. Also, the quest for a socialist change within the Yishuv, inevitably bore the seeds of destruction of the Zionist undertaking.

A Leader in Search of Disciples - Me’ir Ya’ari’s Way to the Leadership of Hashomer Hatzair, 1918-1927

Aviva Halamish

Me’ir Ya’ari (1897-1987), the unequivocal leader of Hashomer Hatzair for almost half a century, did not belong to the founding fathers of that movement which was first founded as a Zionist youth movement prior to World War I. By 1927 he headed the Kibbutz Ha’artzi that was a nationwide movement of Hashomer Hatzair graduates. He later became the leader of the socialist-Zionist political party - Mapam. This article offers answers to the queries of how and when did the man who did not leave a significant impact on the early period of the movement become its leader.

Ya’ari’s rise to leadership is depicted as a three-stage process. During stage one, from the fall of 1920 to the fall of 1921, he gained prominent status among a close circle of comrades and represented the movement in various conventions and gatherings. Stage two was an interlude, from the fall of 1921 to the spring of 1923. During this time, he did not belong to any steady group and underwent a process of self examination which led him to make the transformation from being a leader of a small intimate group to become the head of a movement scattered all over the...
country. Stage three was a series of persistent steps he took. In cooperation with Ya’akov Hazan he formed an independent kibbutz movement of Hashomer Hatzair graduates. This culminated with the establishment of Hakibbutz Ha’artzi in April 1927. By that time, Ya’ari was universally recognized as the leader of the movement.

The main contention of the article is that Ya’ari was driven by an ambition to be a leader from his early youth. Since his coming to Palestine in 1920, he endeavored to realize his aspirations by forming an organization that he would lead. Hakibbutz Ha’artzi was molded as an all-encompassing movement, to fit Ya’ari’s type of leadership.

The most important assets on the road to leadership were Ya’ari’s clear ideas as to the desired aim: preserving the uniqueness and the unity of Hashomer Hatzair graduates in Palestine. Also, his continuous and stubborn efforts to build institutions and organizations that facilitated the formation of the social framework over which he could establish his leadership.

Ideology played only a secondary role on his way to leadership. He adopted Marxism as the second pillar, next to Zionism, of Hashomer Hatzair’s ideology for the purpose of preventing the movement from being assimilated into other political groups or disintegrating all together.


Amiram Oren

In December 1997, the IDF Archives declassified various documents pertaining to the first years of the State of Israel. Amongst these was a document of the Planning Division of the IDF General Staff entitled: ‘The Order of Battle - An Assessment, 1953-1960.’ The aim of this article is to present the main points of this document which is the summary of the work done by the Planning Department of the General Staff. The article also examines the moves that led to the staff paper, as well as the first steps of the application of the recommendations of this document.

The main claim of this article is that this document was a conceptual turning-point in the basic organization of the IDF following the War of Independence, from a ‘Defensive-Offensive’ approach to an ‘Offensive-Defensive’ approach. The underlying thought was that due to its lack of any strategic depth, the State of Israel could not await quietly for the all-Arab attack. There was a potential threat that the Arab armies would invade the country and sever it. This led to the need to change
the components and structure of the IDF so that it would include long-range strategic intelligence that would locate in advance the intentions and movements of the Arab armies. Also, a large and strong air-force which could hit the Arab air-forces and also prevent the Arab land forces from being activated as well as enlarging the IDF’s armored forces to enable them to carry out land attacks, including paratroopers for special missions.

David Ben-Gurion studied this document of the General Staff Planning Division while on leave from the government, and when forming his new political and defense policy which he presented to the government on his return in October 1953. This ‘Offensive-Defensive’ concept and new program, as outlined by Ben-Gurion, was approved by the government and passed on to the IDF for implementation.

The General Staff Forum held several debates concerning this document after which a number of operative decisions were taken following the recommendations layed out by the planning team. Further applications are to be found in the IDF’s work-plan for 1954-55 that was presented as soon as Lt.-General Moshe Dayan took office as Chief-of-Staff at the end of December 1953. In April 1954, the basic stage was completed. This was the planning in case an all Arab initiated attack against Israel should take place any time between 1955 to 1958. This became known as the ‘Lavie Plan’. The uniqueness and importance of this plan, and all the plans for war which were derived from it, all rest with the conclusion that the initiative must be preferred. Namely, a ‘preemptive strike’ is better than to await the aggressors’ attack. To forestall the attack and only after that to attack the foe. Clearly, the 1953 document is the theoretic basis for the ‘Lavie Plan’ and signalled the turning-point in the IDF’s defense policy. It was also the ideological foundation for the built-up of the IDF in the late ’fifties and early ’sixties and found expression in the IDF’s image and activities in the Six-Day War in June 1967.

The Israeli-Arab States Water Dispute, 1964-1967 - As a Factor in the Process which Led to the Six-Day War

Moshe Gat

At the end of 1963, the water dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbours erupted in all its fury. Of all the issues on the agenda of the Arab-Israeli conflict, whether the refugee problem or the status of the demilitarized zone along the Israeli-Syrian border, the water dispute, from then onwards, would have the most incisive and far
reaching effect on Israel’s relations with its neighbors. Also, though to a lesser degree, on inter-Arab relations as well. The dispute not only undermined the relative stability, which the Middle East had enjoyed since the conclusion of the Sinai campaign, but engendered a new and dynamic pattern of aggressive reaction and counter-reaction, which would, henceforth, characterise the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The two sides to the dispute adopted, throughout the crisis, diametrically opposed positions as regards the question of who had the right to exploit the River Jordan. Israel considered its ability to utilise the River’s waters to be vital to its future development. Allowing Israel to absorb immigration, as well as to rationally distribute its population, would ensure the state’s continued and fruitful existence. Accordingly, Israel had little doubt that the Arabs’ strident opposition to its plans was part and parcel of the Arab strategy of first weakening, and then eradicating the State of Israel. The Arabs, by contrast, were convinced that Israel’s water project posed a grave threat to their national interests. By vastly improving Israel’s ability to absorb new immigrants, it would lead to a colossal increase in the population of the Jewish State. The result would be a pugnacious Israel even more determined to expand at the Arabs’ expense. No less seriously, the Israeli plan would also put an end to the Palestinian refugees’ chances of returning home.

The dispute over the Jordan River was deemed by both Israel and the Arab states to be one of power, past, present and future. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that neither side was willing to compromise and resolve the affair peacefully. Instead, the Arabs sought to counter-divert the River Jordan at its source, while Israel exploited its military might to thwart the Arab scheme to sabotage its ability - vital to its continued development - to transport water southwards. The intransigent and bellicose policies adopted by both sides spawned a rapidly growing escalation in the Middle East, culminating in the air battle which took place on 7 April 1967, over the skies of Damascus; an air battle which was to be the prologue to the Six-Day War.

**Economic and Security Aspects of the Decisions to Produce an Airplane and a Tank in Israel**

**Yitzhak Greenberg**

The idea of producing an airplane and a tank in Israel had been examined prior to the Six-Day War but was not fully explored. Following the war and realizing the difficulties that had been raised in purchasing arms abroad, the issue became acute.
Therefore, in 1968, it was decided to develop and produce an airplane in Israel, and in 1970 the same decision was taken regarding the tank.

The arguments in favor of the local development and production of the airplane and the tank were foremost political as well as ones of security. These included the aspiration to create an alternative supply source should there be an embargo on selling arms to Israel, thereby reducing the security risks; as well as the need to decrease Israel’s dependence on external suppliers and reduce the exposure to political pressures.

The decision making process included economic considerations. On the one hand were the advantages: Reduced expenses in foreign currency, increasing Israel’s industrial infrastructure as well as creating further employment opportunities. On the other hand, the local production compelled huge financial investments. Namely, it entailed a heavy burden on Israel’s entire economy and on the State’s budget in particular.

As the issue of equipment became more acute, and there was fear for lack of acquisition possibilities - so the political-security consideration grew in importance and the question of economics decreased. This found expression in the decision to produce the airplane and the tank. In the case of the airplane, the political-security consideration was decisive whereas the economic aspect became secondary. In contrast, in the case of the tank, it appears that there was depreciation in the political-security consideration and a far greater weight was attributed to the economic factors.

Terms of Disgust: Hygiene and Parenthood of Immigrants from Moslem Countries as Viewed by Veteran Israelis in the 1950s

Orit Rozin

The relationship between Israel’s veteran society and the newly arrived immigrants, especially those who came from Moslem countries during the 1950s, has been the focus of many studies. The common stereotype of those new immigrants was a negative one. Amongst other traits, they were portrayed as ignorant, primitive, dirty and lazy. They also suffered from their affinity to the culture of Israel’s enemies - the Arabs. One of the purposes of this article is to describe how the negative image of the new immigrants was shaped in the eyes of the old timers and how this view was transferred to the general public. Two separate, but related, aspects of the stereotype are the focus of this study: The image of the Mizrachi (Eastern) immigrants as parents and their attitude towards matters of cleanliness and hygiene.
Both issues are considered in the article as belonging to the cultural infrastructure of the veterans. When exposed to the surrounding and culture of the Mizrahi immigrants, the veterans felt disgust and found them repulsive. The connection between hygiene, morality and the attitude of the veterans towards the Mizrahi immigrants is examined. The sources of the disgust, its nature and the boundaries of this emotion are also drawn.

At the end of the paper the alternative or optional feelings are presented: the feeling of responsibility, of empathy, compassion and solidarity, but also those of indifference and ignorance.

The Beginning of the Moderate Vision in Hapoel Hatzair
1905-1917

Meir Chazan

The question of the use of force, its usefulness and its far-reaching moral and educational consequences was a major issue in the Yishuv during the first half of the Twentieth Century. Since the controversy surrounding the volunteering for the Gdud Ivri [The Jewish Legion] in 1918, the split between the ‘activists’ and the ‘moderates’ became a determining factor in the molding of the consciousness and the opposing political standpoints within the Labor Movement. However, the source of these molds can be found during the Second Aliyah. At that time, the lines of division, both overt and potential regarding the use of force, became evident amongst the Laborites. The article describes affairs in the fields of labor and defense, which laid the basis for the future clash within the Labor Movement regarding the use of force and its significance. It focuses on the evolving line of the ‘moderates’.

The article deals with the years 1905-1917 and discusses the struggles for Jewish Labor, those around Hahoresh and Hashomer, the way Hapoel Hatzair implemented the principle of defense during the ‘Zarnuga Affair’, and during the First World War. The article attempts to clarify in which areas the moderates’ approach came to light in Hapoel Hatzair at that time and how it was expressed. Can different degrees of moderation be distinguished within Hapoel Hatzair? To what extent is Hapoel Hatzair’s image accurate, as it is manifested in the consciousness and the writing of history as having always upheld moderation?

In this article a distinction is made between two forms of ‘moderation’ which
existed amongst members of *Hapoel Hatzair*. In the first form the ‘moderates’ gave priority to Jewish labor, distanced themselves from militarism, recoiled from rebelliousness and procrastination in public life and objected to the use of violence in internal debates. In the second, in addition to the trends mentioned above, the ‘moderates’ also opposed activism in defense and politics, and fostered the desire for compromise between Jews and Arabs.

**Agents of the Criminal Investigations Department in the Palestine Communist Party**

Yair Spiegel

The recruitment of agents and activating them within the ranks of the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) was the central pillar of the CID’s intelligence efforts aimed at the Communist opponent.

Between 1945 and 1947 the CID had at least two highly placed agents amongst the Communists - one in the Jewish PCP, the other in the ‘Arab League for National Liberation’ (ALNL). These agents supplied the CID with intimate, inside information about both parties, their central institutes and auxiliary organizations. From CID documents one can learn about the probable identity of the CID’s top agent in the ALNL and his motives for cooperating with the CID.

**The Pursuit after the ‘Red Brothers’ - The CID and the PKP (1921-1933)**

Jacob Markovizky

This article focuses on the activities of the British Mandatory authorities, especially the Criminal Investigation Department (The CID), against the ‘peril’ of the ‘Red Brothers’, the Communist party members in Palestine, from 1921 to 1933.

On the basis of prevailing documentation, the article addresses the causes of this policy and maps the main reasons for these activities. The author also draws attention to the correlation between these conspiratorial and agitating activities and the escalation among the militant members of the Arab national movement in Palestine during this period, mainly towards the incidents and the riots of 1921, 1929 and 1933.
The Home Front at War: The Civil Guard in Tel Aviv, 1938-1945

Moshe Naor

The author traces the origins of the Civil Guard in Tel Aviv, founded in 1938 during the Arab revolt, as part of the Yishuv’s assessments and preparations for World War II. Also, its development as a permanent local organization and its dismantlement at the end of the war in 1945. During this period, the Civil Guard dealt mainly with problems of public order on the Home Front and was in charge of the Civil Defense in Tel Aviv. The Civil Guard was based on volunteering. It came about as a result of the community’s local initiative that was actively involved in civil organizations. The organization itself was an apolitical structure that reflected in its formation the peculiar character of a city like Tel Aviv.

The author stresses the Civil Guard’s modes and attempts in trying to face the different problems which grew out of the organization itself: The question of whether to remain a local association or become a national organization; of conserving its ‘civic’ character or developing into a military structure as well as the problems connected to the Civil Guard’s goals and aims.

The author underlines the importance of this voluntary association that was, to a certain extent, the expression of the relations between the local authority and the British Government, as well as the expression of the relations between the political local leadership and the political leadership of the Yishuv during the war.

Mapai’s Fear of Educating for ‘Russian Apostasy’ and the Abolition of the Zerem Haovdim Schools

Zvi Zameret

In the summer of 1951, Mapai decided to abolish Zerem Haovdim, the education network of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor), after many years that a decisive majority within the party had rejected the demands to do so. This article claims that the decision was taken then, for the abolishment, primarily due to a process of diminishing the moral common denominator shared by the various branches of the Zionist Labor Movement.

Five major reasons led to that decision. First and foremost amongst them: The
feeling amongst Mapai’s leaders that Zerem Haovdim was blinding its pupils, educating them to cancel their own power of criticism, leading them to admire a dictatorial figure and causing them, what David Ben-Gurion called with great concern, ‘Russian apostasy’.

Second: Pressure from large groups of new immigrants, which had doubled the population of the country between 1948 to 1951, most of whom did not comprehend the difference between the two secular education frameworks (the ‘General Network’ and the ‘Workers’ Network’).

Third: The economic pressure and lack of resources that did not enable to build so many school-buildings simultaneously and purchase so much learning equipment.

Fourth: The self assurance of the leaders of Zerem Haovdim that their network was growing so steadfastly - it was in fact already the largest in the country - that even if the two secular networks were to be cancelled, their educational ethos would in any case remain dominant and leave its mark on the state’s education system.

Fifth: The public pressure from various circles of old-timers, from some significant leaders as well as senior educators who were tired of the over-politicization of the education system and the struggles over recruiting pupils.

Of all these factors, Mapai’s fear of Mapam’s increasing pro-Soviet tendency was the cause to the breakdown of the defenses concerning Zerem Haovdim within Mapai and it is that which led the majority of Mapai’s leaders to join Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett in including a promise in the party’s platform to have a national school-system and abolish the secular networks. In fact, as of winter 1950, it became impossible to bridge over the breach between the two parties. Mapai prefered the democratic world, while Mapam favored the Communist-totalitarian bloc. At the beginning of 1950, when the anti-Jewish change in the Soviet Union began to be realized, two-thirds of Mapam’s members decided to remain loyal to the Soviet Union not realizing to what an extent its regime was hostile to the Jewish world, the Zionist Movement and the State of Israel, thereby deciding the fate of the education system of the workers’ children.
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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Restraint and Expansion Strategies Facing the Establishment of Tel Aviv University, 1953-1961

Uri Cohen

During the ’fifties, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem aspired to solidify its status as the leading academic institution having been crowned the national university of Israel. It was the only university oriented towards excellence in general, in contrast to the other, more specific and limited institutes that were under its total supervision. During the first decade of the State’s existence, the dramatic changes that took place in Israel’s higher education, found expression in the keen internal struggles between the academic center of the older, prestigious, monopolistic and wealthy institute, and the groups that had been rejected by it, or felt that they had not received their due status within its framework.

The balance of powers amongst the academic institutions which were involved in the struggle, as well as the political forces which encouraged the tendencies for change, point to the sweeping success of the Hebrew University in retaining the structure of the academic capital distribution, in Israel, during the first stages of the contention.

Orthodoxy, in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms, had succeeded in efficiently implementing a variety of supervising and punishing means; patronizing and obstructing access to sources; disregard and co-optation. Namely, using several conservation strategies at the height of the struggle which as it turned out, quickly led the new academic institute to a state of expiration towards the end of the ’fifties. The Hebrew University’s effective siege on Tel Aviv University seemingly construed a script whose ‘end was known in advance’.

However, the analysis of this case study indicates that the fundamental structure of the academic sphere could not be confined solely to the balance of powers between the academic agents or the institutions involved in the struggle. The structure of this specific field was also shaped by the ability to penetrate and the involvement of other spheres, as in the case before us - the political sphere. This expressed further interests of power, status and economics all of which claimed to set the fundamental rules of the game of the academic sphere, based on the interests that were far from being derived from the distribution structure of the specific capital of the academic sphere itself.
Not by the Spirit Alone - Also by Ideology
Heretic Reflections on the Economic History of Israel in Light of the Research of Nachum T. Gross

Raul Teitelbaum

Studying the collected works of Prof. Nachum Gross leads one to an interesting conclusion: the Zionist enterprise in Eretz Israel was not an economical one, at least not until the establishment of the State of Israel. The rules of market economy did not apply to it. Its motives were also uneconomical. They certainly did not resemble the motives that had led European powers to search for colonies overseas. The motives of the Jewish settlers were not to exploit the resources of Eretz Israel or to improve their own economic situation. Their motives were mainly religious, spiritual, national-Zionist or political-existential ones. Therefore, it is difficult to include the Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel within the category of Colonialism in its accepted definitions, as many anti-Zionists or post-colonialists do. Therefore, the appropriate title for the Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel is ‘Not by Bread Alone’.

One can relate to Herzl’s economic concept that was an obvious mixture of public planning and private initiative. From here rose the concept of a ‘mixed economy’, which, in fact, became the leading economic concept of the Jewish Yishuv during the British Mandate period as well as the first decades after Israel’s independence. This concept was not so far from the theories of Keynes, Galbraith or the recent Nobel laureate Joseph Steiglitz. It is also close in its spirit to Roosevelt’s New Deal. But this economic concept has been nourished more by specific needs, dictated by reality, than by any economic theory. The social and economic absorption of the mass immigration, or the huge expenses for defense, in any case, raise the issue of the size and role of the public sector and the government’s role in general, both during the time of the Yishuv and in Israel’s economy.

Research in the economic history of Eretz Israel generally suffers from a basic methodological flaw since it is discussed as an ethnic economic history, solely that of the Jewish settlement. The Arab sector in the country is disregarded as are the mutual influences, during the British Mandate, or after 1967. This is so, despite the fact that these ethnic-national communities were active in a common geographical region and even in one sovereign-political framework. Of course, a separate ethnic-economic history reflects an existence of two separate economies with huge differences between them. The economic ties were influenced by the state of the
relations between the Jews and the Arabs. Such is the situation to this very day. Each wave of violence and clashes widens the gap between both communities. Albeit, there have been mutual influences that are still to be researched in an integral way.

Conservative Socialism? The Forverts and the Radical Plutocratic Coalition, New York 1897-1917

Ehud Manor

Jewish Socialism in the United States was incarnated in the successful and powerful Forverts (JDF). The JDF’s heritage concentrated from early times on the great success of the paper, that in 1915 reached an outstanding daily circulation of more than 200,000 copies. For its creators, memoir writers and scholars alike, the JDF was an ‘Americanization’ agent that for many immigrants kept the flame of social justice in its most radical form. Albeit true - the JDF contributed in some ways to the Americanization of its readers, and used fierce radical-socialist arguments. Very few scholars have paid attention to the fact that the JDF was running a defacto ‘coalition’ with the most conservative elements within American Jewry. This ‘coalition’ was created in relation to some issues that shaped the Jewish public-sphere, such as: the reactions to the Kichinev pogroms; the establishing of the Kehillah in 1909; ‘The Great war’ and its effects on ‘The East European Jewish Question’; the American-Jewish-Congress movement, and more.

This ‘coalition’ is the main concern of this article, which tries to shed a more accurate light on the political struggle between the JDF, its celebrated editor Abraham Cahan, Jacob Schiff and his circle on the one hand, and some more democratic Jewish agents, among them Zionists, on the other.

As opposed to ‘common knowledge’, Zionists everywhere, and especially in the U.S., were aware of the fact that most Jews would not re-cross the Atlantic on their way to Jerusalem. By politicizing the Jewish public sphere, the Zionists hoped to enhance their political feasability by confronting a not surprising plutocrat-conservatism opposition from the ‘right’, and a more surprising Socialist-radicalism opposition from the ‘left’.

The conclusion of this article is that Jewish Socialism in America in general, and the JDF and Cahan in particular, should be put again in a more accurate and relevant political context. By doing so, the observer will most likely come to the
conclusion, that Cahan’s ‘radicalism’ was in fact pushing out the immigrants from political reality. Hence, no wonder, Zionism was perceived by Cahan to be his main foe.

Strange Bedfellows: The Revisionist Movement and Agudath Israel during the Holocaust

Judith Tydor Baumel

Throughout history, it is possible to note unique alliances between what appear to be diametrically opposed groups in order to achieve a particular goal. This article deals with several such alliances which existed between the Revisionist-Zionist movement and Agudath Israel during the Holocaust period. It also raises the questions whether this was a pattern, and if so, what was its nature and from where did it stem?

The cooperative ventures which are analyzed in this paper took place in Palestine, in the United States and in Europe, both during and right after the Holocaust. Most of them centered around issues of rescue. The cooperation between the two movements was a form of ‘An alliance among pariahs’. They were both driven out of the political center by the Labor Zionist movement. The Revisionist-Zionists considered themselves an alternative to Labor Zionism while the ultra-Orthodox Agudath Israel considered themselves an alternative to all of Zionism. However, this did not stop them from ad hoc cooperating with the Revisionists, in order to further the agenda of saving Jews during the Holocaust.

American Zionists in the State of Israel in the ’Fifties: Political Opposition and Social Alternative

Zohar Segev

During the ’fifties, Silver’s group and their partners among American Zionists were strongly involved in the Israeli arena, through financial support, establishment of a system of social organizations, and activity through the political party of the General Zionists. With the establishment of the State of Israel, Silver and his supporters
were removed from all official positions in the Zionist movement. American Zionists were forced to search for new venues of action in the Israeli arena; in as much as they wanted to influence the newborn Israeli society, as well as the Israeli-Diaspora relations and their own status as American Zionists after the establishment of the Jewish state.

American Zionists, under the leadership of Silver were also motivated to act in the Israeli arena by their conviction that Ben-Gurion wanted to destroy the Zionist Organization of America and their wish to fight this tendency, both in Israel and in the Diaspora.

The activity of Silver’s group in Israel, during the 'fifties, brought about forceful back-reactions, including the establishment of the Progressive Party, the removal of Silver from all Zionist activities, and a fierce propaganda against him. The intensity of the actions taken against Silver can be understood in light of his strength and importance. Silver and his group presented a political and ideological alternative to Ben-Gurion and Mapai in Israel. In the USA, Silver could have used his special status to influence the American government policy in the Middle East in accordance with his own world outlook, without coordinating his actions with the Israeli government.

A central component of American Zionists' involvement in Israel was their activity in the General Zionists Party. Starting in the mid-'fifties both the cooperation between the two groups, and the political strength of the General Zionists Party in Israel, gradually deteriorated. American Zionists in general and Silver’s group in particular were left without a political or organizational power base in Israel. They could no longer influence the processes of formation of the Israeli society and the State of Israel.

In the 'fifties, during the first decade of the Jewish State, a small opening still existed in the window of opportunities that had opened for American Zionists from the beginning of the 'thirties to influence the Jewish State and the Israel-Diaspora relations. Through this opening, American Zionists had tried to take an active part in the building of the State of Israel according to their world outlook as both Zionists and Americans. During the 'fifties this window gradually closed, as part of the processes of the formation of the State of Israel.
Revisiting Elisheva (Bikhovsky)
Part I

Dan Miron

Elisheva Zhirkova-Bikhovsky (1888-1949) was born in Russia. She converted to Judaism. After her marriage to Shimon Bikhovsky she began writing in Hebrew in 1921, having already published two collections of her poems in Russian in 1919. In 1925, the Bikhovskys came to Eretz Israel and settled in Tel Aviv where they founded their own publishing house, ‘Tomer’, and developed a literary network, unprecedented on the Hebrew literature scene of the time. In 1932 Shimon Bikhovsky died and Elisheva withdrew into silence and isolation.

Of all the founders of modern Hebrew women’s poetry, Elisheva is the most forgotten and abandoned. This, despite the fact that when she first appeared as a Hebrew poet, at the beginning of the 1920s, to gauge by the ‘wide’ circle of readers at the time, she was the most prominent and famous. She was abandoned and forsaken not only in comparison to Rachel Bluwstein who gained popularity after her death in 1931, but also in comparison to Esther Raab and Yokheved Bat-Miriam. Elisheva hardly got noticed, even on the fringe of the canon of modern Hebrew poetry. Literary criticism that had held Elisheva in high esteem, at the beginning of the 1920s, turned its back on her. It mentioned her only on her death, at the age of sixty-one, and upon certain anniversaries.

This paper places Elisheva’s work in historical perspective. It deals with its components and the role she played in establishing the sub-genre of women’s poetry and directing its development within Hebrew literature in the 'twenties and 'thirties. The author’s intention is not to plead on behalf of Elisheva, but to understand the dynamics of her rise and fall and to illuminate her contribution to the literature of her times.

Until now, the relevance of the historic-literary discussion in the oeuvre of Elisheva, within the context of the dialectic development that enabled the appearance of Hebrew poetry women’s poetry in the 1920s, has not been appreciated. Within this development, Elisheva’s poetry served as a link to the models of Russian women’s poetry as this developed at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th. These were the models that served the founders and developers of Hebrew women’s poetry; Rachel Bluwstein, Yokheved Bat-Miriam and Lea Goldberg. The traditionalists, among the literary circles, considered the women poets to be outsiders.
The revolutionism was embodied in the very readiness and capability to create a female voice and to form a ‘female’ language within literature. The fact that the feminine positions in the poetry of Elisheva, and Rachel, were acceptable (as was their desistance from formative innovations) eased the acceptance of the ‘feminine’ voice and language. Elisheva and Rachel opened the gate and determined the prospects of lyrical Hebrew poetry that was more or less based on the spoken language. In this respect, Elisheva was more radical as well as conscious, than other poets.

In the early 1930s, having been hit by tragedy and crises, her literary work was over. All she expressed was a state of detachment and alienation. She lived her poor and lonely life in a humble shack, in a mean neighborhood, on the outskirts of Tel Aviv while the voices of Rachel, Shlonsky and Alterman as well as Lea Goldberg were constantly on the rise.

The Homeland is the Real Diaspora: On Nissim Aloni’s World
Isaac Ben-Mordechai

It is possible to divide Nissim Aloni’s works into two periods, the earlier one is from the ’forties until the end of the ’fifties. At the beginning of this period Aloni wrote emotional ideological articles and short stories which presented the general Israeli cultural spirit. However, in the late ’fifties it is possible to identify changes in Aloni’s outlook. During this second period of his creative activity, which can be dated from the end of the ’fifties and continued to the end of his life, the mature Aloni developed and gave expression to a distinctive voice and world view which have become synonymous with his name.

In his first period, the young Aloni wrote about the local Israeli experience, both contemporary and past. In his second period, Aloni seems to have made a conscious choice to write about, and give expression to, cosmopolitan themes that were not specifically related to the Israeli experience or reality. This is true even in plays like ‘The Bride and the Butterfly Catcher’, ‘Aunt Liza’ and ‘The Gypsies of Jaffa’ which are set in Israel. In these plays, even though ostensibly set in Israel, Aloni created an un-realistic structure, which could have been set anywhere.

However, with all the ideological, political and literary differences among the works in Aloni’s two periods, he returns constantly and intensively to one theme:
the substance and meaning of the homeland and of life within it. The notion of homeland is present in all his works, even those that are not set in Israel. In the plays ‘Most Cruel is the King’, ‘The American Princess’, ‘Aunt Liza’ and ‘Eddy King’ many of the scenes revolve around such issues as the substance of homeland, its meaning, spheres of influence (emotional and spiritual), its power over people connected to it and the need to leave and return to it. Aloni dealt with these themes most extensively in two stories which were written with a thirty years interval between them, ‘The Last summer’ (1956) and ‘Returning to the Homeland by Train’ (1983). The stories in his collection *The Owl* also deal with this theme.

The relation of the individual to his or her homeland in Aloni’s work is at once complicated and ambivalent. This complication is often expressed openly, even in works of the first period, when Aloni’s relationship to his homeland was ostensibly clear, unquestioning and unambiguous.

There is a thematic connection between Aloni’s plays and his stories about his neighborhood. Leaving the homeland is critical for the characters in each play. The short story ‘Returning to the Homeland by Train’ is the exception in Aloni’s oeuvre. This late allegorical story is concerned with the relationship of homeland to diaspora. In this story Aloni’s cosmopolitanism takes on a Jewish form and the homeland is contemporary Israel. Aloni deals here with the ideas of ‘diaspora’, ‘homeland’, ‘being Jewish’ and ‘being Israeli’. In the story, the protagonist who attempts to return to his homeland is doomed to fail, because, as Aloni makes clear, for him ‘the homeland is the real diaspora’.

Whereas, in his early period the homeland for Aloni was a physical entity that occupied a geographical area, in his later works, the homeland became a spiritual entity that expressed the feelings and standpoints of the existentialistic pronouncements of his characters.