ABSTRACTS

Arnold J. Toynbee: Pro-Arab or Pro-Zionist?

Isaiah Friedman

In the late 1940s, Arnold J. Toynbee acquired the reputation of being a passionate Arab advocate and a firm opponent of the State of Israel. But during World War I and its aftermath, he was less sympathetic towards the Arabs. By 1917, when the general Arab uprising against the Turks had failed to materialize, he concluded that they had no national consciousness. In his estimation, the Arab Revolt was of marginal importance and, unlike T.E. Lawrence, he never glamorized it.

Ironically, during the given period, Toynbee was a convinced Zionist and was full of admiration for the Jewish colonization of Palestine. ‘For the Zionists’, he wrote, ‘Jewry is a nation, and [in order] to become like other nations it needs a motherland. In the Jewish colonies in Palestine they see not merely a successful social enterprise, but the visible symbol of a body politic [...] their greatest achievement has been the revival of Hebrew as a living language’.

On the political level he thought that support of Zionist aspirations might swing Jewish sympathy over to the Allies’ side and welcomed the publication of the Balfour Declaration wholeheartedly. Throughout the Peace conference in Paris he was in close touch with the Zionist leaders; Weizmann in particular earned his admiration.

In contrast to the Zionists, who showed statesmanship, the Palestinians, in Toynbee’s opinion, were obdurate and uncooperative. In his address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, on 9 December 1930, he made some barbed remarks on the ‘Intransigence of the Arabs, in their opposition to the establishment of a Jewish national home [which] proved an insuperable stumbling-block’ to any settlement and warned that the Palestine Question could not be solved by violence. However, he prophesied that sooner or later the Arabs ‘Would find themselves obliged to come to terms with Jewry’, just as the Jews would have to come to terms with the Arabs.
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During 1937, Toynbee established a good rapport with George Antonious, the author of *The Arab Awakening* (London 1938) and, like a great many British intellectuals and public men, fell under his spell. Henceforth, he began to veer toward the Arab camp and away from the Zionists.

**Between Bourguibism and Nasserism: Israeli-Tunisian Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict during the 1950s and 1960s**

Michael M. Laskier

The article grapples with back-channel ties between Israel and Tunisia during the 1950s and 1960s. These links broached the potentialities of cooperation and special relations. Two themes emerge: First, Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba and his confidants, like Israel, evinced concern over Egyptian influence in the Middle East, the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. Whether real or imaginary, both Bourguiba and the Israelis were obsessed with Nasser and depicted him as a hegemonic leader out to fulfil his dream of extending Egypt’s authority in the spirit of his ‘Three circles of influence’- Arab, Islamic and African. They accused him of undermining Arab regimes, seeking to destroy Israel and manipulating the Arab summits and the League of Arab States, organizations they regarded as instruments in his aggressive intents. The Israelis compared Nasserism, as an ‘Arab adventurist’ phenomenon leading the Middle East and the Maghreb to chaos, with Bourguibism, representing pragmatism, a pro-Western orientation, and adherence to ‘state particularism’ in lieu of Pan-Arabism. Tunisia and Israel wanted to check, if not curb, Nasser and his allies.

The second theme evolved around Bourguiba’s Middle East peace plan of March 1965 that sent tremors throughout the Arab world and evoked interest in Israel. It was the first time that an Arab leader had overtly called for peace, and done so before Arab audiences. This prompted Israel to intensify ties with Bourguiba. While both sides realized that no genuine peace initiative could gain momentum in the foreseeable future, each party used the ‘peace plan’ for its own purposes. Tunisia had hoped that by advocating peace her image in the world would improve. Thus, Israel and Western Jewry - together with the Europeans and Americans - might view Bourguiba as a constructive leader worthy of financial assistance for Tunisian development projects; with Israel and the Jews facilitating this goal by discreetly
securing the necessary funds. Israel thought that offering assistance to Tunisia would only stimulate Bourguiba to influence Arab leaders in actively isolating Nasser.

These tactics came to naught in the aftermath of the June 1967 War. Once Bourguiba realized that he could not secure sufficient financial resources in the West, Israel became less useful to him. Also, the 1967 War compelled him to demonstrate Arab solidarity and distance himself from Israel. For Israel, the complexities of the war rendered Bourguiba less attractive. Though Israeli-Tunisian contacts may have continued, they were of little consequences. Besides, Bourguiba failed to rally Arab leaders, actually becoming more isolated.


Eitan Barak

The second decade of Israel’s existence is generally considered by Israeli historiography as a period of relative tranquillity in the Arab-Israel relationship. The resulting lack of attention to this period is responsible, inter alia, to a gap in our understanding of the Israeli-Egyptian relations during this period. This article contributes to the filling of this lacuna by illuminating a forgotten episode of those days: The diplomatic battle over Israeli demands for freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. In the aftermath of the Suez War, Egypt vigorously opposed the Israeli demands. By July 1957, via intense mediation efforts, a tacit understanding was reached, in which Egypt acquiesced to the passage of Israeli goods, to and from Israel, on foreign ships through the Canal. Nevertheless, in March 1959, the Egyptians suddenly began confiscating the Israeli goods. In response Israel considered a military operation, but news of the UN Secretary General’s intention to come to Cairo to settle the dispute led Israel to refrain from such an act. Finally, the UNSG succeeded to formulate a new complicated tacit arrangement: the ‘effective stand’. Israel opposed such an arrangement but decided to take advantage of it for another purpose. Egypt, however, refused to ‘play the game’. Once again Israel chose not to carry out a military operation that had been planned, realising that it could endanger the underlying principle in the Israeli-Egyptian relations in those days; a common aversion to war. The article demonstrates that under the superficial appearance of two states in an apparently intractable conflict there existed
a raging sea of contacts and hidden activities. This evidence reinforces, to some extent, the argument that covert diplomacy is indeed the bright side of Israel’s foreign affairs.

Did Shuqayri Call to Throw the Jews into the Sea?

Moshe Shemesh

On the eve of the Six Days War, Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the PLO Chairman in the years 1964-1967, made a statement in Amman that implied throwing the Jews of Israel into the sea following the successful occupation of Israel by the Arab armies.

According to Shuqayri, Israeli propaganda defamed his alleged statement as indication or proof of the Arabs’ hostility towards Israel thus justifying her military offensive on 5 June 1967. Western and Arab researchers also used this declaration against Shuqayri himself after the war.

Shuqayri categorically denied this allegation but failed to convince. He argued that ‘This was one of the biggest lies the Zionist propaganda had spread’. Helena Cobban wrote in her book The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics (1984): ‘For his part, Shuqayri was remembered in later years, even by many Palestinians as the man who gave the Palestinians a bad name by threatening to throw the Jews into the sea’.

The origin of this allegation was a statement Shuqayri made in Amman on 2 June 1967, and which was published by the Lebanese newspaper al-Yom, on 3 June 1967. According to the newspaper, Shuqayri was asked at a press conference ‘What would happen to the inhabitants of Israel if the Arabs won the war?’. To this Shuqayri replied: ‘We will endeavor to help them and ease their departure [from Israel] through the sea to the countries from which they came [to Israel]’. To the question what would be the destiny of the Israelis who were born in Israel, Shuqayri answered: ‘All those who will remain alive [of the Israelis who were born in Israel] will stay in Filastin, but I think none of them will remain alive’.

The study concludes that Shuqayri’s statement was indeed an expression of extreme enmity towards Israel, but it did not imply throwing ‘the Jews who remain in Filastin, if any will remain’, into the sea. His intention was that those who remained alive would be deported to the countries of their origin, in ships via the sea, the same way they had arrived in Israel. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that it
is clear from his statement that his aim was to annihilate the Jews when he said ‘I think none of them will remain alive’, thus there would be no question of their future survival.

The Search for a Fast Military Victory: The Similarity between German and Israeli Military Strategies

Ehud Eilam

Every state has its own military strategy. Sometimes, there are similarities between the strategies of different states, despite their differences in other respects, as in the case of Israel and Germany. Both countries have had to deal with situations when the balance of power was against them. Germany is of course larger than Israel both in terms of territory as well as population, yet it was surrounded by far stronger enemies and fought on more than one front. In 1943-1945, it had to face land battles on three fronts as Israel had to face in its War of Independence in 1948.

Israel and Germany rely upon a fast military victory. In order to achieve this goal, both countries concentrated their best units on an attack to transfer the war quickly to enemy soil where they sought to destroy its army. Success in these missions enabled both Israel and Germany to proceed with their forces to other fronts.

In 1870-1871 and in World War I Germany trusted its infantry that marched to battle even after the trains became part of the war efforts. Since the late 1930s however, the task of launching the main strike has been that of the armor columns which combine tanks and other kinds of vehicles. Israel too has proceeded from an infantry based army to a modern one. This formation proved successful in the 1967 War. It is an interesting question whether Germany in World War II and Israel in the 1967, 1973, and even in the 1956 Wars, did indeed master the Blitzkrieg method.
Zionist Policy and American Politics
A New Look on the American Zionist Movement in the 1940s

Zohar Segev

Political activities in the latter half of the 1940s show a mixing of interests between American Zionism and the general political system of the US. These include, in particular, the proposed pro-Zionist resolutions in the Congress and the introduction of similar statements in the Republican national platform in 1944. Activity on behalf of gaining pro-Zionists resolutions in the House of Representatives and the Senate was one of the important political courses of action directed by Abba Hillel Silver. Silver’s and Newman’s papers show that the failure of the proposals was pre-planned. Raising the proposals was part of a structured political plan whose purpose was to bring about a clear declaration by the American Administration, and the British government, as to their policies on the Palestine question. Presentation of the proposals took place contrary to Ben-Gurion’s view or that of the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem. The upper rank of the American Zionist leadership acted as part of the American political system, with no clear separation between the Zionist and the American systems; at times, in fact, activity on the two planes was combined. In 1944, there were elections for the presidency. Parallel with their Zionist significance, the resolution proposals served as political means of goading Administration action, of threatening electoral harm to the Democrats and to Roosevelt himself, and as political means of furthering the standing of Congressmen in both parties. Given this set of circumstances, the resolution proposals became an issue that occupied the whole American political system. The merging of the American and Zionist arenas in the United States revealed itself from another angle: In the attempts by the Administration to influence the structure of the Zionist leadership in the United States in the wake of Silver’s activity. The essence of this activity involved senior Administration officials exerting pressure and making veiled threats, the purpose of which was to remove Silver from the center of Zionist activity and to bring Wise back to the American Zionist leadership. Political events at the time show that the two most important American Zionist leaders of the period, Stephen Wise and Abba Hillel Silver, operated from different political points of departure, but the significance of their activities was similar.
The Tel Hai Affair: A Test-Case of Impossible Neutrality

Nakdimon Rogel

For a hundred and twenty days, between 15 November 1919 and 3 March 1920, a handful of Jewish settlers and volunteers held their ground in the remote corner of Upper Galilee, cut off from the main body of the Yishuv. In theory the area was dominated and administered by the French army, but in fact complete anarchy prevailed. Well armed Bedouins, guided from Damascus by the Emir Faisal, who refused any sort of French tutelage, and bands of robbers who took advantage of the chaotic situation, fearlessly attacked the scant French garrisons and the Christian villages which allied themselves with the French. The Jewish settlers declared their neutrality, which was generally respected by the organized Bedouins, but not necessarily by the robber gangs. The local Bedouin chieftains, as well as leading personalities in Faisal’s entourage, reiterated their obligation not to hurt the Jewish settlers as long as they remained neutral and refrained from collaborating with the French and the Christians. This neutral situation was precarious. For how could the Jews be strictly neutral between the legitimate French rulers and the insurgent Bedouins? Yet, it was this neutrality more than any other factor that enabled the Jews to remain in the area during the harsh winter of 1919-1920. It was believed that as long as the guerrilla war against the French was run by the local chieftains, the situation was tenable and the marauders could be held back. But the rising nationalistic attitudes in Damascus and the replacement of the local leaders of the uprising by regular officers of Faisal’s army caused alarm. Word was that it had been decided in Damascus to attack the unreliable remaining Jewish settlements and destroy them. Even the far friendlier Bedouins insisted that the Jews concede to them the same rights they had accorded to the French, including the right to enter the settlements and search for French soldiers allegedly hiding within the compounds and for concealed French weapons. They conducted a number of such searches which ended peacefully.

On the 11th day of Adar (3 March 1920) some hundred and fifty armed Bedouins encircled Tel Hai, cutting it off from Kfar Giladi. A search party, led by Kamil al-Hussain the Sheikh of near-by Halsa, which included some officers of Faisal’s army, was allowed in to conduct a search. A shot was fired in the upper room of Tel Hai, followed by a hand grenade. All but one of the occupants were killed. A shooting battle ensued. It lasted for a few hours until the Arabs finally took off. Five of the
defenders were killed, Trumpeldor was gravely wounded and died while being carried on a stretcher to Kfar Giladi. That same night Tel Hai was evacuated.

In the 3 March skirmish, the Arabs also suffered casualties, five dead and eleven or twelve wounded. It was generally believed that revenge was imminent. The red line had been crossed, and neutrality irreparably shattered. The odds were such that deprived of the shield of neutrality the defenders stood no chance to survive. Despite their sworn determination to persevere until the end, two days later the defenders of Kfar Giladi and Metulla left for the South, aided and guided by the friendly Shi’ite chiefs.

The Role of the Palestinian Press in Organizing the Palestinian General Strike, April-October 1936

Mustafa Kabha

In light of what is presented in this article, the author argues that during the period under discussion, the Palestinian press had considerable influence on all matters related to the organization of the Palestinian General Strike; also, on the crystallization of the sympathy and the support for the strike among the general public. By these efforts, the press reached the hight of its influence over values and processes in Palestinian society of the time. This influence would drop dramatically during the armed Palestinian Rebellion (1937-1939), when the armed groups controlled the spirit of the Palestinian street and dictated the form of the journalistic discourse.

The Vision of ‘A Greater Jewish Haifa’: The Annexation of Neighborhoods for Demographic Benefits During the British Mandate

Tamir Goren

Statistical data, for the presentation of national arguments, was used by both the Jews and the Arabs during the time of the British Mandate. Both sides involved in the conflict tendentiously acted to make use of and to manipulate that data in order
to prove their cases. This was especially noted in the demographic scope due to the political implications attributed to it, as was shown in Haifa from the end of the ‘Thirties until the end of the Mandate.

The article investigates and describes the factors that brought the leadership of the Yishuv to determine its policy regarding Jewish demographics in Haifa. It also points out the achievements of this policy which was in fact changed several times as new considerations arose due to political developments, the development of the municipality and the changes in the demography of the city.

Since the Jews had difficulties in gaining a significant demographic advantage they annexed the inhabitants of the suburbs of Haifa Bay to their numbers, though they were aware that in fact these inhabitants were not considered to be part of the population of the city of Haifa. This was the only solution backing the argument for a Jewish majority, as long as the vision for a greater Jewish Haifa was not realized.

The Magazines of the Hebrew Secondary Schools in Eretz-Israel as an Additional Historical Resource to the Studies on the Identity of the Jewish Youth in Israel: The lives of the Urban (Non-Religious) Learning Youth in the 1920s and the 1930s as a Case Study

Yuval Dror

The two complimentary aims of the article are to deal with some personal and national issues in the identity of the Jewish youth in the pre-State and the State of Israel and to introduce an additional historical source to the studies in this field, which concentrate on these topics only from the Six-Day War (1967) and onwards. The identity issues are: Myself and my school; myself, my homeland and my people; myself and the ‘others’ in the world. The additional historical source in which these issues are to be found are magazines of the Hebrew secondary schools in Eretz-Israel. This article is based on a representing sample of the urban main gymnasiums’ magazines during the 1920s and 1930s, prior to the Second World War and the Holocaust. The article starts with a comprehensive review of the existing limited research literature on the identity of the Jewish youth in Israel and is summed up by a discussion about the contribution of the additional historical source of the schools’ magazines to the ‘state of the art’.
ABSTRACTS

From the Sublimation of Femininity to the Sublimation of Maternity: Stages in the Attitude of Hashomer Hatzair towards its Women Members

Eyal Kafkafi

The attitude towards women in the Kibbutz Ha’artzi movement and the Shomer Hatzair underwent a number of turns and changes: From Meir Ya’ari’s attempt to form a men’s fraternity to the equally unsuccessful experiment, common to the whole Kibbutz movement, in having the babies and children separated from their parents in different sleeping quarters right from birth.

One of the aims of the Kibbutz communal education system was to prevent independent women from sinking into the daily drudgery of care taking and to enable them to participate in the economic, social and cultural life of the Kibbutz on an equal footing with the men. In fact, separating the mothers from their babies and small children impaired the intimacy between them thus damaging the self-confidence of the children as well as the mothers.

‘Oded and Nurit do not Live Here’
The Absence of the Eretz-Israeli Child in the First Core Curriculum

Tali Tadmor-Shimony

The Israeli curriculum for literature (1956) was to serve mainly as a linguistic agent of the Hebrew language, as well as to teach the national canon in order to create a common national culture. One would expect the ‘Eretz-Israeli Child’ prototype to be dominant, or at least central, in the literature curriculum. In this paper, the curriculum was examined under a dovetailed methodology, consisting of analytical discourse reinforced by the quantitative dimension.

One central finding was the existence of numerous literary works dedicated to Eretz-Israel, but almost none of them to the Eretz-Israeli child. Likewise, only a few stories were written by Sabras [Israeli born], and even those were usually not about children. This conclusion is unexpected, considering the Eretz-Israeli children’s literature which had existed since the ‘Thirties. The conclusion was that the Eretz-Israeli child prototype was largely absent from the first core curriculum.
Several explanations for these finding are suggested: One is the conservative leaning of the curriculum. Another can be classified as an attempt to ‘understand the curriculum as a biographical text’. The literature curriculum was a result of a ‘Selective Tradition’ which was compiled by teachers born in Eastern Europe, rather than in Eretz-Israel. These veteran teachers preferred stories known to them from the little Jewish towns (Shtetls) about children in Eastern Europe.

The Israeli Electoral System 1948-1959: From Default to an Entrenched System

Gideon Rahat

The paper analyzes the politics of electoral reform in the first decade of Israel’s independence (1949-1959). The politics of reform of that period were mainly an inter-party struggle and other actors did not play a significant role, although there were attempts to recruit and even create them. The two largest parties in the Second Knesset (1951-1955) were Mapai and Hazionim Haclali’im (General Zionists), who together held a majority of seats in the Knesset. They initiated reforms but were unable to cooperate and pass an agreed upon version. In the Third Knesset (1955-1959), these parties lost their combined majority. The politics of reform accelerated and became adversarial, due to an initiative to adopt a single-member-district electoral system, made by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and adopted by his Mapai party in 1954. This threatened the independent survival of all the other parties. These developments led to the rejection of the reform bills in their preliminary readings, as well as to the entrenchment of the electoral system that had been adopted in 1948 as a temporary arrangement. Thus, not only was that specific electoral reform blocked, but the electoral system gained additional safeguards against reform, through the adoption of legislation that required that an amendment to the electoral system be supported by an absolute majority of Knesset Members at every stage of the legislative process.
A Chapter in the Process of Adapting Modern Hebrew Poetry to the ‘Sephardi’ Pronunciation

Pinhas Ginossar

During the first three decades of the Twentieth Century, Hebrew poetry painfully adapted itself to the pronunciation of Hebrew as it was being spoken by the New Jewish community, (Hayishuv Hechadash) in Eretz-Israel (Palestine). This process was accompanied by a lively debate. Avigdor Hameiri, poet, story-teller, literary critic and journalist contributed to this discussion in his article ‘Avoda Zara’ (‘Paganism’), published in 1922.

The revival of the Hebrew language progressed on two parallel routes:
1) The revival of the written language which emerged mainly in Eastern Europe, (including the great renaissance poetry, ‘Shirat Hatkhiya’, of Bialik, Tchernihovsky and their contemporaries).
2) Revival of the oral (spoken) language which took place mainly in Eretz-Israel (Palestine).

This renaissance poetry was composed in order to be read aloud in the ‘Ashkenazi’ accent. Since this pronunciation was harnessed to the accentual-syllabic meters, the poets were able to create a rich musical texture. When transferring this poetry into the ‘Sephardi’ accent the musicality of the text was lost. This caused great frustration to the poets. Some historians of Hebrew poetry claim that Bialik ceased to write poetry for a long time due to this loss of musicality.

Avigdor Hameiri offered a simple modernistic solution to the problem. He proposed to totally ignore the accentual-syllabic meters and to turn to ‘free verse’. Hameiri himself did not adopt his own solution, he made efforts to master the accentual-syllabic meters in the ‘Sephardi’ pronunciation.

The Secular Basis in the Thought of Aharon David Gordon

Gideon Katz

Many of Gordon’s interpreters regard him as a religious thinker and rarely discuss the significance of the secular basis of his thought. The first part of this article is devoted to the clarification of this ‘secular basis’ which the author relates to Gordon’s
thought. Most of it is based on Gordon’s rejection of the surmise that the source of Judaism is in the divine revelation. Nevertheless, Gordon did not stop stressing his intense affiliation to the Jewish religious tradition. Gordon’s attempt to maintain this affiliation, despite the secular element in his thinking, means that here was an attempt to explain the legacy in a ‘secular’ way. This matter, the secularization of Judaism, according to Gordon, is evaluated in the second part of the article. Thus, the first two parts of the article are an attempt to present an interpretation of Gordon’s thought. The third part of the article is a critical debate on his thought. In particular, it is an attempt to show that this train of thought can demonstrate that that which appears as essential to secular-Jewish thought, whose self-interest it is to continue from within its own tradition, does indeed require the tradition, but its affiliation must reduce itself to subjectivism.

The Cross, the Crescent and the Magen-David:
The Zionist-Crusaders Analogy in the Israeli Discourse

David Ohana

This article focuses upon four groups of writers within Israeli society who have dealt with the Zionist-Crusaders analogy: Historians, statesmen/politicians, authors and publicists. Each group has referred to the historical analogy, to its terms, symbols and language. The combined analysis of these sheds light upon several significant aspects in the self-awareness of the Israelis, and on their collective identity, in the first fifty years of the State of Israel.

Studying the Crusaders discourse within Israeli culture is an examination of the Israeli story: Where did we come from and whither are we going? Though the Zionist-Crusaders analogy has not been central to the Israeli discourse, the wide and varied reference to it in this paper clarifies that the historical analogies made by the Arab circles were not lost upon many Israeli intellectuals. Even without referring to the regional conflict, the Israelis have discussed the Crusaders analogy amongst themselves, from a piercing viewpoint of being strangers in the area: The ‘Other’ has turned out to be ‘Us’.

The Crusaders discourse has not been a historical debate, or a fact-finding investigation, but an examination as to the future of the ‘Western’ Jewish State existing in the very heart of the Arab-Moslem East. Has the analogy itself turned
into a mobilizing symbol? How did each side acquire the elements, images and perceptions that conformed to its political positions and its world-views? Did the analogy reflect a hidden debate, and at times even hesitated as to how to deal with the question of Colonialism without calling it by name?

The article defines three rounds within the Israeli discourse regarding the analogy: Following the War of Independence, the Six Days War and the Al-Aqza Intifada.

Thus, the Crusaders tale has an appeal that survives to this very day while it is also a mythical ‘Rashomon’ in which each side cultivates its own narrative.