ABSTRACTS

The Historiography of the Yom Kippur War: A Forty Years’ Perspective and a New Discussion

Uri Bar-Joseph

This article traces the development of the historiography of three interrelated elements of the Yom Kippur War: First, the political alternative to the war, primarily the diplomatic process that had taken place since early 1973, which compelled the Israeli leadership to choose between a comprehensive settlement that would lead to a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and an Egyptian war initiative that was likely to end in an Egyptian defeat; second, the causes for the IDF’s lack of readiness when war started and the implications of this insufficient military readiness on the course of the war during its first days; third, the causes for the intelligence fiasco, primarily the personal role played, on the eve of the war, by the director of Military Intelligence in misleading the Israeli leadership to believe that a specific means of intelligence collection on which they counted to get a war warning was operational, while, in fact, he did not allow its use. The article shows how the institutional history of the 1973 war – the Agranat Commission Report – withstood the test of time, and how the ‘new histories’ of the sources for the military fiasco had failed to meet this challenge.
The Agranat Commission Report and the Making of Israeli Memory of the Yom Kippur War

Nadav G. Molchadsky

Chaired by Chief Justice Simon Agranat, the Israel State Commission of inquiry that was set up in the wake of the Yom Kippur War focused a great deal of attention on the view that Israeli intelligence failed to produce an accurate picture of Egyptian intentions on the eve of the war. This view came to be known in Israel as ha-konseptziyah (the concept). This word, which became a popular Israeli term, is often taken to be the quintessential explanation for the war. The article grapples with the questions of how the term ‘Concept’ came to be looked upon as the dominant explanation for the Yom Kippur surprise. What enabled the Agranat commission to etch ‘the Concept’ into Israeli historical memory? And what are the main manifestations of this phenomenon in the historiography about the war?

The article suggests that the common Israeli wisdom about the Yom Kippur War focused on ‘the Concept’ was in fact born in the meeting room of the Agranat Commission, and was not coined or employed by Military Intelligence (AMAN) personnel, as the Commission wrongly asserted. Although the Commission did borrow the term ‘Concept’ from the testimony of AMAN Chief General Eli Zeira, Zeira used the term only in passing. The Commission’s effect on Israeli historical discourse is to a great extent an unintentional byproduct of its work, and the way it used Zeira’s term.

The Early Years of the Israeli Intelligence Community

David Siman-Tov

The Israeli intelligence community experienced tension in relations between its components in the first two decades following its establishment – rivalry and competition characterized the relationship in the fifties and a harmonious relationship and deeper cooperation in the sixties.

This article describes the history of the intelligence community, the establishment of it by David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister, through the dominant period of Isser Harel, head of the Mossad, and strained relations with the
head of Military Intelligence, Jehoshaphat Harkavi. Next, we describe the sharp
change that occurred in the relations within the community during the time of Meir
Amit, head of Military Intelligence and the Mossad.
Sources of the research are documents from the archives of Articles of the Israeli
Army led by the two reports dealing with the functioning of the intelligence community
(from 1957 and 1963), which were written by two different committees appointed by
the prime minister. The article explores the background for the committee, what its
recommendations were, and how and whether they were implemented.

Shmuel Ettinger, Anti-Semitism, and ‘The Thesis beyond Zionism’:
Historiography, Politics, and Class

Danny Gutwein

Despite the marginality of his scholarly contribution in terms of both publications
and impact, Shmuel Ettinger shaped the studies of modern Jewish history in Israel
from the mid-1960s to the late-1980s. While this paradox is generally explained
by his many academic administrative duties, this article suggests that Ettinger’s
poor scholarly performance resulted from an inherent contradiction between
essentialist-primordial and contextual-modernist analyses, which underlies his
writings. This contradiction thwarted his pretense to formulate ‘the big concepts’
of modern Jewish history, which he described as the goal of his historiography.
This contradiction – overlooked by existing research – is the result of the
subjection of Ettinger’s historiography to his political agenda. Indeed, his return
to public activity in 1965 was marked by a turnabout in his theory of the origins
of modern anti-Semitism, considered to be his major contribution to historical
research. Until 1965, using his original contextual-modernist analysis, Ettinger
pointed to a constant improvement in the Christian attitudes towards Jews with
the advance of capitalism. After 1965, however, while adopting an essentialist-
primordial approach, he argued that an anti-Jewish stereotype that originated in
the Hellenistic era has actually turned the phenomenon of anti-Semitism into a
constant factor in the Jews-Non–Jews relations throughout Europe.
Although Ettinger was closely associated with the ‘Jerusalem School’ in Jewish
history, his new historical approach was in opposition to the concepts of Ben-Zion
Dinnur, his teacher and co-founder of the ‘Jerusalem School’. While Dinnur, as a
socialist, emphasized the importance of the masses and social factors in historical analysis, Ettinger, as a liberal, underlined that of the elites and intellectuals. Ettinger further used his new theory of anti-Semitism to criticize what he considered to be the Zionist pretense to solve the problem of anti-Semitism, and he replaced Zionism with anti-Semitism as the framework of Israeli collectivity. In this way, Ettinger challenged the ideology of ‘Mamlachtiyut’ that underlined Israeli Statism. One should note, in this regard, that Ettinger’s approach chronically coincided with the struggle that the Israeli professional elite was waging at the time to keep its advantageous status and to free itself from the State’s control, whose mechanisms, they suspected, favored the masses – mainly the Oriental ones – which Ettinger considered to be a risk for the liberal character of Israel.

The conclusion of this article is that in opposition to the widespread convention that perceives Ettinger as the embodiment of Zionist historiography, his criticism of Zionism and his disapproval of Mamlachtiyut actually turn his work into a link between the Zionist and post-Zionist historiography.

The Limits of Holocaust Representation in the Literature of the 1948 Generation: The Case of ‘The Second Stutter’ by Moshe Shamir

Or Rogovin

Moshe Shamir’s story ‘The Second Stutter’ (1945) has been recently discussed as literary evidence for the Yishuv’s attitude towards the Holocaust and the survivors. Literary scholars, such as Avner Holtzman, Nurith Gertz, and Nurit Govrin, present Shamir’s short story as an indication for a sympathetic attitude towards the survivors and their experiences. However, current readings of the story tend to settle for thematic and contextual aspects of the work, while lacking a thorough and systematic investigation into the text’s poetic qualities, which shaped Shamir’s ability to treat the sensitive material of the Holocaust. My essay suggests the first comprehensive textual analysis of the story, and it formulates the impact of the perspective and poetics of the 1948 generation on Shamir’s attitude towards the survivors and their experiences. My conclusion is that the story manifests strong commitment to representing the Holocaust and the survivors, side by side with patronizing and alienating attitudes. Most importantly, this genuine commitment is heavily confined and undermined by the poetic, ideological, and experiential infrastructure of the Yishuv.
From Forced Community to Individualism in Public Urban Construction

Hadas Shadar

From the 1970s to the 1990s, at the time of transition from the rule of the Labor party to the rule of the Likud party, the urban design of high density public housing changed completely. The new neighborhoods built by the state through the Ministry of Housing were planned according to different, not to say completely opposite, principles. While in the 1970s the neighborhood was planned to be disconnected from the city around it, in the 1990s it was planned as a part of it. While in the 1970s the neighborhood was planned facing inwards, towards green lanes and public institutions, in the 1990s it was planned outwards, facing the main streets. While in the 1970s traffic in the neighborhood was planned based entirely on walking, in the 1990s planning took into consideration motorized traffic.

Examination of these urban changes reveals that social processes, led by privatization and the loss of faith in the ability of professionals and the state to control society and man, were among the factors leading to the spatial changes. Under the guise of functional discourse and practical reasons, architects expressed deeper insights: of freedom of choice and individualism.

The First Decade of the Development of Tel Aviv Neighborhoods across the Yarkon, 1947-1958

Yaron Balslev

The declaration of the State of Israel brought the city of Tel Aviv to a turning point. Since the late 1940s the landscape of Ever Ha’Yarkon has started to change. One neighborhood after the other was established in that environment, which was characterized as a rural area during the British Mandate era. These neighborhoods were built with various characteristics for different populations. Examination of the first years of these neighborhoods shows two types of urban development in the region. The first is regional – the existence of fundamental differences between the development of the eastern and western parts of the Ever Ha’Yarkon. The second relates to the types of building constructions, which can be divided into public
construction, private construction, and the formation of poverty areas. This article
deals with the first decade of the development of Ever Ha’Yarkon neighborhoods,
the circumstances of their founding, their regional development, their population,
and the urban relations between them and the city and between the neighborhoods
themselves. This analysis helps understand the process in which a third of the area
of Tel Aviv-Jaffa today changed from a rural periphery to an urban space.

Civilian Demolition: The Premeditated Destruction of Manshiya
Neighborhood in Jaffa, 1948-1949

Or Aleksandrowicz

Manshiya was a Jaffa neighborhood that shared a long borderline with the southern
neighborhoods of Tel Aviv. In the beginning of Israel’s War of Independence it was
transformed into an arena of military actions culminating in the IZL operation for
the occupation of Jaffa in late April 1948. Following the war, several parties tried
to leave the false historical impression that the military operations resulted in the
total annihilation of the neighborhood. This paper claims that the eradication of
Manshiya was the result of a premeditated plan that had almost no relation to the
damage caused by the military actions. The plan was concocted by Tel Aviv’s
mayor, Israel Rokach, and the city engineer, Ya’akov Ben Sira, who shared a
common world-view that regarded city plans of massive destruction a legitimate
instrument for the reshaping of the urban landscape. Since they believed Manshiya
was a hopeless slum, they initiated a comprehensive destruction operation that
was believed to be the first step in the reconstruction of the whole southern Tel
Aviv region. The operation came to a sudden halt when Rokach and Ben Sira
failed to receive governmental financing for the acts because of their illegal nature,
leaving behind an unrecoverable and dilapidated urban scape.

Ricki Shiv

The 1985 Economic Stabilization Plan was a strategy to combat inflation and stabilize the Israeli economy. This program was also an instrument that advanced a paradigmatic change in the economic regime. The new paradigm supported liberalization, privatization, and the dominance of monetary policy. This approach has become the hegemonic economic regime since the nineties. Economists became influential intellectuals in social policy. The new economic paradigm has become the accepted truth as it was in accordance with the beliefs of the dominant economic elite in Israel.

The study shows that the ideas that flowed to the public sphere were based on Western scientific paradigms and were accepted as legitimate scientific truth. The economists gave a solution to a specific problem, to an economic crisis. Their ideas had ‘clients’ among the dominant elite. These economists were not collaborators with the dominant economic elites, they were autonomous agents who acted according to the scientific rules of their community. Their social opinions were embedded in old Israeli values: Socialism and Zionism. Unlike dominant economists in the West, they thought that the new plan was ‘Right’ not Just. However, in the long run, these ‘scientific truths’ were homologous with the dominant elite’s interests, were ‘consumed’ by them, and hence became ‘Common Sense’.

From Tsaddiq to Messiah: Guidelines for A Comparative Analysis of the Chabad and Braslav Hasidic Groups

Yoram Bilu and Zvi Mark

For many Israelis the Hasidic groups of Chabad (Lubavitch) and Braslav seem the most dynamic forces in the contemporary religious sphere. How should we account for the vitality and popularity of what appears as sheer anomaly – Hasidic groups without a living tsaddiq (Hasidic master)? Is the fact that Chabad and Braslav are headless relevant to their current success? Is it conducive to it? To answer, we expand
on the willingness of both groups to cross and dissolve established boundaries in the Jewish orthodox orbit. This orientation we attribute to the strong messianic ideology that engulfs both Chabad and Braslav. Given the messianic stature of Chabad’s seventh leader, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson (1902-1994) and (less explicitly) of Rabbi Nachman of Braslav (1772-1810), nominating a successor in either camp was not a viable option. We argue that the absence of a living tsaddiq may become a virtue in the present time, when individual Hasidim have more leeway for personal initiative and autonomous action. Assisted by modern technology, the dissolution of boundaries in both groups is conducive to making the absent tsaddiq present. Without the constraints of a rigid rabbinical hierarchy mediating between master and disciples, many Hasidim in Chabad and Braslav can experience their virtual rabbis as visible, accessible, and palpably close.

The Attitude of the Kibbutzim towards The Institutions of Higher Education: From Rejection and Disagreement to Integration

Doron Timor and Uri Cohen

Over the century of the Kibbutzim’s existence, their approach to higher education has changed significantly: from total rejection in the spirit of ‘no pens, paper, and ink’ to gradual integration in specific fields targeted to improve the Kibbutzim’s economic status, to full integration. Over the years several models of the Kibbutzim’s approach to academic studies have developed, each of which were dominant for a different time period: the exclusionist model, the instrumental model, the ideological-exclusive model. The study shows a relationship between the tempering of the ideology rejecting academic studies or treating them solely in an instrumental manner, to an almost complete cessation of accepting new members, together with the disappearance of groups identifying and supporting the Kibbutzim in Europe and a rise of skepticism by the Israeli population towards joining the Kibbutzim. This was accompanied by large waves of departure of the Kibbutzim during the ‘50s and ‘60s, when many of those leaving the Kibbutzim did so in order to study at higher education institutes, contradicting the Kibbutzim’s stance on the matter.
The Response of the Yishuv and the Zionist Movement to the Pogroms in Ukraine, 1918-1920

Gur Alroey

Between 1918 and 1920 there were hundreds of pogroms in Ukraine, during which some 100,000 Jews were killed or wounded. The pogroms took place against the backdrop of a bloody civil war between the Bolsheviks and their many opponents. The years of massacres in the Ukraine were years of optimism mixed with trepidation in the Yishuv, the pre-state Jewish community in Eretz Israel. The Balfour Declaration and the beginning of the British military government in October 1918 heralded the beginning of a new life for the Jews in the Holy Land. This article examines when the Jews of Eretz Israel first received word of the pogroms and how they and the Zionist leadership responded to the Ukrainian bloodbath that took 60,000 Jewish lives. Two aspects of the response are examined. The first is how various components of the community reacted to the pogroms – as individuals, as groups, and through the various published reports about the pogroms that appeared during this period. The second is the Zionist leadership’s response to the bloodbath, which didn’t necessarily correspond to the response of the Yishuv and was motivated by feasibility considerations that didn’t necessarily favor the refugees who had survived the pogroms.

Also, in this article I examine the position of the Zionist leadership primarily through the formulation of its policy of immigration to Eretz Israel, which could have provided a solution for the tens of thousands of refugees who wanted to get out of Europe. On the one hand, I will try to follow the open narrative of the Zionist movement, which condemned the pogroms and conveyed empathy for the survivors and the victims, while also tracing the movement’s covert (and lesser-known) policy of turning its back on the refugees and shirking any responsibility for their disastrous fate following the civil war in Russia.
Immigration of Entrepreneurs to British Mandatory Palestine: From the Default of Greece (1932) to the Establishment of Discount Bank (1935)

Orly C. Meron

This paper deals with the migration of Jewish capitalists from Greece to British Mandatory Palestine, which was motivated by a combination of nationalism and ethnic commercial entrepreneurship on the part of these migrants. The announcement by the Greek government that it would default and suspend payment on its foreign debt (April 1932), along with the favorable conditions existing in British Mandatory Palestine for immigrants with entrepreneurial experience, led an ever-growing number of Jewish Zionist Greek capitalists to participate in the process of building a Jewish homeland. A description and analysis of the establishment of Discount Bank by Leon Yehudah Recanati shows that these immigrants, who possessed real, social, and human capital, behaved as voluntary migrants who were motivated by economic considerations and operated in the free market, enlisting their ethnic resources for their commercial activities. Prior acquaintance with Judeo-Spanish speakers from the Salonica diaspora (the ‘absorbing group’) living both in British Mandatory Palestine and outside it, primarily in Egypt, helped to raise the capital for Discount Bank under the suffocating credit conditions of the time; a loyal, industrious, and devoted work force (willing to work unconventional hours) recruited from among the Greek immigrants attracted customers to the bank from the Spanish-speaking diaspora, who placed their trust in the bank; and Recanati’s communal activities for the future and welfare of the Greek immigrants and the Spanish speakers regenerated the group resources.

Hava Eshkoli-Wagman

The plight of Jewish refugees in Europe due to persecution under the Nazi regime, as well as the strict immigration policies of Western countries, led to dozens of proposals to settle Jewish refugees in underdeveloped territories. This article discusses the response of the Jewish press in the United States to two refugee settlement programs in America: one in Alaska, a colony of the democratic United States, the second in the Dominican Republic led by the dictator Trujillo. A survey of the most prominent Jewish newspapers in English and Yiddish indicates that the accepted view of the alienation of Jewish organizations, especially the Zionist movement, to the programs is not accurate.

As long as the programs seemed realistic, the Jewish press was careful not to reject them. Total opposition arose only after Congress shelved the bill for developing settlement in Alaska and the San-Domingo Settlement Project vanished with the spread of war. Furthermore, resistance was mainly due to a realistic analysis of geographic, economic, and social reality in the settlements and its implications for the scope and pace of rescue. Apparently, American Jewish patriotism was a more important component of the Jewish institutions’ reservations regarding the Alaska program than the Zionist ideological component. Disappointment with the lack of national symbols in the discussed plans increased reservations even among territorialists.