The Socio-Economic Logic of the 1977 Regime Change in Israel

Danny Gutwein

The 1977 transfer of political power (ha'mahapach) has entered the Israeli public discourse and academic research as a term with two complementary meanings: in the narrow and limited sense it refers to the results of the 9th Knesset elections that created the first ever, left to right regime change in Israel; in the larger sense it pertains to the loss of Labor's hegemony that stemmed from profound socioeconomic processes which culminated after two decades and which has continued changing Israel's socio-political structure ever since.

The change of government took place in two stages. In the first stage - the 1973 8th Knesset elections - the right-wing Likud gained 13 seats out of 120 (going from 26 seats to 39), and the left-wing Alignment (Ma'arach) lost 5 seats (dropping from 56 seats to 51) but still retained its hold on government. In the second stage – the 1977 9th Knesset elections - Likud picked up 3 more seats (increasing its strength from 39 to 42) while the Alignment lost 19 (plummeting from 51 seats to 32) thereby forfeiting the government.

Research claims that the change in voting patterns that led to the change of government was class based: the lower middle class (Sephardic or Oriental Jews) shifted its support from the Alignment to the Likud, while the upper middle class (Ashkenazi or European Jews) deserted the Alignment and voted for the centrist Dash (Democratic Movement for Change) Party. The various reasons for the Alignment's fall - the Israeli voter's drift to the right following the Six Day War, the debacle of the Yom Kippur War, and revelations of corruption in the Alignment elite - fail to explain the correlation between class and party preference. However, despite the correlation between class and voting, given the great overlap between class and ethnicity in Israel, most scholars tend to focus on ethnic variables rather than class factors in explaining the changes in voting patterns that brought about the change in government.

The article's main argument is that the Alignment's loss of power between 1973 and 1977 was the result of a conjuncture of responses for the socioeconomic turnabout that it had been advancing since the late 1960s and which was
based on expanding the welfare state and the universality of its services. This universality reduced the oriental lower classes' dependence on the Alignment as a supplier of social services and enabled them to vote for the Likud as a protest against their past discrimination; while the Ashkenazi middle classes voted against the Alignment because its new socioeconomic policy reduced this discrimination which had benefitted them in the past three decades.

Public Corruption and the Struggle against It

Doron Navot

This article analyzes corruption in Israel between 1967 and 1977. The main thesis is that high-profile affairs were related to changes in the state’s autonomy. Corruption, the misuse of public power for private gain, was possible due to new opportunities that were created by the initiatives of Pinhas Sapir in the mid-1960s and the Six-Day War. The anti-corruption struggle followed the development of state autonomy in 1968 and the political upheaval in May 1977.

State autonomy had many sources, such as the changes that Sapir promoted and the two wars that Israel fought in that decade - the Six-Day War and Yom Kippur War. The struggle against corruption strengthened the legal enforcement system at the expense of the political elite, and changed the nature of the state’s autonomy and national political economy.

Between Culture and Politics: Young Protest in Israel

Tal Elmaliach and Anat Kidron

Between 1967 and 1977 Israel experienced unprecedented social, cultural and political protests whose main target was Labor Movement hegemony. The protestors were young people, a public that had traditionally represented
conformism and obedience to the national establishment.

The decade of protest in Israel coincided with the Western world’s counterculture, New Left, and student demonstrations. The Israeli case, however, reflected the local context of wars, the peace process, and social-economic tensions.

This article analyzes Israel’s youth protest of 1967-1977 by combining the local and global perspectives and determining their relation to the two main processes that Israeli society was going through in that period: normalization and economic development after the heroic years of the War of Independence and mass immigration, and the decline of the Israeli Labor Movement, which ended with the 1977 political upheaval.

The Impact of the Six Day War on the Canaanite Awakening

Avi Shilon

The article examines the impact of the Six Day War on the Canaanite awakening - whose relevance ended in the 1950s - in the search of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Israel as a Jewish state.

The author focuses on two schools of thought that emerged from the Canaanite perception: the moderate view of Hillel Kook and the more radical one of Jonathan Ratosh. The differences and similarities between the two schools after 1967 are discussed and the author explains their aspiration to transform the nature of Israeli society and recognize the Palestinian people (Kook) or incorporate Jewish and Palestinian identities into a single Hebrew nation that could lead to a radical geopolitical restructure of the Middle East (Ratosh).

The article also looks at why Israeli society and the Zionist establishment rejected these options, and shows that the public and academic discourse have assimilated Kook’s and Ratosh’s ideas into the 21st century mainly because they touch on fundamental, unresolved issues.
The Birth of a Political Alternative: The Road to the Likud, 1973

Amir Goldstein

The path to the Likud’s establishment in the autumn of 1973 is a weighty reference point for the right-wing’s emergence in Israel. The initiative to expand Gahal originated from different sources within the Liberal party and Herut’s internal opposition. Between 1966 and 1973, however, Menachem Begin had reservations about forming a broad right-of-center party. This paper describes the initiatives and reasons behind Begin’s qualms and examines the hard-fought negotiations that eventually gave birth to the Likud and Ariel Sharon’s strategy to expand Gahal while fully aware of the objection of Begin and his party.

The establishment of the Likud party is shown to be an attempt to engineer regime change while limiting Begin and Herut’s influence on the joint-party ticket. The paper explains how the Herut movement remained the dominant body in the Likud despite its partners’ intentions. Turning Herut into a thriving, politically engaged force to be reckoned with made it the major power in the newly created party and gave it a significant role in crafting similar profiles for the Likud and Herut in the following years.

The Golden Age of the Israeli Welfare State

Michal Koreh

This article offers a new and complementary explanation of the rapid growth of social programs in the 1970s, a period that many regard as the ‘Golden Age’ of Israel’s welfare state. The article systematically traces decisions on social insurance in the early 1970s and the rarely noted connection between the government’s fiscal and social policies. The sharp rise in the cost of social insurance in this period is shown to have been driven by nonsocial motives, especially financing the mounting security outlays and resolving the crisis in
Israel’s balance of payments. Although the upswing in contribution levels was driven by budgetary and economic constraints, it nevertheless had a major impact on social policy. The need to justify the spike in insurance costs and the resulting surplus in the National Insurance’s social security funds led to new programs and increased social allocations.

Israel’s Population in the Third Decade:
Trends and Relationships
Sergio DellaPergola

This article deals with the population and demography of the State of Israel in its third decade. The years under review are 1966 to 1976, before the 1977 political earthquake. In June 1967, shortly after the 19th Independence Day, the founding event of the Six-Day War occurred, and six years later in the middle of the third decade, came the anti-climax to the 1967 euphoria - the Yom Kippur War. The events of 1967 and 1973 raise the issue of whether and to what extent the demographic and social processes that began in the previous two decades changed, and whether the effects of the decade’s major military events were temporary and reversible or permanent.

The article begins with a brief discussion on the main propellants of change in Israel’s population – structural change, behavioral transformation, institutional intervention, and, from 1967, the status and role in Israeli society of the Palestinians from the occupied territories. The article’s main focus is on the major demographic developments: population size, the growth of key religious and ethnic groups, international migration, natural movement (births and deaths), geographic distribution, countries of origin, seniority, and age composition. The article also provides a synthesis of several demographic and social indicators that reveal six types of change in the third decade as compared to the previous two and subsequent two decades. The last part of the article looks at the debate on demographic policy in the third decade and evaluates the policy decisions made at the time.
Against the Tide: Resistance to Ultra-Orthodox Enthusiasm Following the Six Day War

Yair Halevy

The current Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) ideology is explicitly non-Zionist. However, in the early years of the state the Haredi mainstream held a strikingly different view. The ‘old Haredism,’ which was largely pro-Zionist, became infused with enthusiasm after the Six Day War.

This article deals with another side of the Haredi attitude toward the state. The first part examines the conflicts between the Haredi community and the state after the Six-Day War to a certain extent, paradoxically, because of the enthusiasm, such as the desecration of Shabbat by secular Israelis who flocked to the Western Wall. The second part of the article looks at the Haredi ideologists’ attempts to dampen their community’s enthusiasm and affinity for the state. Although they struggled against the tide, their efforts bore fruit, and less than a decade after the 1967 war, the Haredi community conformed to their ideological positions.

Rehabilitation Medicine in Israel: A Historical Perspective

Geula Paran, Lilach Rosenberg-Friedman, Avi Ohry

From the 1948 War of Independence to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, rehabilitation medicine in Israel lagged behind its counterparts in the West. Israel conducted very little scientific research in this period and treatment was based primarily on clinical empirical experience, assumptions, and intuition. Specialized fields, such as rehabilitation after severe brain injury, were nonexistent. The situation began to change after the 1967 Six Day War and surged after the Yom Kippur War with its high number of severe injuries. This was the tipping point for rehabilitation medicine in
Israel. Since then enormous strides have been made in resources, research, and treatment. Rehabilitation medicine has not only attained the status of other medical disciplines in Israel and but has become a world leader in the field. Furthermore, the awareness of rehabilitation medicine and its practical applications has altered Israeli society’s attitude toward people with disabilities.

Territory, Society and Culture in the Educational Television Series *Ivrit be-Siman Tov*

Eitan Bar-Yosef

Israel’s Channel One television station was founded in 1968 in direct response to the Six-Day War. While scholarship has examined the political and regulatory tensions that typified Channel One’s first decade, very little attention has been accorded to Israeli Educational Television (IET) that was established in March 1966. Thus, scholars have overlooked the powerful impact that IET’s programming had on Israeli children in the 1970s as the result of the station’s exceptional creativity and its practice of broadcasting endless reruns.

This article considers one of IET’s flagship programs in that decade: ‘Ivrit be-Siman Tov’ (‘Hebrew, Auspiciously’), a televised course in spoken Hebrew, aimed primarily at new immigrants and veteran Israelis. The series followed the adventures of Siman Tov, a congenial tour guide in his late forties whose travels were meant to introduce viewers to Israel’s geographical, cultural and human landscape. Nevertheless, rather than portray the dramatic changes reshaping Israel after 1967, the show depicted the spatial and political reality of the previous decade. It virtually ignored the new territories conquered in the war; it presented an all-Ashkenazi society with some token Mizrahi figures (Jews of Arab world origin); and looked back to more innocent times. Often explored self-reflexively, this nostalgia was complicated by the fact that the series’ most avid viewers were not the new immigrants but rather the children of Greater Israel, growing up in a reality increasingly distant from Siman Tov’s lost world.
The Making of an Israeli Style: 1967-1973

Tamar El Or and Motti Regev

By examining two different forms of cultural production between 1967 and 1973, one in the field of material culture and the other in popular music, the article looks at the burgeoning ‘Israeli style’ that came to dominate the following decades. It analyzes the aesthetic logic and meaning in the musical album ‘At Avigdor’s Grass’ by Arik Einstein and Miki Gavrielov and in the fabrics and textiles designed by the Maskit fashion house. The authors argue that the style in these works exemplify the turning point in Israeli culture, the shift from separatism and purism to cultural globalization and hybrid locality.

Amos Oz and Hanoch Levin as Anti-Euphoric Prophets of Rebuke

Alon Gan

This paper considers the anti-euphoric discourse that developed in Israel in reaction to the ecstatic atmosphere during the ‘six years of empire’ between the Six-Day War and Yom Kippur War. The paper focuses on the works of two of the most prominent figures in this discourse: Amos Oz and Hanoch Levin.

Although their styles are fundamentally different, both writers were very similar in their wish to burst the steadily inflating balloon that clouded the post-1967 public discourse.

Both authors felt the gap between personal bereavement and the collective victory euphoria, and both protested the triumphalism of Rabbi Goren and his disciples of the religious messianic movement, and the exultation of Alterman and his followers in the Movement for Greater Israel.

The three kinds of elated worship that Oz and Levin wanted to shatter were territorial sanctity, the justification of Israeli conduct, and the glorification of the Six-Day War. The article analyzes the similarities and differences between the two authors.
IDF Hymns and Anthems

Reuven Shoham

This paper examines the image and mood of Israeli society as reflected in the IDF’s formal and informal hymns and anthems between 1967 and 1977. It also discusses the texts that were later adopted as anthems even if they were not officially recognized as such.

By the nature of the texts, they should reflect the broadest national consensus while serving two main objectives: first, an aggressive message that serves as a national landmark and compels the audience to follow a certain path; second, a display window for army units to parade their assets.

The paper looks at four texts written in a decade marked by dramatic swings in the national mood: ‘Al Kanfei Hakesef’ (‘On Silver Wings’) by Naomi Shemer; ‘Basayeret Shaked’ (‘In the Shaked Commando Unit’) by Dahlia Ravikovitch; ‘Shir Hayechida’ (‘The Unit’s Song’) about an elite reconnaissance unit, written by Avraham Ben Artzi; and ‘Golani Sheli’ (‘My Golani’) by Amos Ettinger.

United and Eternal: The Annexation of East Jerusalem in Israeli Banknotes

Na’ama Sheffi & Anat First

The topic of this article is ‘Gates Series’, the fourth series of banknotes issued by the Bank of Israel in 1975. The authors argue that the presentation of the gates of Jerusalem’s Old City on the reverse of the note, the Bank of Israel’s Banknotes and Coinage Planning Committee demonstrated the notes’ role as a low-power means of communication. Using such imagery attests to Anssi Paasi’s ‘ideological territorialism’ which in this case is the portrayal of Greater Jerusalem. A careful reading of the protocols of the Banknote Committee reveals the unanimous acceptance of the gates for the notes’ reverse, unlike the heated discussions in the past on the choice of archeological sites. Interestingly, the media completely ignored the Bank of Israel’s decision.
Thus, large sections of Israeli society seem to have accepted the new ideological territorialism. The choice of the Old City’s gates provided a symbolic bridge between two major territorial decisions regarding the capital city: the de facto annexation of East Jerusalem less than three weeks after the 1967 War through legislation that consequently created Greater Jerusalem; and the 1980 legislation of Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel. In this light, the Gates Series served as a useful tool of banal nationalism.

Yigal Allon and the Palestinian Issue: From Denial to Recognition

Ronen Traube

Yigal Allon was one of the most influential figures in the public discourse on security and political affairs in Israel in the decade following the June 1967 war. The ‘Allon Plan,’ his most important contribution although never formally adopted, was the manifest expression of the Labor Movement’s position on the Palestinian issue.

Allon was a leading figure in the Labor Movement’s hawkish stream but his plan represented a rather dovish stance in comparison to conventional approaches. The plan sought a balance between rigid ideological premises and changing political realities. Allon recognized, earlier than most Israeli statesmen, the inevitable crystallization of a Palestinian national identity therefore he advocated a political arrangement before the Palestinians gained greater political power. This arrangement involved building Israeli settlements that were considered essential to guaranteeing ‘defensible borders’ in areas without a dense Palestinian population.

The Road to UN Resolution 242

Yoav Gelber

In the wake of the 1967 Six Day War, Israel embarked on a tough diplomatic struggle to translate the military victory into political accomplishments.
Memory of the 1957 settlement after the Sinai Campaign made Israelis fear another forced solution based on a hasty Israeli withdrawal. The Americans, however, had no such intention. They were determined to use the war’s outcome to check Russian penetration into the region and to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Resolving the conflict would require signed peace treaties or, at the least, non-belligerency pacts, which Israel insisted could only be obtained through direct negotiations. President Johnson adopted this demand and declared that the parties in the conflict should also be partners in peace.

The Soviets and the Arabs insisted on Israel’s immediate withdrawal from all occupied territories as a precondition to any discussion. The Arabs acknowledged that they had been defeated militarily not in a war but in a campaign, and they hoped to regain their lost territories and national honor by diplomatic means or further military means endeavors. Talking directly with the Israelis was out of question and equivalent to capitulation.

A compromise between the opposing attitudes and positions was impossible. Ultimately, Resolution 242, which was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council, was a masterpiece of diplomatic wordage. It treated all the issues but said nothing specific about any of them and established no guidelines or timetables. The only concrete matter was the recommendation to the UN secretary to appoint a special envoy to the Middle East who would promote peace according to the principles of the resolution. This was the beginning of the Jarring Mission.